Tag Archives: Afghanistan

Trust Deficit: The Future of UN Engagement from a Youthful and Developing Country Perspective, by Jamshid Mohammadi

20 Apr

Editor’s Note: Here is another post from Jamshid Mohammadi who is well through his internship now and has been spending more time inside the UN at youth, environment and peacebuilding events. The premise of this piece is that the UN’s engagement with the Taliban going forward needs to be youth-focused and depoliticized. The Taliban’s denial of educational access by Afghan girls is just one example of how the neglect of Afghan youth at present will seriously impede development and reconciliation in the country.

As a Muslim first and an Afghan second, Ramadan is the most cherished month of the year as Muslim families come together in Iftars to bond, bridge and link with one another, starkly similar to depoliticized form of Robert Putnam’s view of social capital to which I will return towards the end of this post. This year in New York, miles away from family without hopes of early reunion, I bond, bridge and link with colleagues here at Bard Globalization and International Affairs program (BGIA), and sometimes with diplomats and civil society organizations inside the United Nations (UN) with my grounds pass provided by Global Action to Prevent War. Civil society in Afghanistan has had a particularly bumpy road as tyrannical regimes, dictatorships, civil war, foreign imposition and religious radicalism have loomed across Afghanistan. In states facing conflict transition, civil society organizations remain a foundational force to foster norms of trust and reciprocity among an often-highly polarized populace, and to establish a framework of non-violent resistance against tyrannical regimes and their draconian policies.

Under US and NATO imposition, Afghanistan began to cultivate what was in some ways a vibrant civil society after years of armed conflict; yet the country largely failed to establish what Tocqueville described in Democracy in America, as “strong associational ties” among civil society organizations to foster the capacity of that sector to promote norms of reciprocity and trust towards unified social goals. It also largely failed to create Putnam’s version of social capital via a solid platform characterized by shared identity and goals. When I speak of the role of civil society, I include supra-national organizations like the UN positioned alongside state institutions. Despite some obvious limitations in terms of trust-building and state-building, Afghans have legitimized and largely supported the UN’s influence on Afghanistan’s socio-political policies. Take for example the post-Bonn political setting in which UN planning played a central role. It goes without saying that the growing mismatch between the capacities of the state and the needs of the population has made the work carried out now by the UN in Afghanistan of particular importance. Last month, the renewal of the UNAMA mandate for Afghanistan by the Security Council was a critical step towards modifying and even reversing the suppression of Afghans’ basic human rights by the Taliban. Another important segment of this mandate is to enable humanitarian assistance with strong transparency in aid management as the country grapples with a devastating humanitarian crisis. In principle, the current UNAMA configuration is celebrated as was the US-based democratic state in Afghanistan–-strong and proficient on paper, but now with the rise of the Taliban perhaps relatively weaker and more fragile in action. The Afghan people seem largely resigned to live through broken promises from the post-Bonn democracy as well as from the Afghan peace process once again.

As recognized, the work carried out by UN in Afghanistan may be the only mechanism that is currently capable of bridging the gap between the mismatch of service delivery and basic needs of the citizens. However, the attempt at state-building in Afghanistan is as much a collective failure as it is a shared obligation.  The cost of this collective failure is now being paid by the Afghan girls going to high school only to face closed doors; Afghan women empowered to educate themselves but now without jobs or clear avenues for political participation; and many Afghans who sacrificed much on the road to what they hoped would be perpetual peace for their country.

As the UN navigates through a myriad of issues which must be negotiated with the de facto government in Afghanistan, the Taliban continue to suppress Afghans in their attempt to gain international legitimacy regardless of how much political legitimacy is demolished at national level. This part of the post is where I must quote John Adams: “every problem is an opportunity in disguise”. This historic juncture in Afghanistan’s history is likely a point in time to recognize the opportunity lurking in disguise. But what form does this take?

