Tag Archives: Middle East

Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations

13 May

The forthcoming Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), which will convene in Geneva for fifteen working days this year, has its first session from 14-24 May (with follow-up sessions 27-28 June and 19-30 August). The OEWG is a result of resolution A/C.1/67/L.31 tabled at the 2012 session of the First Committee by Austria, Mexico, and Norway entitled “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.” This initiative was one of the more concrete results from the sixty-eighth session of the First Committee as it offered a tangible method of seeking to break the impasse currently paralyzing much of the UN disarmament machinery, including and most importantly, the so-called single, multilateral negotiating body for disarmament—the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The resolution called for the established of an OEWG (open to the participation of all member states as opposed to the limited membership of the CD) to “develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons” as well as for the submission of a report to the next session of the General Assembly reflecting the discussions held and proposals made whereby a record of the work of the OEWG would be available to impact future discourse. The OEWG will be chaired by Costa Rican Ambassador Manuel Dengo.

While the mandate of the OEWG has never been entirely clear, it is assumed that the group will take up substantive issues rather than procedural ones. Ambassador Dengo wrote in his letter to member states which included a draft program of work for 14-24 May session, “The main purpose of the May session will be to promote better knowledge and understanding of the different aspects of nuclear disarmament and the challenges faced by multilateral nuclear disarmament.” As noted in Ambassador Dengo’s memo, the OEWG will operate in an interactive manner consisting of thematic panels with a more general exchange of views held at the conclusion of each panel. The centrality of interaction among member states, experts, civil society representatives, international organizations, and other relevant stakeholders is a most welcome aspect of the process. Discussions on disarmament, even when they are labeled “debates,” rarely feature such interactivity. Themes to be covered by the OEWG include: multilateral treaty-based obligations and commitments; nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs); transparency, confidence-building measures and verification; the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons; and the roles and responsibilities of nuclear weapon possessing states and non-nuclear weapon states.

While this thematic discussion is important, it would seem counterintuitive to discuss substantive proposals for taking forward nuclear disarmament negotiations without specifically addressing the procedural questions around the stalemate that continues to plague the CD (the de-facto reason why the OEWG has been established in the first place). Separation of the substantive from the procedural will not provide the necessary comprehensive approach to breaking the negotiating paralysis in the field of disarmament.

The current position of the nuclear non-Proliferation (NPT) nuclear weapon states (NWS), also known as the permanent 5 (P5), is that they will not participate in the OEWG, which is an unfortunate development. The P5 has generally opposed all initiatives and proposals that are perceived as “alternative” processes labeling them “distractions” from the measured, “step-by-step” approach they see as necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament. France, Russia, the UK, and the US all voted against the October 2012 resolution with China abstaining. During explanations of vote (EOV), the delegations of France, the UK, and the US offered a joint statement noting that the proposed OEWG seeks to “circumvent” established mechanisms such as the CD and the UN Disarmament Commission and does not clearly fit into the NPT framework and corresponding 2010 Action Plan. The same type of reasoning was offered with regards to the recent humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons conference held in Oslo in March 2012 that the P5 states jointly decided to boycott.

This reasoning is weak at best and hypocritical and contradictory at worst. The P5 themselves have started a so-called “alternative” and parallel process in the form of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) that began in Washington, DC in 2010, which was followed-up with another NSS in Seoul in 2012. Moreover, the argument that the work of the OEWG does not “fit into the NPT framework” is disingenuous. As is noted often and with an increasing sense of urgency and frustration by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) at NPT meetings, Article VI obligates the NWS to pursue good faith negotiations for the unequivocal and complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Establishing a body, not to mention one without a negotiating mandate, to discuss a range of themes related to Article VI obligations clearly fits within a larger framework of engagement and in no way threatens the (seemingly faltering) NPT regime.

The more pressing threat to the NPT regime is burgeoning frustration (embodied in the decision of the Egyptian delegation to withdraw from the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session) over the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East pursuant to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The Egyptian delegation ominously stated in its final remarks to the 2013 NPT PrepCom before withdrawing, “We cannot continue to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that do not get implemented, yet to be expected to abide by the concessions we gave for this outcome,” referring to the indefinite extension of the NPT in exchange for the promise of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. It would seem that this growing fissure in the NPT framework, the so-called “cornerstone” of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, is of much greater concern than the establishment of an OEWG, which is essentially an opportunity to discuss and brainstorm proposals without obligating any state to commit to binding agreements over already existing agreements (even those whose validity is now being seriously questioned).

The threats to the NPT regime, the increasing isolation of the P5 during the Oslo humanitarian consequences conference, the recent NPT PrepCom, and the forthcoming OEWG session, have all further opened up conversation among NNWS and civil society over the role these states should play in “taking forward” multilateral negotiations. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and others in civil society have advocated for NNWS to take the lead in establishing the necessary framework to obtain a world without nuclear weapons rather than continuously wait for the P5 to meet their Article VI obligations. ICAN has advocated for a “Ban Treaty” building on momentum spearheaded by the NNWS through the humanitarian consequences initiative that would hopefully change the global, political, and legal landscape surrounding the continued existence of nuclear weapons by negotiating and concluding a ban on the use, possession, stockpiling, trade, and manufacture of such weapons. Such a ban could be a simple treaty composed of general obligations with room for additional protocols to which the NWS could eventually sign, but would not necessarily have to negotiate. This course of action has been perceived as an approach different from a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), which envisages framing obligations not only to prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also to ensure their elimination through disarmament obligations and a verification regime (such as the obligations and verification mechanism in the Chemical Weapons Convention). A NWC, therefore, would necessitate the participation of the nuclear weapon possessors.

