Creating ‘Green’ Employment to Rebalance Unsustainable Economies

19 Sep

Amidst all the buzz of the impending opening of the UN General Assembly, an interesting meeting was held in the North Lawn building early on Wednesday entitled “Rio+20: From outcome to action, partnering for action on green economy.”  The event was co-organized by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).  As was noted by more than one presenter, this kind of collaborative enterprise is becoming more common in UN circles, though it is still not as common as it needs to be, especially where issues of climate health and global sustainability are concerned.

The meeting was devoted in large measure to an update on the multi-agency initiative entitled “Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE).”  PAGE, which is supported by the Republic of Korea as well as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, will “build enabling conditions in participating countries by shifting investment and policies towards the creation of a new generation of assets, such as clean technologies, resource efficient infrastructure, well-functioning ecosystems, green skilled labour and good governance.” (http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/PAGE/tabid/105854/language/en-US/Default.aspx)

There was much helpful analysis offered by presenters and participants including reminders that we must simultaneously focus on the development of green jobs, green industries and green economies.  Moreover, in terms of business infrastructure, we must commit both to “greening existing industries and to creating new green industries.” And there was an important reminder of the vital role that agricultural workers continue to play within the total spectrum of employment, even though it was acknowledged that, in many parts of the world, such workers suffer disproportionately from malnutrition and other manifestations of acute poverty.  They also face numerous and often unique security challenges in remote rural settings, especially within states struggling with armed groups and the proliferation of illicit weapons.

As with the speakers and organizers, GAPW remains vitally interested in the security challenges resulting from degraded ecologies and grave challenges to climate health.   We seek to promote greater respect for green employment that both sustains families and helps restore our ecological balance.  And we encourage investors and businesses to consider more tangible investments in Lesser Developed States and to help ensure that governments in those States honor basic obligations to their populations for security, development, transparency and human rights – all elements essential to the maintenance of a healthy and sustainable business climate, not to mention a sustainable environment.

We acknowledge the degree to which ‘green’ still represents a category with more sentimental attraction than conceptual clarity.  And we understand the vast gaps that often separate hopeful programs from tangible, climate-friendly outcomes.   These are but two of the growth edges moving forward.

Our policy priorities and interests in this work are underscored by several key organizational relationships from which we learn much and benefit greatly, including the for-profit CGSG Corporation (http://www.cgsgcorp.com/) and the non-profit Green Map System (www.greenmap.org).  In addition, the 1200 or so civil society organizations that have signed up to attend a major UN event, “Advancing Regional Recommendations on Post-2015,” organized by our friends at the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?page=sommaire), continue to give us hope that strategic and urgent care can overcome the development, security and other crises associated with planetary decay.

The message lying beneath the more obvious messaging of this event was a sober one:  We are simply running out of time to pivot on unsustainable patterns of consumption and governance.  PAGE is one of the vehicles through which governments can find the skills and incentives needed to help their societies respond to the immediate danger posed by a planet under siege.

Dr. Robert Zuber

Tags: , ,

Neither Black nor White: Relating North-South and South-South Cooperation

18 Sep

Editor’s note: The following is a discussion written by a junior associate, Kritika Seth of Mumbai India, regarding a topic that is important to a wide range of development and security frameworks.  Promoting more holistic collaborations among global south states that often share a common history and current economic challenges builds important skills and helps ensure that policy reflects local social and cultural contexts.

The origin of South-South cooperation can be traced back to the creation of the Group of 77 (G-77) in 1964 to promote economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. In 1974, UNDP created a “Special Unit” for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). A high level conference on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) held in Caracas in 1981 urged negotiations on a Global Systems of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing countries to promote joint initiatives in marketing and technology transfer. In 2003, the UN General Assembly formally opted to use “South-South” instead of “ECDC/TCDC” when referring to cooperation among developing countries.

On September 12th 2013, the UN office of South-South Cooperation celebrated the 10th annual United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation at UN Headquarters in New York.

The global south nations have a shared history (colonialism); shared challenges in development progress (low industrialization); and shared experiences as recipients of aid from the global north. Thus it would be reasonable to anticipate that more south-south exchanges would facilitate a more balanced and effective cooperation that would lead to “peer learning” and exchanges of experiences and development-related ‘best practices.’ Such outcomes could, in turn, lead to more positive development outcomes and reduced poverty levels (aligned with the post-2015 development agenda) in the countries of the global south, and even help to avoid the unbalanced relationships characteristic of much North-South cooperation. As the Indian Ambassador, Mr. Asoke Mukherji explained the “UN needs to catch up to this flexible paradigm and not relate it to North-South Cooperation since they both are different.”

The distinction between North-South cooperation and South-South Cooperation was highlighted in a statement repeatedly elaborated by the panel members who spoke during the morning session. “South-South cooperation is not supplementary to North-South cooperation but complementary to North-South cooperation.”

