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2012 Disarmament Commission Opens as Deliberations on the Agenda Continue

3 Apr

The President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the new High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the opening of the 2012 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission (DC), all of whom expressed concerns over the lack of progress made in formulating and adopting consensus recommendations, guidelines, and proposals in the DC over the past twelve years. While there was affirmation that the DC plays an important role in the overall UN disarmament machinery as it provides a forum for deliberating on specific disarmament-related agenda items, the current impasse has contributed to growing frustrations related to a lack of political will, inadequate working methods, and a general and growing resistance to compromise. With each year that concludes without any consensus recommendations, progress will become more challenging and delegations will become even less engaged as frustration will grow over the lack of concrete results.

High Representative Angela Kane noted in her opening remarks that “fresh thinking and new ideas are needed.” She referred specifically to the Chairman’s proposal from the 2008 session on procedural and organizational changes, such as the possible participation of experts in the work of the DC. The Chairman of this year’s session, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru, has agreed to submit a Chairman’s summary documenting the exchange of views from the general debate, including discussion related to working methods. He has made clear that he does not intend to include working methods as a stand-alone agenda item. In whichever form, such discussions on working methods must be taken seriously as the workings of the DC over the last decade have been at best lackluster and at worse irrelevant.

The Chair has made clear in various forums that “business as usual” will not suffice. Inclusion of expert panels would surely contribute to more robust discussions on the substantive agenda items. Additional technical and conceptual expertise could buttress the formulation of recommendations for adoption by consensus. Injection of new perspectives and information by experts would be a welcome addition to the often generic statements delivered by delegations on the same agenda items carried over from year to year. For example, there is little argument among member states that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is an international security priority. As recommendations for achieving this goal do not enjoy the same consensus, the DC should be used as a forum for deliberating on (not negotiating) specific proposals and recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly on precisely this issue. The DC should not serve as just another forum for reaffirming general support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Roman-Morey has argued that the argument of “lack of political will” is not valid for the DC given its deliberative nature, as opposed to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that functions as the negotiating body for disarmament matters. Ambassador Roman-Morey has concluded that the role of this DC is in part to break the current deadlock by identifying recommendations that may contribute to solving the CD stalemate. It would be wise to use the DC as a means forward in helping to lay the conceptual groundwork for future multilateral agreements to be considered in the CD and related fora. Nonetheless, if the obstacle to progress in the DC is not, in fact, the lack of political will as expressed by the Chair, it would follow then that flaws in working methods of the DC must be responsible, to some degree, for its lack of consensus outcomes and be one of the primary factors contributing to its failures over the last twelve years. If this argument is correct, and the problem is primarily structural rather than political, then clearly the operative methods of deliberating in the DC are not lending themselves to adequate consensus building and, therefore, must be altered, reinvigorated, or otherwise addressed.

In moving towards an adopted Programme of Work, the Chairman has offered his suggestions for two substantive agenda items. He has recommended, in addition to the item on nuclear disarmament that is required, to include one on conventional weapons rather than on the disarmament decade or a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). Ambassador Roman-Morey has indicated that the decade and SSOD IV are not likely to garner the same consensus as nuclear or conventional weapons and, for the sake of much needed progress in the DC this year, delegations should adopt items that are more likely to find consensus. The Chair’s intention is to create two working groups focused on the two primary agenda items with a third open-ended group to discuss agenda items for the next cycle.

Chair’s recommendations:

1)     Nuclear disarmament

  1. Recommendations for establishing the necessary framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons
  2. Recommendations on lessons learned and the legacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
  3. Recommendations on the role of the DC in addressing security challenges of the 21st century and reducing nuclear risks

2)     Conventional weapons

  1. Recommendations on strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the UN regional disarmament centers
  2. Recommendations on effective confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

Arguably even more important than the individual agenda items, the DC must find a way to achieve consensus on recommendations this year as it begins a new cycle of work and also celebrates its 60th anniversary. In the absence of clear recommendations, the DC’s path towards irrelevance will become harder and harder to divert.  And while the DC’s role has been obscured by years of inaction, diplomats still understand the value added of the DC is its ability to put forth general guidelines and recommendations on points of agreement among member states that can lay the groundwork for fruitful resolutions in the General Assembly and even negotiations in the CD.  In order for progress to ensue, it is essential to maintain a clear perspective on the function of the DC.  It is intended as a forum for introducing new proposals and suggested pathways forward, not a formal negotiating body – a flexible mandate that makes it possible for the DC to exceed expectations, not only disappoint them.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

