Tag Archives: Rule of law

Briefing Note: The Rule of Law and Complementary Mandates

19 Oct

The peaceful settlement of disputes was the theme of this year’s plenary on the Rule of Law (RoL) in the Sixth Committee. As per Article 33 of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, when there is a dispute likely to affect international peace and security, the parties involved shall try to resolve the dispute by pursuing “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”[i]

Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliason highlighted that RoL is essential in the peaceful settlement of disputes and noted that Article 33 could help with the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Reference was made throughout the plenary to the 2012 High Level Declaration on Rule of Law, which reaffirmed previous commitments on RoL and its importance in advancing peace and security, human rights and development issues.[ii]

Member states are placing emphasis on RoL within the post-2015 development agenda as well as within the current Millennium Development Goals, and highlighted links between RoL and gender equality, focusing especially on women’s participation in peace processes.

Argentina promoted the right to truth and reparations as essential elements to combat impunity, Kenya questioned the relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and supporting states’ parties, the Nordic countries noted the significance of RoL in preventing mass atrocity crimes, and Liechtenstein called the recent political bias against the ICC unfair given the limitations imposed on the Court by the contemporary international legal order.

Attention was given to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which is significant in resolving disputes among states, but only if states accept its jurisdiction. Switzerland, with the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the UK is working on a draft document to facilitate some of these jurisdiction issues. Liechtenstein reassured delegations that the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is not meant to be a violation of sovereignty, but a step toward sovereign equality.

Moreover, the African Group called for equality in the application of international law to avoid double standards and called for reform of the Security Council (SC) and other international instruments. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) voiced its concern about SC mandates that encroach on prerogatives of the GA, as well as the SC’s willingness to take on issues already within the purview of the GA. The NAM called for more collaboration among relevant UN organs to ensure that the entire Organization is responding to emerging challenges.

In conclusion, references between RoL and issues such as gender and development are more than welcomed especially since women’s active participation in peace processes is promoted by the SC in Resolution 1325 and women’s political participation is to be discussed during the 68th session of the Third Committee.

Moreover, Article 33 is particularly relevant to the third pillar of RtoP, which places emphasis on Ch.6 of the UN Charter, before resorting to collective coercive action under Ch.7. While support for Ch.6 is welcomed and promoted by GAPW and others, one cannot help but wonder how these measures can be strengthened to ensure disputes are resolved effectively and in time-sensitive manner? Shouldn’t it be a matter of ensuring that the existing tools are effective and efficient to minimize the civilian casualties targeted as violence unfolds?

Furthermore, the separation of the SC and GA mandates is a complex issue that affects RoL, disarmament and women peace and security debates, housed in the Sixth, First and Third Committees and can also be found on the SC agenda. It is disputable where these issues are better served. Arguably, it can be significant for the SC to throw its weight behind these thematics because it reinforces their importance for international peace and security. In contrast, it is generally known that the SC’s work on thematics is not always consistent and they might be better taken up under country-specific considerations in the SC’s agenda. It has always been GAPW’s mandate to highlight complementarity between different processes and thematics because issues do not exist in a vacuum. But when it comes to process and scope of mandates, a question rises to what extent is complementarity useful to the issues and to what extent it raises the political stakes for implementation?

Finally, calls were made for follow-up meetings to the High Level meeting on RoL. We will stay involved to see how this develops, if and how these calls for separation of mandates will be reconciled and the extent to which they should be separate.

– Melina Lito, Legal Adviser on UN Affairs

 

The Sixth Committee Talks Terrorism

10 Oct

The Sixth Committee (hereinafter 6C) of the General Assembly opened this week with measures to eliminate international terrorism as the first agenda item. The general discussion focused on a wide-range of issues, including support for the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and convening a high-level conference under UN auspices. Member states noted the significance of international law, especially international humanitarian law (IHL), international refugee law (IRL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in combating terrorism. In this regard, member states emphasized that terrorism is not affiliated with any particular race, ethnic group or religion, and a distinction should be made between terrorism and the legitimate struggle for people’s self-determination.

In addition, the importance of strong rule of law mechanisms was recognized as well as more attention on the financing of terrorism and ransom payments. References were also made to arms proliferation including support for the Arms Trade Treaty.  Moreover, welcomed attention was given not only to relevant General Assembly Resolutions, but to the Security Council and the sanctions committees, especially regarding the listing/de-listing process. Finally, Liechtenstein noted in its statement the complementarity between the work of the Security Council, General Assembly, the Secretariat and the contributions of the 6C therein. Given the forthcoming counterterrorism discussion in the GA plenary, Liechtenstein suggested that the 6C consider the terrorism agenda item on a biannual basis so as not to overlap with the GA’s agenda.

Procedurally, one of the main items considered in this agenda was the adoption of a working group, which ultimately failed to be adopted.

The General Assembly had recommended the creation of a working group in 2013 to both facilitate the drafting of a convention and carry on discussions about the high level conference.[i] The working group was also recommended by the ad hoc committee in its report to the 6C.[ii] The ad hoc committee was created in 1996 to “elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings” and nuclear terrorism; this would build on existing instruments and develop “a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism.”[iii] In 2000, the Committee’s mandate on the convention was extended and the conference was added as an agenda item “to formulate a joint organized response of the international community to terrorism.”[iv] In 2012, A/RES/67/99 extended the Committee’s mandate with a report due to the 68th session.[v]

The report provides draft text for the preamble and articles 1, 2, and 4-27, which address jurisdiction issues, conflict of laws, extradition, adopting relevant domestic legislation, etc.  Speaking as Vice Chair of the ad hoc committee, Guatemala noted that while the committee provided an opportunity to engage in discussions, they were not able to reach a conclusion. More political will is necessary to address the challenges. In its statement, South Africa raised concerns about continuing to hold meetings especially in instances when consensus has not been reached; nevertheless South Africa hopes that consensus will be facilitated before next year.

From the report, it appears that one of the outstanding issues surrounds the scope of the convention, including the definition of terrorism, the actions of the state military, and actions of “armed forces” vs. that of “parties,” etc.[vi] Regarding the conference, the objective is to increase political support for negotiation of the convention.[vii] While there doesn’t seem to be much opposition to the conference per se, there appears to be a preference among delegations to hold it after negotiations are completed.[viii]

Overall, most welcomed are the references to human rights especially since the right to self-determination is provided for in appropriate human rights instruments including the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively. References to the ATT are of course welcomed, but it is important to also give attention to complementary instruments like the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, which provides for commitments to eradicate, prevent and combat the illicit flow of small arms. Procedurally, it remains to be seen how this agenda item will develop and to what extent there will be more coordination and collaboration with the GA plenary.