During the inaugural session panelists deliberately made an effort to make these seemingly similar adjectives sound significantly different. The term ‘complement’ is to create a satisfactory, relational whole, whereas the term ‘supplement’ (in non-economic terms) refers to enhancing or filling in a missing void. Thus, complementary acts to bind and make whole while supplementary acts to enhance what exists or make up for something missing.

Therefore, according to the statement reiterated by panelists, South-South cooperation is the satisfactory whole and is not merely an effort to address the deficiencies of North-South Cooperation.[1]  This however raises a question: Why is it important to establish such a defining line between the two types of cooperation?

South-South cooperation should not presume an either-or but should be supplementary (on ideas and capacity assistance) where North-South cooperation falls short and should also make sure to offer more comprehensive, context-specific, culturally sensitive, assistance across the global south as well. The merging of the two types of assistance offers a win-win situation for nations directly and indirectly involved in development assistance to help balance development efforts and make them sustainable   There are gaps to be filled in social development, but the ultimate goal must be to create more holistic and cooperative engagements among states that share a common history, social contexts and economic challenges.  Such engagements can both inspire development in the global south and help reform development frameworks and priorities in the global north.

The morning inaugural session of the event was witnessed by a relatively full audience; however, an afternoon session that was packed with vital strategy proposals and recommendations for implementing sustainable social protection addressed only a handful of people. Overall, the event included involvement by a number of eminent members from the South-South cooperation team including representatives from UNDP, ILO, the IBSA fund and Group of 77.  In the main, this was a well-structured event that deserved broader interest from the UN community.

Kritika Seth, GAPW

[1] Wanjiru Rose, Is the South-South cooperation achieving its intended outcomes? (2009)

Tags:

Civil Society and RtoP: Prevention and Strong State Capacity

16 Sep

On September 9, 2013 the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES-NY), the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), and the Stanley Foundation held the event titled Civil SocietyPerspectives: Building State Capacity to Prevent Atrocity Crimes. This was held as a pre-meeting to the 5th annual General Assembly informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, scheduled for September 11, 2013. Dr. Jennifer Welsh, the newly appointed Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect, as well as Mr. Adama Dieng, the Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, were both present. The event was also attended by many civil society representatives as well as diplomats from numerous Permanent Missions. The event featured civil society representatives who shared their experiences in working towards the prevention of atrocity crimes as well as their recommendations on strengthening domestic capacity. Ms. Valnora Edwin, the Director of the Campaign for Good Governance, provided first-hand experience of RtoP in practice. She explained the post-conflict work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the transitional justice process through the Special Court for Sierra Leone. She also explained how her organization is engaging with the Sierra Leonean government in order to prevent future atrocities.

Both this event and this year’s UN dialogue are focused on Pillar 1 of the Responsibility to Protect, which states, “The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing”. This is reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s latest report on RtoP, State Responsibility and Prevention.  In the opening remarks Mr. Keith Porter, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stanley Foundation, stressed that one of the key aims of the dialogue was to discuss how civil society can contribute to the building of societies where mass atrocities are not an acceptable means of holding power. Although the current situation in Syria was widely acknowledged as a challenge, the debate did not focus on it. Instead, Syria was referred to in order to clarify the norm. Dr. Welsh acknowledged that RtoP has been operationalized in the Syrian conflict through the form of sanctions, the acceptance of refugees by surrounding states, and the work of civil society groups as well as UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council and other humanitarian organizations. Nonetheless, the effect of Syria on the future of RtoP was not fully addressed.

In the keynote speech by Dr. Welsh, emphasis was placed on civil society’s role in advancing RtoP and affirming the need for prevention. Dr. Welsh addressed the next steps that need to be taken in the norm’s development including: the necessity for the development of a clearer framework which would facilitate early warning and response, the fact that regional and sub-regional organizations need to take greater ownership of the agenda, the need to strengthen interaction with the members of the Security Council, and that member states should work together to remind the Security Council of its responsibility to prevent atrocities. Moreover, apart from continuing to advance Pillar 1, Dr. Welsh argued that it is time for the General Assembly to pay greater attention to the Pillar 2, or the idea that the international community needs to support states in carrying out their responsibility to protect their citizens.

The first panel of the meeting was chaired by Ms. Angela Bruce-Raeburn, the Program Officer of the Stanley Foundation. The panelists discussed how their organizations work to influence political actors to cooperate in strengthening institutions. Rev. Cannon Thomas Muyya Godda emphasized the need for a common sense of equality and that key causes of conflict, such as poverty, must be addressed. Mr. Kyle Matthews highlighted some of the internal political obstacles to successful RtoP implementation. Referring to Canada he explained how although once a leader of RtoP, Canada has lost this position due to the fact that the current government views RtoP as the work its predecessors – the opposition. Finally, Mr. Noel Morada explained the ‘bibngka approach’ or the necessity for cooperation between the top and bottom – just like when cooking a rice cake, the cooperation of the pan on top with the fire on the bottom is key.