Youth Centric and Depoliticized UN Involvement in Afghanistan Based on a “winning hearts and minds” narrative, a further legitimizing of UN involvement in Afghanistan requires an approach that is both youth-centric and depoliticized. The UN must continue to enable the role of youth in shaping policies in and across Afghanistan. This generation of youth displaced by the rise of the Taliban has nevertheless cultivated strong social capital that revolves around bonding, bridging and linking throughout 20 years of shared struggles, including under the former UN-backed government and the international stakeholders which have been pervasive in Afghanistan. What comes in addition to strong associational ties is empathy for all Afghans equally; Afghans often divided, even at times by the UN, into urban and rural communities. The full inclusion of this generation in UN’s decision-making regarding Afghanistan can potentially generate new political legitimacy as well as sustainability, and this made even more possible as the UN helps stakeholder to see Afghanistan beyond references to global and regional political rivalries, thus depoliticizing involvement in Afghanistan. Much of the UN involvement now seems focused on removing logistical and structural impediments in central regions of Afghanistan whereas Afghan citizens residing in the rural areas remain somewhat deprived of international humanitarian assistance channeled through UN and other international stakeholders. Adopting a youth-centric approach enables UN to connect with rural populations despite such logistical and infrastructural impediments. Connection between young Afghans became evident as they undertook efforts to distribute aid packages to families across the country, even in some rural areas often beyond the reach of the international community and previous government. This knowledge and connection should be included in the UN’s vision for reaching Afghans from all walks of life.

What, then, are some preconceived perceptions and expectations that we need to overcome to design a more accurate and effective response to looming uncertainties in Afghanistan and other countries with similar religious and cultural contexts? In many fragile country cases like mine, external perceptions and expectations can be alienating to local populations, and certainly to governments with fundamental challenges related to political representation. Taking a combined youth-centric and depoliticized approach is an option I recommend because it serves as a counter-weight to illegitimate states and better connects with civil society organizations and diverse citizens in general. The case of Afghanistan is no exception to this. As the Taliban consolidate power despite a lack of political legitimacy, the UN must go well beyond conventional mechanisms to address the challenges facing Afghans. I began with a mention of Putnam’s theory of social capital and come to it now as I discuss unconventional efforts to establish more effective UN engagement in Afghanistan. In South Asia, Hindu nationalist party of Modi is consolidating power at the cost of Muslims, the Pakistani deep state and security establishment has deepened control over civilian leadership, and the Taliban are imposing tyrannical policies to sustain their totalitarian reign. Against all this stands Civil Society organizations, more and more of which are run by younger people, taking stands and (and taking risks) against oppression and using creative means to promoting international norms and principles advocated by United Nations.

Counterbalancing unconventional policies of oppressive states requires unconventional UN engagement. Thus arguing, the UN must develop and promote robust policies to navigate around the challenges of tyrannical regimes and hybrid democracies to connect with and build a stronger civil society. Civil society in Afghanistan, for example, lacks support to craft a unified front against growing control by the Taliban. It lacks what Tocqueville described in Democracy in America, strong associational ties among the populace, especially one as heterogeneous as with Afghans, which is an impediment to establishing a unified stance against Taliban’s oppressive policies. Deborah Lyons, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA, is doing an outstanding job in reflecting ground-realities of Afghanistan. Many Afghan youth generally agree with what she has to say because she reflects what so many of us also perceive and expect, including a country that is doing much better than at present at educating and integrating all sectors of its youth. 

In order to build a stronger civil society and modify government excesses, the UN must continue to do its best to understand the Taliban as they are. As an Afghan, I hate to see prospects of another armed conflict in Afghanistan, so I have a natural inclination to hope for a changed, reformed Taliban. The UN seems to hope for the same, though in both instances more than hope is needed. Deborah Lyons, for example, could do more to challenge Taliban policies that suppress civil society and reverse promises of amnesty. The approach I vouch for here seeks an equal division of attention toward all current challenges to basic human rights. For example, as much as I want to uphold the importance of girls in school for the sake of the long-term prosperity and equality of Afghanistan, I vouch for equal attention to the Taliban’s broken promises of amnesty and to issues such as the ongoing suppression of local journalists.