–          Melina Lito, Legal Adviser on UN Affairs

ENDNOTES


[i] A/RES/67/99, OP.24.

[ii] A/68/37, para. 12.

[iii] A/RES/51/210, OP.9.

[iv] A/RES/54/110, OP. 12.

[v] A/RES/67/99, OP. 25 and 29.

[vi] A/68/37, para. 23-29.

[vii] A/68/37, para. 37.

[viii] A/68/37, para. 39.

Care over Imprisonment: Alternatives to Detention of Migrant Children

5 Oct

Editors Note:   GAPW actively covered and, where possible, participated in the General Assembly’s High Level Segment on Migration and Development.   It was a particularly rich engagement, highlighting many critical security issues, including the increasing militarization of borders and criminalizing of migrants.  Tereza Steinhublova from the Czech Republic, who has had direct experience working with migrants in the UK, offers this analysis of an event focused on the needs of migrant children. 

In countries all over the world hundreds of thousands of people are being held in detention centers due to not having proper documentation or legal status in the country. This problem applies to migrants and refugees as well as asylum seekers. In many cases, people are detained for long or indefinite periods of time in cells, just as if they were criminals. They are not allowed to leave, and visits are limited.

The United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development was held at the UN Headquarters in New York on October 3rd and 4th, 2013. On October 2nd the International Detention Coalition (IDC), with the support of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Government of Liechtenstein, held a side-event titled Expert Meeting on Alternatives to the Immigration Detention of Children. The meeting had two main areas of focus – the legal framework for protecting children who face immigration detention, and the discussion of suitable alternatives to child detention, including a specific example from Belgium.

In opening remarks, Ms. Jyoty Sanghera, Chief of the Human Rights and Economic and Social Issues Section of the OHCHR, explained that detention centers are often run by police or prison authorities who lack appropriate training. Moreover, detention facilities rarely provide the necessary protection migrants require, such as basic healthcare, access to psychological help and legal assistance with their cases. This becomes even more of an issue for vulnerable groups such as children, especially if they are unaccompanied, because they easily become targets of violence. Mr. Francis Crépeau, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, provided a well-structured presentation on how child detention contributes to the violation of children’s rights as set out by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  Both Mr. Crépeau and Mr. Grant Mitchell, the Director of the International Detention Coalition, emphasized that the detention of children can never serve their best interests. Mr. Crépeau also explained the effects of detention on children through a legal lens, noting that unaccompanied children are sometimes detained in adult facilities due to an incorrect age assessment in the immigration procedure upon arrival.

While studying at the University of Kent I volunteered with the Kent Refugee Action Network, which provides mentoring for unaccompanied young asylum seekers. In some cases, even if the person had been living in the country for a relatively long period of time and was granted asylum, psychological trauma was still something they battled. In many cases the migration journey itself is very stressful and even traumatizing. Being placed in prison-like conditions can further contribute to emotional stress. (Even if children are detained together with their families, the family often becomes separated by gender.) These children can become targets of violence, including sexual violence, which has serious negative effects on their psychological and overall well-being. In addition, children who leave detention centers are rarely provided with adequate care and often end up destitute. For these reasons many groups, such as the IDC, have begun to push for alternatives to detention, which would decrease the suffering of people in transition.

If so much evidence exists that detention centers are an inappropriate response, why do states continue to detain migrants? Mr. Crépeau explained that states often justify the confinement of migrants mainly in security terms or as a deterrent. However, he also stressed that there is no empirical evidence that detention deters irregular migration or discourages asylum seekers. Mr. Mitchell explained that asylum seekers awaiting a decision are much less likely to flee and therefore detention is unnecessary. Unfortunately, in many countries migrants are both criminalized and stigmatized, which contributes to xenophobia and fuels the growth of extreme right-wing activity.

What are suitable alternatives to detention? All panelists agreed on the primary responsibility to care, with most emphasis placed on case management, guardians and open family units. Mr. Crépeau argued that the state needs to respect the basic rights of children, such as the right to education, adequate housing and medical care, which cannot be achieved in detention. He argued that in cases where whole families are detained, the family should be eligible for alternative measures such as a supervised release or required reporting. Mr. Mitchell noted that many states have taken positive steps towards the reduction of detention facilities, such as implementing new laws that prohibit child detention, listing Panama, Belgium, Japan, Mexico, China, Venezuela, Australia and Sweden as examples. Mr. Mitchell explained that many countries are being innovative in dealing with migrant children who are alone. In the Philippines, for instance, children are placed into the family welfare system while their case is being processed. Similarly, in the Netherlands, children are assigned guardians from NGOs who then provide them with basic care.

Mr. Bertrand de Crombrugghe (whose surname turned out to be the biggest linguistic challenge at the meeting!!) explained how Belgium has been successful in implementing the alternative system of ‘open family units.’ The units have received international recognition by the UNHCR, the Council of Europe, as well as some states. Belgium has been using this system for regular migrants since 2008, and in 2009 they extended it to include asylum-seeking families as well. The open family unit system involves the placement of families into individual houses intended for temporary stay while they await the resolution of their case. Unlike detention centers, family units allow the family the freedom of movement. Most importantly, families are in contact with supporting officers who provide assistance towards a tangible outcome to their situation – a legal right to remain or a voluntary return home. Families are also given other necessary support such as legal assistance and logistical and medical support.  Unaccompanied minors are placed into the care of a guardian who serves a similar purpose as the supporting officer, but also accompanies the child to necessary legal proceedings.

What some states fail to recognize is that alternatives to detention would not only benefit the migrants themselves, but also the state budget. Mr. Mitchell explained that alternative measures tend to be on average 80% cheaper than detention facilities. Mr. de Crombrugghe noted that family units bear a lower cost to the Belgian state than detention facilities. All panelists stressed the need for continuous development and dialogue on alternatives to detention.

Overall the event was very well organized and although technical difficulties prevented the screening of the short film titled The Invisible Picture Show, all panelists provided well-structured arguments on the need for alternatives to detention. It was motivating to attend such an event, especially since the numbers of migrants are at high levels and difficult matters such as this are often not given enough attention by the international community.

