Tag Archives: conventional weapons

Looking to the Future of the ATT and Shifting Attention to Implementation

3 Apr

After more than a decade of advocating for and working towards a robust and comprehensive arms trade treaty (ATT), relevant stakeholders can now mark a conclusion to the first step in this process. This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the human suffering caused by the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—is prevented to the greatest extent possible.

Adoption of the treaty text

Last week, delegates to the “Final Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty” were unable to adopt, by consensus, an ATT due to formal objections by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRPK), Iran, and Syria. But the text was brought to a vote on Tuesday, 2 April through a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution sponsored by more than 100 states. An overwhelming majority of UN member states voted in favor of this resolution, thus adopting the ATT text. The final tally was an overwhelming 154 states in favor, 23 abstentions, and three votes against (DPRK, Iran, and Syria).

The adoption of the ATT at the conclusion of these two weeks, even if it was a few days after the close of the Diplomatic Conference, was surely due in part to the strong leadership and good management of the President of the Conference, Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. Ambassador Woolcott was able to bring forth a text that had enough support to garner easy passage quickly in the UNGA.

However, not all states were satisfied enough with the text to vote in favor of its adoption. After Tuesday’s vote, the so-called “skeptics” reiterated their well-known concerns and opposition to the text, noting substantive omissions and dissatisfaction with the process. The delegations of Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela were among those that took to the floor to offer explanations of vote (EOV).

Several of these delegations continued to regret the absence of a prohibition against the transfer of arms to unauthorized non-state actors, references to the principle of self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation, an independent section dedicated to definitions, and an accountability mechanism for exporting states. These states also expressed dissatisfaction with the overall imbalance of the text in the favor of exporters and, thereby, the possibility for political manipulation. The Russian delegate reiterated his delegation’s specific concern over the language of article 6(3) related to the knowledge-based test for atrocity crimes. Moreover, the delegations of Ecuador and Pakistan warned against attempts to re-define consensus and the Egyptian and Chinese delegations warned against setting a precedent of forcing a UNGA vote in such processes. Many of these delegations also noted that they would reserve the right to re-examine the text and its possible implementation back in their capitals.

On the other hand, many states expressed robust support for future development of the ATT and its strong implementation, support that will be crucial for the ATT’s future effectiveness. A statement from a diverse group of 98 states, delivered by the delegation of Mexico, noted, “At the beginning of this process we set out to make a real difference in people’s lives. This continues to be our commitment, which we will carry out through the implementation of this Treaty.” Indeed, “making a difference” is the sincere hope of this Treaty. Thus, attention must now shift to implementation. These 98 states also reinforced their commitment to making the Treaty stronger through implementation. In addition, the original “co-authors” of the first ATT resolution in the UNGA—Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the UK—also offered a joint statement noting that adoption of the text is just “one landmark” and the responsibility to support implementation remains.

Looking back over the process

The ATT text represents a convergence, albeit a compromised one, of the majority view that the arms industry needs regulation in the form of a legally-binding instrument. Undoubtedly, the text and the process that came before it have represented the emergence of new international norms that the transfer of arms must be denied when there is serious risk of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and when there is a likelihood that such arms would undermine peace and security. Furthermore, the undertaking of the ATT process has also underscored the need for greater transparency and accountability in the arms trade, bringing it out of the shadows and more prominently in the public domain. It is clear that the ATT writ large has been a worthy endeavor, if flawed, in attempting to consolidate the international drive towards these goals. The treaty has the potential to serve as a useful tool to continue to work towards these goals of reducing risk and increasing some levels of transparency.

Nevertheless, despite the good will of many of the stakeholders that have been dedicated to this process over the last decade, undisputed victory cannot be claimed. The text is not the ideal iteration of what an ATT could be or even the version that the group of 116 states called for in a joint statement during the second week of the Final Conference. These states called for a treaty with a comprehensive scope of items and activities, reflective of existing international legal obligations and norms, and one that enhances transparency and prohibits the transfer of arms when there is “substantial” risk of serious violations of international law, including IHL and IHRL or risk of diversion. Unfortunately, the text’s provisions do not live up to these standards nor fulfill the calls from the vast majority of the governments, international organizations, and civil society groups. This is, of course, in part due to the tremendous compromising power of consensus.

Indeed, the text that has been adopted is a product of a consensus process whereby progressive states had to compromise to keep certain states “on board” with the final product. Any process that is subject to this constraint will indubitably be forced much closer to the lowest common denominator than the highest aspirations, even if the majority of states support the latter. The ATT process has been no exception, with the concerns and interests of a few states being reflected despite opposition from most other states (in particular, the retention of “overriding risk” and the exclusion of ammunition/munitions and parts and components from the full scope of the treaty).

The question becomes: is the text that has been adopted going to, in practice, not only set norms and goals, but positively change arms transfer policy so that it will make a difference in the lives of those who suffer armed conflict and armed violence? Ultimately, the jury is still out. As many states and civil society representatives have noted, the adoption of a treaty is not a victory in-and-of-itself, but step one of a longer process. The real work of evaluating its impact will have to begin immediately. Therefore, the work of the Conference of States Parties (CSP), the national implementation of treaty obligations, and the ongoing interpretation and implementation of its provisions will be all the more important.

