Tag Archives: CTBT

Test Pattern: The UN Gets a Helpful Reminder on Nuclear Testing

5 Sep

Once again this year, the government of Kazakhstan has capably organized events (www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/2013/events.shtml) to highlight the international obligation to abolish nuclear testing as a precondition for abolishing nuclear weapons once and for all.

The highlight for many was an evening reception on the first floor of the renovated UN conference building hosted by Ambassador Byrganym Aitimova and featuring the art work of Mr. Karipbek Kuyukov, a young man who was born without arms and who shared his artwork with diplomats and other UN stakeholders.  The art, it should be noted, was painted with his feet and was in its own way a remarkable testament to the damage that nuclear tests can do to local populations long past the point at which the ‘test results’ have been tabulated by nuclear weapons states.

It should be noted that, despite the lack of universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nuclear testing is being functionally rendered inert.  Tests are few and far between and subject to almost universal condemnation by states.  At the same time, nuclear weapons states continue to modernize their arsenals, a veritable slap in the fact to those who states that have been pursuing a nuclear free world in a variety of settings – through nuclear free zones, in largely deadlocked fora such as the Conference on Disarmament, through ‘like-minded’ processes such as such as was convened last spring in Oslo, through the Open Ended Working Group in Geneva, or through the high level meeting on nuclear disarmament being organized by the GA president’s office during its opening session in late September.

In addition to diverse policy venues, there are also diverse security responsibilities.   As we have noted with respect to nuclear free zones, there is an important difference between honoring a treaty and supporting the security arrangements of a zone.   Lowering violence thresholds and enhancing human security involves multiple complementary activities that can reduce incentives for (and excuses by) the nuclear weapons states to preserve their nuclear monopoly.

There are many pathways to disarmament and all of them have rough patches, some rougher than others. Despite the fact that nuclear testing sits on few of the top priority lists of member state security concerns, it is critically important that there be no backsliding on testing.  As challenging as progress towards disarmament can be, we cannot afford to burden that agenda further, not to mention place new generations at risk of dangerous fallout from the reckless pursuit of such tests.

The ‘path to zero’ articulated during the panel presentations on September 5 has been winding and full of potholes, but still points us towards a nuclear free world.   There are detours required at times, but no dead end.  While it is not always clear how individual events at the UN contribute to preferred outcomes, it is important that we ritualize even more of these powerful reminders of our nuclear weapons responsibilities.  Just as birthdays, religious and national holidays, anniversaries and more are the signposts through which we reaffirm the deep value to our families, friends and other loved ones, such events as those organized by Kazakhstan can help keep us from turning our attention away from our disarmament obligations before our work is done.

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

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2013 NPT PrepCom Opens in Geneva

26 Apr

The second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) opened in Geneva this past week under the leadership of Chairman Ambassador Cornel Feruta of Romania. This PrepCom represents the approximate mid-way point between the conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference, at which the 64-point NPT Action Plan was adopted, and the next RevCon by which time the 2010 Action Plan is to be fully implemented. There is increasing anxiety with each passing year as states parties hope to build on the consensus 2010 outcome document and take concrete steps towards the full realization of the ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT, commitment from non-nuclear weapon states to not pursue nuclear weapons and the pledge by of the 5 nuclear weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The most salient issues regarding the NPT regime came to light during the general debate including the lack of progress in implementing the disarmament-related obligations in the Action Plan as well as the failure to convene a conference for the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East during the 2012 calendar year as was mandated in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The 1995 Middle East resolution was an essential and integral part of the package of decisions affirmed without a vote that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT. Other issues more tangential to the Action Plan were also raised such as the recent provocations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the recently held March 2013 conference in Oslo on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The P5 and disarmament obligations

As expected, much of the discussion of the first week focused on the obligations and special responsibilities of the NPT nuclear weapons states (NWS), also known as the ‘P5’, and the progress these states have thus far made (or not made) in anticipation of the 2014 PrepCom and 2015 RevCon during which they will have to report specifically on their disarmament-related progress. Criticism of the NWS and their lack of attention on the disarmament pillar of the NPT are well-known and levels of frustration regarding the lack of movement on multilateral nuclear disarmament are high. The delegation of Ireland noted in its statement during the ‘disarmament’ cluster, that the “persistent underachievement in progressing the global disarmament agenda is no longer acceptable.” This frustration was manifest during last year’s session of the General Assembly’s First Committee with the adoption of resolution A/C.1/67/L.31 entitled “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations” thus establishing an open-ended working group (OEWG) that will meet in May, June, and August of this year in Geneva for a total of fifteen days. The exact mandate of the OEWG is not yet entirely clear, but Ambassador Manuel Dengo from Costa Rica, chair of the OEWG, has made clear that the discussions will be substantive in nature, rather than focusing on procedural issues. The sessions will most likely feature panels are will not have any negotiating mandate.

