Tag Archives: ATT

Prioritizing the UNPoA on small arms

14 Mar

As member states gather next week for the Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference to assess progress made on the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), there is much work to be done on evaluating the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of implementation of the PoA and the separately adopted International Tracing Instrument (ITI). As more than a decade has passed since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, member states must be serious about using 2012’s forums—the Prep Com as well as the Review Conference—to thoughtfully and thoroughly identify where weaknesses remain in the implementation of the PoA and promote strong and transparent measures to address these weaknesses through information exchange, international assistance, and solid reporting measures. The PoA offers the unique opportunity to tackle an issue that affects all member states—whether as manufacturer or importer of arms, in post-conflict or conflict-laden societies, or as supplier or consumer.

Following a very successful Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in May 2011 under the leadership of Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, member states must now fight the ‘negotiating fatigue’ that is sure to be a factor this year with the PoA Review Conference held just a few weeks after the month-long ATT Negotiating Conference in July. It is significant to highlight that the MGE was both a success for the PoA and a breakthrough achievement for arms-related processes on the whole as it was the first of its kind. The hope is that this type of meeting will be institutionalized and made to repeat in the PoA process and perhaps other arms control processes as well. The technical discussions held among national implementers who directly apply these methods in their capitals was a true value added as member states could share best practices and lessons learned in marking, tracing, and record keeping with regards to the PoA and the ITI. It is hoped that this positive momentum will be carried through into next week’s Prep Com, now under the able leadership of Nigeria’s Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu.

The importance of the PoA ‘blueprint’ for international, regional, and national action on preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) cannot be understated. It important to note, as has been pointed out by many in the diplomatic and civil society communities, that the PoA lays the groundwork for drying up existing stockpiles of weapons as well as those weapons already in circulation, something that the hoped-for, future ATT will not have the ability to do. Therefore, it is crucial that the PoA be robustly supported in concert with the current work on the ATT. It is critical that this Prep Com—in addition to the Review Conference—be prioritized as an important opportunity for progress on the PoA’s implementation. Moreover, as the PoA is a non-legally binding document that lacks clear benchmarks for success, it is vital that member states use the Prep Com as a means of evaluation to push forward implementation mechanisms in the most vigorous way possible. Furthermore, it is imperative that member states discuss a wide expanse of SALW-related issues in evaluating the illicit trade, including border controls, ammunition, intermediary brokers, and civil society cooperation in addition to the technical aspects of marking, tracing, and record keeping in order to improve implementation. These issues provide a valuable context for devising a comprehensive strategy for the control, prevention, and eradication of trade in SALWs, but also a strategy that is realistic in its implementation related expectations.

A key element of the success of the PoA, and thus also of tracking the progress on implementation, is honest and reliable reporting—something that is still starkly lacking among many member states. More than thirty member states have never submitted a report and others have only done so once or twice over the 11-year period since the PoA’s adoption. Although many states are, in fact, implementing the lion’s share of PoA undertakings, the lack of official and comprehensive reporting makes for a difficult process of analysis of progress made, which is the very goal of this Prep Com and subsequent Review Conference. National reports allow for better matching of needs and resources so that adequate international assistance can be provided to those states that need support in adopting measures in line with the PoA commitments. As such, it is important that this Prep Com encourage those states that have been remiss in their reporting duties to recommit to doing so. Moreover, the lack of benchmarks and of a formal monitoring system is often perceived as a major weakness of the PoA. Improvements in national reporting would certainly help curb the negative implications of the limited oversight mechanisms that exist within the PoA framework as well as help generate greater public awareness around the small arms process.