A final look at the text

Many significant issues remain unchanged and new ambiguities have been introduced, making the treaty much less reflective of the majority opinion of states and more reflective of minority interests. Nevertheless, positive aspects of the treaty deserve underscoring in terms of looking forward to implementation:

  • Ammunitions/munitions, parts, and components are covered by prohibitions and export assessment, and are required to be regulated by national control systems.
  • Prohibitions have been set forth that require denial of authorization of transfers if there is knowledge that such arms would be used for the commission of mass atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes and attacks against civilians.
  • Binding criteria for export assessment include if the transfer would undermine peace and security, facilitate serious violations of IHL or IHRL, acts of terrorism, or acts relating to organized transnational crime. Moreover, the text also includes a binding criterion for preventing gender-based violence (GBV). States shall not be permitted to authorize the transfer where there is an “overriding risk” the weapons will be used to commit or facilitate GBV.
  • A detailed article on diversion lays forth measures that states parties should take in cooperating with one another in order to address diversion risks and enhance the practice of effective anti-diversion measures.
  • States parties involved in transfers must take measures to prevent diversion of items in the scope.
  • The provisions on international cooperation encourages that states parties jointly support others in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures pursuant to the treaty. Likewise, states parties are encouraged to provide assistance in concrete areas related to the arms trade, notably stockpile management, model legislation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR).
  • The CSP has the ability to review implementation of the treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arm as well as to consider issues arising from the interpretation of the treaty. This thus allows, at least in a limited fashion, that the treaty can be adjusted to respond to evolving technological and security advances.
  • Amendments can be adopted, as a “last resort,” by a three-fourths majority should adoption by consensus fail.

Despite the retention of these positive provisions, some loopholes and weaknesses still remain that will continue to pose challenges in the implementation of the ATT. These weaknesses and loopholes will have to be dealt with, to the greatest extent possible, during the follow-up meetings of the CSP.

  • Ammunition/munitions and parts and components are not covered by the obligations under import, brokering, transit or trans-shipment, or reporting.
  • The “floor” of the definitions of the items in the scope is limited to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and “other relevant United Nations instruments” at the time of entry-into-force and, therefore, states can “freeze” definitions established more than two decades prior.
  • Non-commercial activities such as gifts, loans, and leases are not expressly covered under the definition of “transfer.”
  • There is no explicit prohibition against transfers that would violate human rights.
  • Inclusion of the term “overriding risk” ostensibly allows states to proceed with a transfer even if there is substantial risk of violations of IHL or IHRL if there is some other risk (political, economic, or otherwise) is noted to “override” these risks.
  • References to socio-economic development and corrupt practices were dropped from export assessment criteria.
  • When states parties become aware of new information, they are not required to revoke or suspend an authorization, but are merely “encouraged to reassess the authorization” after possible consultations with the importing state.
  • Public reporting is not mandatory and states parties can exclude any information deemed “sensitive” from a national security standpoint from reports to the Secretariat.

Moving Forward

The time for substantive improvements of the text has passed. In moving forward with the ATT process, attention must shift to implementation and interpretation in order to ensure that the robust provisions that have been adopted are implemented in the best and most consistent way, while those that are still weak are not allowed to limit the overall effectiveness of the Treaty. Indeed, this is only the beginning of evaluating the ATT’s effectiveness.

This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the negative consequences of the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—are limited to the greatest extent possible. As noted by the group of 98 states in its joint statement following adoption of the text, “The hard work starts now. We must secure the rapid entry into force of this historic Treaty and implement it as soon as possible.”

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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International Media and the Arms Trade Treaty

22 Mar

The final round of the arms trade treaty negotiations (18-28 March 2013) has been attracting global attention, expressed by numerous press outlets worldwide, mainstream as well as alternative, signaling a growing and strengthening awareness process throughout the world and revealing a justified sense of urgency. An awareness of the illicit arms trade’s mortal consequences has manifested itself as a comprehensive matter of conscience, a situation that is as a result calling for global provisions now. It also shows the willingness to publicly negotiate and back a legal framework that has the strength and capability to regulate a global, $70 billion business. An idea that was initiated by a group of Nobel peace prize laureates in the mid-1990’s seems to have come to fruition.

The level of awareness demonstrates political will that affects the everyday citizen, who might not be part of a politicized environment via an organization or institution, but has the option to vote, donate, and maybe down the line, organize in a political fashion. Just as diverse in national interest and approach as are member states and civil society, so are media outlets that position themselves as voices in the process.

The Financial Times granted a forum to the foreign ministers of Denmark, Germany, Mexico, The Netherlands, UK, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Finland to call for an effective arms trade treaty, defining the negotiations an “historic opportunity” and appealing to the aspect of “common responsibility.” One paragraph explicitly addresses the fact that the treaty has no intention to “obstruct the legitimate trade in arms.” Furthermore it points out that the treaty is meant to “fully recognize every state’s right to legitimate self-defense.” Additionally, “Neither does the treaty set rules for domestic arms regulation nor laws on the possession of arms; this is categorically a matter for national authorities to determine.”

Despite national sovereignty on domestic arms regulation, the US based National Rifle Association (NRA), which promotes the rights of citizens to bear arms, made it a tradition to claim that the UN is trying to end private gun ownership in the US. This strategy is primarily geared towards fundraising from NRA constituents. Not only has fear proven to be a hot seller, the US Constitution’s second amendment is an extremely sensitive and emotionally charged topic.

UK journalist Karen McVeigh focuses on NRA rhetoric in her story “NRA accused of stirring ‘anti-UN panic’ in campaign against Arms Trade Treaty,” from 17 March 2013in The Guardian. “For years, the NRA has painted the UN as a bogeyman figure, claiming in its literature and fundraising drives that there is an international conspiracy to ‘grab your guns’. Last July, when negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty broke down – in part because of US resistance to global regulations on gun sales – the gun lobby group claimed victory for ‘killing the UN ATT’.” Rick Gladstone from the New York Times states in the context of an ATT and the NRA, that in February of this year, the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights published a report describing that the ATT, as currently drafted, “did not exceed the scope of American trade statutes that already regulate the import and export of weapons.” Gladstone points out that the study clearly outlines, “U.S. ratification of the treaty would not infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment.” In the Huffington Post, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane pointed out, “This absurd but often-repeated claim requires a strong rebuttal.”

The German media outlets Deutsche Welle and die tageszeitung focus on the fact that the current ATT text from July last year would undercut not only European, and particularly existing German regulations, as they relate to the arms trade and therefore describe the need of stronger language.