Although all panelists presented great examples of how civil society encourages national legislatures, Ms. Bruce-Raeburn asked a thought-provoking question of what happens when a government changes? In other words, what happens to atrocity prevention when those supporting it are no longer in power? The panelists generally did not provide an answer to this question; nevertheless Mr. Matthews explained how civil societies in Canada try to overcome this issue. Despite his statement, no substantive answer was given. Another issue discussed by the panelists was the relationship of RtoP and sovereignty. There was a general consensus among the speakers that RtoP needs to be presented as a friend, rather than an enemy of sovereignty. The problem of sovereignty often arises in relation to RtoP discussions primarily regarding Pillar 3 or the use of force if a government is not fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens. Panelists and Dr. Welsh agreed that rather than restricting sovereignty, RtoP actually has a sovereignty enhancing purpose. This is where the work of civil societies in aiding the strengthening of states and the implementation of RtoP principles into legislatures remains highly important.

The second panel chaired by Mr. Tibi Galis, the Executive Director of the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, focused on reconciliation and peacebuilding as important factors in atrocity prevention. In many post-conflict situations a relapse into violence is highly likely unless appropriate action is taken to address the key issues that caused violence in the first place. Important peacebuilding efforts such as the inclusion of women in decision-making, the use of judicial processes and the development of good governance were also presented through the cases of Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Kenya. Although the presentations were relevant in content, at points the debate seemed to have gotten too specific and the message of how these case studies can contribute to the future general policy development of the RtoP was a bit lost. The overarching issue remains to be the fact that there are very few cases of when RtoP was successfully used in atrocity prevention. Both Sierra Leone and Guatemala highlight situations of post-conflict violence prevention rather than the initial prevention of the opportunities for mass atrocities. Therefore, the Kenyan case, which is often celebrated as a prime example of effective diplomatic action under the RtoP banner, remains perhaps one of the only real examples of RtoP application. Regrettably, there are still cases where atrocities have happened or are now happening, yet where RtoP has not been invoked.

Overall the event presented a good discussion on issues related to the role of civil society in working with states to strengthen their domestic institutions in order to successfully prevent mass atrocities. As the title of the event suggested, much emphasis was placed on the experiences of civil societies from different parts of the world in working together with national governments in order to strengthen measures for atrocity prevention. The debate reaffirmed the crucial role of civil society groups in pushing governments in strengthening their institutions in order to adopt RtoP principles into their national agendas. With many governments remaining skeptical about RtoP and its effectiveness, the role of civil society in keeping the norm at the forefront of government deliberations is key. RtoP is a noble concept yet it continues to go about unfulfilled due to hesitation by governments based in part on a failure to heed their legitimate concerns.

 

Tereza Steinhublova, GAPW Junior Associate

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Time Management: The 2013 RtoP Debate

13 Sep

A less than full Trusteeship Council was the setting for the fourth General Assembly debate on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm held on September 11.This was the first debate featuring Dr. Jennifer Welsh, the new UN special representative on the responsibility to protect.   Following an opening panel that included remarks from Dr. Welsh, over 60 government statements were offered, most of them positive and all moderated by Adama Dieng, UN special representative for the prevention of genocide.

The debate this year seemed to be, on content alone, preferable to previous iterations.  While delegations continue to raise reservations regarding several aspects of the norm —  a number of which we feel warrant more respectful attention from the RtoP community — delegations also demonstrated greater skill in articulating the nuances of the norm as it has evolved under the guidance of the ‘Joint Office’ on the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect and through dialogue with the five reports on RtoP issued by the Secretary General.

Nevertheless, the debate generated surprisingly little controversy or even energy, especially given what has been going on in the world in recent weeks with Syria.  Reactions to the efforts of Mr. Dieng to ‘keep time’ in a packed agenda were significantly more visible than reactions to delegate statements. Our interpretation is that this is not an indictment of the issue and its importance, but rather a reflection on the context for this debate within the UN system.  This context include a number of competitive meetings on September 11 that forced many delegations to spread their involvements thin; renewed energy and excitement over prospects for a new and more robust commitment to post-2015 development goals; even a recognition of the long shadow cast by the Council and its increasingly consolidated power over the specifics of any RtoP response.  Indeed, if there are no clear pathways to the effective preventive response that many delegations called for, to the degree that available responses to atrocity crime threats are in the hands of unaccountable institutional partners such as the Council, this creates disincentives to enthusiastic engagement with the norm.  And there remains a considerable lack of clarity regarding what a commitment to prevention might practically entail, the fitness of the full UN system to engage such a commitment, and the sufficiency of tools and capacities needed to move beyond the politics of atrocity crime response towards a cleaner, more transparent and more principled engagement with these threats.