Whether there is a question of sequencing or whether a “Ban Treaty” could serve as a precursor to a NWC is not necessarily of the question of highest importance, but rather it is how to achieve nuclear abolition as comprehensively and quickly as possible. Perhaps a ban negotiated by the NNWS would inspire the P5 to negotiate an agreement among themselves to eliminate their arsenals in a reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the call to NNWS to take a more prominent and active role in pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament is essential to future progress towards this objective. Maintenance of the status quo is simply no longer an option given the stalemate across the UN disarmament machinery and the obstinacy on the part of the P5 with regards to any new proposals or initiatives seeking to address disarmament. Clearly they fear losing “veto power” derived from the consensus rule and the inherent imbalance in the NPT that ultimately privileges the NWS and their “step by step” process.

As the OEWG begins it work, there is some hope that the proposals gleaned from the discussions will provide the necessary injection of momentum to take forward disarmament negotiations that will genuinely make progress in nuclear disarmament, although it would seem that this will have to be done without the nuclear possessor states, which include the P5 as well as the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan (those outside of the NPT regime). “Nobody should assume that any regime structured on a have/have-not principle can be sustained forever,” argued Angela Kane, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at the Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation on 6 May 2013. It is time for an honest appraisal of strategies through the OEWG for nuclear disarmament that do not perpetuate a regime that maintains the status quo.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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The Twin Problems of the Middle East WMDFZ and Modernization: The Current Precariousness of the NPT regime

4 Feb

As the new review cycle of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues this year and the second Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) for the 2015 Review Conference is scheduled to be held in April 2013 in Geneva, the sustainability and robustness of the NPT regime remain uncertain. This is the result of the inability to convene a NPT-mandated conference for the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East as well as the continued pursuit of extensive nuclear modernization programs in all the nuclear possessor states.

Concern around the NPT was inevitably heightened when the NPT-mandated Conference on a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDFZ) for the Middle East was “postponed” in December 2012. The so-called “co-conveners” of the Conference, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia could not reach agreement on a postponement decision and issued separate statements with the US noting the lack of agreement among the regional states on “conditions for a conference,” the Russian government called for the Conference to be held under the same conditions no later than April 2013 (before the next NPT Prep Com), and the UK issued a statement that called for continued consultations and urged the conference to be convened in 2013.

The Action Plan adopted at the conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference called for the convening of a WMDFZ conference in 2012 in fulfillment of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The inability to do so undoubtedly has not only damaged the credibility of the NPT regime, but has brought into question future implementation and adherence to cornerstone Treaty provisions among many states parties. In particular, the Arab states, most notably Egypt, have placed much emphasis on this Middle East conference tying it closely to its investment in the NPT writ large. In 1995, Egypt threatened to withhold support for the NPT’s indefinite extension should the United States not support the Resolution on the Middle East, including the paragraph about the need to establish a WMDFZ. It is a serious and valid concern that the NPT regime could be “held hostage” by those states, specifically the Arab Group, who believe that such a failure to fulfill a binding commitment represents reason enough not to fulfill other obligations furthering hindering progress made on the twin pillars of the NPT (in addition to the third pillar regarding ‘peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy)—non-proliferation and disarmament. It is also possible that states parties may interpret these failures as a reason to leave the NPT framework altogether and join those states outside of the regime (India, Pakistan, Israel, and the DPRK) that are not subject to its obligations. These alarming trends would only further increase insecurity and decrease the NPT’s legitimacy.

Moreover, the issue of modernization has not been adequately addressed in the context of the NPT itself. While many delegations called for an end to modernization of nuclear weapons at the 2012 NPT Prep Com, modernization programs continue in China, France,  India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States. While it might still be an open question as to whether modernization results in ‘new’ weapons, the continued investment in nuclear weapon arsenals must clearly be understood as incompatible with obligations to non-proliferation and disarmament. By improving and expanding the capabilities of nuclear warheads, even if the number of warheads itself remains the same, the nuclear weapon possessor are engaging in a form of proliferation. Moreover, the disarmament obligations found in Article VI are surely not being met with the appropriate seriousness and resources (both financial and political) where modernization programs are under way. Reaching Critical Will notes in its study “Assuring Destruction Forever” (April 2012) that committing billions of dollars to nuclear arsenal modernization not only drains a large portion of the world’s resources, it sets precedents for pursuing the global nuclear weapon industry indefinitely. As Beatrice Fihn of Reaching Critical Will has rightly stated, “Commitment to nuclear disarmament is not just about quantitative reductions, it must also include a cessation of qualitative improvements, as ‘leaner but meaner’ weapons do little to change the continued reliance by a few states on nuclear weapons to provide security.”

There is much to be done to reinsert confidence and robustness back into the NPT framework. The 2013 NPT Prep Com in Geneva must begin to rebuild the momentum that was first gained with the adoption of the consensus Action Plan from the 2010 Review Conference. The success of this Prep Com will depend, in large part, on whether or not the Conference for a Middle East (WMDFZ) will be convened prior to the start of the Prep Com in April. If not, the stakes of the Prep Com will only be higher and the political difficulties only increased. Patience will wear thin and some states may seek alternate pathways, including pathways outside of the NPT, to achieve security assurances. This would be a dangerous precedent if it were realized.