Illicit trafficking in SALWs is at the forefront of minds this year as many in the diplomatic community are set to tackle this issue through both the PoA and ATT processes. It would be wise to bear in mind the distinctive importance of the PoA in addressing the current challenges of communities awash in weapons and suffering severely from armed violence and other abuses committed at gun point. Illicit SALWs are a true blight on the security of communities by limiting and often preventing the ability to create and sustain a robust security sector with implications for the participation of women, the education of children, and much more. Building on the positive energy of the MGE, the Prep Com must continue its work of evaluating where weaknesses in implementation exist and, in turn, providing the support and pressure necessary to fill those gaps.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Worry on Many Fronts for the #Armstreaty

22 Feb

The ATT preparatory committee completed its work last week during the fourth and final session of its series of meetings. Diplomats were able to adopt rules of procedure and a report on its work during all four preparatory meeting.

With each passing day, there seemed to be more urgency and anxiety around completing the preparatory process of the ATT—making state positions clearly known on substance, gathering and approving the necessary background documents, and adopting some semblance of rules of procedure. Also prevalent in the undertones of many statements and interventions was an air of worry over tackling too much or too little in the months remaining until the negotiating conference.

Some delegations focused this angst on completion of a comprehensive compendium of views from all four of the previous preparatory committee sessions. Cuba’s delegate made the case that national experts—military, trade, and legal—would benefit from this sort of document in their deliberations back in capital prior to the negotiations in July.  The European Union and Swiss delegations expressed doubt over the usefulness of this burdensome task for the Secretariat claiming that statements and positions are already available on the UNODA website. Algeria’s representative, whose delegation first brought up the idea of a compendium during the last Prep Com, disagreed stating that such statements on the UNODA website were incomplete and member states should have access to alternatives not reflected in the Chair’s Paper from 14 July 2011. Likewise, the Nicaraguan representative reiterated support for a compendium document reflecting updated states’ views. Belize’s delegation stated that any document, including such a compilation, would have to be reviewed and approved by member states before its inclusion in background documentation for the negotiating conference. The Iranian delegation reiterated the need to have all documents related to the conference—the SG’s report on states’ views, the Report from the GGE, and the Draft Report on the Prep Com among others—to be available to all member states in the interim.

Other delegations focused intently on completing and adopting rules of procedure before close of discussions for fear that negotiations will seriously be hindered without clear and agreed upon provisions. The Costa Rican delegation noted that the rules of procedure must facilitate negotiations rather than hinder them. The Indonesia delegate referred to a certain level of awkwardness that may come about if during the July negotiations the rules of procedure would need to be amended. As such, the delegate called for including a stipulation in the rules of procedure that they could be changed by consensus. More generally, Morocco implored all member states to stay focused on the rules of procedure and the Chairman’s report.

Some delegations focused their worry on particular substantive aspects of the treaty. Sweden’s delegation cautioned against an outright ban against arms transfers to non-state actors as industry would fall under this category and such cross-border industry cooperation is important and likely to increase among states. The delegation of Malaysia focused on the overall goal of the ATT and stated that reference to corruption, legal and victims’ assistance would serve to detract from the main objective of an ATT– completion of a legal and trade agreement. Contrastingly, the Chilean and Sierra Leonean delegation claimed that there is an undeniable humanitarian element to the ATT in addition to the legal regulations negotiated. Nigeria’s delegate took the opportunity to reiterate the necessity of including ammunition in the treaty’s scope.

It comes as no surprise that there is much anxiety still remaining on many fronts. As this final Prep Com concluded, delegations continued to make those anxieties known in the waning days of official preparations. The task at hand is complex and wrought with substantive and procedural challenges. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that the lack of international standards for the transfer of conventional arms is a severe blight on the world community and needs remedying. Furthermore, the distinct air of anxiety among diplomats illustrates just how important filling this crack in international law truly is.

For more reporting, analysis and documents from the Prep Com, please see Reaching Critical Will.

–Katherine Prizeman

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4th ATT Prep Com: Time to be Realistic and Concrete

7 Feb

As diplomats and civil society alike prepare for the final preparatory committee in the Arms Trade Treaty process, it is important to take note of the original intent and point of consensus behind the initiation of the process: despite difficult and complex political considerations, there is general and widespread support for negotiating an ATT indicating a majority opinion that arms transfers should operate according to a common set of international standards. How those standards will be negotiated, who will ‘monitor’ compliance with these standards, and how much latitude will be allowed for more robust and explicit ‘disarmament’ language remains to be seen.