Opportunity Beyond Uncertainty and Action Beyond Words: Reflections of an Afghan Student, Jamshid Mohammadi

27 Mar

Editor’s Note: Jamshid came to us this spring via Kandahar, Kabul and the Bard Globalization and International Affairs Program. While Jamshid is not the first Afghan intern we have had over the years, he is most likely the first intern from any source to have escaped from his home country prior to his tenure with us. As the UN continues to open up after two years of COVID restrictions, he is already experiencing the richness and frustration of UN policy environments. Jamshid is not the last young person to experience grave uncertainty due to conflict and political turmoil. We need to do more to accompany their difficult journeys.

One global trend today is a mismatch between what fragile governments can provide and what the citizens expect or rather need. Take the de facto state in Afghanistan as an example, where the cause of a growing mismatch is well beyond the ability of the state to resolve due to wide-ranging factors including but not limited to a lack of political will. As in other regions, a void has been created in Afghanistan and subsequently filled mostly with uncertainty which could ultimately be either disruptive or constructive depending on the models we adopt and the frameworks we construct around this uncertainty.

I grapple with a similar uncertainty on an individual level. I experience a growing mismatch between what I envisioned 2022 would look like what it is like today. I had assumed, as a Fulbright Semi-Finalist and a U.S. Embassy in Kabul alumnus, that my higher education was destined to be in the United States. I also assumed that I would go back to Afghanistan and tell the tales of Central Park to my friends who are obsessed with the “Friends” series, an American TV Show popular among young Afghan adults.

My country and I are facing many of the same questions: what lies beyond uncertainty and what lies beyond words (or beyond “work” as in meetings at the UN and elsewhere to discuss Afghanistan compared to taking actions that can make larger and more lasting differences)? As is the case with Afghanistan, my own growing mismatch is at some level caused by myself and our own people, and at some level caused by outsiders.

As a kid who went to high school in Kandahar, Afghanistan, I had to work so hard to be able to debate global issues with my fellow exchange students who came from Europe, the Americas and Eastern Asia to join the Bard Globalization and International Affairs Program where I now study. My country had gone through so much in order to rise from having almost no functioning institutions to having a recognized state apparatus, albeit corrupt and largely ineffective. For my own part, I admit that I could do better and work harder, and my country also acknowledges that some elite Afghans could do better and do more to finally end the longstanding suffering of the Afghan people. Surely I should not have missed my classes to sometimes join soccer matches to satisfy my personal desires. Corrupt elites (often with dual citizenship) do as I did but on a much larger scale, prioritizing personal gains over the national interest.

I want to ask those who are reading this personal post alongside Dr. Zuber’s thoughtful pieces: is it now unfair of my country or myself for that matter to seek a more stable, less uncertain life?

As I unpack my things here in New York and plan for my future, I still see commonalities between my country and me. I see opportunity beyond uncertainty, but to make that happen I need to go beyond planning. Some perhaps disagree, but I believe that there is also opportunity beyond uncertainty for Afghanistan. But to grasp that opportunity, we must go beyond meetings and discussions of issues affecting Afghanistan and risk more specific, tangible actions on the ground.

As a sovereign actor, the burden of my future falls solely on me. However, there are obvious impediments to realizing opportunity in the case of Afghanistan, including an international structure designed and based largely on neoliberal ideals that can compromise and even undermine the sovereignty of fragile states by large global powers or even by supra-national organizations such as the UN, IMF and World Bank.  For Afghanistan the involvement of large states and institutions has been a mixed blessing, a source of assistance but also a collective burden.

We must remind ourselves that the quantity of assistance to Afghanistan is not as important as effective aid management.  We must also do more for ourselves, to open educational opportunity for all and ensure that our economy and politics are fully inclusive.  In this regard, the recent reversal by the Taliban of a decision to allow girls in school is a major setback for the future of Afghanistan.  And yet there is hope that the recent, welcome renewal of the UNAMA mandate, including its human rights monitoring, will help ensure that the Taliban will keep its promises and meet its international obligations.

Rightly focused now on the situation in Ukraine, the international community must also strive to maintain its practical attention on other conflict settings. When it fails to do so, this implies that ending such conflicts is merely a means for protecting strategic interests rather than ending human suffering. My internship at Global Action to Prevent War and Armed conflict, providing me the opportunity to write and reflect alongside Dr. Robert Zuber, has given me a chance to scrutinize UN meetings on Afghanistan but also to keep appraised of other conflict settings in global regions where opportunity is being compromised.  

