CEDAW Reviews: Indonesia

16 Jul

Delegates from the Republic of Indonesia came before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on 11 July 2012 for the Committee’s review of the state party’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafater “Convention”). In introducing the report, the Minister of Women and Child Protection discussed the establishment of a national development plan and national strategy plan for the protection of human rights including women’s rights; legislation on human trafficking and migrant smuggling; and migrant and domestic worker’s rights. Indonesia also discussed the ongoing progress in gender mainstreaming, education and awareness as well as socialization training.

Questions from the Committee ranged on a variety of issues, with special attention on female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM was previously outlawed but has again been legalized within health care facilities. In making the practice legal again, Indonesia hope it will ensure that FGM is administered safely and within sterile conditions. Nevertheless, FGM remains a grave violation of human and women’s rights. A secure, equal and non-discriminatory environment cannot be upheld where this practice is encouraged under a veil of traditional or religious rights. Moreover, the practice is in direct violation of Convention obligations. Until the practice is completely eliminated, it demonstrates an unwillingness to protect women. It is an act of discrimination and violence and is a significant barrier to achieving women’s equality.

Most strongly addressing the FGM issues were Committee members from Afghanistan, Egypt and Turkey, each stating that FGM was not associated with or upheld by the Muslim religion. Overall, the Committee was persistent on this issue and reasoned that, regardless of traditional or religious justifications, the practice was still a significant violation of the obligations under the Convention.

Besides FGM, compliance with CEDAW recommendations on the issue of gender equality was also addressed, especially as it pertains to political life and meeting gender quotas; to marriage and family relations; and inequalities in land rights and tenure. Such inequalities can inhibit the status of women within society, specifically when political decentralization is used as a veil behind which human rights violations targeting women are occurring. 

The utilization of decentralization to restrict the rights of women sets a challenging and complex precedence, which may have vast consequences on women’s security. Women’s security is significantly threatened when the violation of their rights are not addressed within political systems. Decentralization is being used in this case to give local governments the authority to establish bylaws in direct violation with national, international and human rights laws. Such violations can lead to gross domestic violence and damaging marriage practices as well as other discriminatory and violent acts against women.

Overall, Indonesia is trying to progress in the realm of women and gender equality.  Most notably they have implemented legislation on human trafficking and migrant workers; they are working toward meeting their quota agenda; they are mainstreaming women and gender equality and they are implementing training and socializing programs at multiple governmental levels, within law enforcement, the judiciary and within civil society. While all of these efforts are of course welcome and promoted, there are still grave human rights violations, specifically targeting women and girls. It is understandable that behavioral norms, customs and cultures are challenging specifically when trying to change a society steeped in years of a patriarchal system. But, at the same time, the government must take a stand to address and end the gross violations against women and to progress forward. Although CEDAW maintained an understanding of the climate and culture within Indonesia, they also highlighted these issues and raised the bar of expectations in terms of Indonesia’s future report.

–          Cara Lacey 

CEDAW Reviews: Guyana

12 Jul

The Committee on the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) began the morning of 10 July 1012 with a discussion between the Committee and nongovernmental organizations from Cooperative Republic of Guyana (hereafter “Guyana”).

With representatives from the Ministry of Human Services and Human Security, Jennifer Webster, and Ministry of Education, Priya D. Manickchand, as well as representatives from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Guyana to the United Nations present in the room, Guyana gave an overview of the status of women and gender equality domestically. Guyana noted progress made on legislative reform, access to land, access to education, elimination of discrimination against women, and promoting gender equality between women and men. On domestic violence specifically, it is considered a national priority and relevant laws have been amended to include new offenses or severe penalties. Legal clinics are also available to provide aid to six of the ten administrative regions of the country; such legal aid clinics are run by a nongovernment organization but are state-funded.

Overall, in her introductory remarks, Webster focused on the many legal achievements Guyana has made and the country’s strong commitment to women’s rights and human rights.  Also mentioned were Guyana’s four Human Rights Commissions – on Rights of the Child, Women and Gender Equality, Indigenous people, and Ethnic Relations— all of which include women at the leadership level. The Parliament is currently 32% female and five of these female parliamentary members are also indigenous women. Finally, Guyana reemphasized the importance of Guyana’s constitution, and also brought up a few newer acts on sexual offenses and women with disabilities, which Guyana believes will have a significant impact.

Questions from the Committee ranged on a wide array of issues, mainly on the status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter “Convention”) as well as statistics about the status of women and accessibility of counseling services to victims of violence.

On how the Convention is enforced domestically and justice system reform, Guyana noted that the Convention part of its national constitution. As such, the terms of the Convention can be enforced as fundamental rights. When national laws are amended or reformed, Guyana is still bound by the rights protected by the Convention. Furthermore, Manickchand explained that even if the Convention is not explicitly referenced in related court decisions, by drawing upon the Constitution, these decisions all implicitly invoke the Convention. Since Guyana has four to five women judges, Manickchand expects that members of the judiciary are informed about the Convention and its provisions.

