Tag Archives: security

Securing the inspectors: Legitimacy, capacity and security dimensions of disposing Syria’s chemical weapons

17 Oct

Editor’s Note:  The following is analysis on options for protection of those disposing of Syria’s chemical arsenal by Dr. David Curran.  David teaches at the University of Bradford in the UK and is a Fellow in peacekeeping at GAPW for fall 2013.  David has taken leadership on joint conferences and publications with GAPW and has offered consults with diplomats on some of the important peacekeeping issues coming up in the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly. 

The UN Security Council’s endorsement for Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s three-stage strategy for the elimination of the Syrian Governments arsenal of chemical weapons marks a small yet positive step in its handling of the crisis. It has also set a rapid time frame between the passing of UNSCR 2118[1], and the eventual elimination of all chemical stockpiles belonging to the Syrian Regime. Destroying the stockpile contains a number of risks, at several different phases in the process, from transportation to sites, securing the sites, destroying stockpiles and the process of verification of the destruction. This is difficult enough in peace-time yet alone in the midst of a civil war. Thus in the implementation of UNSCR 2118 a question arises over the possible role of military and security assets which will be used to assist the joint OPCW/UN mission. In particular, the question of ‘who’ provides such assets will be of importance to the development of the operation.

The Secretary General outlined a three phase approach to the elimination of the chemical arsenal. Phases I and II make the first steps towards the destruction of chemical weapons, through initial investigation and destruction of production and mixing and filling equipment respectively. Phase III of the plan poses the most serious challenges for the mission, particularly regarding the safety and security of the inspectors. In Phase III, (to be completed between 1 November 2013 to 30 June 2014), the joint team will be expected to ‘support, monitor and verify the destruction of a complex chemical weapons programme involving multiple sites spread over a country engulfed in violent conflict’ [2]. This process is expected to require movement by the operation (and potentially certain types of chemical agents) through ‘active confrontation lines and in some cases through territory controlled by armed groups that are hostile to the objectives of the Joint Mission’ [3].  In a situation described as ‘dangerous and volatile’, with a range of belligerent groups (some attached to formal command structures, some not), there exists a potential for serious risks to the success of the operation and, more significantly, the health and wellbeing of those in the vicinity of the destruction sites.

The assessment of the Syrian opposition from the International Crisis Group outlines the range of factions fighting against the Syrian regime as being ‘pluralistic and deeply divided, their structures improvised and shifting and their foreign backers apparently altogether less consistent and coordinated’[4]. Moreover, as Al Jazeera has reported there has been a shift in the opposition whereby thirteen of the most powerful rebel groups have withdrawn their recognition of the Syrian National Council, leaving the free Syrian Army ‘increasingly splintered’[5]. There are also significant reasons for those in opposition to be skeptical about any process which leads to ceasefire

Surrender, they are convinced, would mean merciless vengeance at the hands of a regime that, already, has shot at peaceful protestors, killed untold numbers of detained prisoners, tolerated the slaughter of women and children, bombed villages and fired ballistic missiles into densely populated neighbourhoods[6]

It is in this environment that the Joint Mission will operate. It is therefore important to look through what options for military support have been discussed.

It appears that discussion on the topic has led to two main options being espoused. Firstly, a ‘coalition of the willing’ type arrangement formed from a lead nation, and supported by others. For example, towards the end of September, the Russian government offered to provide a security force comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan troops[7]. The benefits of such a coalition would be in common operating procedures, and cultural familiarity (through joint training for example). However, such compositions may effect the legitimacy of the operation in a context such as Syria, where the conflict has become internationalized to a considerable extent[8], and a wide range of states are seen as being allied to one side or another. This is particularly true with regards to the generally hostile view held by opposition groups towards the Russian Government, a strategic partner of the Syrian Government[9].  Reflecting on this, Richard Gowan from NYU’s Centre on International Cooperation suggests that Russian personnel would be counter-productive for security

I think there is a very significant risk that rebel forces will try to disrupt this process, especially if they see significant numbers of Russian personnel involved in the destruction of chemical weapons, because for the hard-line rebels the Russians are almost certainly fair game[10]

An alternative solution would be some kind of force which would look similar to UN peacekeepers. The Secretary General’s letter to the Security Council highlights that in the process of developing a ‘viable operational concept’ there is a requirement for consultation with Member States ‘that may be in a position to contribute to the associated activities’, leading to questions of the extent to which the DPKO would be involved[11]. Involvement of a ‘type’ of peacekeeping is reflected in other areas. Richard Guthrie, a British chemical weapons expert, suggested that some kind of UN peacekeeping presence was needed as those who normally inspect weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention are not military personnel, and ‘can’t stand there with machine guns in hand and protect the weapons,’ Guthrie adds that any mission ‘would have to be done in coordination with some kind of UN peacekeeping force — which would have to be armed guards and they would have to be able to deter any attack on those locations’[12]

A UN peacekeeping-style plan may however be more difficult to attain in practice. There are reasons for this. Firstly are the technicalities of raising a UN peacekeeping force. In particular issues of mobilizing forces, logistics, equipping and the levels of training have led some in the UN to suggest a Peacekeeping plan is not feasible’ [13]. Moreover, the requirement of a functioning peace process has also been highlighted by advocates of intervention as a necessary precondition for the deployment of UN peacekeepers[14]

However, one thing that the United Nations could represent is a degree of legitimacy in being able to cross lines of conflict. This legitimacy is not by any degree watertight, but it may mean (to use Gowan’s terminology) that UN forces are not seen as ‘fair game’. The internationalized nature of the conflict could well mean that conflicting parties rely on external funding and support. Attacking a civilian-led UN operation designed to uphold international law may not be the best way in which to maintain an external funding base. One of the guiding principles of UN peacekeeping is the perceived legitimacy of its operations, as they are derived from an institution which broadly represents the will of the international community[15].