The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), particularly the NPT states parties of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have harshly condemned the P5 for disproportionately focusing on proliferation risks and not enough on disarmament. While the ‘P5’ has initiated a parallel process of meetings to address the disarmament-related obligations committed to in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, including the obligations related to reporting, transparency and confidence-building measures, the output from this group has been assessed as mostly underwhelming. The fourth P5 conference was held last week in Geneva under the aegis of the Russian Federation. Subsidiary working groups have been formed, for example a working group led by China on a glossary of terms. Likewise, France has taken the lead on discussions on a common approach to reporting on relevant activities across the three pillars of the Action Plan at the 2014 PrepCom and the 2015 RevCon.

The issues of transparency and reporting are of particular concern to the NPT states parties, especially the NNWS that are keen to receive more detailed information on existing stockpiles and, therefore, reduction of such stockpiles as mandated in Article VI of the NPT. Public declarations highlighting both strategic and non-strategic stockpiles are seen as an essential step in confidence-building and next steps in the disarmament process. The ten-country, cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which focuses on practical non-proliferation and disarmament steps with a view towards implementing the Action Plan, proposed a standard reporting form during the 2012 PrepCom. There has yet to be a decision among the P5 on the form that reporting will take at next year’s PrepCom and the 2015 RevCon.

Nevertheless, it is still unclear if any P5 activities have contributed to building confidence among the NWS or how they will contribute to increasing levels of confidence among the non-nuclear weapon states. The hope is that these meetings will help to prepare the NWS to more comprehensively report to the upcoming PrepCom and subsequent RevCon in order to facilitate the path to global zero “in good faith,” as required in Article VI of the NPT.

The Middle East

The failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East during the 2012, or even prior to this NPT PrepCom continues to be a major source of concern, particularly for the Arab states. The NAM called upon the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution (the UK, US, and Russia) to convene the conference as soon as possible in order to avoid “an attack on the credibility of the NPT.” During this week’s discussion, the US and Russia both addressed this issue, although from quite different perspectives. The Russian delegation was clear in its opening statement that it did not perceive the failure to convene the conference as a responsibility of the states of the region and called such an allegation “inappropriate.” Moreover, the delegation stated that Russia never in fact agreed to the postponement, but rather “would have admitted the possibility” for postponement only with explicit agreement of all states of the region and commitment to new, specific dates. The delegation also noted that “No collective decision concerning this matter had been taken by the co-sponsors.” The US delegation, however, continues to reiterate that the postponement was a joint decision that was taken as the conditions in the region are not yet “right” for the conference and it is up to all the states of the region, including Israel, to adopt a common agenda before convening the conference. The UK has not yet made such explicit statements regarding the postponement, but called for the convening of the conference “as soon as possible in 2013.”

The fear, of course, is that the more prolonged the process before beginning discussions on a WMDFZ in the Middle East, the weaker the NPT regime will become. It is a serious and valid concern that the NPT regime could be “held hostage” by those states angered by the postponement, specifically the Arab Group, who believe that such a failure to fulfill a binding commitment represents reason enough not to fulfill other NPT obligations, particularly concerning non-proliferation. Such inflammatory actions would only further increase insecurity and decrease the NPT’s legitimacy.

Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

Delivered by the South African delegation, 77 states signed onto a statement delivered at the conclusion of the general debate underscoring the grave humanitarian consequences associated with the use of nuclear weapons. This is an initiative that was borne out of the 34-country statement delivered during last year’s session of the UNGA First Committee by the Swiss delegation. This initiative was followed-up with an international conference hosted by Norway in Oslo in March 2013 during which representatives of 127 member states were present as well as UN secretariat officials, civil society, and other humanitarian response technical experts detailing the environmental, health, and developmental impact of nuclear weapon explosions. . The humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament has been reinvigorated and has provided for a renewed enthusiasm for pursuing the larger objective of abolition. Several delegations, including Egypt, lamented the lack of participation by the P5 in Oslo and called upon the NWS to participate in the follow-up meeting in Mexico that is expected to take place in early 2014.