Some debate arose in the afternoon session when statistics from alternative sources were incorporated in the questions posed to Manickchand and Webster; these statistics were not used in Guyana’s report to the Committee.  Guyana refuted many of the referenced statistics, especially those regarding any gender imbalance in the education system, but admitted that gathering reliable statistical information was a central challenge and future priority the Guyanese government. One noticeable statistic that was not refuted regarded mental health services in Guyana; Committee members were concerned about counseling services for victims of violence because only one hospital currently provides psychiatric support to victims. Guyana agreed that, while there were psychosocial services provided by various NGOs, there are few medical services offered for mental health. A psychosocial service provided by the government is a men’s empowerment network. After receiving complaints and requests in surveys on domestic violence, Guyana created the network to reach men at different community levels and offer counseling and anger management services.

Overall, as the first review of a state party for the 52nd session, the review process seemed to run rather smoothly. Even when questions from the Committee were more straightforward, Guyana elaborated on statistics by assessing the structural difficulties (usually political, economic, and geographic) that must be addressed in order realize greater equality and comply with their country’s CEDAW commitments. It was good to see the steps Guyana has taken nationally on the implementation of the Convention. Implementation of the Convention, of course, is a main issue of the Committee that will likely frame many discussions for the rest of the month.

– Henry Neuwirth

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CEDAW Committee Comes to the New York

10 Jul

Celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee’s 52nd session opened in New York on 9 July 2012 with a public event focusing on Women’s Participation and Leadership. As established by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereafter ‘Convention’), the Committee is the working body of the Convention, monitoring its implementation. It is composed of 23 international experts who are elected from states parties and serve in their personal capacities. The Committee is mandated to formulate general recommendations to states parties regarding articles or themes of the Convention, to receive communications about instances when the Convention has been violated, and to initiate inquiries in instances where violations of women’s rights exist.

The Chairperson, Silvia Pimentel, opened the session by providing an overview of the work of the Committee since the 51st session; Ms. Pimentel noted the Committee’s involvement in Rio+20 and the future of women’s empowerment in sustainable development. Also noted was the Committee’s involvement in strengthening the work of treaty bodies, an initiative that has been recently taken on by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR). During this session, the Committee will review the Bahamas, Bulgaria, Guyana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, New Zealand and Samoa.  Guyana is the first country to be reviewed, and the Committee is likely to focus on the domestic and sexual violence of women and young girls, access to counseling services, as well as programs supporting the elderly.  

In addition to the review of states parties, this session also provides the opportunity for the Convention to be tied to different security themes, including the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations that are taking place in parallel to the session. Civil society groups are likely to use this time to highlight the links between CEDAW and the ATT and combating violence against women. Similarly, as the Committee is in the process of formulating the general recommendations from last summer’s general discussion on Women in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, it will be interesting to see if and how discussions from last summer and throughout the past year will continue this summer, especially with the upcoming session of the Commission on the Status of Women under the theme of Elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls.

GAPW will be monitoring the work of the Committee during this session and reporting regularly on the review of states parties, informal meetings with NGOs and national human rights organizations, and relevant side-events. Please check back here for further reporting.

-Melina Lito 

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OHCHR Global Panel: “Moving Away from the Death Penalty – Lessons from National Experiences”

6 Jul

The Panel, presented by The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights offered progressive perspectives on the possible global abolishment of capital punishment, including mechanisms towards abolishment and lessons learned from existing and previous efforts. The program was divided into two sessions. First, panelists discussed the experience of their States regarding the abolition of the death penalty. In addition, participants discussed the link between the death penalty and human rights. The conversation was insightful, respectful and thoughtful. It provided a new foundation from which a human security framework surrounding capital punishment can emerge.  In addition, the meeting highlighted education and awareness as being essential roles for civil society.  Civil society, non-state and state actors hold a vital stake in this discussion with clear links to peace and security. The meeting provided a necessary public forum empowering a comprehensive and robust dialogue.

Three significant and highly related perspectives materialized from the discussion:

1)      Capital punishment is more likely to be supported in countries that lack awareness and education on the topic as well as the institutions and resources to support other means of punishment;

2)      The death penalty is a human and civil rights issue and in many cases it is utilized to specifically target marginalized and vulnerable groups therefore increasing inequality and undermining efforts to eliminate discrimination.

3)      State capacity to back-check and scientifically rule out human and judicial error is significantly lacking in the international community (specifically in those countries lacking in economic development and the rule of law) resulting in far too many innocent victims being sentenced to death.

These three perspectives raise significant questions surrounding the purpose of capital punishment laws and their effect on human rights and more specifically on human security.  The assumed purpose of capital punishment is to deter crime through instilling fear in punishment by death. Yet, as demonstrated at the meeting, a significant link between the death penalty and crime deterrence does not exist.  It was mentioned that in fact the opposite is true – abolishment of the death penalty is associated with increased human security and decreased human rights violations by States. Therefore, the following questions emerge: What is the death penalty actually accomplishing and for whom? Why should civil society be so concerned?

In States where capital punishment is upheld violence is more likely to become a state-endorsed cultural norm from which a vicious cycle of incapacitating human insecurity can evolve. This cultural norm establishes the use of violence as an acceptable form of problem solving and punishment setting an example of such behavior at the highest levels. Violence is thus encouraged and promoted at every level, opening the door to street-level retribution and gross human rights violations, while often specifically targeting marginalized communities.  Moreover human security is threatened when a government sets the tone of essentially allowing “an eye for an eye” mentality to ensue without thinking through the actions, costs or consequences of such a stance – consequences such as increased inequality, low economic development and enduring poverty and violence. In such a setting civil society recognizes and must address this grave risk.