To keep Afghan opportunity in focus, the United Nations ought to reform much of its policies toward Afghanistan. For me, beyond uncertainty is the opportunity to go to a decent graduate school and use this time to prepare to contribute to a more stable and inclusive Afghanistan. For UN and other international partners, the goal must be to enable a viable pathway towards a self-sustaining Afghanistan: The opportunity to put modern labor forces together with the agricultural base of Afghan communities to gradually develop a self-sustaining economy.  The opportunity to democratize Afghanistan by integrating inclusive governance models which already exist which align with the realities of Afghanistan. The opportunity to pressure the de facto authorities to, among other things, respect the promise of general amnesty, uphold the rights of all, open schools to girls, and end corrupt practices, trafficking and threats from terror groups. 

There is so much more to be done.  I am grateful for this opportunity to prepare to help my country turn the current period of uncertainty into a longer period of opportunity. 

 

Summer Stock: Assessing Progress of our Conflict Priorities, Dr. Robert Zuber

29 Aug

I don’t know where I’m going, but I’m on my way.  Carl Sandburg

Never confuse movement with action.  Ernest Hemingway

By every act that glorifies or even tolerates such moronic delight in killing we set back the progress of humanity.  Rachel Carson

You’ve gotta know when it’s time to turn the page.  Tori Amos

Those who do not move, do not notice their chains.  Rosa Luxemburg

Progress means getting nearer to the place you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong turn, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. C.S. Lewis

Life is the principle of self-renewal, it is constantly renewing and remaking and changing and transfiguring itself.  Boris Pasternak

It is late August in what is finally a cool, if misty New York Sunday.  The UN, our principle “cover,” has been relatively quiet this past week as many NGO folks have fled the city and the diplomats who remain behind struggle to find even a bit of respite before their ministers and heads of state descend on New York in a few week’s time.

For those of us who have spent the month locked in place with eyes and ears tuned into the world, we are reminded yet again that crisis takes no holiday.  Those who watch helplessly as Hurricane Ida approaches New Orleans or the flames from the Caldor fire approach communities on the western shores of Lake Tahoe; those threatened with terrorist attacks at the Kabul airport while begging for passage on literally anything that can get airborne; those in places like Tigray longing for vaccines and other provisions while wondering when and how the abuses which now daily characterize their existence can ever be made to stop.

There is more, of course, more to consider, more to correct, more to assess, more about which to take stock of and, as necessary, change course.  For weary diplomats and burned-out NGOs the prospect of pushing forward on crises both urgent and stubborn is less than fully welcome.  But crises indeed take no vacation, nor do those most directly affected by them.  The wounds live with them daily as will the scars from struggles lost, childhoods denied, community livelihoods in ruins.  We who choose to engage at this level, despite our diminished August capacities (on top of our more generic limitations), recognize that a lack of vigilance on our part may well contribute to a lack of progress on peace elsewhere, that in some fashion our collective determination to push for real action and not mere movement might somehow, some way, facilitate guns being lowered, abuses being curbed.

Late August notwithstanding, there was much movement of a sort this week at the UN where five of the most painful and, in some instances, longest-tenured global conflicts were highlighted – Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Tigray (Ethiopia).  While each has its own context and history, and two of them (Tigray and Afghanistan) presented greater immediacy, all five of these have in common their residual sense that the international community doesn’t entirely know where it’s going on conflict prevention, doesn’t entirely know how best to reassure conflict parties and communities that we are in fact doing the best that we can –and more importantly all that we can – to silence the guns, restore livelihoods, protect civilians and bring perpetrators of grave abuses to account.

We mostly talk a good game, me included, but so many of our words lack impact or at times even sufficient substance.  We continue to double down on what are essentially “wrong turns” of priority or rhetoric, valuing consensus more than impact, including through our overuse of multilateral jargon which obscures intent as much as clarifies a way forward.   Such jargon premises the same objectives, over and over, but rarely offers a viable implementation plan or provides evidence of a thoughtful assessment of plans already in place, mostly guaranteeing that the same issues will present themselves to the Council and other UN bodies, month after month, quarter after quarter, misery after misery.