 Tereza Steinhublova

 

Pride and Prejudice: Human Frailty and the Irreversibility of Capital Punishment

30 Jun

On Friday, June 28 the UN held its second annual event to highlight key elements of efforts to eliminate the death penalty as a viable punitive option for states.   The event sought to call specific attention to the problem of wrongful convictions, a problem impacting many attempts to punish violators of the law, but especially in instances of capital crimes, as there is simply no way to reverse punishment which results in loss of life.

As UN Secretary General, Ban ki-Moon noted in his opening remarks, there have been welcome efforts in several countries (and in some US states) to reduce and/or eliminate the practice of capital punishment.   However, the practice still exists in a number of member states, and there is concern that others might be tempted to roll back hard commitments to eliminate this practice, something that this event was designed to help avoid.  The SG wisely called for a “series debate” on capital punishment in those states that have so far refused to abolish capital punishment.

The event was organized by the Office for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and provided an excellent case study as to why wrongful convictions are so problematic in countries that sanction at least the possibility of executions. The event featured a film clip of “West of Memphis,” the critically acclaimed documentary that follows the events of the so-called “West Memphis Three,” who were arrested for the murders of three 8-year old children in 1993 and imprisoned more than 18 years, before being released with the introduction of new DNA evidence. One of those wrongfully convicted, Damien Echols, who was actually sentenced to death, was among the experts on the panel, along with his attorney.  His reflections on treatment he received at the hands of Arkansas prosecutors, prison guards and others was a chilling reminder of how sloppy police work leads to wrongful convictions and a host of subsequent abusive practices.

One of the important contributions of this event is the degree to which legal prosecutions are potentially compromised by a host of factors – including the careers of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, persons occupying important professional positions who maintain uncomfortably ‘cozy’ relationships in some US states and other countries.  “We’ve never sent an innocent person to prison,” we have heard from law enforcement officials,” a refrain that continues even after DNA evidence contradicts original judicial findings.  Especially in high profile cases, the emotional and political pressure to convict often exceeds the evidence with which to convict.  As more than one speaker at the event noted, judges and prosecutors don’t get re-elected because they set people free.  They get re-elected by putting people behind bars — whether they deserve to be there or not.

In many life circumstances, we encounter people who have strong convictions based on flimsy evidence.  The need to ‘make up one’s mind’ trumps the need to make the best judgment possible based on existing evidence.   A corollary to this is the unwillingness to allow judgments once made to adapt to changing circumstances.   Parents, for instance, often make good decisions about the way to raise their pre-school child, but some of these decisions will inevitably and rightly evolve as the child moves through stages of development.  Mature judgments are held hostage neither by pride nor prejudice, but by the need to make the best possible choices based on shifting circumstances.

This tendency to ‘rush to judgment’ coupled with a compelling need to defend such judgments and maintain career reputations make for a shaky circumstance when it comes to any policy work, but even more when it comes to capital punishments. The more any punishment approaches irreversibility, the higher the guarantees we must offer regarding the objectivity and integrity of trials.   All relevant evidence gathering must be encouraged and then heeded even once an initial judgment is rendered.   In criminal matters, it seems ironic that opportunities for identifying and overturning wrongful convictions were provided not so much by jurists but by scientists working on DNA coding.  Some of that scientific discipline – specifically the ability to resist reaching past the limits of available, credible evidence – should be mandatory for criminal justice professionals as well.

GAPW remains deeply concerned about the trend in so many areas of policy to blatantly taint sound judgment with personal pride and institutional prejudice.  In the case of capital punishment, we will continue to engage strong partners – especially FIACAT and the World Coalition against the Death Penalty – as part of broader efforts to ensure that flexible, evidence-based policy becomes the norm in both domestic and international contexts.

 

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

17 Apr

For the last two weeks (9-18 April 2013), states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been meeting at The Hague for the third CWC Review Conference. The CWC, adopted in 1993 and now comprised of 188 states parties, has been hailed a success by many disarmament civil society advocates and member states alike for setting a high multilateral disarmament standard. In particular, the CWC’s robust verification regime implemented through the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been identified as the type of verification measure that should be required for all comprehensive and universal disarmament measures, namely a similar convention on nuclear weapons.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was on hand to deliver opening remarks to the Review Conference and urged complete chemical weapons disarmament before the next meeting scheduled for 2018. Also noteworthy, non-governmental organizations addressed a CWC Review Conference for the first time in an official plenary setting.

The previous two CWC Review Conferences (Rev Con), as well as the current third session, are mandated by the Treaty itself to “undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific or technological developments.” This Rev Con, covered capably by colleagues at The Hague (see: cbw-events.org.uk for up-to-date and current analysis and summary), has seen the emergence of some several themes, some more contentious than others. As reported by colleagues present at the Rev Con, some of the important issues arising from the current debate include

Syria

As expected, the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria has been treated at the Rev Con. The government of Syria, which is not a CWC state party, has requested that the Secretary-General investigate allegations of use by the rebel groups. The Syrian government submitted allegations of chemical weapons use by rebel groups on 20 May. However, the investigation has not yet taken place nor the investigating team dispatched to Syria. Allegations concerning both parties in the conflict have ultimately complicated and delayed the investigation. States parties have been debating how precisely to treat this issue in the forthcoming Final Document. It remains to be seen how this current issue will appear in the document.

Post-Destruction Era

As set forth in the Convention, all chemical weapons were to be destroyed within ten years of entry-into-force of the Treaty (29 April 2007) with a possible extension of five years. This original deadline has not been met. A “Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 2012” taken by the Conference of States Parties (CSP) in 2011 refers to the states parties Libya, Russia, and the United States that have not yet fully destroyed their remaining stockpiles. This decision requires that these possessor states report (albeit in closed sessions) to each regular session of the Executive Council on measures undertaken to accelerate progress or overcome problems related to destruction programs. As these issues of destruction are particularly sensitive, these discussions have been challenging to engage. Nevertheless, it has been argued by some NGO colleagues that it is not a lack of political will that has been inhibiting destruction and that states parties with existing stocks have, in fact, been working towards destruction. Rather, technical and economic reasons have been identified as the main contributors to the delay in destruction activities.

Furthermore, given that stakeholders are now discussing a ‘post-destruction era’, the future role of the OPCW is being debated. The responsibilities of verification, consultation, and cooperation will inevitably be shifted as universal destruction of all existing chemical weapons is fully realized over the next (hopefully) few years.

Advancements in Science and Technology

Article XI of the Convention concerning economic and technological development has also been addressed. Wide recognition that the CWC must keep pace with scientific and technological developments is clear and the work of the Scientific Advisory Board has been specifically underscored. Such “future-proofing” of the CWC is an important component of its long-term success in maintaining a world free of chemical weapons.