In order to reduce risks in States that continue to apply capital punishments, Mr. Barry Scheck and others recommended that standards and regulations be required at the international level to enforce the use of DNA and scientific evidence testing to eliminate wrongful convictions. In many States which continue to uphold the death penalty, instances of wrongful conviction and death sentences are likely to occur due to the fact that there are no national or international regulations or standards in place to require a “back check” on possible human and judicial errors.  However, even though this is an admirable point and one that requires additional study it derails the conversation and shifts the focus from the goal of globally eliminating capital punishment for human security to one of legal procedures to ensure fairness in punishments.

In this case the argument should be re-framed to address how the possibility of wrongful convictions can be used to eliminate public support of the death penalty.  Furthermore, many States upholding the death penalty lack the resources and capacity necessary to support testing mechanisms, in particular they may lack strong institutions, the rule of law and the ability to finance DNA testing. Therefore it is essential as a first step to address the underlying issues through institution building and development in order to even begin a discussion about standardizing the use of procedures and scientific evidence.  In order to do so, the best approach may be to first encourage a moratorium on the death penalty and second to educate citizens on the effects of the death penalty and its impact on human security and human rights.

In a society where the death penalty is upheld, human security is threatened due to violence perpetuated at government levels. Civil Society therefore has a significant role to play in this debate requiring a strong and informed voice. Involving civil society in the conversation on the death penalty is essential to its abolition. Therefore it is important to heed the recommendation of increased education and public awareness – a theme that remained a constant thread throughout the meeting. (Education was specifically noted multiple times by Guatemala and Mr. Federico Mayor) Education and awareness play a vital role in successfully shedding light on the death penalty as a violation of human rights and as a punishment that actually decreases human security.  For example; in Trinidad (discussed at the meeting by Mr. Mendes) awareness o f the consequences of wrongful conviction, framed within a human security perspective, significantly decreased public support for the death penalty.

Although panelists suggested that public opinion should be separated from human rights, it is necessary to keep the perspective that public opinion is indispensable when trying to achieve change in a State’s human rights climate.  Education and awareness should therefore be appropriately instituted and targeted to enhance bottom-up change and limit top down influence in setting a tone of violence. However; the question remains: how can bottom-up change occur in a society that is not democratic?  It may be necessary in this case to re-frame the issue beyond a human rights perspective and instead demonstrate the cost-benefits of abolition. Ultimately, a two-pronged approach may be best in order to connect the national security risks and costs with the human rights and security issues in order to induce a paradigm shift to eliminate the death penalty on a global scale.

“Moving away from the death penalty” provided an important forum for discussion on this still controversial issue. Framing a compelling strategy for abolishment of the death penalty requires multiple approaches to reach the ultimate goal.  Most importantly it is essential that the global abolishment remains the goal and that the debate is not led off track.  At a minimum, the moratorium on the death penalty should continue to be pushed, and we must continue to address the systemic and underlying issues that lead to its use.  As we edge closer to upholding the right to human life as the global standard, it is essential that governments set an example that violence is not the answer to human security and that civil society uses its collective voice to set the stage for change.

–Cara Lacey

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Security Council Debate on Protection of Civilians

3 Jul

The Security Council’s recent debate on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict boasted much consensus by Security Council members and attending member states regarding the necessity of protecting civilians, the implementation of which continues to be debated.

The briefing came after Secretary General’s report (S/2012/376) where Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon highlighted five core challenges in protection, including enhancing compliance by non-state armed groups; protection of civilians by UN Peacekeeping and other missions; humanitarian access; and accountability.

Mr. Ban Ki-Moon gave opening remarks and discussed the main challenges to protection as well as noted that more must be done to protect women and children and to save innocent lives. Invited speakers to brief the Security Council included Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs; Dr. Philip Spoeri, Director for International Law and Cooperation of the International Committee Red Cross; Ivan Simonovic, speaking on behalf of High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay; and Mr. Harold Caballeros, Foreign Minister of Guatemala. They all addressed the ongoing conflicts affecting civilian populations; the need to uphold humanitarian laws and the need for prevention mechanisms.

Overall, there seemed to be some agreement on issues like the elimination of the use of explosive weapons in densely populated urban areas; condemning violence and humanitarian violations committed against civilian populations particularly within Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many states also called for civilian monitoring and data collection for effective and reliable information; building and implementing a robust peacekeeping operation and support of peacekeeper training by DPKO with much consensus on the effectiveness of the current training modules.

On the issue of violence against women, while sexual violence was addressed, it focused mostly on the “vulnerable populations” of women and children and again highlighted women as victims without addressing the necessity of their participation in the peace process. Only Canada provided a detailed discussion and analysis regarding the role of women in empowerment and participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They referenced Security Council Resolution 1325 and strongly expressed that women’s participation will significantly contribute to peace and security.

Disagreement on multiple items also ensued, mainly focused on promoting conversations between non-state armed actors and the UN. Colombia stressed their reservations on this topic, while other States saw coordination with non-state armed actors as being necessary to protect. Similarly, in regards to Security Council Resolution 1973, the role, timing and placement of such international intervention remained debatable with Russia particularly stressing that the role of the international body be secondary to that of the state. Moreover, on Syria, all states agreed that the crimes against civilians were unacceptable yet there was no agreement on how to proceed. Finally, on the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Mexico, Austria and the representative of the European Union spoke in support of a robust, workable Treaty to address arms trade as an essential mechanism to protecting civilians.