This year’s ATT host country, Australia’s media outlets have been vocally promoting the process back home, at times lending media platforms to civil society. National Director of Amnesty Australia, Claire Mallinson,took the stage with an op-ed piece for The Australian on 18 March. Here she describes the ongoing illegal arms transfers from Russia to the Assad regime in Syria and the failure of the UNSC to impose an arms embargo. Mallinson continues, “This strong evidence and the indiscriminate nature of conflict shows that even with the best of intentions, as it currently stands, Australian organizations and individuals that sell weapons and defense technology have no way of controlling where these devices end up.” Meanwhile Dr. Helen Szoke of Oxfam Australia is urging her government on ABC TV to “help close off any loopholes” in the existing draft.

The African news network AllAfrica named, in the article “Africa: Curbing the Arms Trade?” from 19 March, a few grave obstacles to a “strong treaty without major loopholes.” Firstly there is, “The fact that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are among the largest exporters of conventional arms,” which impacts decision making and ultimately the strength of a treaty framework. Secondly, the concern that, “In the United States, the powerful National Rifle Association is campaigning against the treaty.” It is a legitimate concern, since the author is referring to a non-profit that, according to the Washington Post, was able to spend $32 million in 2012, lobbying their one and only objective.

Obviously, press coverage often reflects or opposes national interests of individual member states, and therefore might individually pursue/back different levels of regulation or at times lack diversified, technical policy details at all. However, the nearly unanimous, international media echo in favor of a treaty does not only once more put the UN on the map as a global hub for political decision making, but reflects a strong, global concern that reaches far beyond a plea for arms business as usual.

 

—Lia Petridis Maiello

 

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GGI Policy Brief: Anticipating the “Final” ATT Conference: Proposals for Moving Forward

25 Feb

From 2 – 27 July 2012 the member states of the United Nations (UN) gathered in New York to participate in the UN Conference on the ATT. These four weeks of negotiations produced a draft treaty text, but no consensus could be reached on a final text for adoption. In this GGI Analysis, Katherine Prizeman and Niels van Willigen provide essential background and concrete recommendation for a last effort to negotiate a consensus treaty during the Final UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, scheduled to take place 18 – 28 March 2013.

To download the GGI Analysis,  please click here.

 

 

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The Way Forward for the Arms Trade Treaty: UNGA First Committee Resolution

4 Dec

One of the most anticipated items on the First Committee agenda this year, the resolution entitled “The arms trade treaty” (A/C.1/67/L.11), was adopted on the whole by a vote of 157-0-18, thereby authorizing a new round of ATT negotiations for March 2013. The resolution, which was tabled by the original “co-authors” group of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom, was co-sponsored by more than 100 delegations. As the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference ended without adoption of a consensus treaty setting common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms, the fate of renewed negotiations has rested on the formulation of a General Assembly resolution detailing a way forward. Although no delegations voted against the resolution and all have expressed some degree of support for continuing the ATT process next year, there remains contention over the status of the President’s draft treaty text from 26 July 2012 as well as the operative rules of procedure. As such, a separate vote was requested on operational paragraph (OP) 2, which describes the rules of procedure for the “final” 18–28 March 2013 Negotiating Conference as “utilizing the modalities, applied mutatis mutandis, under which the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty of 2 to 27 July 2012 operated.” The result was 153-1-18 with the delegation of Iran dissenting. Likewise, a separate vote was also conducted on OP3, which designates the President’s 26 July text as “the basis for future work on the Arms Trade Treaty.” The result of this vote was 148-1-22 with Iran again representing the lone vote against retaining the paragraph.

Many delegations chose to offer explanations of vote (EOV) on the ATT resolution. Expressions of support were widespread as the representatives of Morocco, Norway, and Nigeria called on member states to support the resolution and remain committed to the continuation of negotiations. Nevertheless, discontent over some specifics within the President’s draft text was expressed by the Nigerian delegation, which underscored the need to more adequately address diversion and ambiguities in the Treaty’s scope. In addition, the delegation of Indonesia noted its abstention to OP2 and OP3 as the draft text “does not reflect its views and those of many other member states,” in particular on the matter of territorial integrity. Several delegations expressed their opposition to treating the President’s text as the sole basis for negotiations, including Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Syria. The representative of Egypt called the draft “a work in progress,” while the delegation of Belarus warned that the document would prejudice the results of the work of the upcoming March conference. The representative of Iran also offered an EOV on his delegation’s vote against OP3 noting that the draft text is “vague and full of loopholes” and also provides for far too much subjectivity in application of assessment criteria. In particular, Iran noted that the parameters explicitly allow arms-exporting states on their own volition to export as many arms as they want to any country or region if in their view it can “contribute to peace and security”. Likewise, he complained that the current draft text gives too much preference to the commercial interests of exporting states than the security of importing states and other states in their regions.

With regards to the rules of procedure, as laid forth in OP2, delegations expressed their support for consensus, although some offered more detailed caveats. The Mexican delegation reiterated its well-known concern over allowing consensus to be interpreted as the right of one or a few delegations to impede general agreement. Similarly, the representative of Morocco supported consensus as “an effective tool” so long as it is not abused or misinterpreted as veto power or a demand for unanimity. Other delegations, including Egypt and India, also warned against placing artificial deadlines or timelines on negotiations.

While the ATT resolution has been adopted and a pathway forward has been identified towards a March Conference to finish work on common international standards for the transfer in conventional arms, there remains significant disagreement over the substance of the future treaty text on many issues from scope to criteria to enforcement mechanisms. This calls into question the status of the President’s draft text as the single basis for negotiations, as some states continue to express their unease with many of its contents.

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Sessions at UN Geneva

19 Nov

In Geneva this past week, High Contracting Parties (HCPs) are meeting to discuss the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and some of its individual Protocols. HCPs to the CCW must sign at least two of the Convention’s Protocols, but are not required to sign all of them.