Under Secretary General Jan Eliasson noted during his own remarks that no one can do everything but everyone can do something.   Until we are able to define what those options for doing something actually are (especially for civil society), and more importantly how those discrete responses impact other facets of the UN’s ongoing security commitments, we will continue to leave assets on the table that we desperately need engaged in the preventive task.   The enduring questions for us relate to how diplomats are to keep track of all of the unanswered questions and unanticipated consequences that characterize RtoP in its current iteration and how we are going to find the right blend of wisdom, skills and capacities to meet new challenges.

Our strong conviction remains that RtoP has outgrown its current expressive formats.   We prefer a more expansive diplomatic engagement with the norm, an engagement that would allow for real dialogue, fewer prepared statements, more resolutions outlining actionable commitments and less need for anyone to be in the unenviable role of cutting off speakers who are making points that the system as a whole needs to consider more fully and under less time pressure.

Any process that allows delegations merely precious minutes to deliver an address on an issue that is both controversial and essential to the work of the United Nations must yield to a process that is more in keeping with the way in which other GA-tethered processes — from small arms to development goals — find expression.   Mr. Dieng, whom we highly regard, should not be in the position of playing time keeper with delegations that, at least for now, have few opportunities to weigh in thoughtfully on the promises of the norm and its still-limited implementation options.

This problem should not be addressed, as some are suggesting, simply by adding days to what is essentially a ‘general debate’ format, which in our view remains the least effective way for delegates to communicate concerns and resolve differences.  In order to facilitate more diplomatic engagement at headquarters, it is time to find ways, including through a more active partnership with the office of the new GA president, to allow this process to breathe more deeply, and especially more regularly.

For RtoP to succeed fully as a fair, viable and implementable norm, it needs more than it currently holds – more stakeholder involvement, more diverse policy voices, more actionable resolutions, more capacity assistance, more diplomatic attention to evolving dangers and their political contexts.   The debate on September 11 made clear that there is steadily growing diplomatic interest in RtoP but there remains an inadequate diplomatic culture of response, one that could help the UN system work through a myriad of political and logistical issues before the next crisis arises.  More dedicated time and space will help expand and enrich such a culture.

Diplomats at UN headquarters navigate a diverse range of issues and structural responsibilities.  RtoP is a primary focus of only a modest portion of UN missions.   We need to ensure that all diplomats have more frequent opportunities to address concerns in a good faith manner such that the 130 or so delegations that did not speak up at this year’s RtoP debate have reason and occasion to weigh in as well.

Dr Robert Zuber

Tags: ,

Test Pattern: The UN Gets a Helpful Reminder on Nuclear Testing

5 Sep

Once again this year, the government of Kazakhstan has capably organized events (www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/2013/events.shtml) to highlight the international obligation to abolish nuclear testing as a precondition for abolishing nuclear weapons once and for all.

The highlight for many was an evening reception on the first floor of the renovated UN conference building hosted by Ambassador Byrganym Aitimova and featuring the art work of Mr. Karipbek Kuyukov, a young man who was born without arms and who shared his artwork with diplomats and other UN stakeholders.  The art, it should be noted, was painted with his feet and was in its own way a remarkable testament to the damage that nuclear tests can do to local populations long past the point at which the ‘test results’ have been tabulated by nuclear weapons states.

It should be noted that, despite the lack of universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nuclear testing is being functionally rendered inert.  Tests are few and far between and subject to almost universal condemnation by states.  At the same time, nuclear weapons states continue to modernize their arsenals, a veritable slap in the fact to those who states that have been pursuing a nuclear free world in a variety of settings – through nuclear free zones, in largely deadlocked fora such as the Conference on Disarmament, through ‘like-minded’ processes such as such as was convened last spring in Oslo, through the Open Ended Working Group in Geneva, or through the high level meeting on nuclear disarmament being organized by the GA president’s office during its opening session in late September.

In addition to diverse policy venues, there are also diverse security responsibilities.   As we have noted with respect to nuclear free zones, there is an important difference between honoring a treaty and supporting the security arrangements of a zone.   Lowering violence thresholds and enhancing human security involves multiple complementary activities that can reduce incentives for (and excuses by) the nuclear weapons states to preserve their nuclear monopoly.

There are many pathways to disarmament and all of them have rough patches, some rougher than others. Despite the fact that nuclear testing sits on few of the top priority lists of member state security concerns, it is critically important that there be no backsliding on testing.  As challenging as progress towards disarmament can be, we cannot afford to burden that agenda further, not to mention place new generations at risk of dangerous fallout from the reckless pursuit of such tests.

The ‘path to zero’ articulated during the panel presentations on September 5 has been winding and full of potholes, but still points us towards a nuclear free world.   There are detours required at times, but no dead end.  While it is not always clear how individual events at the UN contribute to preferred outcomes, it is important that we ritualize even more of these powerful reminders of our nuclear weapons responsibilities.  Just as birthdays, religious and national holidays, anniversaries and more are the signposts through which we reaffirm the deep value to our families, friends and other loved ones, such events as those organized by Kazakhstan can help keep us from turning our attention away from our disarmament obligations before our work is done.