In summary, member states stressed that the protection of civilians was essential and agreed that the initial responsibility rested in the hands of the state. The majority agreed that political will and building state capacity was and continues to be essential. The implementation of PoC remains highly deficient and is severely lacking in capacity, support, motivation, effectiveness and most importantly consensus. Increasingly women are a topic of discussion yet further promotion of their role within the peace process is vital.  Overall, future success of PoC depends on finding the intersections that exist within those lenses and properly applying them to differing contexts with multiple actors.

The Arms Trade Treaty: Anticipating ‘Redlines’

20 Jun

As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations are set to begin in just over a week, member states and civil society alike are examining and speculating on possible configurations of a consensus treaty text. These configurations inevitably beg the question—is a weak ATT better than no treaty at all? Would a weak treaty do more harm than the harm caused by opting out of the process altogether? Where are the ‘redlines’ that would warrant any state to consider abandoning negotiations in July? Are there alternatives for negotiating an ATT within the UN system, or perhaps outside of it?

In a new policy brief, I highlight contentious issue areas and apparent ‘redlines’ that exist among the prominent and most outspoken stakeholders with regards to each issue– SALWs, ammunition, human rights, victims’ assistance, brokering, among others. While states will obviously make decisions on ‘staying or leaving’ based on their own national interests, I also offer  recommendations focused on whether or not these issues should, in fact, be a negotiating ‘redline’ as well as on how best to treat such issues during the negotiations.

The full policy brief is available here.

—Katherine Prizeman

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The ATT won’t be a panacea, but let’s be fair

4 Jun

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will not be a panacea for all the world’s weapons-related human rights abuses, but shouldn’t we give the UN and ATT advocates a bit more credit than Mr. Bromund does in his 30 May 2012 editorial in The Commentator, “When the UN Arms Trade Treaty fails, what next?” Mr. Bromund explains why the upcoming ATT negotiations will not solve all the problems related to the flow of weapons to autocratic regimes. He also argues for why the upcoming negotiations are a bad idea in the first place. We can agree that the ATT will not be a cure-all for the complex problems of the diverted arms trade, but have strong disagreements with the second notion.

Mr. Bromund admits that even if the negotiations fail to produce a Treaty in July,  such a Treaty might well come to fruition perhaps at a later stage within the UN or perhaps outside the UN system altogether. At the same time, he sees ATT advocacy as a push to make the UN “do things it was not designed to do, things that would destroy the system…” This is a categorical and perhaps ideologically-driven claim that does not fairly assess the potential of the UN system for establishing new norms and standards (though not always coherent practices) on matters of international security, including on arms transfers and specifically on the need to end diversion of legally traded weapons. Diverted weapons have a direct and demonstrable impact on criminality, terrorism, insurgency, and corruption. Which of these does Mr. Bromund approve of in practice? Obviously none. One can make the case that at ATT, especially in its earlier iterations, will not have sufficient ‘teeth’ to deal with all aspects of diversion, but Mr. Bromund offers no alternate path and our government, the US, is one of several states willfully undermining the ability of the ATT to deal with this critical challenge to international peace and security – which is, after all, a primary role and responsibility of the UN.

Mr. Bromund is right when he states that many ATT ‘insiders’ are increasingly concerned that the initial Treaty will be far from “bullet proof.”  Mr. Bromund concedes that the ATT will at least create the principles to guide the creation of national systems for controlling arms imports and exports in order to raise overall, international standards for the transfer of conventional weapons. Our sense is that this list of “principles” that states should bear in mind prior to a transfer would be the weakest possible outcome for negotiations. Such principles “considered” by States without any accountability or implementation mechanism could arguably be used as cover for future transfers of questionable character. Signatories could maintain that they are acting in accordance with their international obligations as parties to the ATT, have evaluated (born in mind) a given transfer according to the adopted list of principles, and have nonetheless decided to continue the dubious transfer. Therefore, it is important to advocate for an ATT that does have some “teeth,” at least enough “bite” to highlight the diversion potential of certain transfers and alert sellers publicly of the risk.

As Mr. Bromund seems to be writing from a perspective that essentially supports the current US negotiating position, it is important to note that the US standards on weapons transfers are already high; thus the point of a Treaty would be to get other national standards up to a high level insofar as this is fiscally and technologically feasible. The US would not have to change much in the way of its practices under an ATT, though there is now much chatter, largely uninformed and largely from the NRA and other pressure groups, that an ATT will require a large and controversial program of civilian disarmament.  Nevertheless, the US and other larger powers would certainly be required to acknowledge more than they now do a responsibility to do more to get smaller (and many recipient) nations up to a new international code.

That being said, non-governmental organizations that have worked vigorously for an ATT for more than a decade, and that are fully dedicated to a “binding, bulletproof” Treaty that will advance human rights, should not be altogether dismissed for being unrealistic or naïve as Mr. Bromund implies. Vocal ATT proponents are in no way the “deadliest enemies” of the UN system by advocating for a Treaty with strong oversight and pushing states, very publicly, to be held accountable during the negotiation process. NGOs holding all states accountable for where they transfer weapons do not in any way “destroy the [UN] system they claim to be defending and promoting.” The UN system, even with a “veto”option [it seems Mr. Bromund is referring to the P-5 veto in the Security Council put in place because of a demand made by Stalin as a condition for Soviet membership], is entirely capable of implementing a new treaty that seeks to prevent the flow of weapons to societies (whether directly or through diversion) with a high risk of fueling human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. The ‘veto’ to which Mr. Bromund seems to be referring should not be confused with the consensus rule that was established for the ATT, which in this case was insisted on by the US, but which gives any government the right to jettison the process without explanation. Clearly, there are sufficient ways for governments to ‘protect’ their interests in this process should they choose to exercise them.