Likewise, delegations must continue to hammer the point home that modernization of existing nuclear arsenals is incompatible with NPT obligations. The vast majority of states parties to the NPT do not possess nuclear weapons nor are they pursuing such capabilities. It is time for these delegations, representing the overwhelming majority of the global community, to speak strongly against the inherent hypocrisy of committing to disarmament, but engaging in expansive modernization programs. Rather than modernizing the weapons, nuclear weapon possessors should be pursuing the means to safely, verifiably, and transparently reduce the number of warheads in their stockpiles.

Without significant movement on these two threats to the NPT regime, the likelihood of achieving substantial progress towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons will be seriously lowered.

 

—-Katherine Prizeman

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Germany as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: An Evaluation

16 Jan

The Coordinator of our Media Initative (Matching:Points), Ms. Lia Petridis Maiello, recently authored an article detailing and evaluating the role of Germany as a non-permanent member of the Security Council over the last two years. Germany just completed its tenure in December 2012. She evaluates the issue-specific work of Germany in the following areas: Afghanistan; Children and Armed Conflict; Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions; Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament; Climate and Security; Libya; and Assessment.

An excerpt from her article is below with access to her full evaluation available here.

“In the past two years, the German government has been represented as a non-permanent member at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Despite a closely defined scope reserved for non-permanent members at the SC, the European middle power managed to inject new momentum and nuance to both established and new policy concepts. Following the departure of Germany from the SC and with the beginning of the new year, the inventories and analyses begin, particularly with regard to the perception of Germany by its international partners at the UN.

The last public meeting of the SC on international peace building just before Christmas, gave theoutgoing German Ambassador to the United Nations, Peter Wittig, once again the opportunity to thank the German partners for the excellent cooperation within the Security Council – with a subtle tone of melancholy in his voice. Wittig can be sure of his popularity among colleagues in the diplomatic circles of New York City. He is regarded as an “extraordinarily competent,” “objective,” “humble,” and a “very kind” representative. Many regret his departure and appreciate the Ambassador’s savoir vivre, a feature oftentimes missing in the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle.”

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The Chemical Weapons Convention: Setting a High Multilateral Disarmament Standard

2 Oct

On Monday 1 October, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) celebrated fifteen years of serving as the custodian of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). The Ministerial Meeting was held on the final day of the UN General Assembly’s high-level segment and featured a slew of statements from member states as well as the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat that resides in The Hague, Netherlands. The CWC, as noted by several delegations on Monday afternoon, is an example of the success that can be achieved in the field of multilateral disarmament. The purpose of this meeting was to both generate support for the long-term objectives of the Convention and also to provide impetus to the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, scheduled to be convened in April 2013.

With 188 states parties, the CWC confirms that it is, indeed, possible to eliminate an entire category of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) through nearly universal adoption of a legally-binding convention. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on the eight member states that remain outside of the CWC, namely those that are non-states parties including Angola, Egypt, the DPRK, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria, as well as Israel and Myanmar that have signed the CWC but not yet ratified it, to accede to the Treaty and join the international community’s commitment to destroy all existing chemical weapons stockpiles. In addition to its near universal participation, the CW’s twin pillars of eliminating existing stockpiles and preventing the emergence of new types of chemical weapons are significant commitments to WMD non-proliferation and disarmament.  As the UK Ambassador reminded the attendees, as of August 2012, 75 percent of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been verifiably destroyed.

Among the issues highlighted, several member states underscored the importance of the peaceful uses of chemistry including the delegate of Iran, the newly appointed Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), who noted the importance of chemistry to overall economic development. Cooperation with the chemical industry was a topic also of interest to states parties; in particular the delegate of Japan called for closer cooperation between the OPCW and relevant industry stakeholders. Also encouraged was victims’ assistance. The Iranian delegate, on behalf of NAM, called for an international support network and a voluntary trust fund.

Moreover, the robust verification regime of the CWC was highlighted as an important and unique contribution to multilateral disarmament. The Cuban delegate rightly stated that the total, verifiable elimination of weapons within a specified time frame is a fundamental pillar of disarmament. The Mexican delegate also noted that the exemplary verification regime of the CWC sets a high standard for multilateral disarmament writ large. The specifics of the CWC example illustrate how robust verification is imperative to comprehensive and universal disarmament measures. The CWC Verification Regime is split into two operational units of the Technical Secretariat—the Verification Division and the Inspectorate Division. The Verification Annex to the Convention provides a comprehensive regime for verifying all chemical weapons-related activities, as well as routine monitoring of the chemical industry through on-site inspections. The Verification Annex is by far the most extensive portion of the CWC. (More detailed information on the OPCW’s verification activities can be found here.)

Some delegations also made pointed comments on the recent statements by Syrian officials regarding the government’s possession of chemical weapons. The delegations of the EU, Norway, France, and the Secretary-General all expressed concern over the admission of Syrian officials of the government’s possession and possible use of chemical weapons. The Director-General of the OPCW has echoed the Secretary-General’s concerns and has stated that the OPCW continues to “monitor developments there closely.” The widespread outrage over such claims that the Syrian government possesses and, even more, would contemplate use of such weapons is indicative of the well-established and common international norm that use of chemical weapons is entirely unacceptable.

The success of the chemical weapons regime is encouraging in a field that often struggles with a lack of consensus and a deficit of political will necessary to eliminate such egregious weapons. As noted by the Turkish delegate, attention must also be paid to nuclear and biological weapons, in particular nuclear disarmament through a regional approach in light of the forthcoming Conference on a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. Elimination of an entire category of WMD is possible through universal participation and robust verification—such an important goal must be vigorously pursued in other disarmament contexts.