On Syria, on Yemen, on Iraq the briefings at the UN are frequent and frequently communicate a lack of progress on key indicators needed for successful political resolutions.  While the focus in Syria and Yemen is largely on enhancing humanitarian access and nationwide cease fires, there has been some movement reported by the SRSG in Iraq on securing viable elections (with the support of the UN Assistance Mission) for October and on implementing a new law recognizing and addressing the need for reparations due to grave violations by ISIL against the Yazidi people (this despite ongoing ISIL threats).  As for Syria, sporadic cease fire violations, severe water restrictions, arbitrary detentions and the continued presence of foreign forces and terrorist groups continue to impede political progress and “exhaust” Red Crescent and other workers seeking to maintain essential flows of relief.  As for Yemen, while famine has been averted for now, there are (as noted by UNICEF ED Fore) “few tangible signs of peace on the ground,” enabling still-grave consequences for children caught in the crossfire, children who have known mostly conflict and deprivation in their young lives. In addition Mexico, as they often do in these contexts, highlighted the seemingly unending challenge of arms flows that inflame violence, damage schools and other infrastructure, and dampen peace prospects.

And what of Afghanistan and Tigray?  Earlier this week, the Human Rights Council in Geneva met in special session to air human rights concerns as the Taliban completed its swift takeover of the Afghan government (see report on the session from Universal Rights Group here).  As were a number of NGOs, many Afghans themselves had to be bitterly disappointed in the results, including what Human Rights Watch labelled as an “insulting” outcome document that did not heed calls for a special investigative mechanism, that did not mention the Taliban by name nor sufficiently articulate threats from terror groups embedded in the Taliban’s loose confederation, and that did not specifically reference legal entities to ensure even a modicum of accountability for abuses committed, rights denied.  What it offered, in the words of Pakistan, was “solidarity,” an important principle to be sure, but only if it is incarnate in specific commitments to protect the vulnerable and alleviate suffering.

The Security Council discussion on Tigray was a bit more practical, if not always more hopeful, and included thoughtful messaging from elected members Kenya and Ireland.  Kenya’s Ambassador Kimani was particularly on point, noting that for too many in this world, “war is seductive” and reminding of the need to blend the short-term project of cease fire and relief assistance with the longer-term project of meditating aspirations tied to ethnic identities that seem forever on the cusp of conflict.  Ireland’s Ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason highlighted the children who, in Tigray and elsewhere, are dying in wars “not of their making” and pointedly called out Council colleagues for forgetting that “we” are the international community that needs to take urgent action in this and other instances of conflict and abuse.

And yet, here again, the culture of the system we honor and into which we have long been immersed continues to showcase its limitations regarding its most fundamental responsibility – to a more peaceful planet.  In a system with funding and policy priorities provided by member states and with a seemingly unyielding regard for narrow definitions of sovereignty and consensus, it is common for states under scrutiny – including in the instances under discussion here – to highlight their principles rather than their practices, to push responsibility away from themselves and on to their adversaries, and in varying degrees to reject the notion that UN bodies have legitimate jurisdiction over their internal affairs.  This triad of responses has been commonly articulated in the instances of Syria and Yemen, but was also seen this week in the case of Tigray where the Ethiopian Ambassador shared a statement noting that Ethiopians “are people of values,” denying any accusations of discrimination based on religion, culture or ethnicity, pointing fingers at the Tigray People’s Liberation Front as the party exclusively responsible for the misery in that region, and seeking international support while “respectfully” affirming sovereign national interests.

In our view, this is a formula conducive to “movement” (including in the case of Ethiopia allegations of fresh military recruitment) but much less to progress on peace.  With all due respect for the bureaucratic limitations under which most Ambassadors serve, it is disheartening to listen to the same formulas day after day, witness the same wrong turns that we stubbornly refuse to abandon even when it is clear enough that we have, simply and collectively, lost our way.  We all know we can do better, but the halls of the UN remain populated by those who are often more skilled at upholding national or organizational interests than human interest. This can and must change.