The CCW, negotiated by 51 states in 1980, seeks to address the use and effects of so-called inhumane weaponry. To achieve these aims, the CCW itself contains only general rules and was designed to be expanded and updated to encompass new technological and methodological developments in warfare through the adoption of individual protocols. The Convention is considered a “living instrument” seeking to address new security challenges as they emerge in modern practice. As noted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in remarks to the opening of the Conference on Protocol V on Monday morning, the CCW has been judged by its ability to catalyze action for states to prevent and remedy human suffering. This is a critical point in the context of the CCW framework as it seeks greater relevance to international peace and security. Nevertheless, the assertion that a proper balance between “military requirements and humanitarian concerns” must be struck continues to be made, particularly by delegations such as China and Pakistan. This is an ongoing and even at times unsettling debate in light of international humanitarian law (IHL) implications of the CCW.

Protocols to the CCW include (I) Non-detectable fragments; (Amended Protocol II) Landmines, Booby-traps, and other Devices; (III) Incendiary Weapons; (IV) Blinding Lasers; (V) Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs). Other issues remain unresolved in the context of the CCW, such as a compliance mechanism, a provision to ban small-caliber bullets, as well as a ban on cluster munitions and a restriction on the use of anti-vehicle mines. During last year’s 4th Review Conference for the CCW held in November 2011, a controversial debate arose regarding an attempt by some states to negotiate a new protocol focused on cluster munitions. In addition to the problem of adopting a framework that would ultimately allow for the use of cluster munitions is a larger normative problem insofar as such a protocol  would represent the adoption of an application of IHL that is weaker than a previously, and generally accepted, law in the form of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The CCM comprehensively bans the use of cluster munitions and has been signed and ratified by 111 states parties. The cluster munitions protocol was ultimately blocked, which was deemed a great victory by civil society and many states parties alike.

This year, the CCW HCPs convened for the 6th Conference on Protocol V on ERWs, the 14th Conference on Amended Protocol II, and a two-day Meeting of States Parties (MSP). In particular, the two-day session assessing implementation of Protocol V was a refreshingly practical and beneficial exchange among HCPs as well as civil society experts who are working directly on mine action activities. Protocol V was adopted in November 2003 covering both abandoned and unexploded ordnance. The President of the Conference, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, led Conference discussions on the themes of universalization; clearance, removal or destruction of ERWs; victim assistance; national reporting; generic preventative measures; cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance; and follow-up mechanisms. HCPs to the Protocol, other HCPs, observer states, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other non-governmental organizations actively engaged in information exchange and the sharing of best practices on these themes in order to promote and improve full implementation of Protocol V. The ICRC had convened a meeting of experts the previous week to explore implementation challenges of Article IV of the Protocol related to recording, retaining and transmission of information. The delegation of UNMAS also encouraged HCPs to make greater use of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) adopted last year in the General Assembly. As for follow-up, the Conference decided that the next Meeting of Experts would take place from 10-12 April 2013 in Geneva and, as noted by the delegate of the European Union, Meetings of Experts are important for assessing progress and building on the substantive discussions of previous years.

Since the last CCW gathering, three new signatories have joined Protocol V—Lao People’s Democratic Republic, South Africa, and Turkmenistan—while the delegations of Cuba and Montenegro announced their intention to begin the process of acceding to the Protocol. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised the work of Protocol V HCPs in addressing the challenges of states affected by ERWs, with a particular focus on safe storage of ammunition, sharing of best practices, and assessing fulfillment of Protocol obligations. The delegation of South Africa noted that the issue of ERWs is particularly alarming for the international community as almost every armed conflict generates ERWs that continue to wreak havoc on societies long after active hostilities cease. Observer states that are not a party to the Protocol, including the delegations of Lesotho and Yemen, also underscored the importance of universalization of the Protocol.

Following a general exchange of views, delegations received individual briefings from the respective Coordinators appointed on the various thematic issues and correspondingly adopted relevant recommendations included in the final adopted outcome document. This issue-specific format lent itself to a robust and constructive engagement on the technical aspects of implementation of Protocol V. The US delegation expressed its preference for these sessions noting, “The plenary format does not encourage an exchange of views.” With regards to universalization, HCPs requested the President-designate to consider reporting to the next session of the General Assembly on his/her endeavors. Furthermore, HCPs also agreed to continue consideration of clearance, removal or destruction of ERWs through capacity-building in the areas of surveillance, clearance and removal at the community level. They also agreed to continue to share practices and experiences among HCPs. The plan of action for victim assistance was also identified as a core component of mine action strategy and praised “the heart of the mandate” of the Protocol V instrument. Moreover, the Coordinator of this session noted the links between victim assistance and development, and HCPs agreed to continue to promote data collection and needs assessment, in particular “with regard to disaggregated data on gender and children as well as information on the needs of families of victims…” The delegation of Chile rightly noted that victim assistance is covered in a central chapter of implementation of the Convention and its practical value in this context is clear.

Recommendations on cooperation and assistance as well as national reporting were also adopted, in particular a recommendation on encouraging greater use of the Guide to National Reporting, which was adopted by the 4th Conference. The HCPs also committed to continue to address one specific technical issue directly related to the implementation of Article 9 and Part 3 of the Technical Annex of Protocol V, which includes important practical measures such as munitions manufacturing management, training, transfer, and future production. The delegation of UNMAS encouraged meetings of ERW-affected states to discuss their priorities and views. Likewise, the delegation of Australia, which is currently serving as chair of the Mine Action Service Group (MASG), underscored national ownership and capacity building with regards to cooperation and assistance requests. The UNMAS delegation also highlighted the importance of coordination for cooperation and assistance and noted the role of the UN system in serving as a conduit for such assistance requests. NGO colleagues also offered useful interventions. The Mine Action Group (MAG), for instance, offered its reflections on the work it has conducted in mine action on the ground in diverse global regions. In a similar fashion, the delegations of the Philippines and the US also offered detailed presentations on their national experience related to clearance and removal of ERWs in post-conflict settings.