 

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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That They May Like ‘US’

24 Sep

This is a guest blog post from one of our former interns, Nnamdi Iheakaram, Esq.

A foreign policy that is based on a state’s ability to project force will tend to pursue unilateralist goals. The immense benefit derivable from this strategy is evident when weaker states readily abandon non-essential legitimate claims rather than engage a state that has power advantage and the will to exploit that advantage.  Undeniably, it is well-known that war is more likely when conquest is easy.  However, the interest in question must be essential, such as the threat to a state’s sovereignty, to warrant any state risking the possibility of a direct military conquest. Because most interests are non-essential, it becomes attractive for stronger states to resort to their military might in the event of more essential threats to their interests.

The US has always had a power advantage which it has employed in securing its interests. Not long ago, in 2009, a new US foreign policy approach based on mutual respect of other states and their cultures was pitched to an enthralled audience in Cairo, Egypt. The goal was to reassure the Muslim community that the United States was not an enemy and that the new US government would seek to work closely with all peace loving states in ensuring international peace and security. To give effect to these declarations, the US government gave direct support to protesters all across North Africa and the Middle East during the 2010 Arab Spring and even called on the Egyptian President, an ally, to relinquish power as demanded by the protesters.

While this support may seem appropriate to passionate advocates who are committed to democracy and the self-governance of all people, an objective analysis of the situation may show that supporting a rebel movement that is not clear on its objectives, violates the laws of a legitimate government, and seeks military assistance to unseat a government, is itself unlawful and counterproductive. Accordingly, it was unwonted when the US called on its Egyptian ally to relinquish power as opposed to reestablishing effective control and initiating a constitutional review that would bring about a more representative government structured around the rule of law and secularism. But the US interference, which was based on a new commitment to democratic rule, was undermined by its inconsistent treatment of similarly situated states.

Thus, just as it was difficult to identify any supporters of the continuation of the government of Col. Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, it was equally difficult to identify any law that could support an intervention in Libya while requiring non-interference in Saudi Arabia. The reason is simple: the Libyan government had effective control of its territory while effective control in, for instance, a state likeSaudi Arabia was enabled by external interests. In the 2011 Libyan intervention, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, developed to avoid mass atrocity crimes, was tarnished as it appeared to have been adopted only to justify and legitimize interference in the domestic affairs of a state, which included removal of the head of that state, thereby exposing one of the fundamental flaws of the concept.  While Qaddafi had been accused of killing less than a thousand rebels at the time the “no-fly-zone” was imposed, commentators such as Jordan Street have been clear that “the bombing that NATO embarked upon to protect their initial mandate has also shown to be flawed due to the high mortality rates among civilians.”  .  The killing of Libyans, it appears, is justifiable when effected under an internationally approved political program.

This is the legal and moral quagmire that is encountered when scholars attempt to interpret popular rules or principles of international law without considering the historical backgrounds and the socioeconomic factors determining the purposes or grounds for their application. Accordingly, it is imperative that international action (or more specifically, intervention in states) be framed in a way that makes it consistent and predictable as opposed to flexible and heteronomous. The former (which is consistent and predictable) would ensure that US policies seek to maximize and protect US interests without undermining or diminishing the welfare of other states, while the latter (which is flexible and heteronomous) would ensure that US policies seek to maximize and protect US interests, largely regardless of consequences. The benefit of taking the first approach is that policies aimed at the maximization and protection of interests are not knowingly detrimental to other states and thus, are in line with international law , while the second approach brings about policies that use other states as means to the goal of maximization and protection of interests.

The recent attacks on US interests in Libya and elsewhere, call for concern for the safety of all diplomats. It is unacceptable that individuals representing their nation’s interests should be imperiled for the mere fact that they accepted a responsibility to serve a diplomatic purpose.. There is no justification for the protesters or anyone to take the lives of others on the righteous pretext that the uncivil and supposedly heretical actions of some bigoted, attention-seeking artists provided  sufficient provocation.

Matters regarding religion are emotive and until the denigration of the faith of others is discouraged by non-coercive measures, extremists of various faiths will actively continue to take matters into their own hands in defense of their beliefs. When economic grievances are rooted in sociopolitical problems that cannot be effectively and easily framed as a rallying cry for action, religion is employed as a tool for rallying otherwise diverse groups against an allegedly ‘common enemy.’  Whether such actions are justified is dependent upon the rationale or factuality of their grievance. But one fact remains indisputable, despite the high cost of the US involvement in the Middle East, there is a clear reluctance to adjust the current US Middle East policy. The implication is that conditions which will likely lead to the reoccurrence of violence persist.

While the West viewed the Arab Spring as an effort by an oppressed citizenry to  rid itself of autocratic leaders, anti-western elements viewed it as aimed at removing less effective Western political acolytes. Having declared the Arab Spring a success, it is unclear how a US Ambassador could be assassinated in Benghazi, a city that was the stronghold and capital of the US-supported rebel forces that fought against Qaddafi. What is not in dispute is that the West has interests in the Gulf and has chosen to selectively interfere in the affairs of states in order to secure those interests. The rationale for this position is subject to debate; however, it can be asserted that a legal, purpose-driven approach that seeks to protect the interests of all involved will be more effective in securing long-term peace than a value-driven approach that is subject to the whims and caprices of self-interested foreign interveners.

