Editor’s Note: For some time now, Dr. Solomon has held our attention on the swhifting situations facing Sudan from atrocity crimes in Darfur to the current, coup-influenced violence. We have been grateful for his probing commentary which has exposed conflict prevention and resolution flaws across the African continent and beyond. We are pleased that Dr. Solomon (along with Professor Jude Cocodia of Nigeria) will soon be in New York to launch their new book, “African Security in the Anthropocene.” Please contact me (zuber@globalactonpw.org) for more information about their New York events.
The carnage of war is evident in Sudan as the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the command of Burhan’s deputy – Mohamed Hamdan `Hemedti’ Daglo continues to escalate. The fighting is most intense around the three adjoining cities that make up the country’s greater capital – Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North. However, it is also occurring in other parts of this blighted country. After six weeks of fighting, 25 million require aid and protection according to the United Nations. Moreover, 1,1 million people are internally displaced whilst 350,000 fled across borders seeking refuge in neighbouring states.
Tensions between the SAF and RSF came to the fore in January 2023 during the discussions around the integration of the RSF into the regular armed forces. By April the tensions escalated into full-scale conflict. Ironically, the Sudanese Armed Forces assisted in the creation of the RSF from Janjaweed militias which it used to fight the anti-Khartoum insurgency in Darfur.
The RSF was estimated to be 5,000 strong in 2014. They grew stronger and by 2016, it sent 40,000 of its members to fight in the civil war in Yemen. By 2023 it was estimated to consist of 100,000 fighters – many battle-tested veterans of the Yemeni civil war. Its growing military strength also lay in its growing economic footprint – especially in gold mining. Consider here the case of the Jebel Amer mines in Darfur which stretch for more than 10 kilometres. Following the RSF wresting control over it, Hemedti was transformed into the most important player in Sudan’s gold industry. Gold gave the RSF the ability the be financially self-sufficient and exist outside the military’s chain of command. This, of course, Burhan would not countenance. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that the SAF are also major players in Sudan’s economy and contribute to the military’s reluctance to hand power over to civilian authorities.
From this perspective, the current conflict in Sudan should not be seen as beginning this year but relates to the problem of civil-military relations and the military’s penchant of getting itself immersed into the economy. Consider the following fact: Sudan has only had three short-lived attempts at civilian democracies – 1956-1958, 1964-1969 and 1985-1989. Following the ouster of Sudanese strong man Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir on 11 April 2019, there was a serious attempt on the part of Sudanese civil society to establish a civilian government. This, however, was prevented by the military coup in which both Burhan and Hemedti cooperated to thwart the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people. Both Burhan and Hemedti are the problem together with the ongoing penchant of the military to involve themselves directly in the political and economic spheres.
From this perspective the Jeddah talks which Saudi Arabia and the United States were mediating was bound to fail. It simply did not go far enough to seek a lasting solution beyond the current crisis. The talks were also bound to fail since not enough attention was given by the mediators to the role of outside actors who may be stoking the conflict. For instance, it is alleged that the RSF gets support from the likes of a Libyan National Army strongman – Khalifa Haftar — as well as from Russia’s Wagner Group.
The talks were also bound to fail given the low-level delegations sent by these two Sudanese combatants to Jeddah. Both were attempting to use the Jeddah talks as a public relations exercise as well as to win brownie points in Washington and Riyadh. Embarrassingly for both Saudi Arabia and the United States, they have declared 6 times since the 6th of May when the mediation effort began that a humanitarian cessation of hostilities had been reached, only to have it violated each and every time. Burhan’s commitment to the peace talks was already in doubt when he wrote to the UN Secretary General seeking the removal of Volker Perthes, the UN’s Special Representative for Sudan. This followed Perthes criticizing both Burhan and Hemedti and warning of the “growing ethnicization of the conflict”. Burhan also formally removed Hemedti from his post as deputy and has brought in further army reinforcements in his fight against the RSF.
All these developments point to a further escalation of the conflict. These rivalries, meanwhile, are hastening the disintegration of Sudan. Given the fact that the armed forces are distracted by the RSF, there is a real danger that the banner of insurrection will once again be raised in the Darfur region as well as in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.