There are many questions remaining, including the most basic of all: What is the goal and objective of such a treaty? Differing answers to this question present a complex challenge for both this Prep Com as well as the July Negotiating Conference. There is ultimately no philosophical consensus—some advocate for a treaty that can establish strong humanitarian standards for the transfer of conventional weapons that can combat, prevent, and eradicate the illicit transfer of such weapons where they can facilitate destabilizing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, while others wish to negotiate strictly on the grounds of trade. How a member state characterizes the core objective of a future ATT will likely impact all relevant positions adopted and thus will influence the success of drafting and adopting the treaty. Therefore, it is necessary that the upcoming negotiations and these final preparatory consultations seek a realistic and pragmatic solution to this philosophical difference of opinion. Without such a harmonization of purpose, the ATT negotiations will forever be divided between schools of thought that seem less reconciled than they might actually be.

It is also important to highlight the difficulty of the ATT process in the context of the other disarmament challenges that are to arise in 2012. During a year that is punctuated by many disarmament and arms control challenges, such as the Review Conference on the Programme of Action on small arms and a conference on establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, creation of a legally-binding ATT will require some degree of political capital investment, especially in light of the provision of consensus decision-making and acceptance of at least minimal international oversight of national control systems. Large manufacturing states will have to be active and productive participants in the ATT process if the treaty is to have any real impact on the arms trade – both cooperating with the provisions as well as providing international assistance to smaller states for the necessary national implementation capacity. There is an inherent responsibility on the part of the major exporters to negotiate an honest and robust ATT based on the fact that they account for the lion’s share of total arms manufactured, and thus in circulation.

As the ATT preparatory phase comes to a close and official negotiations begin, it is important to take into account the following recommendations that will make for a more robust and better implemented treaty over the longer term:

  • It is wise to incorporate a concrete review process that establishes regular meetings of the states parties to assess and adjust the ATT to better reflect evolving security circumstances as well as provide opportunities to make the treaty stronger to hopefully include some or all of the ‘additions’ that still remain contentious and perhaps are too difficult to include in the initial treaty.
  • It is essential that negotiations on an ATT focus on a structure that can support and even monitor national implementation once a treaty has been adopted. Member states must look realistically at the security, communications, and oversight challenges that lay ahead for treaty implementers. There is no obvious mechanism that currently exists to coordinate ATT-related logistics.
  • Even those member states that vigorously contend that any ATT should neither encroach on territorial sovereignty nor interfere in the ability of states to conduct arms transfers cannot argue against the dangers of diverting otherwise legally transferred weapons to non-state and illegitimate actors, such as criminal or terrorist elements, as well as through reselling weapons to line the pockets of corrupt officials. Delegations should address diversion directly in formulating a robust treaty that sufficiently highlights, monitors, and addresses all facets of this risk.

Understanding the inherent purpose of the ATT, as well as the broader disarmament context in which it is being negotiated, is important to the process. We hope that the final Prep Com will yield concrete negotiating points for July as well as a strong sense of enthusiasm and commitment from member states that will put diplomats in the strongest and most encouraging position possible for the diplomatic conference.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Mexico, Drug Trade, and Illicit Arms

25 Jan

The Mexican government has recently released updated drug war death toll figures, reporting 47,515 deaths in drug-related violence since 2006 when President Calderon began a military assault on drug cartels. The so-called ‘war on drugs’ has ravaged the security sector and continues to present a dangerous challenge to the US as drug cartels battle over control of the lucrative US consumption market. The factors associated with this struggle are plenty and can be evaluated both in isolation as well as collectively– the role of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity surely contribute to the allure of drug trafficking. Such societal stresses have perpetuated the illicit business and enticed the hopeless and struggling into a black market that, although highly risky, dangerous, and gruesome, can offer high financial returns.