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

Tags: , , ,

A Matter of Balance and State Sovereignty – DGACM’s meetings on languages

5 Sep

Within the framework of its mandate from the General Assembly, DGACM (Department for General Assembly and Conference Management) held its annual round of language-specific informational meetings with Member States last week.  This meeting was focused on the quality of multiple language and conference services provided during the past year in the six official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish).

The upcoming summary of the 2013 meetings might well read very similarly to the one published in 2012, as the obstacles and problems discussed this past week appeared quite congruent with those from last year.

– As in 2012, it was recommended that the General Assembly should reduce the number of informational meetings from two to one per year.

–  As suggested in 2012, and still highly valid, one delegation proposed to combine the six separate language-specific meetings into one, provided that there was interpretation available. Holding one rather than six different meetings would increase efficiency of tackling the various issues related to language services, and would have a wider overlap in terms of opinion/expert exchange.

–  Overall, an unequal treatment of the six official U.N. languages was stated repeatedly in a number of the meetings.

–  Timing seems to be another permanent issue within the dissemination of multilingual documents within the  U.N. system. Many documents appear to be sent for translation too late, if at all, and therefore are not available when optimally required.

Overall, the importance of making a greater effort to streamline and optimize the language services within the U.N. system were summarized by one speaker thusly, “If only a few delegations have access to all documents within the system, only those delegations can raise their voice in meetings. Therefore it is important to have all the documents available in all six languages at all times. It is a matter of state sovereignty.”

It is also a matter of fairness, impacting the ability of all states to have access to timely, comprehensible documents.  It is equally essential for the press and civil society to have such access.  Translation services are not optional at the United Nations but are essential to the full enfranchisement of all member states and other policy stakeholders.

Lia Petridis Maiello, Media Consultant for GAPW/Journalist for Political Affairs

The Politics of ‘Doing Something’

26 Aug

On Wednesday, August 21, a special briefing on peacekeeping was offered for diplomats and NGOs entitled: “Humanitarian law, peacekeeping/intervention forces and troop-contributing countries: Issues and challenges.” The briefing was organized by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization and featured presentations from UN Legal Affairs, the ICRC and Dr. Scott Sheeran from the University of Essex.

The briefing had two objectives:   to explore International Humanitarian Law (IHL) implications for UN peacekeeping forces involved in coercive actions to prevent violence against civilians; and to examine from the UN’s perspective the value of the recently deployed Intervention Brigade in the DRC.

The IHL objective yielded some important insights. For instance, the panelists reminded participants that UN peacekeepers are ‘protected forces’ which underscores the issue of whether ‘protective’ status applies to peacekeepers engaging in aggressive actions, even if those actions are in accordance with a Security Council (SC) mandate (specifically the ‘do whatever is necessary’ mandate).  They also raised the issue regarding the applicability of IHL to peacekeepers who are, technically speaking, not parties to the conflict taking place in their zone of operations.   While Status of Forces agreements generally reference IHL responsibilities, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) appear to reject the notion that IHL applies to them in the application of their Security Council mandated tasks.  Thankfully, the UN explicitly affirms its responsibility to abide by IHL in all its operations, including ensuring that any applications of force by Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) are proportionate and carefully targeted.

There were of course many more ‘challenges’ on the table than ‘resolutions’ to challenges, and this was especially evident when it came to the discussion about the Brigades, a deployment about which the panelists seemed more enthusiastic than was the larger audience. The stated objective of the Brigade is ‘to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.’  Of prime importance, to be sure.

As some readers of this blog know, we facilitate work on a proposal for a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), a standing, complementary, gender and service integrated capacity that we feel has great promise but that has had limited traction to date within the UN system.  The community surrounding UNEPS (see for example www.globalactionpw.org/?page_id=102) continues to wrestle with a series of questions that are germane to the Brigades as well.   Such questions include the following:

Are there sufficient resources to honor this coercive mandate and the expectations that this deployment is creating?  The Brigade consists of 3000 personnel supplemented by other force arrangements, including drones.  Can such a force save at least some lives in an environment as unforgiving as the Eastern DRC? Clearly there is reason to believe that it can.  But should this be equated with a sufficiently strategic and robust response to years of violence perpetrated by a range of state and non-state actors?  The jury on this is still out.  I used to work as a chaplain in an urban hospital in a tough neighborhood.  If 40 patients are being rushed into an Emergency Room and I send an orderly, a shift nurse and a resident doctor to meet them, this is indeed ‘better than nothing,’ (a phrase that at least one panelist used while responding to concerns about the Brigade), but does it constitute a ‘good faith’ response?  Moreover, an overwhelmed capacity is one that is more likely to make mistakes – sometimes grievous ones.  Despite the best, most disciplined efforts of Brigade troops, mistakes that result in body bags of troops themselves or civilians caught in the cross fire will quickly dissipate expectations and even endanger other stakeholders.