Thus, instead of trying to capitalize on the current violence for political purposes, US leaders must use the on-going presidential campaigns to develop, articulate and communicate a realistic and reassuring foreign policy aimed at absolute respect for the rule of law on the international scene and less reliance on force as a means of securing interests. Such a change ensuring that power is not an advantage and that weakness is not a disadvantage is necessary in persuading states like Iran and North Korea to abandon realist security measures which increase the risks of devastating  conflict. It is suggested that only a change in US policy will positively affect the perception and attitude of these states, not an increase in its military might.  The US must choose between the better peace that flows from its support for universally recognized, just policies or a fragile peace held together by the fear of its military might.. A just foreign policy may or may not improve the welfare of other states, but an unjust foreign policy will deliberately diminish the welfare of other states.

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The Question of Palestine: Divisions at the Top and Human Insecurity at the Bottom

31 Jul

The Security Council (SC) debated on 25 July 2012 whether or not Palestine could become a Member State of the United Nations in a debate entitled “The Question of Palestine.” Yet, the standard rhetoric clouded the issue and buried it within the ongoing Israel-Palestine and Israel-Arab world divides. Several other divides also surfaced stemming from historic occurrences, present actions and current ongoing conflicts that continue to produce gaps and stall peace negotiations. These divisions reveal the underlying fundamental issue: the divide between State security and human security and the disconnect that exists between high-level officials and the human perspective.

When discussing Israel and Palestine the underlying systemic issues dividing the Middle East and the international community surface. The continual divide between Israel and the Arab world; Iran’s alleged enrichment of nuclear weapons; and the Syrian Conflict – a subject within which there are multiple high-level divides – collectively clouded the focal issue on Wednesday and continue to form the broader backdrop against which the Palestine-Israel issue is framed.

The topic of peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel has been ongoing since 1967. A stalemate in negotiations between Palestine and Israel has endured since 2010. The “Question” of Palestine has been reviewed several times at Security Council meetings. Israel refused to attend the last Council meeting fearing it would only result in countries ganging-up on them from multiple sides. This was the reality at the 25 July 2012 meeting.

The meeting began with Robert Serry, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process. Serry expressed that a continued stall in peace negotiations is perilous and an effort to restart direct talks between Israel and Palestine is critical. The “worrying issues on the ground” make this timing of the utmost importance. A Two-State agreement is vital to reaching peace and security in the region and on a global scale.

The stalemate in the peace process between Palestine and Israel is based on four main issues: Israel’s continued construction and encroachment of settlements, destruction of agricultural and orchard lands, violations of multiple international laws and the six year blockade in Gaza; the internal divides that exist within Palestine stemming from the ousting of Fatah from Gaza by Hamas in 2001,resulting in tensions  between the Hamas-lead government under Ismail Haniya and the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas; the pre-1967 boundaries; and a diminished or nonexistent level of trust due to enduring violence and conflicts as well as terrorist attacks in the region.

The Palestinians, as well as Egypt, Qatar, Iran, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Tunisia and Syria agreed that Palestinians were specifically targeted for war crimes and ethnic cleansing through the use of “demographic change via geographical expansions” and that it represents a “collective punishment” by the “colonizers.”

The majority of the SC, including four of the P-5 (excluding the United States), agreed that Israel’s illegal settlements as well as the blockade erected in 2004 were the main cause of the stalled peace negotiations, with Iran specifically stressing that Israel should immediately return all of its occupied territories – meaning their past military occupations of lands within Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

The U.S. delegate stressed that “unilateral decisions were contrary to reaching a two-State agreement,” which is essential to the end goal of creating an “independent Palestinian State living in peace and security alongside a Jewish democratic State.” The U.S. also did not support expansions of outposts. In response, Russia specifically suggested that the U.S. has been supporting Israel’s expansions– an accusation based on the U.S. veto of the 2011 UN Resolution which was to declare Israeli settlements illegal.

Israel was further accused of detaining multiple Palestinians illegally – many of which are children and not allowing visits from Palestinian families. Only recently was one visit allowed. Reports of continued hunger strikes by Palestinian prisoners continue and allegations of torture ensued at the meeting. This is a grave and sensitive issue which fuels anger on the Palestinian side and further increases human and State insecurity in the region.

Palestine was blamed – mostly by Israel for engaging in, supporting and continuing acts of violence.  Israel blamed Hamas for carrying out continued terrorist attacks on Israeli soil and accused them of engaging in rocket launches. The majority of speakers at the meeting condemned such actions. All states at the meeting stated they condemned any and all acts of terrorism.

Israel also blamed Iran for supporting terrorism throughout the Middle East and specifically accused them of the attacks in Bulgaria. Accusations significantly escalated between Iran and Israel, with Iran later accusing Israel of targeting and killing its own citizens in order to blame and frame Iran. Further, Iran’s alleged uranium enrichment was raised and continues to trump the Palestine “Question” yet it is directly linked to the high-level divisions which exist on both topics – creating national, international and intra-national divides.

A majority of States blamed the SC, the Quartet and the international community for continually failing to find a solution to resolve the issues in Palestine and Israel.

Amidst all the finger pointing, disagreement and accusations, the actual purpose of the meeting was buried. Many States did not address the “Question,” whether or not they supported the Palestinian application for Statehood. The meeting merely demonstrated continued stalemates at the top levels. It illustrated the inability of high-level officials to properly address on-the-ground issues and reach any sort of standing resolution that will bring peace to a region that has been in the midst of conflict for decades.  While the top remains divided, human suffering and insecurity on the ground endure.  A connection between State and human security is missing.

For more analysis on the debate, as well as a reflection on the need for a “bottom-up” approach to the conflict, please click here.