This short review of response options has opened up an important issue. On the one hand (a ‘coalition of the willing’) there exists high levels of preparedness yet possibly less legitimacy in the eyes of all parties; yet any attempt to mandate a UN peacekeeping-style operation would likely have lower preparedness but a higher chance of maintaining legitimacy. Unfortunately it appears that the nationality of the security providers will matter, possibly as much as where the highest levels of expertise can be sourced. This means that there exists a fundamental need for creative solutions to blend competence and legitimacy in the operation, something which is already evident in Ban Ki Moon’s flexible design of the operation, as well as in the recent plea from the head of the OPCW to instigate short-term localized ceasefires[16], which may facilitate the removal of weapons. Possibly a ‘golden egg’ solution can be found which is able to draw on the best expertise whilst maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of those involved in violent conflict (a different type of coalition?). This is a large step into the unknown, and the stakes are high. This fact is not lost on the Secretary General, who stated in his letter that this will be an ‘operation the likes of which, quite simply, has never been tried before’[17].

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 (S/Res/2118), 27 September 2013

[2] United Nations, Letter Dated 7 October 2013 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/591), 7th October 2013, P6

[3] United Nations (note 2), P6

[4] International Crisis Group, Syria’s Metastasising Conflicts: Middle East Report N°14327, June 2013, P25, Found at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/143-syrias-metastasising-conflicts.pdf)

[5] Al Jazeera, The Future of the Free Syrian Army, 6th October 2013, Found at http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/10/future-free-syrian-army-2013105155250560782.html

[6] International Crisis Group, (see Note 4), P26

[7] The Guardian, Russia offers to guard sites holding Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, 26th September 2013, Found at

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/russia-guard-syria-chemical-weapons-sites

[8] Open Democracy, Syria, realigning the war, 10th October 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/syria-realigning-war

[9] See: CNN, War of words between Russia, U.S. on Syrian crisis heats up, 6th September 2013, Found at, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/05/world/russia-us-relations/index.html; The Moscow Times, Russia’s Syria Ties Boost Humanitarian Aid, Red Cross Says, 8th October 2013, Found at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russias-syria-ties-boost-humanitarian-aid-red-cross-says/487556.html

[10] Worldpress.org, Syria: Interview with Richard Gowan, 10th October 2013, Found at http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3985.cfm

[11] Inner City Press, On Syria, Questions of UN Trust Fund & Plans, Ban Said to “See From One Eye”, 8th October 2013, Found at http://www.innercitypress.com/syria1baneye100813.html

[12] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Explainer: How Practical Is Russia’s Syria Chemical-Weapons Proposal?, 10th September 2013, Found at,  (http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-chemical-russia-practical/25101800.html)-

[13] The Nation, Racing the Clock, Chemical Experts Begin to Disarm Syria, 7th October 2013, Found at, http://www.thenation.com/article/176519/racing-clock-chemical-experts-begin-disarm-syria#

[14] The Guardian, MPs vote down military intervention in Syria: Politics live blog, 30th August 2013, Found at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2013/aug/29/mps-debate-syria-live-blog

[15] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines, UN, New York, 2008

[16] See: BBC, Syria chemical weapons: OPCW plea for short ceasefires, 14th October 2013, Found at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24516303; New York Times, Syrian Rebels Urged to Let Inspectors See Arms Sites, 14th October 2013, Found at

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0

[17] United Nations, (see Note 2), P6

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The Sixth Committee Talks Terrorism

10 Oct

The Sixth Committee (hereinafter 6C) of the General Assembly opened this week with measures to eliminate international terrorism as the first agenda item. The general discussion focused on a wide-range of issues, including support for the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and convening a high-level conference under UN auspices. Member states noted the significance of international law, especially international humanitarian law (IHL), international refugee law (IRL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in combating terrorism. In this regard, member states emphasized that terrorism is not affiliated with any particular race, ethnic group or religion, and a distinction should be made between terrorism and the legitimate struggle for people’s self-determination.

In addition, the importance of strong rule of law mechanisms was recognized as well as more attention on the financing of terrorism and ransom payments. References were also made to arms proliferation including support for the Arms Trade Treaty.  Moreover, welcomed attention was given not only to relevant General Assembly Resolutions, but to the Security Council and the sanctions committees, especially regarding the listing/de-listing process. Finally, Liechtenstein noted in its statement the complementarity between the work of the Security Council, General Assembly, the Secretariat and the contributions of the 6C therein. Given the forthcoming counterterrorism discussion in the GA plenary, Liechtenstein suggested that the 6C consider the terrorism agenda item on a biannual basis so as not to overlap with the GA’s agenda.

Procedurally, one of the main items considered in this agenda was the adoption of a working group, which ultimately failed to be adopted.

