Editor’s Note: As those of you who frequent this blog recognize, Hussein Solomon has been our “go-to” for many years in helping us understand the implications of colonial rule on contemporary manifestations of African governance. The context for this piece is the recent killing of Chad’s president Deby Itno, a man who served several presidential terms and maintained the support of numerous foreign governments for his “anti-terror” contributions despite some very sketchy governance priorities. Clearly, as Solomon implies, we in the west need to think harder about our support for governments, in Africa and elsewhere, that maintain colonial legacies under the guise of rejecting them.
In 1905, John Ainsworth, a British colonial official based in Kenya wrote how the British administration governed their dominions first by finding a strong local personality who was also loyal to the Crown. They would then do everything possible to increase this person’s power relative to other “natives” and finally conspire to make this person’s continued rule totally dependent on the colonial power. This process was euphemistically termed “indirect rule”. This same pattern could be seen as colonial powers carved out other parts of Africa into their fold. The legacy of this colonial plan then was a type of local authoritarianism in which incumbent post-colonial elites were dependent on foreign powers in order to maintain the levers of their own power.
I reflected on this legacy as I recently watched tragic developments in Chad unfold. On the 19th April 2021, Chad’s president – Idriss Deby Itno – was killed while fighting rebels alongside his troops. His death was immediately lamented within the region as well as in some Western capitals as a major set-back for counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel. Chad, after all, is an integral contributor to the 5,000 strong Sahel G-5 force closely allied with French Operation Barkhane troops aiming to robustly engage and defeat Islamists in the region.
Unfortunately, the reaction in several quarters to the Chadian President’s death explains in part why counter-terrorism is failing across the Sahel despite the training and equipping of armed forces, the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars and the stationing of Western troops across the vast expanses of this desert region.
Despite being lauded for his counter-terrorism stance against radical Islamism, the late Chadian president, by his actions, actually served to fuel some of the fire of extremism in his country. Here it is instructive to recall that Deby had just begun his sixth term as Chad’s president. He originally came to power via a coup against the brutal dictatorship of Hissene Habre whom he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Following his ascent to power in December 1990, Deby promised democratic reforms and for a short period of time he was treated as a savior. Despite Deby and his Patriotic Salvation Front winning six presidential election and four parliamentary elections, all of these were subsequently alleged to be marred by fraud.
And the fraud alleged for this government went beyond the political sphere. Despite Chad having the tenth largest oil reserves in Africa, it is one of the world’s poorest countries, ranking a measly 187 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index. Much of the oil revenues were redirected towards Deby’s own pockets and those of his family and the wider Zaghawa clan which constitutes only 4 percent of the population. Other funds were redirected towards dubious purchases of weaponry while many of Chad’s citizens languished in abject poverty. Despite all this Deby maintained the support of the former colonial power France as well as other Western allies.
His exclusionary, corrupt and authoritarian rule encouraged rebellion as ordinary Chadians lost faith in the power of (and results of) the ballot box. Deby crushed rebellions to his rule in 2006, 2008 and 2019. In the midst of this chaos, various Islamist groups spread their pernicious influence among Chad’s Muslims who constitute 55.3 percent of the total population. It remains clear that a close relationship exists between terrorist expansion and the persistence of deep mistrust and even conflict among citizens and groups. In 2019, for instance, 96 percent of all deaths resulting from terrorism occurred in countries already experiencing such turmoil.
We now know that an effective counter-terrorism strategy involves more than merely focusing security assets against the threat posed by a particular terrorist group itself, but also must reduce impacts from conflict dynamics in the country as a whole. Effective counter-terrorism entails not only counter-insurgency but also conflict resolution, economic development, political accommodation and social inclusion. Conflict de-escalation not only includes short-term measures like the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants but also entails structural and governance improvements to sustain reforms in the medium to long-term.
Across the vast arid expanses of the Sahel, there are worrying trends that political violence is becoming acceptable practice as groups feel that there exists no reliable institutional means for redress of grievances. This is especially the case where group grievance exists – whether the Kanuri in Nigeria, the Tuareg in Mali or the Fulani – and then are allowed to spread across the region. The sad truth is that terrorism is often a reaction to the historical violence and exclusion associated with the state and should be understood as such. Consequently, governance must become less elitist and more popular. It must become more responsive, tolerant and inclusive – politically, economically and culturally. The influential Global Terrorism Index is emphatic that “…governance is the most important factor that determines the size, longevity and success of a terrorist group”.
Good governance is a potent antidote for the likes of militant Islamist groups exploiting local grievances, whether based on social alienation, economic marginalization or political disenfranchisement, as they seek to gain a pernicious foothold amongst the local population growing tired of an uncaring and unaccountable government as we have witnessed time and again across the Sahel. Rather than honoring and supporting despots seeking to maintain their power, foreign countries who seek to defeat terrorism in this troubled region should utilize their leverage over incumbent elites to open up democratic space and otherwise challenge – rather than reinforce — the malevolent legacies of colonialism.