The CWC in the Context of Multilateral Disarmament Failures

The success of the chemical weapons regime is encouraging in the broader disarmament field that often struggles with a lack of consensus and a deficit of political will necessary to eliminate such egregious weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that elimination of an entire category of WMD is possible through universal participation and robust verification. This helpful and successful strategy must be vigorously pursued in other disarmament contexts.

The current stalemate that seems almost endemic to various parts of the UN disarmament machinery—the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament—as well as other perceived failures in multilateral disarmament such as the slow progress made in implementing the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan and the failure to convene a 2012 conference on a Middle Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made so-called “successes” in disarmament difficult to come by. Nevertheless, the hope is that the CWC will be just the first of many future multilateral disarmament instruments that strengthen the rule of law and eliminate such heinous weapons with the potential to wreak unthinkable havoc on humanity.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

Looking to the Future of the ATT and Shifting Attention to Implementation

3 Apr

After more than a decade of advocating for and working towards a robust and comprehensive arms trade treaty (ATT), relevant stakeholders can now mark a conclusion to the first step in this process. This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the human suffering caused by the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—is prevented to the greatest extent possible.

Adoption of the treaty text

Last week, delegates to the “Final Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty” were unable to adopt, by consensus, an ATT due to formal objections by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRPK), Iran, and Syria. But the text was brought to a vote on Tuesday, 2 April through a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution sponsored by more than 100 states. An overwhelming majority of UN member states voted in favor of this resolution, thus adopting the ATT text. The final tally was an overwhelming 154 states in favor, 23 abstentions, and three votes against (DPRK, Iran, and Syria).

The adoption of the ATT at the conclusion of these two weeks, even if it was a few days after the close of the Diplomatic Conference, was surely due in part to the strong leadership and good management of the President of the Conference, Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. Ambassador Woolcott was able to bring forth a text that had enough support to garner easy passage quickly in the UNGA.

However, not all states were satisfied enough with the text to vote in favor of its adoption. After Tuesday’s vote, the so-called “skeptics” reiterated their well-known concerns and opposition to the text, noting substantive omissions and dissatisfaction with the process. The delegations of Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela were among those that took to the floor to offer explanations of vote (EOV).

Several of these delegations continued to regret the absence of a prohibition against the transfer of arms to unauthorized non-state actors, references to the principle of self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation, an independent section dedicated to definitions, and an accountability mechanism for exporting states. These states also expressed dissatisfaction with the overall imbalance of the text in the favor of exporters and, thereby, the possibility for political manipulation. The Russian delegate reiterated his delegation’s specific concern over the language of article 6(3) related to the knowledge-based test for atrocity crimes. Moreover, the delegations of Ecuador and Pakistan warned against attempts to re-define consensus and the Egyptian and Chinese delegations warned against setting a precedent of forcing a UNGA vote in such processes. Many of these delegations also noted that they would reserve the right to re-examine the text and its possible implementation back in their capitals.

On the other hand, many states expressed robust support for future development of the ATT and its strong implementation, support that will be crucial for the ATT’s future effectiveness. A statement from a diverse group of 98 states, delivered by the delegation of Mexico, noted, “At the beginning of this process we set out to make a real difference in people’s lives. This continues to be our commitment, which we will carry out through the implementation of this Treaty.” Indeed, “making a difference” is the sincere hope of this Treaty. Thus, attention must now shift to implementation. These 98 states also reinforced their commitment to making the Treaty stronger through implementation. In addition, the original “co-authors” of the first ATT resolution in the UNGA—Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the UK—also offered a joint statement noting that adoption of the text is just “one landmark” and the responsibility to support implementation remains.

Looking back over the process

The ATT text represents a convergence, albeit a compromised one, of the majority view that the arms industry needs regulation in the form of a legally-binding instrument. Undoubtedly, the text and the process that came before it have represented the emergence of new international norms that the transfer of arms must be denied when there is serious risk of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and when there is a likelihood that such arms would undermine peace and security. Furthermore, the undertaking of the ATT process has also underscored the need for greater transparency and accountability in the arms trade, bringing it out of the shadows and more prominently in the public domain. It is clear that the ATT writ large has been a worthy endeavor, if flawed, in attempting to consolidate the international drive towards these goals. The treaty has the potential to serve as a useful tool to continue to work towards these goals of reducing risk and increasing some levels of transparency.

Nevertheless, despite the good will of many of the stakeholders that have been dedicated to this process over the last decade, undisputed victory cannot be claimed. The text is not the ideal iteration of what an ATT could be or even the version that the group of 116 states called for in a joint statement during the second week of the Final Conference. These states called for a treaty with a comprehensive scope of items and activities, reflective of existing international legal obligations and norms, and one that enhances transparency and prohibits the transfer of arms when there is “substantial” risk of serious violations of international law, including IHL and IHRL or risk of diversion. Unfortunately, the text’s provisions do not live up to these standards nor fulfill the calls from the vast majority of the governments, international organizations, and civil society groups. This is, of course, in part due to the tremendous compromising power of consensus.

Indeed, the text that has been adopted is a product of a consensus process whereby progressive states had to compromise to keep certain states “on board” with the final product. Any process that is subject to this constraint will indubitably be forced much closer to the lowest common denominator than the highest aspirations, even if the majority of states support the latter. The ATT process has been no exception, with the concerns and interests of a few states being reflected despite opposition from most other states (in particular, the retention of “overriding risk” and the exclusion of ammunition/munitions and parts and components from the full scope of the treaty).

The question becomes: is the text that has been adopted going to, in practice, not only set norms and goals, but positively change arms transfer policy so that it will make a difference in the lives of those who suffer armed conflict and armed violence? Ultimately, the jury is still out. As many states and civil society representatives have noted, the adoption of a treaty is not a victory in-and-of-itself, but step one of a longer process. The real work of evaluating its impact will have to begin immediately. Therefore, the work of the Conference of States Parties (CSP), the national implementation of treaty obligations, and the ongoing interpretation and implementation of its provisions will be all the more important.