The General Assembly had recommended the creation of a working group in 2013 to both facilitate the drafting of a convention and carry on discussions about the high level conference.[i] The working group was also recommended by the ad hoc committee in its report to the 6C.[ii] The ad hoc committee was created in 1996 to “elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings” and nuclear terrorism; this would build on existing instruments and develop “a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism.”[iii] In 2000, the Committee’s mandate on the convention was extended and the conference was added as an agenda item “to formulate a joint organized response of the international community to terrorism.”[iv] In 2012, A/RES/67/99 extended the Committee’s mandate with a report due to the 68th session.[v]

The report provides draft text for the preamble and articles 1, 2, and 4-27, which address jurisdiction issues, conflict of laws, extradition, adopting relevant domestic legislation, etc.  Speaking as Vice Chair of the ad hoc committee, Guatemala noted that while the committee provided an opportunity to engage in discussions, they were not able to reach a conclusion. More political will is necessary to address the challenges. In its statement, South Africa raised concerns about continuing to hold meetings especially in instances when consensus has not been reached; nevertheless South Africa hopes that consensus will be facilitated before next year.

From the report, it appears that one of the outstanding issues surrounds the scope of the convention, including the definition of terrorism, the actions of the state military, and actions of “armed forces” vs. that of “parties,” etc.[vi] Regarding the conference, the objective is to increase political support for negotiation of the convention.[vii] While there doesn’t seem to be much opposition to the conference per se, there appears to be a preference among delegations to hold it after negotiations are completed.[viii]

Overall, most welcomed are the references to human rights especially since the right to self-determination is provided for in appropriate human rights instruments including the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively. References to the ATT are of course welcomed, but it is important to also give attention to complementary instruments like the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, which provides for commitments to eradicate, prevent and combat the illicit flow of small arms. Procedurally, it remains to be seen how this agenda item will develop and to what extent there will be more coordination and collaboration with the GA plenary.

–          Melina Lito, Legal Adviser on UN Affairs

ENDNOTES

[i] A/RES/67/99, OP.24.

[ii] A/68/37, para. 12.

[iii] A/RES/51/210, OP.9.

[iv] A/RES/54/110, OP. 12.

[v] A/RES/67/99, OP. 25 and 29.

[vi] A/68/37, para. 23-29.

[vii] A/68/37, para. 37.

[viii] A/68/37, para. 39.

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Human Security on the National Level – A shift from foreign to domestic policy

10 Oct

Security and insecurity are two very subjective concepts. What may feel unsafe for one person may very well be a normal circumstance for another. Personally, being raised in a safe neighborhood in Rotterdam – the Netherlands, I was never confronted with any real danger. So to be honest, feeling safe and secure is something I grew up with. I know that, sadly, not everyone has the luxury of having a safe home and presence of basic needs. Even though it seems logical, for you and me, to think of security as being directed towards human beings, for centuries security on the international level revolved around states instead of people. The common assumption was that having secure borders was sufficient for people to feel safe. We all know now that, unfortunately, this is not always the case. To deal with the concept of security of citizens, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) released a Human Development Report (HDR) in 1994 that introduced a new concept of security: human security. This concept refers to the security of people rather than security of territories, with development rather than with arms. On Wednesday, 2 October 2013, a panel discussion on applying the human security approach at the national level was co-hosted by the Human Security Network and the Permanent Mission of Japan, in partnership with the Human Security Unit.

The concept of human security can mean different things to different people. A survey done in 20120 on human security in Benin by panelist Mr. Janvier Alofa (lead drafter of the National Human Development Report in Benin) resulted in different perspectives of human security and different perspectives on threats. Mr. Alofa explained that human security consists of seven interconnected components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. A lack of security in any of these components can pose a threat to someone’s safety. In the case of Benin, if we look at the personal component, human security is endangered by trafficking in children, taxi accidents, organized crime and acts of violence (rape and domestic violence). Examples of the effects of the lack of human security can be found in ‘Lessons from the field – Applying the  Human Security Approach through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security’ released by the Human Security Unit. In the case of Lesotho, were an estimated 80 per cent of the population depends on the agriculture for their livelihoods, we can see that the adverse effects of climate change (environmental insecurity) on agriculture have hindered Lesotho’s development process. Health insecurity is evident in Peru. In Apurímac and Ayacucho in the Andrean region close to half of the populations lives in extreme poverty. As a result of this, rates of infant and maternal mortality, chronic malnutrition and illiteracy are very high.

Because human security consists of seven different components, as explained by Mr. Alofa, it encompasses all essential elements of society. The other two panelists, Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (leader of the Specialization on Human Security at the Masters of Public Affairs at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris) and Dr. Oscar A. Gómez (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Postdoctoral Fellow at the Doshisha University’s Graduate School of Global Studies), agree with this view and believe that human security is relevant to each framework because (national) security, development and human rights are all interlinked.

The three panelists underlined the importance of the concept of human security for the security of both states and their people. Dr. Tadjbakhsh noted the degree to which state security depends on the security of their populations. As a consequence of this focus shift from state security to human security, the policy focus of security is shifting from foreign to domestic policy. This shift, in my opinion, represents an important step towards the protection of basic human rights. If a state believes that its security depends directly on the security of its people, that state will likely put more effort into fulfilling its obligations to its domestic constituents. Dr. Gómez emphasized the fact that the state remains primarily responsible for human security. To provide this human security the state should learn from national experiences: historical processes should be analyzed and comparisons should be made to build knowledge about a wide range of security concerns. In this instance, both objective and subjective components of insecurity should be addressed and mismatches of threat perception should be identified.