Nevertheless, in taking such a strong stance, we believe, if the process should be severely undermined or even fail altogether, both of which are certainly possible, then Mr. Bromund is correct:  If we (NGOs) are full partners in this process, NGOs should be subject to the same scrutiny as states in any assessment of why the process did not succeed in producing a viable Treaty.  “Looking into the mirror” is something that none of us does enough.

We, along with many of our NGO colleagues, believe that the ideal outcome of an ATT is a robust instrument of international standards to regulate the global business of the transfer of arms that is fully implementable to include a comprehensive scope, primary attention on diversion, provisions and structure to facilitate international cooperation and assistance that will ultimately stop transfers of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty, and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, we are not unmindful of the possibility that the first iteration of the Treaty will most likely be lacking in many of the characteristics that NGOs rightfully push for—strong humanitarian language, victims’ assistance when rights are violated via illicit transfers, a requirement of denial notifications. However, institutionalizing a strong review process with the possibility for improving on the first iteration of the ATT would be a generally positive outcome. Similar to the evolutionary process of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the argument would be that the ATT will most likely require sequential refinement under the auspices of a regular cycle of review conferences in order to achieve even close to its full potential, and that such refinements in this case are possible and preferable to abandoning the process entirely.

On a side note, Mr. Bromund’s characterization of review conferences as “running battles between countries that are easily swayed by left-wing NGOs” is hardly our experience. We don’t know how many review conferences he has attended (we would be pleased to make his acquaintance as we attend them all), but there are a few points to be made in response to his characterization, one of which is that specific expectations for the ATT are by no means shared by all NGOs, which are generally not considered to be ‘left leaning’ by any groups claiming to be so. Second, the NRA and other gun lobbies – not a lot of “left leaners” in that crowd – have participation in Preparatory Committee meetings, though their interventions have been mostly focused on US policy and the concern that the “UN” is somehow a major threat to gun ownership in this country.  Third, the “battles” referred to, such as they exist, are an inherent and sometimes useful aspect of diplomatic processes. It is better to air grievances in initial stages than to have them ‘sprung’ on states at later stages.

Mr. Bromund’s point concerning implementation is correct insofar as the ATT must make a practical difference in preventing and combating the diversion of weapons to abusive regimes if it is to be counted as a success. However, Mr. Bromund categorically and carelessly dismisses the utility of an ATT saying that it will not make any practical difference where the world’s dictatorial regimes are concerned because the Treaty will state clearly and explicitly the right of all governments to buy, sell, and transfer weapons. However, this claim of the sovereign right of states to import and export weapons does not preclude an ATT that can help stem the flow of weapons to abusive governments and eliminate a diverted market dominated by criminals, terrorists and other rogue interests. States retain the sovereign right to sell weapons under an ATT, and arguments by the NRA and others that the UN is seeking (or even has the capacity) to undermine the US second amendment are careless and ideologically driven. But the point here is that no state is required to make sales of weapons and, certainly, states cannot reasonably argue that there is no national interest in keeping weapons out of the hands of criminals, human rights abusers, terrorists and corrupt government officials. In instances where a state willingly permits a weapons transfer to a government that is known to divert weapons to non-state actors, a strong ATT would authorize the means to apply political and diplomatic pressure on both producing and recipient governments to reconsider the sale.

Human rights abuses will not be curbed solely by the adoption of an ATT (even if it were to miraculously receive full and enthusiastic endorsement by all 193 member states of the UN). But we have an opportunity in July to negotiate a strong Treaty to stem the flow of weapons and ammunition to corrupt or rights-abusing governments. We understand full well that the UN system is not always the most functional playing field, but the issue of diverted weapons is one where norms and practice can find a common and positive framework. This is a path that our own national interest requires us to follow.

 

–Katherine Prizeman & Robert Zuber

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The Arms Trade Treaty: No Treaty, Weak Treaty, ‘Plan B’?

25 May

As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) preparations are drawing to a close and diplomats and civil society alike anxiously await the July Diplomatic Conference, much of the attention has turned to the possible configurations of a (hopefully) forthcoming consensus treaty. Some would argue that it is best to focus on making the negotiations a success rather than prematurely anticipating their failure. As such, the levels of pessimism and optimism vary according to whom one is talking, whether a member state delegation or civil society advocate.