A final look at the text

Many significant issues remain unchanged and new ambiguities have been introduced, making the treaty much less reflective of the majority opinion of states and more reflective of minority interests. Nevertheless, positive aspects of the treaty deserve underscoring in terms of looking forward to implementation:

  • Ammunitions/munitions, parts, and components are covered by prohibitions and export assessment, and are required to be regulated by national control systems.
  • Prohibitions have been set forth that require denial of authorization of transfers if there is knowledge that such arms would be used for the commission of mass atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes and attacks against civilians.
  • Binding criteria for export assessment include if the transfer would undermine peace and security, facilitate serious violations of IHL or IHRL, acts of terrorism, or acts relating to organized transnational crime. Moreover, the text also includes a binding criterion for preventing gender-based violence (GBV). States shall not be permitted to authorize the transfer where there is an “overriding risk” the weapons will be used to commit or facilitate GBV.
  • A detailed article on diversion lays forth measures that states parties should take in cooperating with one another in order to address diversion risks and enhance the practice of effective anti-diversion measures.
  • States parties involved in transfers must take measures to prevent diversion of items in the scope.
  • The provisions on international cooperation encourages that states parties jointly support others in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures pursuant to the treaty. Likewise, states parties are encouraged to provide assistance in concrete areas related to the arms trade, notably stockpile management, model legislation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR).
  • The CSP has the ability to review implementation of the treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arm as well as to consider issues arising from the interpretation of the treaty. This thus allows, at least in a limited fashion, that the treaty can be adjusted to respond to evolving technological and security advances.
  • Amendments can be adopted, as a “last resort,” by a three-fourths majority should adoption by consensus fail.

Despite the retention of these positive provisions, some loopholes and weaknesses still remain that will continue to pose challenges in the implementation of the ATT. These weaknesses and loopholes will have to be dealt with, to the greatest extent possible, during the follow-up meetings of the CSP.

  • Ammunition/munitions and parts and components are not covered by the obligations under import, brokering, transit or trans-shipment, or reporting.
  • The “floor” of the definitions of the items in the scope is limited to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and “other relevant United Nations instruments” at the time of entry-into-force and, therefore, states can “freeze” definitions established more than two decades prior.
  • Non-commercial activities such as gifts, loans, and leases are not expressly covered under the definition of “transfer.”
  • There is no explicit prohibition against transfers that would violate human rights.
  • Inclusion of the term “overriding risk” ostensibly allows states to proceed with a transfer even if there is substantial risk of violations of IHL or IHRL if there is some other risk (political, economic, or otherwise) is noted to “override” these risks.
  • References to socio-economic development and corrupt practices were dropped from export assessment criteria.
  • When states parties become aware of new information, they are not required to revoke or suspend an authorization, but are merely “encouraged to reassess the authorization” after possible consultations with the importing state.
  • Public reporting is not mandatory and states parties can exclude any information deemed “sensitive” from a national security standpoint from reports to the Secretariat.

Moving Forward

The time for substantive improvements of the text has passed. In moving forward with the ATT process, attention must shift to implementation and interpretation in order to ensure that the robust provisions that have been adopted are implemented in the best and most consistent way, while those that are still weak are not allowed to limit the overall effectiveness of the Treaty. Indeed, this is only the beginning of evaluating the ATT’s effectiveness.

This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the negative consequences of the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—are limited to the greatest extent possible. As noted by the group of 98 states in its joint statement following adoption of the text, “The hard work starts now. We must secure the rapid entry into force of this historic Treaty and implement it as soon as possible.”

 

—Katherine Prizeman

After the Spotlight: Following Post-Election Kenya

1 Apr

On 26 March 2013, The World Policy Institute and Fireside Research presented After the Spotlight: Following Post-Election Kenya, a panel discussion featuring, via skype from Kenya, John Githongo, CEO of Inuka Kenya Ltd. and Kwame Owino, CEO of the Institute of Economic Affairs. The panel discussion was moderated by Eddie Mandhry, Associate Director of NYU Africa House, and hosted by Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP in New York City.

The panel discussion intended to investigate the challenges arising from the most recent elections in Kenya, particularly in the light of the domestic, regional and global complications of the 2007 elections. With over 1000 people dead, 350,000 people displaced, and the mass violence that erupted in the 2007 elections, this discussion was pertinent to the goals and mission of Global Action to Prevent War, which seeks to address broad themes and issues related to human security in diverse global regions.

On 4 March 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected as President and Deputy President Elect of Kenya, respectively. Kenyatta, who is the son of the first Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, has been accused by the International Criminal Court of committing crimes against humanity in the 2007 elections. President Elect Kenyatta has since been summoned to The Hague for such indictment of war crimes. Furthermore, in 2010, Kenya became party to the Rome Statute.

The panel discussion began with outlining the importance of ethnicity and identity in Kenyan politics. According to Githongo, this election has been the most important election in Kenyan history since its independence as it marks a new constitution based on so-called “Western liberal models.” Moreover, a new voting procedure was put in place. This included a high-tech biometric voter registration system, on which $250 million was spent, and the electoral provinces were expanded from 8 to 47 providing for new positions and constituencies to encourage free and fair elections and greater representativeness. In this same vein, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan founded the Election Management Body Policy, which seeks to address arising problems as well as to prevent election-related violence.

Unfortunately, the digital portion of the election failed. The IEBC, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the so-called contracted election “watchdog,” claimed that the new biometric voter identification system failed. However, opposition parties claim that this was a conspiracy to rig the elections. The two main opposition parties have since contested the results of the election, and, as a result, the official results are still pending.

QUESTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS IN KENYA:

  • So far, many governments from the international community have already called President Elect Uhuru Kenyatta to congratulate him on the elections. These governments include China and other African Nations. Given this, if the Kenyan Supreme Court upholds Kenyatta’s election, what are the implications for an indictment against Kenyatta by the ICC? What if Kenyatta fails to present himself to the ICC?
  • If the Supreme Court does not uphold Kenyatta’s election, another election will need to be held within 60 days. Does Kenya have enough money to do so?  Even more so, does the country have the capacity to do so?
  • If Kenyatta is confirmed, do we suspect there to be violence?
  • Are the institutions that were responsible for this election facing court charges for their handling of the elections?
  • What kind of media was used during the Kenyan elections? Was this majority negative or positive?
  • What kind of campaign was conducted before the elections?

RESPONSES

In the event that the Supreme Court decides on a run-off, the question of who will run the election will be tantamount. Githongo made it very clear that Kenya does not have the capacity to run another election within 60 days following the results of the Supreme Court decision. He stated that perhaps the international community could step in to run a second election, but likewise warned that Kenyans may see this as imperialist sentimentalism, which is already a sensitive issue in Kenya. Therefore, having the international community intervene in this matter may not be a viable option either. He also noted that the Kenyan people have the will and capacity to carry out the elections if necessary, but that they do not have sufficient technological capacity necessary to do so.