How does this deployment affect options for an eventual political agreement?  There was some sensible discussion back and forth as to whether the deployment of the Brigade would make a political settlement more or less likely.  In the context of discussions about development of UNEPS, we have spent much time thinking through the contexts and implications of deployment. How does importing a coercive military presence into a region that has been coping with violence for many years affect the political and social dynamics of those communities, including their ability to participate in a negotiated settlement?  Our general (not universal) assessment is that such coercion is best applied at the earliest possible stages, before attitudes harden and violent recrimination becomes habitual.   The longer the fire is allowed to burn, the more problematic the efforts of the eventual ‘fire responders.’

Does this deployment increase the vulnerabilities of existing peacekeeping operations or other UN field activities that are NOT involved directly in forward projections of power?  From my years working in a crack neighborhood, I know that when police abuse or overstretch their mandates, it is not just the abusers who are placed at risk.  All police and other service providers within and beyond the security sector are at risk.   The Brigades may benefit from some institutional distance from the rest of MONUSCO (as well as from other UN activities on the ground), but M23 rebels are not likely to sort through the protocols to ensure that they only take out their hostilities on Brigade forces.   They see a UN helmet or convoy, they fire a shot.

Does the deployment represent a genuine, due-diligence response to violence or is it more about just ‘doing something’ after a period of insufficient engagement?  In the case of the Brigades, critics can point to a lack of capacity, a conflict that has been raging for years, a massively sized conflict zone, an expanded coercive mandate institutionally tied to less coercive operations, etc.   If this is in any way a token gesture of response or even a proving ground for a more coercive PKO that could set a precedent for future engagements, is this the right time or place for that?  Is this the population on which such an ‘experiment’ should be conducted?   This issue has come up often in the context of our own UNEPS proposal — assuming that it is eventually fully developed and authorized, where and when should it be best be used? And how should it be used to ensure positive security outcomes rather than mostly symbolic responses?

We were grateful for the efforts that went into this briefing, but we were a bit dismayed that none of the panelists seemed sufficiently sensitive to the direction of the questions being posed from the floor.   For instance, I assume that all of them have had experiences of being overwhelmed by external challenges in their personal and professional lives and making unfortunate mistakes as a result.  Thinking through the implications of capacity-related mistakes in a theater like the DRC is not a particularly high bar. Moreover, most responses during briefings like this tend to accentuate the political more than the normative, as in “everything here at the UN is political.”  Politics granted, though, it is not unreasonable to wonder at what point the weight of risks and challenges outweighs the need to simply ‘do something?’  Indeed, if this Brigade has some politicized elements of a half-hearted or even ‘experimental’ response with implications for future deployments, it is even more important that mission assessments are robust and free as possible from politicized dynamics.   As horrible as the violence in the DRC has been we need to take particular care to avoid ‘practicing’ coercive engagements on human lives, especially lives that have already gone through so much during these long years of conflict-related abuse.

Dr. Robert Zuber

Tags: , , ,

Growing the Responsibility to Protect

24 Aug

On September 11, the General Assembly will hold what has become its annual rite of Late Summer – the ‘debate’ on the Responsibility to Protect norm.

As is usual for the GA, this isn’t really a ‘debate’ at all. Instead it is a series of parallel statements by governments that too rarely take account either of the opinions of other states or of the content of the remarks by the panel of experts.  Nevertheless, the discussion this year does allow for an official ‘coming out’ party for Professor Jennifer Welsh, the new UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.  It also allows the relatively small group of NGOs that take an active interest in RtoP to gauge the degree to which states are willing to offer public support (or express public concern) regarding the norm. 

GAPW has attended all of the GA’s RtoP focused debates to date.  We still think they are worth pursuing as an interim step, inasmuch as they allow states to comment on the various reports by the Secretary General on themes (regionalization, third pillar capacities, etc.) germane to the evolution and full implementation of the norm .  The debates also allow for limited NGO input, though the politics of NGO involvement on RtoP have never been transparent, nor has there been any clear role for NGOs aside from supporting what have largely been modest initiatives by states to begin to fill the RtoP toolbox, create focal points for state-based activities, and provide alternative narratives to help guide Security Council ‘use’ of the norm.

Clearly more is needed if the norm is to guide conduct more than provide rationalizations for conduct.  GAPW is quite supportive of the priorities of the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, though we have also maintained for some time that a more open-ended process that encourages diplomats beyond the Security Council to take regular account of the opportunities and challenges of RtoP would be to everyone’s advantage.  Moreover, the modest NGO community that engages with RtoP, by and large, has failed to provide leadership commensurate with efforts to ‘guard the gate’ from critics who would allegedly diminish the norm.  Such critics it seems can get on the ‘wrong side’ of the discussion merely by having the temerity to suggest that we must travel farther – and in some ways travel differently – if the norm is ever to achieve necessary levels of diplomatic trust and functional competence.