As stated by the delegation of the Holy See during the general debate, ERWs not only pose a safety problem, but also a regional security challenge. Although no “new,” groundbreaking issues related to Protocol V were highlighted or resolved this session, the continued interest and enthusiasm around its universalization and robust implementation are important for both the disarmament and human rights communities as advocates and diplomats alike work to prevent gross human suffering during acts of warfare. It is essential that HCPs, in the context of Protocol V as well as the broader CCW framework, address not only the devastating humanitarian effects of such weapons during conflict, but also post-conflict and even during times of peace. As was noted by UNMAS and other delegations, unplanned explosions of munitions and ammunition sites are increasing risks and deserve attention at all times. Damage from unplanned explosions at munitions sites is far more costly than implementation of generic preventative measures that seek to curb this threat.

Many lessons can be drawn from the work on Protocol V of the CCW, namely the central role of victim assistance, the strong emphasis placed on national reporting and corresponding national templates, and the robust and regular exchange of information and best practices in an issue-specific format. With many other related processes underway in the disarmament and human rights fields, including the ongoing arms trade treaty (ATT) process and the Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs), the hope is that CCW practices based on the values of transparency and accountability will inspire these parallel processes. Such core principles must be an inherent part of any successful arms control, disarmament, or humanitarian instrument seeking to make a concrete difference on the ground.

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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The Arms Trade Treaty at the First Committee General Debate: Views on Where to Go Next

16 Oct

One of the most anticipated items on the First Committee agenda this session is the future of the arms trade treaty (ATT) negotiations. As the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference ended without adoption of a consensus treaty, many delegations have come to this session of the First Committee hoping for a mandate to continue negotiations in 2013. 62 delegations, nearly every delegation that took the floor, referenced the ATT during this week’s general debate either expressing support for an additional Diplomatic Conference, underscoring the importance of adopting universal conventional arms trade regulations and lamenting the inconclusiveness of the July Conference, or reiterating the necessity of transparency and non-discrimination in the negotiation of the future ATT. Despite the varying views on how to move the process forward, the process must indeed move forward by capitalizing on the momentum of the summer’s negotiations. Nevertheless, building on the progress made requires improvement and strengthening of the draft treaty text and not merely maintenance of the status quo or, worse, a weakening of the text. As Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand noted, robust support for continuing the ATT process is crucial to the human and humanitarian dimensions of security and, as noted by the delegate of the Republic of Korea, states must engage in “effective deliberation in the First Committee for constructive alternatives.”

The general debate underscored the nuances in state positions regarding how the July negotiations were viewed as well as specific text suggestions that delegations seek to address in future deliberations. Furthermore, the interventions also highlighted states’ positions on how and under what circumstances negotiations should move forward.

Interventions by delegations this week illustrated how states viewed the July Conference and, ultimately, how such views will affect decisions on moving forward. Some delegations noted July as a “failure,” including the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Percaya of Indonesia, who called the “recent failure” of the ATT disappointing and the representative of Cameroon who noted that “the failure of the ATT makes things harder” in the context of international security concerns. The Ambassador of Costa Rica called the lack of consensus “a blow to peace and human rights.” Other delegations chose to focus more explicitly on the progress made in July and appealed to delegations to “continue to push ahead,” as suggested by the representative of Malaysia. Ambassador Adamson of the UK asserted, “I want to make absolutely clear that the Conference did not end in failure. To say it did ignores the huge progress that has been made towards our ultimate aim…” The general and widespread consensus, nonetheless, was a sense of deep disappointment over the inability to reach consensus over the summer, although somewhat tempered by hope for future negotiations.

Despite varying views on whether or not July was ultimately a “failure,” the vast majority of states expressed support for continuing the process through continued deliberations to adopt a treaty in “the near future.” Some chose to underscore specific items that remain contentious, including issues of scope, criteria and parameters, as well as inclusion of specific principles. For example, the representatives of CARICOM, Colombia, and Peru all called for inclusion of munitions in the scope of a future treaty. The representative of Colombia also appealed to states for a comprehensive list of activities to be covered, including brokering, financing, export, and import. The representative of South Africa warned against becoming “side-tracked” by extraneous issues such as production and possession. Discussion also arose related to the principles and criteria to be included in the ATT. The representatives of the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement underscored that there must be “no undue restriction in the way of the sovereign right of states for self-defence,” while the ASEAN states highlighted that any ATT must ensure the rights of self-defense and territorial integrity. The Arab Group representative laid forth specific guidelines related to parameters of a future ATT noting, “Any criteria developed by the treaty to regulate arms exports must also be based on clear legal instruments…” Therefore, it is clear that such reiteration of state positions illustrates that many issues remained unresolved from July and will require further debate before adoption of a treaty.

In terms of the pathway forward, such a decision is expected to be taken in the coming weeks. The “co-authors” group of the original 2007 General Assembly Resolution on the ATT, composed of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya, Japan, and the UK, announced their intention to submit a resolution at this session of the First Committee seeking a mandate for an additional Negotiating Conference in early 2013. Ambassador Adamson noted that the Resolution sets the timing for “a short, final, consensus-based conference to finalize the work of the treaty” stating that as some states asked for “more time” to consider the President’s draft text, that time should be given. The EU, France, Guatemala, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and the US all supported a final conference in 2013 with negotiations based on the President’s draft text. However, other delegations chose to refer more loosely to the future ATT process. The representative of India said no treaty “should be rushed through” by an imposed timeline and the representative of Cuba noted that his delegations would “pursue discussions” on the ATT in a transparent manner.