Gender Issues in the Human Rights Committee– From Guatemala to Yemen

3 Apr

Joining the Arms Trade Treaty Preparatory Committee, the annual meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women and the Programme of Action on Small Arms Preparatory Committee as major, recent UN activities with direct implications for GAPW’s mandate, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) also convened to review select state performance in the human rights area. As it has done in the past, GAPW monitored the HRC as it posed often difficult questions to high level representatives of states parties regarding the fulfillment of their commitments under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The HRC is a treaty body consisting of eighteen non-government experts and is designed to assess gaps and inconsistencies in states reports submitted as part of treaty obligations. The impact of HRC’s recommendations on the states under review has been a subject of debate. What is not debated is the commitment and skill of committee members as they interrogate official interpretations of performance – in this cycle of the Dominican Republic, Yemen, Guatemala, Turkmenistan and Cape Verde – while supporting states that agree to come to New York (or Geneva) and submit themselves to this type of review.

Particularly alarming aspects of the HRC’s discussions with these states – especially in the case of Yemen and Guatemala – were related to both violence against women and discrimination that impedes women’s participation in social and political life. Given Guatemala’s current membership in the Security Council as well as the heightened attention to women’s contributions to the so-called Arab Spring, the HRC’s dialogues with these countries were particularly relevant reflections of some of the core issues under discussion within the UN on how to hold governments accountable to their obligations to promote participation of women and end impunity for violence.

Cultural diversity, protecting legal pluralism and assurances of greater accessibility were some of the key issues for Guatemala. Similarly, violence against women was also addressed, in particular the ‘femicide law’ and the specialized courts that were established to enforce the provisions of the law. Guatemala was specifically asked for details on how cases of violence against women are prosecuted, as well as how police and prosecutors are trained on these issues to ensure that formal charges are filed and pursued for all crimes related to femicide. In this context, violations of the rights of the indigenous women were also emphasized. Guatemalan officials gave details about the national legal framework that has been enacted to ensure equality, end discrimination against women, improve accessibility to justice, and increase response to the particular needs of indigenous women. To what extent any of these law and provisions have positive outcomes for ending violence and promoting participation was an open question.

Violence and discrimination against women are critical human rights issues for Yemen as well. The responses by government officials to committee questions highlighted government efforts to promote women’s rights in the constitution and increase the representation of women in politics and the judiciary. Enacting a quota system to increase women’s participation in political affairs was specifically mentioned. Yemen also responded to questions about women’s limited access to education and the high illiteracy rate by noting that young girls are transitioned from school into marriages at a young age. While secondary education of young girls is encouraged, there is limited opportunity in Yemen’s many rural communities. On some of the Sharia-governed practices, such as polygamy or early marriages, Sharia requires equal treatment for women so women must be consulted before marriage and have grounds for divorce if they are treated unfairly. Yemen also highlighted proposed legislation to withdraw weapons from armed groups as well as efforts to control the flow of weapons into the hands of non-state actors, situations which pose unique risks for violence against women.

Overall, it was helpful for committee members to keep their focus on women’s participation and the state’s accountability regarding violence against women. It will be important to follow how these issues will be developed and, in particular, to what extent the recommendations of the HRC will be implemented. Clearly, there was some skepticism on the part of Committee members that concerns they raised in response to national reports from these and the other countries on this docket (including Turkmenistan and Dominican Republic) would lead to significant and lasting changes. Especially the case of Yemen, women’s issues seem to be adjudicated on the basis of three distinct and at times contradictory principles – the ICCPR, the national constitution and Sharia law, the latter of which still permits stoning and amputation as suitable punishments for transgressions including adultery. Only women are eligible for stoning. 

There is a tendency in these meetings for governments to respond to allegations of neglect or abuse with affirmations that appropriate constitutional provisions are in place, the assumption being that if the right laws exist, the right behavior ensues. Clearly this not always the case, and committee members are wise to insist, as best they can, on practical policy responses to their practical human rights concerns. Moreover, despite their heavy case load and report backlogs, members are wise to insist on diretrct engagement by relevant UN agencies within the countries under consideration. It is important that states respond to evidence-based concerns with evidence of their own, rather than recourse to constitutional or other texts.

– Dr. Robert Zuber and Melina Lito