— Cara Lacey

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Looking Forward to the 1st NPT Prep Com and Back on the 2010 Outcome Document

12 Apr

For two weeks this May, states parties of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will gather to begin the next review cycle as the first Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) is to be held in Vienna.  This Prep Com comes just two years after the conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference when states adopted a 64-point Action Plan as part of the outcome document of the conference. The two additional elements of the outcome dealt with the 1995 resolution on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East and a call for the complete and full abandonment of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programmes by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). One of the most practical successes of the document was the call for a 2012 conference on the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, which is scheduled to be held in Helsinki in December. The Secretary-General has appointed a facilitator of this process, as called for in the 2010 document. Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jaakko Laajava, will serve in this capacity and has already begun rounds of consultations in the region (most recently with Foreign Ministry officials in Israel). Any zone in the Middle East will be sustainable only when all participating states have complementary roles and responsibilities that contribute to a more secure region that will render weapons of mass destruction ultimately irrelevant. (See previous post on “Following through on Middle East WMD-Free Zone” from 18 January).

Much of the forthcoming NPT Prep Com in Vienna will be focused on organizational work– election of officers, dates and venues for further sessions, methods of work, etc– but there will inevitably be substantive discussions on consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, including specific matters of substance also related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 Final Document, including the recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the Review Conference (64-point Action Plan). These discussions will culminate (hopefully) in the adoption of a final report and recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference. Working papers (although non-binding) are also expected on varying topics related to the Treaty’s implementation. The Prep Com will be chaired by Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia.

States parties will inevitably focus on certain aspects of the 2010 outcome document, in particular certain action points that have explicitly called for further efforts on nuclear disarmament and related mechanisms and reporting tools. In general, the outcome document was hailed as a great success by many governments and media outlets insofar as states parties were able to adopt, without calls for amendments, a forward-looking action plan that addresses nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear energy, as well as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. This outcome represented a stark contrast the 2005 Review Conference that ended without a consensus document and largely labeled a failure. As noted by many disarmament advocates, the 2010 document does not provide concrete, meaningful commitments on the parts of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to disarm nor does it necessarily assign substantial measures to deal with non-proliferation challenges. Many disarmament and non-proliferation advocates have stated that the document very much maintains the status quo, while encouraging the spread of nuclear energy and extolling its “virtues.” (See Reaching Critical Will’s NPT News in Review from 2010).

  • Garnering much attention is Action 5, which commit the NWS to “accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference…”  Furthermore, Action 3 resolves the NWS to implement the “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals…” Perhaps most importantly, the NWS are called upon to report to the 2014 Prep Com and the 2015 Review Conference on their undertakings related to Action 5, thereby placing a timeline (however weak) on progress towards nuclear disarmament. Action 5 also promises that the 2015 Review Conference will “take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of Action VI.” Action VI states that each party to the NPT is obliged to pursue negotiations on measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to pursue a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This provision gives hope to the 2015 Review Conference insofar as the groundwork will perhaps be laid for development of a road map towards full nuclear disarmament.
  • Action 20 calls upon all states parties to submit regular reports on implementation of the Action Plan as well as Article VI and the 13 Practical Steps agreed to in the 2010 Final Document. Action 21 calls upon the NWS, in particular and as a confidence-building measure, to agree to a standard reporting form and regular reporting intervals for providing “voluntary” information on implementation and also invites the Secretary-General to establish a public repository of this information. Such calls for regular reporting is indicative of the growing interest by many states, in particular, of course, from the non-nuclear weapon states, to create concrete benchmarks to evaluate implementation of the Action Plan. Nonetheless, the provision of “voluntary” inevitably weakens hopes for regularity and uniformity in reporting.

The road ahead for the NPT is a tough one– member states must now move from celebration of the 2010 outcome to the difficulties of implementing it in the 2015 review cycle. There remains widespread discontent over the disconnect between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament with  many states concerned that there is still great focus on the former and not enough on the latter. The Action Plan does indeed call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary group to negotiate this topic (Action 6), although with the caveat that it must be done in the “context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.” Such a programme of work remains elusive and, thus, so does nuclear disarmament. 

The Action Plan can function as a yardstick against which to measure the three pillars of the NPT– nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This next review cycle will undoubtedly be characterizes by discussion over a focused framework of evaluation of this Action Plan and, ultimately, the full implementation of the NPT’s articles. It cannot be ignored that the NPT represents the only binding commitment to nuclear disarmament in a multilateral treaty and, with its indefinite extension, remains the cornerstone of work towards a world without nuclear weapons. Therefore, the next review cycle represents another step on the ladder towards this goal and must not be wasted.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Security Council Discusses Two Key Security Issues: Rule of Law and Middle East

25 Jan

Over the past week, the Security Council has engaged in two separate debates on thematic issues of critical importance to the broader human security agenda– the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies and the situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian question. One key highlight was the warning by the UK delegate on illegal arms smuggling into Syria that continues to feed the violence.

Our intern Helene Samson provides detailed reports on the meetings. Please see below.

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On 19 January 2012, the Security Council met to discuss the UN’s approach to transitional justice and the rule of law, a norm which is acknowledged by the UN Charter as a precondition to national and international peace and security, and remains a vital element for ensuring prosperity, sustainable development and reducing poverty in states. Although the UN intervention in war-torn states countries has helped in transitional justice, both the UN and national capacities still need to be strengthened given the growing corruption, lack of transparency, and accountability. The Council also reaffirmed its opposition to impunity for violations of international law and highlighted the responsibility of states to prosecute people responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the meeting by supporting the role of rule of law in monitoring armed conflicts, and the growing threat of transnational trafficking, and organized crimes. He further stressed also the necessity to reinforce the rule of law to protect civilians and vulnerable groups, such as women and children. He discussed reinforcing norms through transitional justice; building justice and security institutions to promote trust; and achieving justice for women and gender equality.