While the issue of continuing discussion of the ATT was generally uncontested, the rules of procedure remain debatable. The representatives of Mexico and Norway rightly underscored the deadlock caused by the consensus rule in July. As the Ambassador of Norway noted, “We have seen the consensus format watering down or paralyzing important disarmament processes time and again.” Likewise, the Mexican delegation urged that delegations do not allow a small number of states to impede the entire process because of their own “political or economic considerations.” Holding hostage an entire process due to the demands of a few states is simply unacceptable and interpreting consensus as de facto veto power will seriously undermine, if not prevent, adoption of a robust ATT that seeks to have a concrete humanitarian impact. As the First Committee continues to debate the future of the ATT process, the requirement of consensus must continue to be debated such that a new conference does not yield the same unsatisfying and disappointing result that came in July.

For more information on the First Committee, see Reaching Critical Will.

–Katherine Prizeman

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International Media and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms

10 Sep

“Sparse” would describe the level of attention international media has been paying to the Review Conference for the UN Programme of Action on small arms and lights weapons (UNPoA). The reasons are manifold and can obviously not be reduced to a general rule of thumb. The personal dedication of the individual journalist willing to push a story or topic that might not be as newsworthy as others in the eyes of the editor or outlet would be one reason. Needless to say, every media representative today, in particular those who are publishing with corporate media outlets, has to deal with an entirely new framework of restrictions and guidelines.

Newsworthiness has been redefined, often but not always to the detriment of quality of information. On the other hand, tangible results are still more likely to make it into the paper than theoretical discourses, which often exclude the every-day-reader. The counterargument for that statement would be the journalist’s ability to break down, analyze and communicate complex, specialized contexts. Not all journalists can, not all of them want to, not all of them have the time to, and not every outlet is suitable for such analyses.

These various arguments can be directly applied to the UNPoA Review Conference.

For many, the failure of the arms trade treaty (ATT) negotiations in July, although different in nature and objectives, has been paralyzing whereby UN stereotypes surrounding effectiveness and pace of implementation have certainly resurfaced. Additionally, discussions on language or meeting details, as has been the case for some of the first week of the Review Conference, are simply of no interest to the every-day-reader, while they are very important in a UN context when multiple cultures with particular political boundaries are trying to come to an agreement on complex political matters, such as national military build-up or the eradication of the illicit arms trade.

Nevertheless, as in most situations in life, there is a way to cover solid middle ground. Numerous side events at the UNPoA Conference have offered a high level of practicality and result-driven implementation that is well -worth communicating to the outside world of political ordinaries. For example, the launch of the publication A decade of Implementing the UNPoA on SALW: Analysis of National Reports by Sarah Parker and Katherine Green from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) provided a summary of the degree of national implementation of the UNPoA, and although the provision of national reports is voluntary and therefor incomplete, the study could be a basis from which effectiveness or ineffectiveness could be much better quantified.

Another event worth covering was hosted by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which focused on physical security and stockpile management and demonstrated a very tangible and reportable result of UNPoA implementation by coordinating UN actors for emergency response as well as creating national focal points in areas of crisis for humanitarian organizations. As Global Action’s Katherine Prizeman writes, “To date, UNMAS has destroyed over 180,000 landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXO) in Libya through 23 deployed clearance teams.”

What creates international headlines a day after the UNPoA had started is the fact that “The legal international trade in small arms, light weapons, their parts and ammunition is worth at least $8.5 billion annually”— more than double the previous estimate in 2006, according to a survey by independent researchers released at UN headquarters last week. The Small Arms Survey 2012 said the increase from the last estimate of $4 billion is due to several factors — large-scale government spending especially during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, increased purchases of small arms and ammunition from foreign countries by American civilians, and better information and improved methods of calculating the value of transfers”, as UN-Correspondent Edith Lederer writes in Bloomberg’s Businessweek.

What will it take to make peace that profitable and hence newsworthy? According to the Small Arms Survey, there are an estimated 875 million small arms in circulation worldwide, produced by more than 1,000 companies from nearly 100 countries. A concerning situation this PoA conference is dedicated to and would indeed deserve extensive, global media attention.

–Lia Petridis Maiello

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UNPoA on Small Arms Review Conference Ends with Consensus Document

10 Sep

After the President of the Review Conference (RevCon), Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria, provided a third revision of the draft outcome document on Friday afternoon, delegations were able to adopt, by consensus, the compilation document. This document is composed of a Declaration, two implementation plans for the Programme of Action (UNPoA) and International Tracing Instrument (ITI), respectively, and a follow-up mechanism detailing a future schedule of meetings to guide the small arms process. As expressed by the President in her closing remarks to the Conference, the successful completion of the RevCon with a consensus outcome is a welcome achievement in helping to create positive momentum in the multilateral disarmament fora. As the representative of Algeria noted, this RevCon “achieved success where the ATT [arms trade treaty] couldn’t.” Likewise, the fact that member states were able to constructively engage and adopt a consensus document indeed represents a positive reaffirmation of the importance of the UNPoA framework to international peace and security and, more specifically, combating the scourge of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Undoubtedly, the UNPoA remains the only global framework of practical measures for combating illicit trade in SALWs and its dire humanitarian consequences.

Many delegations took the opportunity to praise the work of the Conference on Friday afternoon, including the representative of Mexico who noted how this success represented a significant step forward since the first RevCon in 2006, and the German delegate who welcomed this “landmark” document. Similarly, the delegation of Switzerland affirmed the document as an impetus for success in the area of disarmament that is “crucial to the work of international peace and security.” While it is true that this RevCon can be hailed as a general success, due in large part to the great skill and dedication of the President as well as the four facilitators, the RevCon on the whole did not thoroughly take stock of progress achieved nor did it provide for an in-depth assessment of implementation to date in order to draw lessons for the future. As has been previously expressed in this Monitor, a reiteration of previous UNPoA or ITI commitments is not sufficient. The various components of the review cycle, including this RevCon, should be integrally linked so that they can incrementally build upon the specific findings and discussions of the preceding debate in the context of the current security circumstances. As noted by the delegate of the UK in his concluding remarks, although the RevCon achieved a significant success in the consensus document, “ambition” in the document was left wanting.