Githongo argued that since politics in Kenya have been organized around ethnic lines, this election has consolidated such ethnic-based attitudes even further. Furthermore, there is an ethnic divide among the Kenyan leadership that includes ethnic supremacy and entitlement. The “losers” of the 2007 and 2013 elections continue to feel exclusion from the leadership system and continue to feel as though there has been insufficient justice in the matter. This obviously also increases the likelihood of violence.

Githongo described the silence of the Kenyan people as powerful and that it speaks to the narratives that were cultivated along ethnic lines during the previous election. According to Githongo, there is a “narrative of exclusion” that constitutes an emphasis on numbers such that if an individual is not a part of the right numbers, then one’s vote does not count.

Githongo also explained that the ICC has played a huge role in the external messages of the elections, which has created a dichotomous relationship based on whether or not one supports the ICC. According to Githongo, these messages have been relayed quite simply as: “If you do not support the ICC, then you are not a nationalist and if you support the ICC, then you are an imperialist.” The campaigns were structured in such a way that communicated to citizens that they were not voting against an individual, but rather against the country or against the Western forces.

Githongo stated that it is important to speak about the role the media has played in the coverage of this election. Since the media was accused in 2007 of fueling the violence that ensued post-elections, it is now over-compensating by being ‘overly-cautious’ not to report, on the even “soft violence,” which is happening across the country. It would seem that the media is censoring itself.

Overall, Githongo stated that this election has caused Kenya to revert backwards in terms of its democratization process. Additionally, there is a worry that in the future, depending on the outcome of the ICC trials and the Supreme Court decision, on whether or not to uphold Kenyatta and Ruto’s victory.

It is expected that the incoming government will have to take Kenya out of what Githingo described as a “hole.” Addressing this “hole” is imperative as Kenya is geopolitically important to the international community and global economy. With the discovery of coal, oil and many other mineral elements, it has been argued that the Kenyan private and financial sector is positioned to take off in terms of capital formation, the quality of education and human capital, and skilled labor within the workforce, particularly with regards to financial services.

 

****Since this panel discussion, the Kenyan Supreme Court has upheld the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto even with the former’s impending summons to The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

 

–Shari Smith, Intern GAPW

Cross-Cutting Discussion in UNSC on Protection of Civilians

16 Feb

On Tuesday, 12 February, the Security Council held an open debate on the issue of “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” Currently holding the presidency of the Council, the Republic of Korea’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade hosted the debate, while both Council members and non-members weighed in on the international community’s responsibility to protect unarmed populations victimized by parties to a conflict either intentionally or as an unintended consequences of fighting. The Secretary-General addressed the Council highlighting Afghanistan, Mali, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan as examples of instances where civilians in large numbers continue to suffer. He also called out the conflict in Syria as a stark case of the “searing reminder of the human cost of war.” The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Navi Pillay, also briefed the Council and took the opportunity to highlight the dire situation for civilians in Syria calling on the Security Council to act immediately and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. The Director of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also addressed the Council and chose to focus on three priorities in the context of protection of civilians (PoC)—threats to access to healthcare; the availability and use of arms; and the lack of compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) by state and non-state actors.

Many delegates underscored the importance of the role of the Security Council in protecting civilians in conflict, in particular ensuring that peacekeeping operations, “where appropriate,” were mandated to play a part in prioritizing PoC and allocating resources commensurate with the circumstances. The discourse among the more than 70 speakers revealed that there remains a myriad of obstacles in conflict-affected communities as the international community seeks to address the difficult challenge of the responsibility to protect civilians when governments and parties cannot meet those obligations. The primary responsibility for the protection of civilians, it was reasserted, does lie with states, although, as the Secretary-General noted in his remarks, the obligation to protect civilians in conflict “does not rest solely with warring parties: we all have a responsibility to protect.” There was, as expected, some concern expressed over the potential manipulation of PoC mandates for purposes of ‘regime’ change or military intervention. The Iranian delegate, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), pointed out this danger, while the Nicaraguan delegation called PoC a “lofty” concept that has been manipulated in Libya and now in Syria. Moreover, the delegate of Pakistan noted that any conflation of the concepts of PoC and the Responsibility to Protect norm (RtoP) was likewise dangerous especially from the standpoint of preserving the integrity of peacekeeping operations The discomfort with, and even opposition to, application of PoC by stakeholders external to national authorities continues to be an ongoing challenge as politicization of the concept must find balance with the humanitarian concerns on the ground.

The importance of addressing the issue of PoC in conflict is, in and of itself, a significant part of the work  of the Security Council given its mandate to maintain international peace and security as well as its responsibility in formulating the mandate and renewals for robust peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the cross-cutting nature of PoC also grants the issue particular importance within the often siloed landscape of the UN system and its varied stakeholders. As noted by the delegate of Costa Rica, options for response to complex obligations with protection mandates must also become more diverse, including establishing early alert mechanisms, providing support for national authorities in protecting civilians, and providing assistance for the functioning of security-related and rule of law bodies. Related issues, including but not limited to the illicit trade and movement of small arms, violence against women and other gender-based violence, were also highlighted as key components of a comprehensive and effective PoC strategy. In light of the upcoming 57th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), some delegations chose to highlight the importance of this session’s thematic priority in this PoC context—violence against women and girls. Other security-related priorities such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), application of the RtoP norm, as well as the use of explosive weapons in populated areas all were made manifest during the discussion underscoring that any robust and effective human security agenda requires recognition of the linkages among different priorities.

As already noted, the forthcoming “Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty” set for 18-28 March received some attention during the debate beginning with the Secretary-General who referenced the poorly regulated trade in arms calling the free flow of weapons a significant contributor to violence against civilians. Likewise, the delegations of the ICRC, Australia, Egypt, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Uruguay, Sweden, Costa Rica, Tanzania, Lithuania, Mexico, Guatemala, and Montenegro were among those delegations that referenced the upcoming ATT negotiations in the context of PoC. Most of these delegations chose to highlight the importance of incorporating the concept of protecting civilians in the future ATT codifying circumstances where arms transfers should be denied should there be a risk that such weapons would be used to violate human rights, IHL, or otherwise harm civilians. The ICRC rightly called for an instrument that incorporates strict transfer criteria covering all categories of conventional weapons.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas was also an issue raised by several delegations in the context of PoC as the indiscriminate humanitarian consequences of such weapons cause extensive harm to civilians. As noted by a study from UNIDIR’s Maya Brehm, explosive weapons have been shown to be a key threat to health care access, contributor to destruction of houses and assets as well as have long-term impacts on socio-economic and human development. In 2009, the Secretary-General identified the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as a core challenge to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and also called for more systematic data collection and estimation of associated human costs. At this debate, the delegations of Australia, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Germany, Chile, Qatar, and Spain were among those delegations that identified the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as a threat to PoC. In particular, the delegate of Germany noted that the indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Syria “…often caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide impact in densely populated areas, remains the most appalling aspect of the Syrian conflict.”