The presentations by non-governmental organizations to the delegates of the PrepCom also focused, in part, on the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation. The conclusion drawn by the humanitarian response community, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), has been quite clear—that there is simply no way for the international community, let alone an individual governments, to adequately respond to such a crisis. Therefore, the only sensible course of action is to prevent the use of such weapons, which can only be guaranteed through their elimination.

Moving Forward

The continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, the failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter-into-force, and the inability to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) were once again highlighted by many of the delegations during this week’s discussions. Furthermore, the issues of nuclear security and safety and the role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines and policies were also addressed by a broad range of delegations in formal sessions as well as during side events. While all these issues are surely important components of the drive towards global zero, perhaps the most crucial challenge to the NPT regime will be moving away from the still-lingering belief that nuclear “deterrence” represents security and that the nuclear ‘haves’ occupy a privileged position in relation to the ‘have nots.’ Nuclear disarmament diplomacy depends on realizing the ‘grand bargain’ and maintaining the balance that is provided for in the NPT. Ultimately, as noted by the US delegation in its opening statement, disarmament is not an obligation limited to the five NPT NWS. Rather, the existence of nuclear weapons is an issue that must be addressed by all member states as global security depends on their abolition.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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China and the CTBT: stepping up new responsibilities

24 Aug

Despite its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing and as an active participant in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty PrepCom, China remains reluctant to ratify the CTBT. Without Chinese (and the remaining eight annex-two nuclear states) ratification, the CTBT can never come into force. Like all nuclear weapon states (bar DPRK), China’s last test was in the 1990s. So what’s the hold up?

China’s position is that it will only ratify after the US does so; opponents of the CTBT in the US use China’s military rise as an excuse not to ratify: catch 22 – anybody?

There is no need to wait on the US. Russia didn’t. As a major world power and claim to a ‘peaceful rise’, China ought to live up to its rhetoric and step up its new responsibilities on the world stage. Tongji University’s Xia Liping (in The CTBT and China’s New Security Concept) makes the compelling case that the CTBT’s principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, particularly with regard to equality in international security are consistent with China’s 2002 New Security Concept. “China’s ratification of the CTBT would help to solidify China’s image as an open, transparent, and responsible nation, committed to following the road of peaceful development.”

Like the US – and fifteen years after China’s last test – there’s simply nothing to lose. Let China take the lead if the US won’t.

– Kees Keizer

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Nothing to lose: the CTBT and US ratification

20 Aug

In September last year we discussed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and made the ironic connection that despite nuclear weapon testing having largely ceased, key states remain reluctant to sign the treaty. Indonesia has since ratified. That now leaves eight Annex Two states to ratify for the treaty to come into force.

So how about the US?

The US signed the CTBT in 1996 but was rejected by the senate three years later so has never been ratified. Back then, reservations were about US nuclear reliability (the potential need for future testing) and the difficulty of verification (how to ensure that other states abide by the treaty).

Since then, major strides have been made at both domestic and international level so these reservations can now safely be put aside. The National Research Council and the Stockpile Steward Program conclude that new technological capacity has advanced so far that physical testing is now unnecessary. Global monitoring for verification is also sufficient: with over 330 monitoring facilities having been brought together under the CTBTO umbrella. Sixty-one of these detected North Korea’s 1996 underground test.

Now without any excuse the US should go ahead and ratify the long overdue treaty. President Obama had ratification on the agenda early in his administration (during his famous Prague speech) but this was not realized. Many now believe that an Obama second term could see CTBT ratification returned to the agenda. A Romney administration could and should and could also pursue this.

The US would be placed in a better position should the treaty come into force, as global nuclear monitoring has the potential to become very powerful. And just to top things off, the US has not physically tested any nuclear weapon since 1992. There’s nothing to lose.

– Kees Keizer

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Following through on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

18 Jan

A recent editorial in the NY Times from 15 January proposed that the best way to prevent a ‘nuclear Iran’ is through a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East (WMDFZ). A 1995 resolution on the Middle East at the Review Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calls upon the states from the region to “take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.” Furthermore, a statement from the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. The outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference committed states parties to a 2012 conference on the establishment of such a WMDFZ and such a conference will be held later this year in Finland. Given this historical context and mindful of current political circumstances in the region, it is essential that the development of concrete proposals for treaty elements and confidence-building measures towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East are taken both seriously and expeditiously.