The endemic contributors to drug trafficking aside, the role of illicit arms and its relationship with drug trafficking may not necessarily be causal, but illicit weapons surely perpetuate and enable the drug-related violence that has become a blight on the world community. In a year when the UN General Assembly will negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons, it is important to focus on why it is international standards for export and import matter. The consequences of unregulated trade, which lead to societies awash in illegal weapons used for criminality, violence, and intimidation, are dire. Nowhere is this more evident than in Mexico. As noted by Daniel Avila Camacho in a report for the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), drugs and arms often account for the largest sections of the black market and often use the same transport roots. Possession of arms by drug traffickers is more than a common practice and has become a sort of requirement for protection and security reasons when moving about areas of operation. Possession of arms is often involved from primary production by drug growers to the couriers accompanied by armed bodyguards. The financial symbiosis is also evident– drug trafficking often generates vast proceeds creating a financial base for criminal and terrorist groups to conduct illegal traffic in arms and vice versa creating a synergistic relationship between the two activities.

The sincere hope of many working for a ‘robust ATT’ is that the treaty will not only regulate the legal trade in arms between governments, but will also prevent and contribute to the eradication of illicit trade in arms (hopefully to include small arms and light weapons [SALWs], which is the type of weapon generally referred to here as related to drug and gang violence). The example of drug-related violence brings to light the critical importance of adopting a strong humanitarian perspective in an ATT so that it is more than a commerce agreement between states. The conflation of the business of arms trade (which does have a legal market in government-to-government transfers of military equipment and arms) and human rights concerns comes via the issue of diversion — the movement of weapons from the legal to the illicit market for purposes of criminality, insurgency, to violate the human rights of civilian populations, or to line the pockets of corrupt government officials.  It is diversion that must be ‘flagged,’ addressed, and eliminated through the framework of a strong and legally-binding ATT that takes care to disallow loopholes and bypassing of its provisions by criminal networks and corrupt individuals.

States continue to reinforce the right to acquire arms for self defense as part of their innate state sovereignty. These references to Article 51 of the UN Charter will not cease and neither will trade in arms between states. Manufacturing and trade in arms is a business that accounts for billions of dollars of revenue for states. An ATT will have no power over this legal trade insofar as creating a mechanism that would limit legal trade between states, something that has been expressly warned against during the ATT preparatory discussions. States are careful not to encroach on this right. Nonetheless, a central goal of an ATT, along with the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms (PoA), must be to address the human suffering related to the illegal trade in arms by preventing illegal diversion such that there are less weapons in the hands of drug traffickers.

–Katherine Prizeman

 

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2012 and Conventional Weapons: Balancing the PoA and the ATT

5 Jan

For those that follow processes related to conventional weapons disarmament, 2012 is proving to be a busy and significant year with its own set of opportunities and challenges. This July, diplomats will come together at the UN headquarters in New York and negotiate treaty language for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that seeks to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons. Just four weeks later, many of those same diplomats will gather for a Review Conference to assess implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects (UNPoA).

Each process has its own difficulties– the objective of an ATT is still unclear as to whether it is a treaty with a strong humanitarian perspective aimed at preventing human suffering caused by illicit trade in conventional weapons or, rather, merely a treaty to regulate commerce of arms; the PoA still suffers from weak implementation without benchmarks or enforcement power. Moreover, advocates of a robust ATT fear that small arms and light weapons (SALWs) will not be covered under the scope of the treaty, while many states that have tried to implement the UNPoA framework still lack the coordination and technology necessary to provide the marking, tracing, and record keeping of weapons that is necessary to eliminate illicit trade. As such, the challenges in both processes are vast. However, in a year that provides forums for improvements in both processes, we would be wise to make good use of them by advocating and underscoring linkages and complementary qualities that exist between the two.

The UNPoA is a political (non-legally binding) framework document that covers a wide variety of activities involving SALWs– international transfer, brokering, manufacture, stockpile management, marking, tracing, and record keeping. The UNPoA provides a framework for implementing adequate national laws, regulations, and adminstrative procedures around these activities as they relate to illicit trade. An ATT, as a legally-binding treaty of international law, would cover only internati0nal transfers of conventional weapons such as tanks, military vehicles, naval vessels, missiles, and missile systems and provide for a list of criteria to which signatories would be bound when determining if an arms transfer will be permitted.