I found the information provided during the panel discussion very interesting and possibly groundbreaking. The shift from state security/foreign policy to human security/domestic policy and the view that the state security depends on the safety of its people seems a big step forward in promoting the protection of people within a state. The difficulty, I believe, will be in the actual implementation of human security within the policies of states. States will have to alter their concept of security; and indicators to monitor and follow up on human security violations will need to be developed. Only if this is done successfully can the concept make a real difference and can everyone experience the security they deserve.

Marianne Rijke, Disarmament Fellow

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The Politics of ‘Doing Something’

26 Aug

On Wednesday, August 21, a special briefing on peacekeeping was offered for diplomats and NGOs entitled: “Humanitarian law, peacekeeping/intervention forces and troop-contributing countries: Issues and challenges.” The briefing was organized by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization and featured presentations from UN Legal Affairs, the ICRC and Dr. Scott Sheeran from the University of Essex.

The briefing had two objectives:   to explore International Humanitarian Law (IHL) implications for UN peacekeeping forces involved in coercive actions to prevent violence against civilians; and to examine from the UN’s perspective the value of the recently deployed Intervention Brigade in the DRC.

The IHL objective yielded some important insights. For instance, the panelists reminded participants that UN peacekeepers are ‘protected forces’ which underscores the issue of whether ‘protective’ status applies to peacekeepers engaging in aggressive actions, even if those actions are in accordance with a Security Council (SC) mandate (specifically the ‘do whatever is necessary’ mandate).  They also raised the issue regarding the applicability of IHL to peacekeepers who are, technically speaking, not parties to the conflict taking place in their zone of operations.   While Status of Forces agreements generally reference IHL responsibilities, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) appear to reject the notion that IHL applies to them in the application of their Security Council mandated tasks.  Thankfully, the UN explicitly affirms its responsibility to abide by IHL in all its operations, including ensuring that any applications of force by Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) are proportionate and carefully targeted.

There were of course many more ‘challenges’ on the table than ‘resolutions’ to challenges, and this was especially evident when it came to the discussion about the Brigades, a deployment about which the panelists seemed more enthusiastic than was the larger audience. The stated objective of the Brigade is ‘to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.’  Of prime importance, to be sure.

As some readers of this blog know, we facilitate work on a proposal for a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), a standing, complementary, gender and service integrated capacity that we feel has great promise but that has had limited traction to date within the UN system.  The community surrounding UNEPS (see for example www.globalactionpw.org/?page_id=102) continues to wrestle with a series of questions that are germane to the Brigades as well.   Such questions include the following:

Are there sufficient resources to honor this coercive mandate and the expectations that this deployment is creating?  The Brigade consists of 3000 personnel supplemented by other force arrangements, including drones.  Can such a force save at least some lives in an environment as unforgiving as the Eastern DRC? Clearly there is reason to believe that it can.  But should this be equated with a sufficiently strategic and robust response to years of violence perpetrated by a range of state and non-state actors?  The jury on this is still out.  I used to work as a chaplain in an urban hospital in a tough neighborhood.  If 40 patients are being rushed into an Emergency Room and I send an orderly, a shift nurse and a resident doctor to meet them, this is indeed ‘better than nothing,’ (a phrase that at least one panelist used while responding to concerns about the Brigade), but does it constitute a ‘good faith’ response?  Moreover, an overwhelmed capacity is one that is more likely to make mistakes – sometimes grievous ones.  Despite the best, most disciplined efforts of Brigade troops, mistakes that result in body bags of troops themselves or civilians caught in the cross fire will quickly dissipate expectations and even endanger other stakeholders.

How does this deployment affect options for an eventual political agreement?  There was some sensible discussion back and forth as to whether the deployment of the Brigade would make a political settlement more or less likely.  In the context of discussions about development of UNEPS, we have spent much time thinking through the contexts and implications of deployment. How does importing a coercive military presence into a region that has been coping with violence for many years affect the political and social dynamics of those communities, including their ability to participate in a negotiated settlement?  Our general (not universal) assessment is that such coercion is best applied at the earliest possible stages, before attitudes harden and violent recrimination becomes habitual.   The longer the fire is allowed to burn, the more problematic the efforts of the eventual ‘fire responders.’

Does this deployment increase the vulnerabilities of existing peacekeeping operations or other UN field activities that are NOT involved directly in forward projections of power?  From my years working in a crack neighborhood, I know that when police abuse or overstretch their mandates, it is not just the abusers who are placed at risk.  All police and other service providers within and beyond the security sector are at risk.   The Brigades may benefit from some institutional distance from the rest of MONUSCO (as well as from other UN activities on the ground), but M23 rebels are not likely to sort through the protocols to ensure that they only take out their hostilities on Brigade forces.   They see a UN helmet or convoy, they fire a shot.

Does the deployment represent a genuine, due-diligence response to violence or is it more about just ‘doing something’ after a period of insufficient engagement?  In the case of the Brigades, critics can point to a lack of capacity, a conflict that has been raging for years, a massively sized conflict zone, an expanded coercive mandate institutionally tied to less coercive operations, etc.   If this is in any way a token gesture of response or even a proving ground for a more coercive PKO that could set a precedent for future engagements, is this the right time or place for that?  Is this the population on which such an ‘experiment’ should be conducted?   This issue has come up often in the context of our own UNEPS proposal — assuming that it is eventually fully developed and authorized, where and when should it be best be used? And how should it be used to ensure positive security outcomes rather than mostly symbolic responses?