The third revision, and subsequently adopted text, was identical to the previous version with the exception of a paragraph in Annex 1 (under the UNPoA implementation plan) referring to the risk of diversion in the context of export authorizations which was deleted. Following the adoption of the document, many delegations expressed regret over the lack of inclusion of certain elements as well as weak language on others. In particular, many delegations noted with regret the exclusion of language on a gender perspective in UNPoA implementation (EU, Germany, Mexico,) as well as on munitions (Colombia, ECOWAS, Guatemala, Switzerland), parts and components (EU, Ghana, Guatemala, UK),  and a lack of strong language on diversion (CARICOM, Trinidad and Tobago, UK). Also missing from the document were strong references to monitoring and assessment and evidence-based research on implementation as the text refers only to measurability in the context of international cooperation and assistance. Moreover, there were no references to monitoring and assessment of casualties of armed violence through which states could better understand the effects of illicit use of SALWs. Rather, such language was weakened to “…enhancing their ability to monitor and analyze the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of illicit small arms and light weapons and their misuse,” not an altogether terrible substitution, but weaker nonetheless.

While the document was hailed as “fair and balanced” and the best possible representation of consensus, states must use the next 6-year review cycle to achieve more in the way of practical implementation.  Moving forward, the ongoing discussion of how to ensure full and effective implementation of the UNPoA will persist as many delegations called for a return to the many issues previously mentioned that were not addressed in this RevCon. More alarming, however, will be the ongoing debate and inability to convince some delegations of the difference between “reviewing” the UNPoA in order to strengthen its implementation by applying a fresh context in light of changing dynamics and circumstances and “re-writing” the UNPoA.  If left unresolved, it is expected that this division will continue to challenge the process and undoubtedly limit the effectiveness of the subsequent meetings of the review cycle. Adoption of the latter approach, limiting and constraining the process to only that which is explicitly found in the 2001 document, is precisely what future review meetings must seek to avoid.

Prior to adopting the outcome document by consensus, the delegate of Iran stated that although his delegation would not “stand in the way of success,” the document was unsatisfactory as it “lacked clarity and accuracy and at times went beyond the scope of the PoA.” The representative of Syria echoed this sentiment when he shared “reservations” about certain proposals adopted in the document that “were not in the PoA.” Likewise, the delegation of Cuba called references to resolutions related to women as well as the term armed violence “selective and outside the specific framework of the PoA.” This central debate—how to balance reiteration and re-commitment to the “old” language of UNPoA with infusion of “new” forward-looking language that addresses challenges related to national implementation that introduces concepts and recommendations not explicitly found in the original 2001 document—is absolutely crucial to future success. Finding this balance is imperative if the UNPoA can continue and even strengthen its relevance to ending the scourge of illicit trade in SALWs.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Second Review Conference: Reviewing, Strengthening, and Energizing the PoA on small arms

15 Aug

As member states gather for the second Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), a potentially contentious policy gap remains between those who emphasize only the implementation of the PoA and those who seek to strengthen the instrument itself. During the first Review Conference (Rev Con) in 2006, the PoA came close to collapse as divisions surfaced between those states wanting to expand its scope to include provisions on ammunition, civilian possession, and a prohibition on transfers to non-state actors and those that wished only to focus on implementation of the existing measures adopted in 2001. Concern that the PoA process would be permanently damaged was fortunately unfounded, although much of the attention devoted to the PoA was subsequently diverted to the arms trade treaty (ATT) process. The PoA process did received a welcome infusion of robustness following the successful (and first of its kind) 2011 Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) under the leadership of Ambassador McLay of New Zealand when practical and technical discussions were held regarding the PoA and the corresponding International Tracing Instrument (ITI).  However, after a busy summer for First Committee experts with the conclusion (without agreement on a consensus Treaty document ) of the ATT negotiating conference just a few weeks back, there is now legitimate worry that the PoA will not receive the attention it deserves during this Rev Con.

As previously expressed, member states have extensively debated whether the Rev Con mandate, in addition to a “review,” should include “strengthening” (through expansion, legal status, or amendment) of the PoA. This disagreement is not semantic in nature. It is a critical distinction that will affect both member states’ approach to the Rev Con and the future of the PoA framework. Methods of strengthening national implementation measures must be identified and pursued at this Rev Con. Therefore, it would be wise to avoid highly divisive debates regarding expansion of the scope and nature of the PoA (i.e. discussion over its non-legally-binding status) and focus instead on highly important and practical implementation issues such as stockpile management, proper disposal and storage of surplus arms, the role of peacekeepers and DDR programmes in SALW management, the responsibilities of national contact points, and the possibility of institutionalizing technical meetings such as MGEs. In this case, functionality should trump legality, at least for the moment.

Despite the arguable “overshadowing” of the PoA process by the ATT, preparations for this Rev Con have been moderately successful. The March 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Rev Con yielded a factual and procedural report, although a more substantive Chair’s summary under the authorship of Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria was also produced. The summary laid forth views expressed by member states during the week according to the structure of the PoA itself—measures to combat illicit trade at the national, regional, and international levels; international cooperation and assistance; follow-up mechanisms to the Review Conference; and review of the ITI. The summary was not a consensus document, but did its best to summarize member states’ views and recommendations on which elements would serve as a basis for the discussion during this Rev Con.