One could continue to debate the ‘nuts and bolts’ of treaty language from scope and final provisions to the strength of the humanitarian references included. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is absolutely necessary at this point to, at the very least, objectively evaluate and consider the possible scenarios of the 4-week Diplomatic Conference and the corresponding consequences of each circumstance irrespective of one’s position on the desired outcome. Such an evaluation would be useful insofar as it would essentially reveal the net effect of each outcome, whether positive or negative, on what I see as the most desirable outcome of the ATT process—a robust instrument of international standards to regulate the global business of the transfer of arms that is fully implementable to include a comprehensive scope, primary attention on diversion, provisions and structure to facilitate international cooperation and assistance that will ultimately stop transfers of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty, and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Questions on the minds of many who have dedicated themselves to this process for over a decade are clear— is a weak treaty better than no treaty at all? Would a weak treaty do more harm than the harm caused by opting out of the process altogether? Where are the ‘redlines’ that would warrant such an abandonment come July? Are there alternatives for negotiating an ATT within the UN system, or perhaps outside it? In order to address these inquiries it is important to contextualize the ATT debate. To my mind, the ATT process will encompass much more than the month of July. It is essential to assume a long-term perspective, in particular a process through which states commit to a review process that establishes regular meetings of states parties to assess and adjust the ATT to better reflect evolving security circumstances. Moreover, as with all multilateral negotiations, the ATT has not and will not be formulated in a vacuum. In 2012, member states are faced with parallel disarmament and arms control challenges—high stakes for a Conference on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, a continued stalemate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament now stretching over 15 years, and a 13th straight year without consensus recommendations in the Disarmament Commission. Furthermore, a failed negotiation on an ATT would, in turn, also cast a long shadow over the Review Conference of the UNPoA, which is scheduled to take place in August after the ATT negotiations have concluded.

What, then, are the possible scenarios for the ATT Conference? It seems that two of the principle scenarios—adoption of a weak treaty or adoption of no treaty at all—will have significant negative consequences. The only outcome that would not have negative effects would be adoption, by consensus, of an ideal treaty characterized by high levels of state accountability (especially on weapons diversion), oversight capacity for an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), and strong, binding humanitarian language. However, as this process is subject to a consensus rule, a provision that was introduced by the US as a precondition for taking part in the negotiations, this scenario is highly unlikely. Some member states, including the US, have already made clear that a high level of oversight, or any oversight, will not be acceptable and that it is entirely a national prerogative to determine how to manage national export controls in response to any international standards adopted in the ATT. Other member states have continuously asserted that the ATT is a trade treaty seeking merely to regulate the legal business of arms transfers and will not seek to limit the right of member states to sell or purchase arms by overburdening them with treaty-specific reporting obligations.

Therefore, I highlight two principle scenarios and what effect each would have on the long-term process. There are strong arguments that an ATT deemed ‘weak’ is better than no treaty at all. Some would argue that a strong review process with the possibility for improving on the first iteration of the ATT would be a generally positive outcome. Similar to the evolutionary process of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the argument would be that the ATT will most likely require sequential refinement under the auspices of a regular cycle of review conferences in order to achieve even close to its full potential, but that such refinements are possible and preferable to abandoning to the process altogether.

It could also likewise be argued that prospects for success of an ATT next July, as opposed to this July, is not any higher (especially given the consensus provision); thus any postponement would be futile, especially given the weight of the consensus provision. In light of other related UN processes such as the UNPoA, a completely failed ATT Conference would be severely detrimental to the other, in many cases already broken, parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery dealing a major legitimacy blow to the system. Even if the ATT is not universally considered a disarmament treaty per se it is certainly being treated as such by civil society and some member states. A failed process would indubitably be a serious blow to a system desperately in need of tangible victories.

In contrast, there are those that argue, and rightfully so, that a weak treaty would have far greater negative effects in the aggregate. A weak treaty— a simple list of principles which member states should bear mind in when transferring weapons without any accountability or implementation mechanism—could be used as cover for future transfers of questionable character. Signatories could argue that they are acting in accordance with their international law obligations as parties to the ATT, have evaluated a given transfer according to this list of principles (‘bearing them in mind’), and have nonetheless decided to continue the dubious transfer. Moreover, a weak ATT could potentially be used as the basis for states seeking to curtail UN efforts to advocate for better controls of illicit small arms or for stronger application of international humanitarian and human rights law related to the production or use of armaments. Either of these outcomes would fuel considerable skepticism regarding the viability of the UN in regulating the global arms trade, not to mention anger at the UN for creating ‘cover’ for bad behavior rather than eliminating said behavior.

Universality of the ATT process will have a direct effect on its strength—the more member states that subscribe to it, the weaker it will inevitably become. This debate begs the question, then, when is it better to walk away from the process than to proceed with a weak treaty? What are the points that are ‘non-negotiable’? For each member state, the answer to this question will vary. The CARICOM states have placed tremendous emphasis on the inclusion of SALWs in the scope, while the UK has recently underscored the arms trade as the ‘greatest threat to development, beyond disease and disaster’. Brazil, on the other hand, has continuously asserted its marked opposition to references to corruption, development, and stability in the criteria. Needless to say, the ‘redlines’ are not uniform and vary according to national interests, but it is absolutely essential that delegations know what those lines are before formal negotiations begin in July. Delegations must evaluate when the best course of action would be to ‘walk away’ from the process and seek alternatives elsewhere.

If delegations choose to ‘walk away’ from the process in July, alternative forums for negotiating an ATT are available, but also with their own set of limitations. There is the option to take the issue to the General Assembly in the fall and seek a new resolution and form of recourse to get negotiations back on track. Some like-minded states have discussed, unofficially, the possibility of opting out of the universal process in order to pursue a more comprehensive ATT, but one that will inevitably have fewer signatories. Foregoing a universal forum for ATT negotiation could call into question the future relevance of universal negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms control, which is already in serious jeopardy given the CD paralysis. Furthermore, such an approach would meet the same difficulties as have been encountered with regards to international efforts to ban cluster munitions and landmines. While such courses of action of like-minded states contribute to norm-setting, they likely fail to provide a universal framework for addressing the issue at hand. The value added of an ATT that is not universal, most especially one that does not legally bind the primary arms manufacturers and exporters, is not altogether lost, but certainly substantially diminished. The states subject to such treaties negotiated outside the universal process are usually those already committed to the regulations.