We were grateful for the efforts that went into this briefing, but we were a bit dismayed that none of the panelists seemed sufficiently sensitive to the direction of the questions being posed from the floor.   For instance, I assume that all of them have had experiences of being overwhelmed by external challenges in their personal and professional lives and making unfortunate mistakes as a result.  Thinking through the implications of capacity-related mistakes in a theater like the DRC is not a particularly high bar. Moreover, most responses during briefings like this tend to accentuate the political more than the normative, as in “everything here at the UN is political.”  Politics granted, though, it is not unreasonable to wonder at what point the weight of risks and challenges outweighs the need to simply ‘do something?’  Indeed, if this Brigade has some politicized elements of a half-hearted or even ‘experimental’ response with implications for future deployments, it is even more important that mission assessments are robust and free as possible from politicized dynamics.   As horrible as the violence in the DRC has been we need to take particular care to avoid ‘practicing’ coercive engagements on human lives, especially lives that have already gone through so much during these long years of conflict-related abuse.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Green Lantern: UNGA Informal Debate on ‘Harmony with Nature”

23 Apr

As a nod to Earth Day 2013, the UN General Assembly was the setting for an ‘informal debate’ focused on ways to more effectively promote planetary ‘harmony’.

A half-full conference room listened to a short presentation from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and more passionate speeches by the UN General Assembly President, Mr. Vuk Jeremić of Serbia, and by Ministers from Bolivia and Ecuador, two ‘left-leaning’ governments that tend to exercise a great deal of control over national economic outcomes.

There were some valuable reminders shared by these four speakers during what was a bit of an ideologically-imbalanced opening session.   From our own organizational standpoint, it is good to be reminded that consumption in the developed world is largely optional and has increasingly deleterious impacts on natural health in all global regions.  In addition, we should recognize that too much of the ‘green’ movement has been co-opted by those who seek to institutionalize levels of developed world consumption while attempting to ‘manage’ levels of growth in less developed nations.

At the debate, there were also renewed calls for a ‘universal declaration’ of the rights of nature tied to an alleged, if helpful, ‘right to recovery’ for nature that has been ravaged by a preponderance of short-term economic resource use disconnected from any reasonable capacity for future generations to access (and preserve) the same resources.

Our economic situation has been increasingly dark in recent times – inequities and shortages abound, as do the toxic effects of our mindless exploitation.    While it is not yet clear how ‘nature rights’ could be properly identified and enforced, nor is it clear how economic reform would result in locally based economies rather than state structures attempting to micro-manage large scale economic development, it is critically important to shine a light on alternatives that are urgent, viable and fair.  Needless to say, we don’t have sufficient alternatives at present. We need to keep the lantern lit as much as possible.

An office like ours has very limited access to deliberations on economic futures.   From our experience in meetings such as this one, it is clear that States too have limited options, more limited than they generally acknowledge.  Economic decisions, more and more, take place beyond the reach of states in board rooms and investment houses.  Whatever one thinks of “Occupy’ and other movements to expose economic inequities, including in economic decision making, it is clear that this current system is being driven by self-interested and unaccountable forces.   If such forces were merely accumulating wealth, there would be sufficient cause for general concern.  That accumulated wealth is driving so much planetary dysfunction should be cause for the loudest general alarm.

Simply put, there are biological limits to economic growth.   And those limits are not being acknowledged, let alone respected.   As one of the ministers from Ecuador wondered aloud and with some urgency, “Who precisely is going to bell this cat?”  How will that be accomplished? The cat has a defensive, nasty disposition and sharp claws.  It will take some real courage to bell it.  Until that happens, though, the rest of us will largely remain ignorant (willfully or otherwise) of the ways that our lives are about to become more painful and toxic than they need to be!

Our collective disenchantment with our economic system seems to grow daily.   At the same time, our resistance to economic change borders on the neurotic.   We have deep addictions to unsustainable and largely optional patters of consumption that remain stubborn in their remedial application and are also quite devastating to our long-term biological prospects.

On Earth Day, we need to shine more light on the structures and choices that undermine a ‘green’ agenda – unequal economic access, unsustainable (and largely optional) patterns of consumption, and more.  We also need to renew our connections with some of our more ‘intimate’ ecological processes – how our food is grown, where our drinking water comes from, what happens to our waste when we are ‘done’ with it.

Our ignorance of basic environmental processes as well as our insistence that we own everything we use are both planet-defeating attitudes. Our preference for owning a neighbor’s land to having a neighbor undermines community integrity.   Our relentless pursuit of non-essential consumer goods represents a psychologically defective, wasteful application of time and resources.   Our ability to simultaneously express a deep love for our children while contributing to the demise of the system that supports their lives is a dangerous inconsistency.  Clearly, we must continue to shine a light on these and other discontinuities, and then organize a viable, participatory strategy to overcome them.