Although the two instruments seem disparate, there are clear areas where an ATT could and should support the UNPoA framework. One element severely lacking in the UNPoA is benchmarks. The ATT could help with this lack of accountability by dictating, in a legally-binding manner, how states signatories must comply with international transfer standards. Additionally, an ATT has the ability to clarify some UNPoA ambiguities with regards to transfers (although it is still unclear as to whether this will include SALWs, which may or may not be in the scope of the treaty).  Most importantly, the ATT has the opportunity to build on national commitments to arms control and conventional disarmament measures by providing (hopefully) a clear reporting process on transfers (including denials), a formal monitoring system, and some form of a secretariat to provide administrative support to signatories in their national implementation of the treaty’s provisions.

While the ATT will neither dry up any existing stockpiles nor cover weapons already in circulation, it will address (how strongly and explicitly is still uncertain) diversion of weapons into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and corrupt officials by providing common international trade standards. In concert with the UNPoA that does provide a framework for drying up stockpiles and eliminating weapons in circulation, the ATT has the opportunity to curb human suffering and armed violence caused by new instances of illicit trade in conventional weapons. It seems the two have more in common than has been generally thought by addressing illicit trade through different lenses.

The argument that an ATT will be a drain on resources and cause reporting fatigue for signatories is a weak one at best. It is a generally accepted notion that the lack of common standards for international trade in conventional weapons must be addressed in a more robust and consistent manner than currently exists in the UNPoA that addresses only small arms in a non-binding framework. Therefore, it is clear that both instruments are relevant and it is important to ensure the effectiveness of both in the upcoming year.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Looking Towards the ATT in 2012

17 Nov

As the First Committee of the General Assembly has come to a close, delegations appear ready, some enthusiastically and others more hesitatingly, to move towards the final negotiations. Whether this negotiating will be based on the most recent Chair’s Paper from Ambassador Moritan or not, it seems that member states are anticipating transition from the preparatory process to concrete Treaty text.  It is to be assumed that the very ambitious Chair’s Paper from July 14, 2011 will not be entirely replicated in the text, but it surely lays forth the existing proposals that will require honest and practical vetting over the three-week period of the Conference. Ambassdor Moritan’s presence at the First Committee enabled member states to hear, once more, the various proposals and divisions that still exist around the ATT underscoring the vast challenges that lie ahead. Ambassador Moritan is under no illusions regarding the complexity of the process as he noted the levels of ambition regarding the ATT are vastly different. The final PrepCom in February will be focused on the parameters and so-called rules of engagement for negotiations rather than a broad thematic discussion of scope and content specifics.

We continue to advocate for strong emphasis on diversion risks as this issue remains at the heart of curbing the illicit arms trade. Addressing this issue will require special attention to the practice of diverting arms from legitimate end users to non-state and unauthorized parties who may use such weapons for criminal, corrupt, and abusive purposes. It is often in this indirect, and sometimes unintentional on the part of governments, manner that the arms trade becomes a harmful practice. The strength of the language on this issue in the Treaty text is still undecided. As the Chair’s Paper from July 2011 noted, “A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms if there is a substantial risk that those conventional arms would…” undermine peace and security in various forms such as to commit violations of international human rights law. One major question for advocates of a strong humanitarian instrument in the ATT is whether the words “shall not” will be changed to “should not,” which inherently alters this responsibility from obligation to suggestion.

This issue of diversion language is but one example of difficult work ahead. We submit that the first iteration of the Treaty may not be ideal for all states parties, but it is the responsibility of all negotiators to take into account that such a Treaty should function as a floor and not a ceiling for improving state arms transfer controls. Implementation of ATT language in national practice will be just as important as the text itself for without implementation the language is empty wording. Therefore, sufficient discussion next year must be focused on implementation support and corresponding structure. We also encourage delegations to put in place a sound review process that will allow for ATT negotiations to continue well passed 2012 such that the ATT can effectively respond to changing international security risks.