What, then, is the best scenario? The best scenario is, as previously mentioned, a robust and comprehensive instrument with full implementation capacity. However, this is not the only question that should be asked. The focus now should not be just on what is the best scenario, but also on the best path towards the ideal scenario, even after July negotiations conclude, by objectively evaluating the consequences of each of the most likely negotiating outcomes.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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‘Small-5’ Propose GA Resolution on Improving Working Methods of the Security Council

17 May

Known as the ‘Small-5,’ Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland presented a draft resolution that seeks to improve the working methods of the Security Council without proposed amendments to the UN Charter. As such, these states advocate that this resolution will have no bearing on the ongoing and separate negotiations for reform and expansion of the Security Council. Member states such as India and Brazil have opposed the resolution given their interest in and support for an amendment to the Charter that would expand the Security Council’s membership and give their delegations a permanent seat. The P5 members have also made clear their opposition noting that they do not see a role for the General Assembly in offering recommendations to the Security Council.

Led by the mission of Switzerland and its Permanent Representative Ambassador Paul Seger, this group has worked for improvement in the working methods of the Security Council since 2006. In March 2012, the S-5 tabled a resolution and have since undertaken several rounds of consultations with member states, in particular the P5, to identify a way forward with regards to these recommendations. This effort has been pursued both in the General Assembly and through cooperation with the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. The S-5 had decided it is time to bring the resolution to a vote in the GA and allow member states, although the adoption of such a resolution would not be binding, to communicate a political and moral message on improving the accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of the Council. However, as of Friday 18 May, Ambassador Seger of Switzerland decided to withdraw the resolution after increasing pressure from opponents of the resolution. Faced with the prospect of procedural wrangling that would “engulf the entire Membership and leave everyone confused”, he said the S-5 had decided to withdraw the text.

Ambassador Seger addressed the GA this week under the agenda item “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit” offering remarks on the content of the resolution. He gave a similar presentation in April 2012 describing the S-5’s proposals.

The principle recommendations include:

  • A greater role for the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and those that make large financial contributions in the preparation and modification of mandates for peacekeeping missions
  • Standing invitations to the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in relevant debates and, when appropriate, informal discussions
  • Better access for interested and directly concerned States to subsidiary organs
  • Establishing a working group on lessons learned in order to analyze reasons for non-implementation or lack of effectiveness to suggest mechanisms aimed at enhancing implementation of decisions
All the proposals are based on long-standing dissatisfaction with the way in which the Council does its work. In particular, GAPW would welcome strong and institutionalized methods of ‘assessment’,  particularly on questions of implementation, of resolutions and decisions of the Council.  The lack of assessment was no more apparent than in the case of Libya in which the Council lost control of the ‘narrative’ after adoption of the original resolution. This was indicative in part by the fact that the resolution barely surfaced in the discourse around NATO’s implementation of it. It wasn’t until the operation itself ended that the resolution was cited. In its aftermath, both Russia and China expressed serious concerns over the implementation of Resolution 1973, which has undoubtedly contributed to the decision by these P5 members to veto an subsequent Western-sponsored resolution threatening sanctions against Syria for the killings of civilians.
It seems the most ‘controversial’ proposals deal directly with the use of the veto. The S-5 proposes what they consider to be “nothing radical or revolutionary” noting that they fully respect the Charter-based right to the veto. P5 states are called to:
  • Explain the reasons for resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so by circulating a copy of the explanation as a separate Security Council document to all member states
  • Refrain from using the veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (as legally defined in the Rome Statute for the ICC)
  • Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring  that when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution it does not constitute a veto thus allowing the P5 member to cast a negative vote while not blocking the action altogether

Many members of civil society have advocated for such a provision to be added to the veto power– requesting that P5 members consider refraining from using their vetoes on action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, warm crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. Civil society and member states alike cite paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, stating that “the international community, through the UN, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; and that when a state is manifestly failing, the international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive response, including measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.” Nonetheless, it goes without saying that garnering support for recommendations to change the highly politicized issue of the veto are fraught with challenges. In order to combat this spirit of contention, the S-5 has tried to make clear that their intention is not to abolish the veto, but to provide recommendations only on how and when it should be used.

It seems that the primary concern of the S-5 is the lack of access for non-members of the Security Council to the Council’s work due to weak transparency and accountability measures, rather than a concern over the composition of the Council. The S-5 has tried to make clear that what they propose is a way forward through which Council members can seek the view of member states outside the Council without prejudice to the need for often timely action on sensitive  matters. Striking this balance is a difficult, but important goal for moving forward successfully with these recommendations.

—Katherine Prizeman

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First Prep Com of New NPT Review Cycle Concludes in Vienna

15 May

From 30 April to 11 May, the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) for the 2015 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met in Vienna, Austria. The Prep Com adopted a final report and a factual Chair’s summary as a working paper of the Committee (not a consensus document), under the authorship of Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. Two welcome developments from this session of the Prep Com were the 16-country statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as well as the increase in attention paid to addressing modernization of existing arsenals as a threat to the credibility of the NPT regime. Both of these initiatives were referenced in the Chair’s summary. Furthermore, the government of Norway announced that it would be host to a conference in 2013 on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.