This Monday, at the end of India’s presidency, the Security Council will discuss the Israeli-Palestine conflict.  We will watch this discussion unfold in real time, hoping for some fresh thinking, some new options for policy renewal, especially some sense that our collective tolerance of violence and illegal settlements, of intimidation and retribution, of hate speech and even more hateful actions, has finally begun to run its course.

I’ll let you know if any of this happens, but we’re not particularly optimistic. We’re tired.  The diplomats are tired.  The people facing violence in this world are especially tired. And yet they still seek more from us, every one of us, even those of us who are consigned to a role of providing advice that states are under no obligation to consider, let alone accept; of suggesting fresh ideas for pathways for progress that often drown under waves of protocol and consensus; of reminding those who make decisions of some of the uncomfortable truths about our world and those who perpetually suffer within it, persons to whom our policy decisions should offer more tangible, dependable support.

As we take stock of ourselves, and of the institution of which we have long been a part, we confess our own considerable limitations, but also the opportunities presented to think harder and act more decisively, to listen better and share more abundantly. And we’re holding out hope that the cooler breezes of fall will revive and renew; will dispel some of the fatigue and confusion that I, at least, have not been able to manage as effectively as in years past; and that we can all find it within ourselves to do more than merely stay the course, but reverse and redirect that course as needed in greater service to our fractured world.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Presents Joint Declaration for Afghanistan

17 Feb

Editor’s Note:  GAPW has had a long and fruitful association with both FES and with Lia Petridis Maiello.   We are grateful to the FES for keeping the issue of Afghanistan in the forefront of our policy work and to Lia for her reporting on/analysis of this important event. This article was originally featured in the Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lia-petridis/friedrichebertstiftung-fe_b_4774767.html. 

An equally ambitious and politically sophisticated project was recently launched by the German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), at United Nations headquarters in New York City. “Envisioning Afghanistan Post 2014” brought together political representatives of Central Asia and other policy experts last week to discuss options for a peaceful future for the still politically unstable country of Afghanistan and surrounding region. The discussion was based on a strategic initiative, “Afghanistan’s region: 2014 & Beyond – Joint declaration on regional peace and stability,” that will be executed and implemented by FES and several, regional, political interest groups.

“A truly regional document, not just an academic paper,” FES regional coordinator for peace and security policy, Sarah Hees, called the joint declaration. The idea was born in 2012 after the region was confronted with the withdrawal of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF mission was established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001, based in part on provisions in the Bonn Agreement (May 2001). ISAF has since been training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as well as supporting the Afghan government in rebuilding core government institutions and battling an ongoing conflict with insurgent groups, including of course the Taliban.

With ISAF minimizing its significant role in stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan, the main responsibility will be transferred to the ANSF in corporation with a smaller NATO-led mission to advise the ANSF. As mentioned in the preamble of the declaration: “The scenario is uncertain: Will the ANSF be able to counter and defeat terrorism and other national and regional threats? Is the region ready to embrace Afghanistan with its myriad of challenges beyond 2014 while helping to guarantee its security, stability and prosperity? And will the region work towards a comprehensive and mutually beneficial outcome based on multi-faceted regional integration, in harmony with legitimate interests of non-regional players?”

A shift in approach, from looking at Afghanistan as more of an isolated incidence to more of an inclusive, regional attempt to bringing peace and stability, is what FES is trying to achieve with this initiative. Critical to the process was the development of regional policy groups, “providing a platform for them to engage in robust discussions,” as explained in FES’ concept paper. All-in-all, four policy groups were established, namely the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; Central Asia, which consists of the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; the Republic of India; and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Further relationships were established with the Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS) in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in China. “When considering the historical grievances and differences, the region having achieved consensus on deliberations and policy recommendations is a remarkable feat,” concluded the FES paper.

Included in this regional process were former and acting senior diplomats, parliamentarians, civil servants, military generals, civil society members, analysts, and journalists with connections to decision makers and authorities in their respective fields.

The declaration drafted by FES and the regional experts reaffirms the “respect to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan.” Furthermore, acknowledging the highly sensitive geo-strategic crossroads location of Afghanistan and the implicated political challenges regarding the cooperation with neighboring countries. Among the call for trust-building measures the declaration also expresses the need “for an early resolution of the Iran-US standoff, which would create a conducive atmosphere to better coordinate and implement development projects in Afghanistan.”