As explained by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull in their Times op-ed, a military attack on Iran will most likely encourage the Islamic Republic to more vigorously pursue nuclear weapons in the long run, even if its program is set back several years due to the attack. Such costs are high insofar as the likelihood of Iran’s more robust and intense pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as the chance that other Arab states will consider ‘going nuclear.’ The other major challenge (and danger) in the region is surely Israel’s policy of ‘opacity’ around its nuclear program– not acknowledging having nuclear weapons while the rest of the world operates under the assumption that they do, in fact, have such capabilities with little to no ambiguity around that fact. Therefore, the only clear path forward is the proposed (and promised) development of a Middle East WMDFZ.

As expressed on numerous occasions by government officials, a nuclear Iran is not an option for Israel or the United States, while Israel continues to operate outside the NPT framework and therefore is not obligated to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Moreover, Israel’s escalating tensions with Turkey and even Egypt (with which Israel has a peace agreement) are indicative of a worsening situation in a region home to some of the most protracted and deep-seeded conflicts in history. Iran’s recent inflammatory actions, including its threatening to shut down access to the Strait of Hormuz because of sanctions imposed against its developing nuclear program, are a sign that the current trajectory is at best alarming and a new pathway to peace must be seriously pursued. A WMDFZ would ultimately force all the major stakeholders to task– Israel’s nuclear program would have to become a viable discussion point and Iran would be subject to legitimized monitoring in terms of its uranium enrichment program for energy production, which the Islamic Republic strongly contends is as far as its production goes.

There are no illusions in terms of how difficult, complex, and unique a WMDFZ in the Middle East actually is. The zones that already exist, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Mongolia, clearly do not have the same political challenges that the Middle East must grapple with. The negotiations around the zone will be long, complicated, and frustrating to be sure, but it is essential to not only international peace and security, but to a sustained regional peace that will never come to fruition if the threat of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons are on the table. Negotiations to develop and implement a WMDFZ must operate in concert with complementary steps toward regional peace as collective security agreements cannot be viably and permanently de-linked from peace agreements. Disarmament and arms control issues must be negotiated simultaneously. Nonetheless, it is important to caution that although a dual peace and arms control process is important, the WMDFZ will have to be negotiated even if a comprehensive peace agreement has not yet been reached in the region (at least to start) .

It is also important to understand the WMFZ negotiations in the context of other international disarmament and arms control processes such as ratification of the CTBT, other biological, chemical and nuclear treaties, the UN Programme of Action on small arms, and IAEA inspections. Compliance with these measures are essential in order to increase confidence in regional security and trust in the preparatory process (which is sure to be long) leading to the creation of the zone.

The time is now for honest and robust efforts towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Such a zone will have positive ramifications for the region and the world at large by eliminating the option of the antiquated Cold War-style nuclear deterrence for ‘mutually assured destruction.’ It’s time for all stakeholders to be held accountable and for a transparent framework that limits the dangerous double standard and acceleration of tensions that currently exist.

–Katherine Prizeman

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The CTBT: 23 September

8 Sep

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enjoys a level of irony. Despite the treaty not yet being in force, its premise to ban physical nuclear tests has to a great extent been realized.

The number of atmospheric explosion tests peaked in 1962, with the USSR and USA going head-to-head. China conducted the last in 1980. Similarly, after a high-level number of underground explosions in the 1960’s and 1970’s, test numbers have decreased drastically: with four explosions on the sub-continent in 1998; two more recently on the Korean Peninsula. To date, the list of countries having tested is just eight (CTBTO interactive map). So despite this significant progress, what’s the hold-up on getting the comprehensive ban into force?

The key obstacle to the treaty’s implementation is that it requires all 44 ‘Annex 2’ states to ratify it. These Annex 2 states participated in the CTBT’s 1994-1996 negotiations and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at that time. Nine out of the 44 – China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, India, DPR Korea and Pakistan – are yet to ratify the CTBT; the latter three are yet to even sign it. Reluctance to ratify varies ranging from:

  • Classical concerns over state sovereignty, the nuclear security guarantee, rival states’ capabilities and suspicion over other states’ insincerity (eg, key states are accused of having double standards).
  • The CTBT being incomplete: concerns about loopholes, clarification and verification.
  • Some states want to uphold the right to modernize their technology, which may require testing
  • Domestic and political issues. (See for example: Kubiak, ‘CTBT Hold-out States’)

So nine is all takes. US President Obama had promised to ratify the treaty but has now come under opposition from the Senate. China want’s the US to ratify first; Pakistan, despite not being opposed to the CTBT, dares India to go first.

Watch this space for further updates.

– Kees Keizer

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