The Prep Com did not accomplish much in the way of advancing the disarmament agenda insofar as there was neither a thorough review of the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan nor adoption of strategies for moving forward commitments to nuclear disarmament. As has been the case in previous NPT review cycles, many member states, particularly the nuclear weapon states (NWS), chose to focus on non-proliferation rather than disarmament (article VI) obligations. Following general debate, the discussion was divided into three clusters– implementation of provisions relating to non-proliferation, disarmament, and international peace and security with discussion on specific issues of nuclear disarmament and security assurances (Cluster 1); implementation of provisions relating to non-proliferation, safeguards, and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) with specific issue debate on regional issues including the 1995 resolution on the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East (Cluster 2); implementation of the provisions relating to the “inalienable right” of states parties to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Cluster 3).

There are still many concerns about the  earnestness of commitments to nuclear disarmament through the full implementation of article VI of the NPT, particularly given the continued call by some member states,  including Russia and China, for first “creating the conditions” for nuclear disarmament by maintaining “strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all.” These calls for continued reliance on nuclear weapons stand in striking contrast to the increasingly unified call for nuclear abolition by the majority of states parties to the NPT. At parallel and civil society meetings, there were also calls for addressing NATO’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons as part of its security framework, especially in light of the Chicago Summit to take place 20-21 May and the release of the Defense and Deterrence Posture Review (D&DPR). In March 2011, NATO began a year-long round of consultations on a new D&DPR.  Many members of civil society noted the innate contradiction that exists between NPT obligations and the current NATO deterrence policies. Professor Erika Simpson of the University of Western Ontario suggested that it is not altogether surprising that horizontal proliferators are trying to acquire nuclear weapons when NATO members themselves rely on nuclear deterrence for their protection.

A frustrating and diversionary debate lives on as member states remain divided between those who wished to emphasize combating non-proliferation risks (i.e. Iran and DPRK) and those underscoring the lack of substantial movement on disarmament and the hypocrisy that surrounds these debates. Brazil’s representative underscored a “groundless addiction” to nuclear weapons noting that the international community has already banned two other categories of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological). A joint P5 statement was “pleased to recall” that the group met in July 2011 “with a view to considering progress on  the commitments made” at the 2010 Review Conference, clearing indicating no urgency in reporting on, let alone adopting, concrete disarmament measures. The Australian delegation called for greater transparency from the NWS with regards to such joint meetings. Although this Prep Com did not see concrete reporting, the 2010 Action Plan “calls upon” the NWS to report to the 2014 Prep Com and the 2015 Review Conference on their undertakings related to Action 5, thereby placing a timeline (however weak) on progress towards nuclear disarmament. There were also many statements of concern regarding the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK, including a call by the UK that Iran implement “practical steps to build confidence around the world that Iran will implement its international obligations and does not intend to build a nuclear weapon.” The Iranian delegation, of course, defended its program as entirely peaceful and called the accusations “baseless allegations of non-compliance,” while also noting that Iran has been previously denied access to IAEA safety workshops. Other member states called for the DPRK to cease all tests and rejoin the NPT.

Also under discussion during the Prep Com was the status of implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The facilitator of the 2012 Conference, Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, addressed the Prep Com, but could not offer many details as no date or agenda has been set, although it is expected that it will be held in Helsinki in December. Ambassador Laajava pledged to continue consultations in the region that will focus on the agenda, modalities, outcome of the conference, and follow-up mechanisms. Ambassador Laajava also noted that not all states in the region have confirmed their participation, even though universal participation by all states in the region is considered by many states to be a non-negotiable element for success of the conference. Moreover, several member states called for greater efforts on the part of the co-sponsors (US, UK, and Russia) to facilitate the conference. The US reiterated its familiar position that regional peace is a prerequisite for the establishment of a WMDFZ and stated that the agenda must be larger than singling out any “particular state.”

The third cluster, that which deals with peaceful uses, consisted of multiple assertions of the ‘right’ to produce ‘peaceful’ nuclear energy. An astonishingly small number of delegations acknowledged the Fukushima disaster or offered an honest assessment of its effect on the future of nuclear energy. The US delegation acknowledged that Fukushima “affected public perceptions of the safety of nuclear power,” but argued that “the basic factors that led to an increased interest in nuclear power before that incident have not changed.” The Japanese delegation asserted its commitment to improving safety standards of its nuclear power facilities. The Norwegian and New Zealand delegations stated that they have chosen not to pursue nuclear energy programs, although these states do not dispute the right to pursue such energy and emphasize that they have exercised their right by not pursuing nuclear power. The Austrian delegation was the stand-out among the group, rightly noting that nuclear power can never be 100 percent safe and is not a panacea for climate change or sustainable development given its safety, security, and proliferation risks.

Although it was just the first session of three prior to the 2015 Rev Con, each meeting of states parties to the NPT is critical to the health, sustainability, and, most importantly, full implementation of dual non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. As is often noted by member states and civil society alike, the NPT is the only binding, multilateral framework available for addressing the blight of nuclear weapons. It must not be allowed to become merely a forum for conversation, but rather a legal document to be rigorously implemented in its totality.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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