The International Coalition for the RtoP, which has done some good work expanding interest in the norm within diverse global regions, has recently shared their own assessment of what this September debate needs to accomplish.   Those recommendations appear at the end of this post.  There are some good (if vague) suggestions for what might grow from this debate, and we are particularly pleased with the gender references.  But our feeling is that we need to expect more from this flowering that, for now at least, blooms only once a year and for only brief periods of time.

Our own (arguably limited) sense from talking to persons worldwide who were originally attracted to the possibilities suggested by the norm is that the proverbial bloom is starting to come off the rose.  Thankfully, none of these discussions has indicated a serious reconsideration of the basic premise of sovereignty as responsibility, nor of the fundamental belief that the international community has a critical role to play in situations where states fail to protect populations.   The caution expressed is less a function of the norm itself and more of the political compromises of some of its caretakers, both institutionally authorized and self-appointed.  When people tell us that RtoP is ‘dead’ (it isn’t) they mean in part that those tasked with promoting and/or authorizing RtoP have planted at least some of their seeds in the wrong soil.

At some point in the future, it would be interesting to have a real debate focused on where this entire process of norm implementation is headed and the extent to which our structures and strategies are capable of getting us there.  Such a discussion would be rather un-UN-like and might possibly shake up the current ‘consensus’ working methods and civil society alliances which, in our view, have uncertain benefit for the credibility of the UNs commitments to prevent mass atrocity crimes and respond rapidly and with minimum coercive force in those situations (hopefully rare) in which diplomatic and other tools fail to halt the path towards violence.

If what we all say is true about the urgency of mass atrocity prevention, then clearly our emotional conveniences, political compromises, career interests and funding needs must always take a back seat.   More than any single responsibility, we need to find ways to lengthen the growing season for this norm and do more to ensure the right amounts of energy and commitment for it to reach full bloom.   At present, we seem to be in a developing situation that reminds us of the crocuses of early spring, a beautiful purple plant that has to work far too hard to force itself through cold soils and then threatens to disappear almost before we realize it is there.

ICRtoP 2013 GA Debate Recommendations

  • Conduct assessments and analyses of domestic capacities and best practices to prevent atrocities, so as to adopt, establish or strengthen existing mechanisms and state policies;
  • Develop a national plan of action for the prevention of atrocities and the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect and/or appoint a focal point tasked with integrating RtoP within national policies;
  • Establish or enhance existing domestic early-warning mechanisms and ensure that the information gathered is analyzed as well as shared with relevant international actors to guarantee swift, preventive action;
  • Adopt or further strengthen existing policies to ensure the full and equal participation of women and minority populations in all political, judicial, reconciliation, and peacebuilding activities, as well as safeguard the protection of equal rights for such populations;
  • Create processes that cultivate dialogue between the State and communities that allow open communication and mutual trust-building, mechanisms that can support an early dissimulation of tensions.
  • Promote a safe and dynamic space for civil society, which includes ensuring an independent and fair media, as well as continue to form key partnerships between government and civil society actors to contribute to the prevention of atrocities.

 

Dr. Robert Zuber, Director GAPW

Tags: , ,

Avoiding Inter-Generational Gender Traps

14 Aug

As many readers of this Blog already know, the primary preoccupation of GAPW is with the ‘gender dimensions’ of UN policies – from peacekeeping and disarmament to youth leadership and social development.   Together with program partners at UN headquarters and in many communities and countries worldwide, we are convinced that efforts to promote women’s full participation in political and social life, as well as ending impunity for gender violence (which itself constitutes a significant barrier to participation) are key to both effective international security and the promotion of sustainable development priorities.

A gender lens is also valuable in approaching the Fourth session of the Open Ended Working Group on Aging.  It is true, as a brochure distributed by the Subcommittee on Older Women notes, that “older men and women both face age discrimination but older women also face cumulative effects of gender discrimination throughout their lives, including less access to education and health services, lower earning capacity and limited access to rights to land ownership, contributing to their vulnerability in old age.”

But there are other vulnerabilities for older women which are cultural in origin, and which may constitute the ‘final frontier’ of gender discrimination.  In my years of providing faith-based counseling for communities of largely older women and in my current work characterized in part by providing mentoring options for women working at UN headquarters, it is clear that older and younger women remain disconnected, that most younger women do not have older women who are not their mothers as ‘accompanying elders’ in their lives and, perhaps most relevant in this context, that younger women are not prepared (and indeed are largely ignoring) the long term, “cumulative” effects of all aspects of this subtle gender discrimination, but especially those aspects that are embedded in cultures that value physical beauty over character and worldly riches over connection.