As the two-week Rev Con gets underway, the PoA’s importance must not be underestimated. While the lion’s share of attention this year has been paid to the ATT process, the PoA is an instrument with tremendous potential to directly and practically address the dire consequences related to the illicit trade in SALWs and, perhaps most notably, to dry up existing stockpiles of weapons already in circulation. This was an issue all too clear in the aftermath of the Libyan revolution when weapons went unaccounted for and stockpiles were pillaged by rebel groups after the fall of Qadaffi. Member states must take advantage of the Rev Con both to honestly assess existing efforts to curb illicit small arms and to robustly and comprehensively tackle the proliferation of looted arms and lack of adequate stockpile management.

The real challenge of the PoA is to fully implement the benchmarks laid forth in the instrument in all national contexts.  The division of provisions among the national, regional, and global level is a helpful format and allows states to thoroughly address the responsibilities at all levels for implementation of the PoA and ITI. Moreover, the proposal to address the schedule of future meetings is an important contribution to the long-term success of the framework. For example, modification of biennial meetings of states into biennial meetings of governmental experts who are directly responsible for national implementation of the PoA would be significantly beneficial to fulfilling a host of PoA-related responsibilities.

It is clear that full implementation of the PoA requires continuous review with an eye towards strengthening national implementation of its measures. Many, if not all, of the challenges associated with full implementation—border control mechanisms, technical information exchange, marking and tracing expertise—require international efforts and cooperation. Therefore, this Rev Con, as well as future meetings of states, must provide for a transparent and honest exchange of information regarding implementation and how to best combat the deadly consequences of illicit trade in SALWs. There is little argument that the PoA’s provisions, if adopted according to national needs and flexible with regard to new challenges, can and will prevent illicit flows of SALWs and thus eliminate the dire consequences of these flows for international peace and security.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

 

 

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The ATT: Moving on and moving forward

30 Jul

As the mandate for the arms trade treaty (ATT) Diplomatic Conference expired on Friday afternoon, delegates and civil society alike were disappointed at the failure to adopt a treaty after four weeks of negotiations and, perhaps more importantly, the inability to address the lack of internationally-adopted common standards for the unregulated trade in conventional arms. The President’s draft treaty text was adopted as an annex to the Report of the Conference, although there was no clear indication of how that text would be treated in the future either in the General Assembly (GA) First Committee in October or elsewhere. While many delegations expressed regret over the lack of a consensus document, there was general agreement that the process is not over. In a statement to the plenary delivered by Mexico, a group of 90 countries expressed the desire to bring the current text to the GA First Committee to “finalize our work” to achieve “a strong and robust Treaty.” The Nigerian delegation explicitly called for a new mandate from the GA to complete the work of the ATT on the basis of the President’s most recent draft text with further consultations. The delegations of Germany, CARICOM, and Spain called for an ATT to be adopted “in the near future,” while others, including Peru, said there was “near unanimity.”

While this large majority of delegations is correct and commendable in their desire to continue to identify a way forward to achieve the still elusive goal of an ATT, it is difficult to imagine how, even with more consultations, the present text would become more robust or that member states would be able to reach “unanimity” on the major issues still left unresolved. After four weeks of hard work and difficult, political wrangling, there is much to be disappointed over.

The President’s most recent draft text still has significant loopholes and is far from the robust ATT that was aspired to by many delegates and civil society advocates—ammunition and munitions are lacking in the core items listed in the scope; the implementation measures provide for a superseding of the criteria by the vague references to “other instruments” and “contractual obligations under defence cooperation agreements;” records of authorizations do not need to be made public; and amendments can only be adopted through consensus leaving very little flexibility for substantive future changes in the Treaty. The language pertaining to criteria is particularly weak given the structure of the ATT as it will be driven primarily by national implementation responsibilities (and thus biases related to national interest). Diversion remains a “secondary” consideration in paragraph 6.4 (national assessment) requiring that states only “consider taking feasible measures” to avoid it. These are not insignificant weaknesses, but rather, compromise the Treaty and its ability to combat and eradicate the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms in a consistent, universal, and legally-binding manner.

Although the particulars of the text could certainly continue to be debated, the question now becomes how to proceed with the process writ large. Although the overwhelming majority of member states have made apparent their intention to continue the ATT process, the specific path forward (and on what basis) does not enjoy the same clarity. The most obvious option would be to bring the draft treaty to the First Committee in October and request another mandate to continue work through a new Diplomatic Conference. This is a position that, although not detailed explicitly on Friday afternoon, would seem to garner significant support among delegations given the commentary in the room. The French delegation noted that states “should not start from zero,” which would indicate support for using the draft text as the base forward.  Likewise the Chinese, Moroccan, and UK delegations called the President’s text “a good basis for future negotiations.”

As member states prepare to bring the ATT to the GA this fall, and they must at the very least report back to the body on the progress made, it is important to remember that the rule of consensus, and ultimately the de facto veto power of each member state, will not necessarily apply to future negotiations. As such, the majority of member states that have called for an ATT with stronger provisions than the ones found in the President’s text (presumably more than the 2/3 majority required for adoption of resolutions in the GA), should propose a text that encompasses more of the provisions that these member states have fought for throughout the negotiations, most notably inclusion of ammunition and munitions in the scope and clear, legally-binding criteria for national risk assessment. The group of 90 states on Friday noted, “Compromises have had to be made, but overall the text you [the President] put forward yesterday has the overwhelming support of the international community as a base for carrying forward our work.” Ultimately, if the rules of procedure change, then so should the Treaty such that these compromises be re-evaluated if they only apply to a few select states and a new, stronger text should be presented.

The goal of a universal, legally-binding treaty for the trade in conventional arms was and remains a noble one. A global ATT would certainly serve as a complement to already-existing, but mostly non-binding, agreements such as the UN Programme of Action on small arms, as well as future instruments seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the UN’s multilateral security framework.  As the next “phase” of this process begins, delegates and civil society should seize the opportunity to adopt a Treaty that can make a robust contribution such a framework.

More analysis and reporting from the month-long negotiations can be found here on Reaching Critical Will with the previous editions of the daily ATT Monitor.

–Katherine Prizeman

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