In addition to verbal debate, the Council adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2013/2) that recognizes the importance of strict compliance with IHL, human rights law, and refugee law, supports strengthened work of the International Criminal Court and related mechanisms for fighting impunity and increasing accountability, promotes systematic monitoring of PoC in conflict situations, and protects the unhindered access of humanitarian workers in situations of armed conflict. It is clear that such a discussion is useful not only for a better understanding of the concept of PoC and its practical application in situations of conflict, but also in allowing the international community to reflect on the multi-faceted nature of security and the need to effectively tackle multiple agenda items in an integrated and mutually-reinforcing manner. It is essential that issues such as violence against women and the use and availability of illicit arms are thought of as related aspects of the same security agenda, rather than concepts to always be taken up in isolated diplomatic fora.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

Security Council Open Debate on the Rule of Law: Challenges and Solutions

5 Feb

On Wednesday, 30 January, a brief “Open Debate on the Rule of Law” was held in the Security Council. There was not an extensive conversation by Council members or non-members of the Security Council. The meeting was called to order by the Pakistani Ambassador who currently holds the presidency this month, while UN Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, was invited to present a statement on the rule of law.

Rule of law is essentially meant to decrease conflict as well as decrease the probability of relapse into further conflict thereby directly contributing to both conflict resolution and recidivism prevention.

As a general theme, Mr. Eliasson reinforced the importance of promoting rule of law in international peace and security, as well as in conflict and post-conflict situations. By promoting and implementing international norms and standards, exemplary in 18 of the 23 current peacekeeping missions adopting provisions for the rule of law in their mandates, Mr. Eliasson reiterated the UN’s commitment to the advancing of the rule of law as formal international law.

The statement from the Deputy Secretary-General highlighted the Security Council’s approach, which compliments the mandates of the UNDP, UNHCR, and individual governments, in increasing the legitimacy of the rule of law.

Challenges

The Security Council recognizes the challenges of broad acceptance and implementation of the rule of law within peacekeeping operations, as well as the difficulties in measuring, collecting and analyzing data in areas of intervention. Better collection of baseline data also proves to be a challenge, especially in an environment where impact and change is difficult to measure, and where impact tends to be uneven. It can also be difficult to identify which factors can be credited in situations of success.

The UN Security Council believes that enhancing field leadership can be used to carry out, and measure programs in respective areas, through continued systematic collection and analyzing of data.

Solutions Identified by the Security Council

• Coordinate support to the field through UNDP and UNHCR area programs.
• Evaluate the impact of work already done and create baseline data to measure progress.
• Recognize and place more importance on national ownership.
• Increase data collection in conflict and post-conflict states to strengthen the rule of law.
• Increase planning and prioritize in order to mitigate future risks.

Examples of Progress Made Using Data Collected

• Thus far, UNDP has been working in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan to incorporate rule of law indicators such as, law enforcement and transformation measures.
• In Malawi, UNDP supported a baseline study, which has been used to shape the Government’s Democratic Governance Reform Strategy.
• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, data collected through public surveys have been used to develop National Transitional Justice Strategies.
• UNDP is expected to publish a “Users Guide to Measuring Rule of Law, Justice and Security Programs,” next year.
• The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UNHCR has developed the UN Rule of Law Indicators Project, which allows governments to gather information on law enforcement, the prison system and to measure and track changes over time.

Examples of Progress Made Through the United Nations, Individual Country and NGO Collaboration

• In Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Justice, in conjunction with the UN peacekeeping mission, has reopened 17 courts and 22 prisons.
• The UN stabilization mission in Haiti has opened 18 legal aid offices.
• The Serbian government, in conjunction with local NGOs, has provided 20, 000 Roma with official documents to prevent them from becoming stateless. Furthermore, 250 individuals have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and more than 120 individuals have been convicted.

Overall, the United Nations Security Council has taken a holistic approach to development, justice and security by including rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations, and by developing tools and systems to help states advance in this area. Continued collection of data will support national policymaking efforts as well as increase country responsibility, ownership and accountability. Current field initiatives are helping to deliver justice, and keep countries on track to building and achieving stability.

—Shari Smith

Shari is a new intern with Global Action for the spring semester.

Security Council Discusses Two Key Security Issues: Rule of Law and Middle East

25 Jan

Over the past week, the Security Council has engaged in two separate debates on thematic issues of critical importance to the broader human security agenda– the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies and the situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian question. One key highlight was the warning by the UK delegate on illegal arms smuggling into Syria that continues to feed the violence.

Our intern Helene Samson provides detailed reports on the meetings. Please see below.

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On 19 January 2012, the Security Council met to discuss the UN’s approach to transitional justice and the rule of law, a norm which is acknowledged by the UN Charter as a precondition to national and international peace and security, and remains a vital element for ensuring prosperity, sustainable development and reducing poverty in states. Although the UN intervention in war-torn states countries has helped in transitional justice, both the UN and national capacities still need to be strengthened given the growing corruption, lack of transparency, and accountability. The Council also reaffirmed its opposition to impunity for violations of international law and highlighted the responsibility of states to prosecute people responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the meeting by supporting the role of rule of law in monitoring armed conflicts, and the growing threat of transnational trafficking, and organized crimes. He further stressed also the necessity to reinforce the rule of law to protect civilians and vulnerable groups, such as women and children. He discussed reinforcing norms through transitional justice; building justice and security institutions to promote trust; and achieving justice for women and gender equality.

The delegations present expressed their respective commitments to rule of law. Rule of law was particularly influential in enhancing the capacity of civil society in the Arab Spring, evidenced in cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. India and Portugal both highlighted the need to eliminate state discriminatory laws that interfere with gender equality, equal rights and the full political participation of women. Indeed, children and women continue to represent one of the most vulnerable groups in armed conflicts. France suggested that ICC judicial decisions should be pursued steadily and consistently by states, when states are not willing to enforce criminal justice within their own domestic legal systems. Next, the UK voiced concerns that some member states have not recognized the Court’s competence, and pointed out that the ICC should have a more compulsory competence in terms of international criminal justice. Furthermore, the UK explained that security goes along with health and education regarding peace building long-term processes; the British delegation declared they were ready to invest 30 percent of its growing development aid to help 12 million women have better access to justice through police, courts and legal assistance.