The delegations present expressed their respective commitments to rule of law. Rule of law was particularly influential in enhancing the capacity of civil society in the Arab Spring, evidenced in cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. India and Portugal both highlighted the need to eliminate state discriminatory laws that interfere with gender equality, equal rights and the full political participation of women. Indeed, children and women continue to represent one of the most vulnerable groups in armed conflicts. France suggested that ICC judicial decisions should be pursued steadily and consistently by states, when states are not willing to enforce criminal justice within their own domestic legal systems. Next, the UK voiced concerns that some member states have not recognized the Court’s competence, and pointed out that the ICC should have a more compulsory competence in terms of international criminal justice. Furthermore, the UK explained that security goes along with health and education regarding peace building long-term processes; the British delegation declared they were ready to invest 30 percent of its growing development aid to help 12 million women have better access to justice through police, courts and legal assistance.

Although they have not signed the Rome Statute, the United States also expressed its moral commitment to the international norms of transnational justice and rule of law by mentioning their honoring institutionalized initiatives for armed conflict prevention: Obama’s Executive Order on promoting women participation in peace process and rule of law enforcement, and also a study on high-level atrocity prevention. Moreover, as for China, it did not mention any initiatives to promote transitional justice and security, but emphasized its reluctance regarding the systematic and intrusive application of sanctions in some unique national situations, arguing that national sovereignty is still the highest legitimate authority. States tending to reinforce the rule of law through issuing laws of post-conflict reintegration and integral reparation, such as Colombia or adopting a more democratic constitution like in Morocco, warned also the UN approach criticized earlier by China. It was suggested the UN should cooperate with states to complete national measures and consolidate the rule of law in the different realities. Guatemala, whose post-conflict institutions are still weak and have seen transnational criminality worsen, highlighted the lack of national appropriation that sometimes follows failed post-war peace building. Guatemala has nevertheless explained that a successful reconciliation consists of a balance between the duty of remembrance and the responsibility of reconciliation.

In sum, the Security Council expressed its concerns regarding displaced groups, children, and particularly women who also play also a critical role in peace building. The adoption of measures, such as Resolution 1325, has been encouraging. It has been argued that Specific international tribunals, in particular the ICC, remain a vital element in the architecture of the international and healing justice. There is a need to coordinate international jurisdiction needs to ensure the reinforcement of the rule of law. However, the Security Council is aware that in an ideal world, national States should preserve jurisdictions should do justice themselves, without any intervention from an international organization. Meanwhile, the Security Council will have to address these challenges to promote rule of law in cooperation with national politics and help states to build peace and security. The Security Council expects an international push and political changes in war-torn societies.

This Security Council’s meeting was part of a high-level meeting on justice and rule of law that will be discussed by world leaders at the General Assembly on 24 September 2012. For the time being, the Council sought to emphasize the major role that rule of law plays in the peace and security field, as a call for political leaders to implement reform measures.

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The Security Council met on 24 January 2012 to discuss the situation in the Middle East, focusing at length on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, welcomed the series of talks on territory and security between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators initiated 3 January 2012. He reported growing violence and illegal measures on the ground by Israel. Indeed, the aggressive Israeli settlement activities and the constant exchanged violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians present a major obstacle to a two-State solution.

As for Lebanon, several incidents in the zone of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) showed the fragile conditions of security. The continued Israeli violation of the Lebanese aerospace not only undermines the credibility of UNIFIL, but also breaks with Resolution 1701. Moreover, 5,660 Syrian refugees have been registered on 13 January 2012 in Lebanon. He thus encouraged the Security Council to support the League of the Arab States’ proposal to tackle the violence and human rights violation perpetuated by the Syrian government.

Following Fernandez-Taranco’s introductory comments, Permanent Observer of Palestine spoke out about the Israeli practices on the ground in violation of international legal norms. He mentioned that Israeli settlement activities increased by 20 percent in 2011 further ‘Judaizing’ East Jerusalem with more checking points, demolitions of Palestinian proprieties, the closure of Palestinian institutions and the ‘ghettoization’ of the Palestinians, among others. He went further in accusing Israeli settlers of ethnic cleansing, in particular in the Jordan Valley, through the destruction of farms and displacement of population, and also acts of vandalism in churches and mosques, all in the full view of the Israeli security force. The Israeli air and land blockade affects deeply the Palestinians since it obstructs the necessary civil construction and humanitarian aids.

The Israeli delegation affirmed that the single greatest threat to the world security was an Iran seeking to build a nuclear weapon. The Israeli representative blamed the Security Council for having spent too much time and energy on the Israeli settlement activities instead of focusing on the real challenges that face the Middle East and the entire world. With its plan of enriching uranium to a 20 percent level, Iran breaks also several Security Council Resolutions, a reason why “the Security Council should be losing sleep over it,” replied the Israeli delegate. Adding to the Iranian threat, Israel also accused Palestinian authorities of keeping silent on the Hamas’ incitement to hatred and the destruction of Israel. Israel concluded Palestine’s misleading insistence on the two-State solution justifies Gazans’ security as the Israeli main priority.