The overwhelming trend in conversation in this year’s Committee has been support for both the preparatory process and the leadership of Ambassador Moritan as well as the inarguable need for better regulation of the arms trade. Building on these consensus points, we are hopeful that next year’s conference will, in fact, yield an ATT that will improve the global arms trade process. The question of its robustness and expansiveness, however, remains unanswered.

For more information on the ATT, follow @DisarmDialogues, @controlarms, @TheIANSA, and @VinoThorsen on Twitter and follow the ATT blog featuring various contributors from different organizations working on this issue.

-Katherine Prizeman

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Arms Trade Treaty goes domestic

3 Aug

Predictably, reactionary news networks, along with their followers, are on the defense over the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), many warning that domestic rights are being compromised as “anti-gun elites” run rampant at the United Nations.

We’ve heard it all before: ‘United Nations’ End Run Around Constitution?’, ‘NRA Takes on ‘Anti-Gun Elitists’ at UN’, ‘Sen. Moran & 44 Senators Tell Obama Administration Second Amendment Rights’. Most of this is of course reactionary crazy-talk – baseless assumptions of a UN conspiracy against US gun-owners.

Most citizens would of course recognize the importance of such a treaty. The ATT is about international arms transfers. Currently, the global trade in conventional weapons (warships, battle tanks, fighter jets, machine guns) is unregulated; internationally agreed standards do not exist to ensure that arms are only transferred for appropriate use, not into the hands of those abusing human rights, including terrorists and criminals, and helping to prevent needless armed conflicts and killings around the world.

A recent rebuttal of the far fetched claims came from GAPW’s Robert Zuber. In an article by USnews.com ‘Opposition mounts to UN gun control treaty opposition mounts to UN gun control treaty’, followed with over 20o comments – he responded with the following:

“Since neither the author of this piece nor those writing comments (so far) was in the room as UN delegates were making final preparations for Arms Trade Treaty negotiations, perhaps a bit of a reality check is in order.

 Once again, the NRA has done a splendid job of reaching out to select US media. However, the individual from the NRA who was given a platform at the UN to make a US-focused speech at the ATT Prep Com (a courtesy which is rarely extended and then normally only to groups exhibiting a broader geographical interest), walked out of the building once his remarks were concluded.   Neither did he apparently bother to attend the sessions leading up to his remarks.  Apparently, like so many sharing opinions on this issue, it was better not to taint his outrage with too much direct experience.

It is certainly predictable to have media folks whip up a frenzy about the UN taking away peoples’ guns and rendering them helpless against the alleged tyranny of the state.  However, as the chief US negotiator to the ATT process — someone who has not been the most congenial presence in the Prep Com room — would readily acknowledge, the ATT is not a disarmament treaty.  It does not propose to destroy weapons or to eliminate their legal possession.  It provides guidelines for arms transfers and seeks to end diversion by which arms traded legally end up in the hands on non-state actors such as criminals and terrorists, are used to violate the human rights of populations, or are ‘re-gifted’ by recipient governments to line their own pockets.   Which of these three diversion potentials the NRA, your readers, the author of this piece, or even our DC legislators would refuse to support is their own call to make, but to refuse to support any of these objectives is simply beyond reason.

I was a gun owner for much of my life.  I respect but don’t fear weapons.  Nor do I fear the ATT or the non-existent ‘power’ of the UN to strip citizens of their guns.   Readers are free to hate the UN.  They are also free to act as though the second amendment is the only legally relevant, binding aspect of the US Constitution.  But what some are accusing the ATT process of promoting is simply nonsense as even 20 attentive minutes inside the Prep Com room would readily reveal.”

Follow discussion on the ATT process:

http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blog/11-07-19-global-arms-trade-treaty-picks-speed

http://attmonitor.posterous.com

– Kees Keizer

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