 

–Dr. Robert Zuber

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After the Spotlight: Following Post-Election Kenya

1 Apr

On 26 March 2013, The World Policy Institute and Fireside Research presented After the Spotlight: Following Post-Election Kenya, a panel discussion featuring, via skype from Kenya, John Githongo, CEO of Inuka Kenya Ltd. and Kwame Owino, CEO of the Institute of Economic Affairs. The panel discussion was moderated by Eddie Mandhry, Associate Director of NYU Africa House, and hosted by Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP in New York City.

The panel discussion intended to investigate the challenges arising from the most recent elections in Kenya, particularly in the light of the domestic, regional and global complications of the 2007 elections. With over 1000 people dead, 350,000 people displaced, and the mass violence that erupted in the 2007 elections, this discussion was pertinent to the goals and mission of Global Action to Prevent War, which seeks to address broad themes and issues related to human security in diverse global regions.

On 4 March 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected as President and Deputy President Elect of Kenya, respectively. Kenyatta, who is the son of the first Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, has been accused by the International Criminal Court of committing crimes against humanity in the 2007 elections. President Elect Kenyatta has since been summoned to The Hague for such indictment of war crimes. Furthermore, in 2010, Kenya became party to the Rome Statute.

The panel discussion began with outlining the importance of ethnicity and identity in Kenyan politics. According to Githongo, this election has been the most important election in Kenyan history since its independence as it marks a new constitution based on so-called “Western liberal models.” Moreover, a new voting procedure was put in place. This included a high-tech biometric voter registration system, on which $250 million was spent, and the electoral provinces were expanded from 8 to 47 providing for new positions and constituencies to encourage free and fair elections and greater representativeness. In this same vein, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan founded the Election Management Body Policy, which seeks to address arising problems as well as to prevent election-related violence.

Unfortunately, the digital portion of the election failed. The IEBC, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the so-called contracted election “watchdog,” claimed that the new biometric voter identification system failed. However, opposition parties claim that this was a conspiracy to rig the elections. The two main opposition parties have since contested the results of the election, and, as a result, the official results are still pending.

QUESTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS IN KENYA:

  • So far, many governments from the international community have already called President Elect Uhuru Kenyatta to congratulate him on the elections. These governments include China and other African Nations. Given this, if the Kenyan Supreme Court upholds Kenyatta’s election, what are the implications for an indictment against Kenyatta by the ICC? What if Kenyatta fails to present himself to the ICC?
  • If the Supreme Court does not uphold Kenyatta’s election, another election will need to be held within 60 days. Does Kenya have enough money to do so?  Even more so, does the country have the capacity to do so?
  • If Kenyatta is confirmed, do we suspect there to be violence?
  • Are the institutions that were responsible for this election facing court charges for their handling of the elections?
  • What kind of media was used during the Kenyan elections? Was this majority negative or positive?
  • What kind of campaign was conducted before the elections?

RESPONSES

In the event that the Supreme Court decides on a run-off, the question of who will run the election will be tantamount. Githongo made it very clear that Kenya does not have the capacity to run another election within 60 days following the results of the Supreme Court decision. He stated that perhaps the international community could step in to run a second election, but likewise warned that Kenyans may see this as imperialist sentimentalism, which is already a sensitive issue in Kenya. Therefore, having the international community intervene in this matter may not be a viable option either. He also noted that the Kenyan people have the will and capacity to carry out the elections if necessary, but that they do not have sufficient technological capacity necessary to do so.

Githongo argued that since politics in Kenya have been organized around ethnic lines, this election has consolidated such ethnic-based attitudes even further. Furthermore, there is an ethnic divide among the Kenyan leadership that includes ethnic supremacy and entitlement. The “losers” of the 2007 and 2013 elections continue to feel exclusion from the leadership system and continue to feel as though there has been insufficient justice in the matter. This obviously also increases the likelihood of violence.

Githongo described the silence of the Kenyan people as powerful and that it speaks to the narratives that were cultivated along ethnic lines during the previous election. According to Githongo, there is a “narrative of exclusion” that constitutes an emphasis on numbers such that if an individual is not a part of the right numbers, then one’s vote does not count.

Githongo also explained that the ICC has played a huge role in the external messages of the elections, which has created a dichotomous relationship based on whether or not one supports the ICC. According to Githongo, these messages have been relayed quite simply as: “If you do not support the ICC, then you are not a nationalist and if you support the ICC, then you are an imperialist.” The campaigns were structured in such a way that communicated to citizens that they were not voting against an individual, but rather against the country or against the Western forces.

Githongo stated that it is important to speak about the role the media has played in the coverage of this election. Since the media was accused in 2007 of fueling the violence that ensued post-elections, it is now over-compensating by being ‘overly-cautious’ not to report, on the even “soft violence,” which is happening across the country. It would seem that the media is censoring itself.

Overall, Githongo stated that this election has caused Kenya to revert backwards in terms of its democratization process. Additionally, there is a worry that in the future, depending on the outcome of the ICC trials and the Supreme Court decision, on whether or not to uphold Kenyatta and Ruto’s victory.

It is expected that the incoming government will have to take Kenya out of what Githingo described as a “hole.” Addressing this “hole” is imperative as Kenya is geopolitically important to the international community and global economy. With the discovery of coal, oil and many other mineral elements, it has been argued that the Kenyan private and financial sector is positioned to take off in terms of capital formation, the quality of education and human capital, and skilled labor within the workforce, particularly with regards to financial services.