The US encouraged both parties to set an environment conducive to progress and condemned any incitement to violence and terrorist attacks against Israel. However, the US delegation reaffirmed that it did not support the legitimacy of settlement activities. Regarding Syria, the US delegate noted that there are urgent needs for sanctions against the Syrian government actions and affirmed support for the Arab League’s plan for a transition to democracy.

With 43 percent of the West Bank clearly not under the control of the Palestinians and corresponding increasing violence, India declared the Israeli settlement unacceptable and contrary to international law. Restrictions to humanitarian assistance have resulted in an increase in poverty levels, something hardly compatible with a two-State solution. Togo, concerned for Palestinian refugee rights, called also for leaving the blockade. Good faith negotiations from both parties, financial and material support from the international community, and the Quartet’s role as guarantor of any agreements reached, were all encouraged as a set of practices to overcome current difficulties.

Colombia reiterated the negative impact of settlement activities in the region, but also noted violence against Israelis and threats to Israeli security calling for defined borders acknowledged by the international community. The Moroccan delegation explained also that Israel’s lack of political and moral will on the ground represented great challenges to peace. They suggested that Israel fulfill its responsibilities and obligations, in particular in Jerusalem and its suburbs where settlement activities have increased.

Pakistan criticized the endless debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the Security Council and the Quartet’s frozen position in a state of “suspended promises” that have not helped Palestinians address the issue. The Russian Federation noted a ‘remote manipulation’ from some states, without explicitly mentioning names, to maintain a certain ethnic group to power constitutes a major obstacle to human rights and the peace process.

The United Kingdom broadened the scope of the debate calling for democracy in the Arab world and the Security Council’s support for the League of Arab States in the transition to democracy in Syria. The UK warned of the illegal smuggling of arms to Syria, which continues to feed the shedding of blood. While Germany suggested expanding product exports to the West Bank to ensure the creation of jobs and prosperity, France urged establishing an international follow-up mechanism that is likely to lead to a two-State solution.

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Following through on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

18 Jan

A recent editorial in the NY Times from 15 January proposed that the best way to prevent a ‘nuclear Iran’ is through a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East (WMDFZ). A 1995 resolution on the Middle East at the Review Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calls upon the states from the region to “take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.” Furthermore, a statement from the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. The outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference committed states parties to a 2012 conference on the establishment of such a WMDFZ and such a conference will be held later this year in Finland. Given this historical context and mindful of current political circumstances in the region, it is essential that the development of concrete proposals for treaty elements and confidence-building measures towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East are taken both seriously and expeditiously.

As explained by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull in their Times op-ed, a military attack on Iran will most likely encourage the Islamic Republic to more vigorously pursue nuclear weapons in the long run, even if its program is set back several years due to the attack. Such costs are high insofar as the likelihood of Iran’s more robust and intense pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as the chance that other Arab states will consider ‘going nuclear.’ The other major challenge (and danger) in the region is surely Israel’s policy of ‘opacity’ around its nuclear program– not acknowledging having nuclear weapons while the rest of the world operates under the assumption that they do, in fact, have such capabilities with little to no ambiguity around that fact. Therefore, the only clear path forward is the proposed (and promised) development of a Middle East WMDFZ.

As expressed on numerous occasions by government officials, a nuclear Iran is not an option for Israel or the United States, while Israel continues to operate outside the NPT framework and therefore is not obligated to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Moreover, Israel’s escalating tensions with Turkey and even Egypt (with which Israel has a peace agreement) are indicative of a worsening situation in a region home to some of the most protracted and deep-seeded conflicts in history. Iran’s recent inflammatory actions, including its threatening to shut down access to the Strait of Hormuz because of sanctions imposed against its developing nuclear program, are a sign that the current trajectory is at best alarming and a new pathway to peace must be seriously pursued. A WMDFZ would ultimately force all the major stakeholders to task– Israel’s nuclear program would have to become a viable discussion point and Iran would be subject to legitimized monitoring in terms of its uranium enrichment program for energy production, which the Islamic Republic strongly contends is as far as its production goes.

There are no illusions in terms of how difficult, complex, and unique a WMDFZ in the Middle East actually is. The zones that already exist, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Mongolia, clearly do not have the same political challenges that the Middle East must grapple with. The negotiations around the zone will be long, complicated, and frustrating to be sure, but it is essential to not only international peace and security, but to a sustained regional peace that will never come to fruition if the threat of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons are on the table. Negotiations to develop and implement a WMDFZ must operate in concert with complementary steps toward regional peace as collective security agreements cannot be viably and permanently de-linked from peace agreements. Disarmament and arms control issues must be negotiated simultaneously. Nonetheless, it is important to caution that although a dual peace and arms control process is important, the WMDFZ will have to be negotiated even if a comprehensive peace agreement has not yet been reached in the region (at least to start) .

It is also important to understand the WMFZ negotiations in the context of other international disarmament and arms control processes such as ratification of the CTBT, other biological, chemical and nuclear treaties, the UN Programme of Action on small arms, and IAEA inspections. Compliance with these measures are essential in order to increase confidence in regional security and trust in the preparatory process (which is sure to be long) leading to the creation of the zone.

The time is now for honest and robust efforts towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Such a zone will have positive ramifications for the region and the world at large by eliminating the option of the antiquated Cold War-style nuclear deterrence for ‘mutually assured destruction.’ It’s time for all stakeholders to be held accountable and for a transparent framework that limits the dangerous double standard and acceleration of tensions that currently exist.

–Katherine Prizeman

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