One of the medium-term recommendations functions as a reminder to the international community that “in order to enable Afghan ownership, increase economic sustainability as well as build and upgrade state capability to deliver public services effectively and accountability, the international community and the Afghan Government must honor their mutual commitments beyond 2014 and through the Decade of transformation.”

Last week’s discussion at the UN made clear where participants in the joint declaration still see deficiencies or difficulties regarding future implementation of the declaration. The outcome of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in early April will play a crucial role for not only the country’s future, but that of the region. The consensus among the participants appeared to be that fraud and irregularities during the elections will very likely take place, but the extent of those problems is unclear. The Guardian newspaper commented, “The election is the third presidential poll since the fall of the Taliban. It should pave the way for the country’s first-ever peaceful democratic transfer of power, because the constitution bars the incumbent, Hamid Karzai, from standing again. The fact that Afghanistan has never managed such a handover before is an indication of how fraught the process could be, even without the complication of a raging insurgency.”

As is widely known, voting can be very challenging for many Afghans. Often, casting a ballot involves hours of travelling while enduring serious risks to well-being. The level of fraud in previous elections has left many disillusioned about the process and therefore unwilling to take risks to reach the polls. The Taliban have disrupted voting and threatened anyone who tried to participate in previous elections. During the elections in 2009, Southeastern Afghanistan had the most incidents with 10 suicide attacks, 10 mine blasts and three other attacks according to data provided by the ministry of defense, as was reported in the Christian Science Monitor.

Security for these upcoming elections will primarily be provided by Afghan security forces, although the shrinking NATO mission has offered help with logistics, including air transport of ballots and other supplies. “Afghanistan’s rugged mountains, harsh deserts and limited infrastructure mean organizers of past elections have relied heavily on both high-tech air transport and traditional solutions such as donkeys to get ballot papers and boxes to more remote areas.”

Beyond elections, the call for the United Nations to play a stronger role in brokering Afghanistan’s peace process united all attendees at last week’s discussion at UN headquarters. The UN has been involved in the region since 1946, the point at which Afghanistan joined the General Assembly. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been carrying out aid and development work since the 1950s. The UN continues to operate UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), established in 2002 by the United Nations Security Council, primarily to support humanitarian, not military efforts in the country.

In an interview with the Global Policy Forum from November 2011, Kai Eide, former UN Special Representative in Afghanistan and former head of UNAMA explained some of the challenges the mission has been experiencing, “There were tensions already in our mandate; the UNAMA mandate said that we should work closely with the military. But of course, many of the UN agencies did not want us to work closely with the military, but wanted the UN to maintain its independence and not be seen as being part of the war against the Taliban. And I think that was important. For me, it was very difficult to position myself between the military, which wanted more and closer cooperation, and the UN agencies, which wanted a distance from the military. My instinct was to keep a distance and that was what prevailed.” Eide explained that many other obstacles came into play, for instance difficulties in getting the international community to speak with one voice on political issues, as well as to bring assistance from international donors together in one strategy. “On the last part, I must say, we did not succeed very well. We managed to set some priorities with the Afghan government, but when I arrived, the international aid effort in Afghanistan was chaotic, and when I left two years later, it was not much better.”

During the FES discussion at UN headquarters, the Central Asian representatives highlighted that the declaration needs to focus stronger on national responsibility to be taken up by Afghanistan, “which Afghans are keen to show,” as well as pointing out that in particularly socio-economic recommendations are crucial for the long-term stability of the region. While explaining the process of establishing this declaration, FES coordinator Sarah Hees pointed out that trust building between individual groups had been proven to be difficult at times, with some participants “remaining in Cold War rhetoric” and others, while neighbors, still exhibiting a fundamental unfamiliarity with each other.

It seems that no matter how complex the implementation, no matter how small the outcome or impact in the end, initiatives like this one by the FES are crucial to keep Afghanistan in the international community’s collective eye. There is a need to support the effort of policy and decision makers to establish a safe and prosperous society in Afghanistan, while closely paying attention to the manifold voices and perspectives of its people.

Lia Petridis Maiello, Media Consultant