 

****Since this panel discussion, the Kenyan Supreme Court has upheld the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto even with the former’s impending summons to The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

 

–Shari Smith, Intern GAPW

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International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons

11 Mar

From 4-5 March, the government of Norway hosted an International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo. Representatives of 127 member states were present as well as UN secretariat officials, civil society, and other humanitarian response technical experts detailing the environmental, health, and developmental impact of nuclear weapon explosions. It was noted throughout that member states must continue to seize opportunities to act responsibly to prevent any accidental or intentional use of these weapons, a goal guaranteed only by virtue of their abolition. The Foreign Minister of Norway, Espen Barth Eide, offered a Chair’s Summary at the conclusion of the conference that, although it did not offer any concrete recommendations for future movement, did note clearly that, “It is unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected.”

While the ‘official’ Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) chose not to attend the conference as a collective group (although India and Pakistan sent delegations), there was a clear sense that the status quo of nuclear disarmament discourse can be neither tolerated nor sustained any longer. The argument by the NWS (also the Permanent 5 [P5] members of the Security Council) was that the conference served as a “distraction” from current disarmament efforts. As Ambassador Laura Kennedy of the United States noted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, “We [the US] are focusing our efforts and energy on practical steps we and others are taking to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals while strengthening nuclear security and the nonproliferation regime.” Likewise, the government of the UK stated that it was pursuing disarmament through “existing mechanisms” such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CD. In response to this argument, Foreign Minister Eide noted in his opening statement that this conference was not intended to serve as a substitute for any existing process, but also noted that the established fora for nuclear weapons deliberations are all “under serious pressure.” Furthermore, as has been rightly noted by colleagues from Reaching Critical Will, the Nuclear Security Summit process is one example of an “alternative process” that has been enthusiastically embraced by the NWS and thereby clearly illustrates the inherent weakness (if not hypocrisy) of the NWS absence from Oslo. Furthermore, the “step by step” and “practical” approach to nuclear disarmament has clearly not been effective and has remained predicated on an inflexible agenda since the 1960s thereby making it all the more appropriate for governments to supplement existing efforts with new fora and political dynamics.

The technical discussion referenced within the conference programme were indeed rich and involved delegations, representatives of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention (UNDP BCPR), the UN World Food Programme, and representatives of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) among others. Both the immediate impacts and longer-term consequences of nuclear detonations were explored by researchers, medical professionals, emergency relief experts, and national officials dealing with nuclear radiation preparedness. Experts stated that global famine, catastrophic climate change, and massive loss of life would be among the long-term ramifications of a nuclear detonation, affecting not just those in the immediate area of the bomb’s “ground zero,” but the whole of the global community. The programme featured several panels of humanitarian response experts detailing how and if governments, international organizations, and other actors could, or rather could not, adequately respond to a nuclear detonation. Dr. Ira Helfand of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear (IPPNW) presented the economic costs of a nuclear detonation, which could be upwards of $ 1 trillion over the long-term, and conjectured that due to climate changes from the explosion potentially one billion people could die of starvation alone. Other experts offered scenarios of nuclear detonation in cities such as Oslo as well as national examples of nuclear radiation emergencies in Romania and Norway. Still other presenters reflected on past examples of dangerous nuclear testing in Kazakhstan, the long-term effects of the Chernobyl accident, and the catastrophic fallout from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Many delegations as well as civil society representatives also cited the examples of landmines and cluster munitions as weapons that have been banned by international law for humanitarian reasons, noting that it was time to do the same for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, ICAN noted in its first intervention that blinding weapons, certain conventional explosive weapons, incendiary weapons, the use of poison, and chemical and biological weapons have all been outlawed, all of which have consequences similar to those from a nuclear detonation.

Quite plainly, the overall conclusion drawn by presenters was that there is no way to adequately prepare for or respond to the impacts of a nuclear detonation. As noted by the Director of UNOCHA Geneva, Mr. Rashid Khalikov, in his presentation on humanitarian preparedness and response, “We should, as the international humanitarian community, continue to consider the extent to which we can respond to a weapon detonation in any meaningful way. Ultimately though, the reality remains that the only sensible course of action is to ensure these weapons are never used.”

While the technical conversation was useful, perhaps more importantly, the tone that has been set for the future of nuclear disarmament efforts has clearly and rightly shifted. The consensus among participants was that the global humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons must be the starting point for discussion of disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Eide noted in his opening statement that, “For decades political leaders and experts have debated the challenges posed by the continued existence and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This conference, however, takes a different starting point.” Moreover, as the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) noted in its final intervention, nuclear weapons represent “the greatest humanitarian challenge of our time” and the delegation of Austria called this challenge a “litmus test” for how the international community is able to resolve challenges to humanity’s survival. It is the contribution of a reinvigorated commitment to a humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament that will have the greatest impact on finally bringing an end to these weapons and the threat to humanity posed by them.

Although the Oslo approach (adopting a humanitarian starting point) has been associated with the drive to end nuclear weapons for quite some time, the renewed energy and commitment by states to this approach is noteworthy. In discussions about proportionality of response, there have been legal and humanitarian elements and international criminal and military law have long acknowledged the principle of proportionality that the response should ‘fit’ the threat and that damage to innocents bears the presumption of impermissibility. Nuclear weapons use can stand up to neither test, in fact not even close.