Although they have not signed the Rome Statute, the United States also expressed its moral commitment to the international norms of transnational justice and rule of law by mentioning their honoring institutionalized initiatives for armed conflict prevention: Obama’s Executive Order on promoting women participation in peace process and rule of law enforcement, and also a study on high-level atrocity prevention. Moreover, as for China, it did not mention any initiatives to promote transitional justice and security, but emphasized its reluctance regarding the systematic and intrusive application of sanctions in some unique national situations, arguing that national sovereignty is still the highest legitimate authority. States tending to reinforce the rule of law through issuing laws of post-conflict reintegration and integral reparation, such as Colombia or adopting a more democratic constitution like in Morocco, warned also the UN approach criticized earlier by China. It was suggested the UN should cooperate with states to complete national measures and consolidate the rule of law in the different realities. Guatemala, whose post-conflict institutions are still weak and have seen transnational criminality worsen, highlighted the lack of national appropriation that sometimes follows failed post-war peace building. Guatemala has nevertheless explained that a successful reconciliation consists of a balance between the duty of remembrance and the responsibility of reconciliation.

In sum, the Security Council expressed its concerns regarding displaced groups, children, and particularly women who also play also a critical role in peace building. The adoption of measures, such as Resolution 1325, has been encouraging. It has been argued that Specific international tribunals, in particular the ICC, remain a vital element in the architecture of the international and healing justice. There is a need to coordinate international jurisdiction needs to ensure the reinforcement of the rule of law. However, the Security Council is aware that in an ideal world, national States should preserve jurisdictions should do justice themselves, without any intervention from an international organization. Meanwhile, the Security Council will have to address these challenges to promote rule of law in cooperation with national politics and help states to build peace and security. The Security Council expects an international push and political changes in war-torn societies.

This Security Council’s meeting was part of a high-level meeting on justice and rule of law that will be discussed by world leaders at the General Assembly on 24 September 2012. For the time being, the Council sought to emphasize the major role that rule of law plays in the peace and security field, as a call for political leaders to implement reform measures.

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The Security Council met on 24 January 2012 to discuss the situation in the Middle East, focusing at length on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, welcomed the series of talks on territory and security between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators initiated 3 January 2012. He reported growing violence and illegal measures on the ground by Israel. Indeed, the aggressive Israeli settlement activities and the constant exchanged violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians present a major obstacle to a two-State solution.

As for Lebanon, several incidents in the zone of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) showed the fragile conditions of security. The continued Israeli violation of the Lebanese aerospace not only undermines the credibility of UNIFIL, but also breaks with Resolution 1701. Moreover, 5,660 Syrian refugees have been registered on 13 January 2012 in Lebanon. He thus encouraged the Security Council to support the League of the Arab States’ proposal to tackle the violence and human rights violation perpetuated by the Syrian government.

Following Fernandez-Taranco’s introductory comments, Permanent Observer of Palestine spoke out about the Israeli practices on the ground in violation of international legal norms. He mentioned that Israeli settlement activities increased by 20 percent in 2011 further ‘Judaizing’ East Jerusalem with more checking points, demolitions of Palestinian proprieties, the closure of Palestinian institutions and the ‘ghettoization’ of the Palestinians, among others. He went further in accusing Israeli settlers of ethnic cleansing, in particular in the Jordan Valley, through the destruction of farms and displacement of population, and also acts of vandalism in churches and mosques, all in the full view of the Israeli security force. The Israeli air and land blockade affects deeply the Palestinians since it obstructs the necessary civil construction and humanitarian aids.

The Israeli delegation affirmed that the single greatest threat to the world security was an Iran seeking to build a nuclear weapon. The Israeli representative blamed the Security Council for having spent too much time and energy on the Israeli settlement activities instead of focusing on the real challenges that face the Middle East and the entire world. With its plan of enriching uranium to a 20 percent level, Iran breaks also several Security Council Resolutions, a reason why “the Security Council should be losing sleep over it,” replied the Israeli delegate. Adding to the Iranian threat, Israel also accused Palestinian authorities of keeping silent on the Hamas’ incitement to hatred and the destruction of Israel. Israel concluded Palestine’s misleading insistence on the two-State solution justifies Gazans’ security as the Israeli main priority.

The US encouraged both parties to set an environment conducive to progress and condemned any incitement to violence and terrorist attacks against Israel. However, the US delegation reaffirmed that it did not support the legitimacy of settlement activities. Regarding Syria, the US delegate noted that there are urgent needs for sanctions against the Syrian government actions and affirmed support for the Arab League’s plan for a transition to democracy.

With 43 percent of the West Bank clearly not under the control of the Palestinians and corresponding increasing violence, India declared the Israeli settlement unacceptable and contrary to international law. Restrictions to humanitarian assistance have resulted in an increase in poverty levels, something hardly compatible with a two-State solution. Togo, concerned for Palestinian refugee rights, called also for leaving the blockade. Good faith negotiations from both parties, financial and material support from the international community, and the Quartet’s role as guarantor of any agreements reached, were all encouraged as a set of practices to overcome current difficulties.

Colombia reiterated the negative impact of settlement activities in the region, but also noted violence against Israelis and threats to Israeli security calling for defined borders acknowledged by the international community. The Moroccan delegation explained also that Israel’s lack of political and moral will on the ground represented great challenges to peace. They suggested that Israel fulfill its responsibilities and obligations, in particular in Jerusalem and its suburbs where settlement activities have increased.

Pakistan criticized the endless debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the Security Council and the Quartet’s frozen position in a state of “suspended promises” that have not helped Palestinians address the issue. The Russian Federation noted a ‘remote manipulation’ from some states, without explicitly mentioning names, to maintain a certain ethnic group to power constitutes a major obstacle to human rights and the peace process.

The United Kingdom broadened the scope of the debate calling for democracy in the Arab world and the Security Council’s support for the League of Arab States in the transition to democracy in Syria. The UK warned of the illegal smuggling of arms to Syria, which continues to feed the shedding of blood. While Germany suggested expanding product exports to the West Bank to ensure the creation of jobs and prosperity, France urged establishing an international follow-up mechanism that is likely to lead to a two-State solution.

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