Despite the dramatic anxiety that too often accompanies women in the early years of their life journey, these women often believe that they can alleviate some of the implications of anxiety and develop a competitive edge by ‘purchasing the surfaces.’   In this context, that means spending lots of energy on the things that win approval of peers and family members – focusing on enhancing physical beauty, having a clearly articulate career path, finding a mate and engaging in conventional family life.

None of these are problematic in themselves, perhaps aside from their implications for the lives of many women as they age.  Eventually, the wrinkles cannot be hidden, the hair greys, joints ache more often, life partners become more sporadically attentive, children move to distant cities, skills that defined a career are supplanted by new technology in younger hands.

In other words, the things of their youth that made these women ‘valuable’ in the eyes of their societies (and often in their own eyes as well) begin to slip away, sometimes slowly, other times with a speed that would shock a gazelle.

Many older women report feeling ‘invisible.’   The world’s attention has flowed elsewhere.   And sadly and unacceptably, respect and appreciation, including too often from younger women, flow away as well.

When that happens, the capacity for generosity is compromised.   The capacity to communicate hope through the aches of aging is undermined as well.  Prospects for life-giving connectivity are reduced to peer groups that are sometimes more restricted than the relationships of school – needlessly age and class specific.

In such circumstances, women are the losers.  Indeed, we are all the losers.    The ‘cumulative’ effects that lead too often to social isolation, feelings of ‘invisibility’ and other psychic deficits are, especially in western societies, undermining respectful and dignified engagements with the ‘last years,’ years that we are all destined to face and for which we are so often emotionally and materially unprepared.

As important as the Convention proposed by delegates to this Working Group would be, these psychic deficits cannot be addressed solely by recourse to resource-focused policies.   This is a problem that will more likely be solved through a robust, multi-generational engagement, an engagement that requires older women to be transparent about the ‘traps’ that they fell victim to in their early years, and younger women who are demonstrably less and less content to rely for their self-worth on things they will surely lose long before their life cycles have run their course.

This ‘final frontier’ of gender discrimination is deeply embedded and too rarely interrogated.   As we lobby for more health, employment and education options for aging populations, we should commit to expose the cultural ‘traps’ that keep too many younger women anxious and too many older women invisible.

Dr. Robert Zuber

Tags: , , ,

Bookends: The UN Takes on the Challenges of Aging

13 Aug

August 12 was one of those interesting and even ironic days at the UN.   On the one hand, there wasn’t much happening in either the North Lawn or Conference Building as many delegations and secretariat officials have wandered off for a bit of pre-September rest.   What WAS happening though was certainly worthy of attention by all policymakers – a morning session devoted to youth empowerment and an afternoon session of the Fourth Open Ended Working Group on Aging.

For GAPW, which has long been involved in youth development, a focus on the elderly is both timely and directly relevant to our mandate.   Given general increases in life expectancy based, in large parts of the world, on increased access to higher quality health care, there is little reason to believe that our seniors cannot be productive contributors to the growth and maintenance of human security frameworks – in both local and international contexts — long past any arbitrary retirement ages imposed by our organizations and agencies.

One question that we struggle with almost daily:  How do we promote the transition in leadership to younger persons without disenfranchising older persons who, in many cases, provided the conceptual and logistical guidance that built and maintained our organizations over many years?

This is clearly a more challenging problem than it might first appear. The ‘cult of youth’ that plagues much of western culture and which is, so far as we can tell, more a marketing ploy than an intentional policy choice, has limited value for the development of the fair and robust human security frameworks that we endeavor to promote.  Creating narrow peer frameworks in a world that offers virtually limitless options for meaningful participation, friendship and intimacy seems almost a cruel rebuke to those who have labored over many years to dismantle barriers of race, gender, sexual preference and, yes, age.

We support the movement, suggested by the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and many other States, to create a process leading to the adoption of universal standards of treatment for older persons.  At the same time, we resist any policy that inadvertently reinforces the ‘ghetto’ that too many older persons find themselves increasingly restricted to.   Perhaps even more than younger people, older citizens require human connection as much as fresh air and mobility assistance.   Services for the elderly matter – and States are right to make this more of a priority — but what matters more is cultures that promote cross-generational interaction that is open to and respectful of diverse lenses on how the world works, and how it can work more effectively.

The elderly are not a ‘population group’ as some delegations casually referred to them, but rather a diverse set of human longings and capacities seeking to remain relevant in the eyes of those with skills and energy to whom they have (perhaps not quickly or gracefully enough) given way.

The peaceful planet we all seek will be characterized in part by the welcome extended to new life and the gratitude extended to those at life’s end.   The elderly represent the direction towards which we are all headed.   An investment in older people – not only their material conditions but their ongoing, respectful connection – will yield great benefit.  After all, the time will come soon enough when we will take their places at the end of the life cycle.

Dr. Robert Zuber

Tags: , ,

← Older Entries
Newer Entries →