Particularly in light of the stalemate found across the various parts of the UN disarmament machinery from the CD to the UNDC, this conference offered various stakeholders, including the vast majority of UN member states, the chance to converge around the common goal of nuclear disarmament and abolition with renewed energy and enthusiasm. Moreover, with the announcement of an important follow-up meeting to be hosted by the Government of Mexico, there is genuine commitment that this recalibrated approach to nuclear disarmament will enable more robust steps towards nuclear abolition to be taken and sustained.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Security Sector Challenges and Women’s Participation

20 Dec

Global Action recently had the opportunity to co-organize a meeting of Andean region governments on combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The conference covered many aspects of the illicit trade from regional cooperation and information exchange to the current status of implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA). Representatives of Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia engaged in an open and honest discussion about how to strengthen regional security and eliminate illicit weapons wreaking havoc on communities.

As Global Action is accustomed to doing, a women, peace and security lens was integrated into the conversation to push forward a  more robust human security agenda that is adequately inclusive of both women and men. At a macro-policy level, the links between a strong security sector and inclusive participation in political processes, peace negotiations, and other forms of civic engagement in helping to keep the peace are inarguable.  It is essential that the security sector is sufficiently robust to enable active and meaningful participation from all constituencies, including women, without fear or intimidation. The linkages between effective security sector reform and women’s participation, in particular, is a key component to a robust human security agenda that can prevent and well as address conflict in all forms. Furthermore, not only is it theoretically important to include the skills and talents of all citizens, such inclusion also practically contributes to the well being of the society.

In practice, the proliferation of illicit small arms continues to facilitate grave community-based crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence as well as other forms of domestic abuse which are often committed at gunpoint. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is not a stand-alone issue to be addressed in isolation, but surely facilitates other trafficking and security challenges faced by policymakers, police and the military.

Moreover, it is inaccurate to classify women as solely victims of gun violence perpetrated by men with arms. This approach neglects the active role women have played, and continue to play, in global, regional, and civil-society driven conflict prevention and disarmament initiatives. This narrow approach has also neglected the role women sometimes play as gun users, combatants, and traffickers.

SCR 1325 is proving to be an effective mandate for small arms policy and implementation by encouraging women’s participation in decision-making as well as by identifying specific entry points for gender analysis—such as reform of national security recruitment practices, implementation of small arms initiatives in collaboration with women’s organizations, and policy training and education to increase women’s participation in issues critical to the UN PoA. In order to address the real causes of societal insecurity, it is essential that participation in all peace and disarmament processes are representative of the whole of the population.

-Katherine Prizeman

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Where are the Women Mentors in the Media?

16 Nov

As a young professional working in the field of ‘Women, Peace and Security,’ I continue to be surprised by the lack of mentors available to women and young girls and, in particular, the lack of media attention- at least among popular media outlets—focused on educating women and young girls on these issues in order to inspire a generation of active participants.

It has become obvious to me just how narrowly women are portrayed in popular media, from music videos to periodicals. These sources tend to focus their attention on body image issues or trying to instill an image of self-confidence, which in turn only works to make women more self-conscious about their appearance. While body image and self-confidence are important issues, there is not much attention on the barriers that affect women’s participation- where is the attention on the barriers that rural women face in accessing resources, education, employment? Where is the support for those women trying to have a voice at decision making tables? Where is the education for those trying to overcome the community stigma of having fought in combat? Where are the mechanisms for overcoming the cultural stigma that prohibits women’s participation in patriarchal societies? Thinking practically, we all face the same challenges. For example, domestic violence is an issue that affects all women, regardless of their ethnic or social backgrounds. The circulation of weapons and small arms that often leads to women as victims of gun violence is an issue of worldwide concern, yet you rarely see this covered in popular media. Accessibility issues, along with institutionalizing women’s participation at decision making tables, and the stories of how these women overcome such difficult circumstances, are not typically covered by the more popular periodicals.

Here at GAPW, we work to promote women’s full participation in social and political life and promote women as agents of change. Our work is solidified by the emphasis and promotion of women mentors who encourage and support women in their struggles of participation. But, this hard work becomes even harder without the support of the media. Media outlets are a viable source for showcasing mentors and inspiring adoption of a norm of ‘women as agents of change’ rather than strictly victims. The need for highlighting women mentors is necessary to educate future generations that to be a confident woman is not just about body image, but also about how to change and overcome the barriers that get in the way of full participation.

-Melina Lito

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SC Open Debate on Peace and Security Implications of Climate Change

21 Jul

Hello all!

Yesterday Giedre and I attended the SC Open Debate on the peace and security implications of climate change. It was quite controversial actually. Not the climate change part, but the fact that the Council was discussing it and not the GA or ECOSOC where the mandate of climate change lies.

The SG gave a strong statement in support of the SC discussing climate change as a threat to peace and security. Director of the UN Environmental Programme also gave a grim briefing on the accelerated threat of climate change. On one side were the US, Germany, SIDs (represented by President of Nauru who was there), Colombia, and EU states who are in strong support of having the SC deal with the security implications of climate change. On the opposite end were China, Russia, Lebanon, G-77, and NAM who believe it to be an encroachment on the authority of the ‘more universal bodies’ such as the GA and ECOSOC who should deal with the issue entirely. Brazil, Nigeria, and India were somewhere in the middle.
I have more detailed notes if anyone is interested!
-Katherine

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