Tag Archives: disarmament

Debating Political Will and Working Methods in the Disarmament Commission

5 Apr

The General Debate in the 2012 session of the Disarmament Commission has been quite scattered as some delegations have used the plenary to lay out detailed positions on all issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation, some to lament the widespread stalemate across the multilateral disarmament fora, and others to propose recommendations for improving the functioning of the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) itself. While there can be some merit to discussing national positions on disarmament-related issues in a broad context such that national priorities can be understood as part of a conglomerate of concerns, there is little value added in reiterating general support for existing treaties, frameworks, and broad principles of disarmament and non-proliferation. This is most especially true in a forum, the UNDC, which is mandated to deliberate on particular issues, formulate recommendations, and submit them to the General Assembly for further action. A reiteration of existing national positions does little to advance this agenda and while the problem of paralysis is not exclusive to the UNDC, but rather characterizes the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as well, member states must use the next three weeks of substantive discussion to address the issue at hand—the UNDC’s failure to deliver recommendations for the last twelve years. The UNDC must take seriously its mandate to deliberate on specific agenda items to formulate recommendations to be submitted to the GA and, indirectly, to the CD for the purposes of negotiation. In order to do so, all obstacles to achieving consensus must be honestly reviewed.

Delegations have been split over the nature of these obstacles, ultimately whether they are of a political or institutional nature. The Swedish delegation reiterated support for time dedicated to a discussion on how the UNDC goes about its work as well as how its work relates to the role envisaged for the UNDC within the multilateral disarmament machinery. The Kazakh delegation suggested the Chair prepare a short note outlining the previous resolutions from the GA and other fora that “spell out how the working methods of the UNDC can be strengthened” identifying recommendations that have been previously set forth on this topic. Other delegations have disagreed with the assertion that working methods have been the cause of the UNDC’s failure. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has made clear on many occasions that the stalemate is due to the lack of political will. The NAM states have called for the work of the UNDC to “be intensified through reinvigorated political will.” The Egyptian delegation stated categorically that the problems of the UNDC are not related to its working methods. Similarly, the Pakistani delegation has stated that the lack of progress is rooted in the lack of political will and “double standards.” Even the Chair has weighed in on this argument in his letter to delegations prior to the start of the session stating that the ‘lack of political will’ case is not valid in a deliberative body.

The issues contributing to the UNDC paralysis are not so simple as to categorically blame either political will or working methods exclusively. As the Norwegian delegate stated during the open debate, perhaps the deadlock is due in part to political will, but delegations must make more imperative use of the UNDC to identify ways to overcome the stalemate in any case. Likewise, the Swiss delegate noted that there are several issues that have contributed to the deadlock. Mr. Bavaud stated, while political will has been significantly lacking and in places where it has existed has not been acted upon, much of the lack of progress has been of an institutional nature. Moreover, the Swiss delegation rightly noted that restrictive approaches to working methods, such as not allowing the input of outside experts into the Commission, are no longer acceptable when national security concerns cannot be delinked from global peace and security challenges.

Member states have put forth specific recommendations for improving the functioning of the UNDC. Poland’s delegation has issued a working paper on the topic calling for a Chairman’s summary or joint statement to be issued on all agenda items on which member states cannot reach consensus, and no recommendation can be formulated, as to reflect the views and positions of delegations and to prevent the loss of exchange of views altogether. The stalemate of recent years has prevented the transmission of information to the General Assembly rendering the UNDC’s work utterly useless. Furthermore, the delegations of Poland, Japan, and Switzerland have also suggested opening up UNDC proceedings to exchanges with representatives from academia and civil society.  Poland, in its working paper, also noted the issue of organizational matters encouraging the early election of not only the Chairperson, but also the Chairpersons of the subsidiary working groups and Vice-Chairpersons.

As noted by a handful of delegations, it would be wise to also examine the formulation of agenda items. Inclusion of broad, generic items related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has not proven effective.  The Brazilian delegation called the debate during the last cycle of the UNDC “excessively general and ambitious, making it more difficult to have concrete results.” The Swiss delegation agreed that it would be helpful to focus on more specific, circumscribed items, such as negative security assurances, nuclear weapon free zones, or verification mechanisms for conventional arms.

The international community has a joint responsibility to find more constructive ways to work and to explore all the possible impediments to success. The argument over the two obstacles to the UNDC’s success is not an either/or debate. Movement forward in the UNDC will require both the political will necessary to accept compromise for the sake of multilateral agreement and a re-examination of working methods that have not yielded concrete results in more than ten years.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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2012 Disarmament Commission Opens as Deliberations on the Agenda Continue

3 Apr

The President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the new High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the opening of the 2012 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission (DC), all of whom expressed concerns over the lack of progress made in formulating and adopting consensus recommendations, guidelines, and proposals in the DC over the past twelve years. While there was affirmation that the DC plays an important role in the overall UN disarmament machinery as it provides a forum for deliberating on specific disarmament-related agenda items, the current impasse has contributed to growing frustrations related to a lack of political will, inadequate working methods, and a general and growing resistance to compromise. With each year that concludes without any consensus recommendations, progress will become more challenging and delegations will become even less engaged as frustration will grow over the lack of concrete results.

High Representative Angela Kane noted in her opening remarks that “fresh thinking and new ideas are needed.” She referred specifically to the Chairman’s proposal from the 2008 session on procedural and organizational changes, such as the possible participation of experts in the work of the DC. The Chairman of this year’s session, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru, has agreed to submit a Chairman’s summary documenting the exchange of views from the general debate, including discussion related to working methods. He has made clear that he does not intend to include working methods as a stand-alone agenda item. In whichever form, such discussions on working methods must be taken seriously as the workings of the DC over the last decade have been at best lackluster and at worse irrelevant.

The Chair has made clear in various forums that “business as usual” will not suffice. Inclusion of expert panels would surely contribute to more robust discussions on the substantive agenda items. Additional technical and conceptual expertise could buttress the formulation of recommendations for adoption by consensus. Injection of new perspectives and information by experts would be a welcome addition to the often generic statements delivered by delegations on the same agenda items carried over from year to year. For example, there is little argument among member states that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is an international security priority. As recommendations for achieving this goal do not enjoy the same consensus, the DC should be used as a forum for deliberating on (not negotiating) specific proposals and recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly on precisely this issue. The DC should not serve as just another forum for reaffirming general support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Roman-Morey has argued that the argument of “lack of political will” is not valid for the DC given its deliberative nature, as opposed to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that functions as the negotiating body for disarmament matters. Ambassador Roman-Morey has concluded that the role of this DC is in part to break the current deadlock by identifying recommendations that may contribute to solving the CD stalemate. It would be wise to use the DC as a means forward in helping to lay the conceptual groundwork for future multilateral agreements to be considered in the CD and related fora. Nonetheless, if the obstacle to progress in the DC is not, in fact, the lack of political will as expressed by the Chair, it would follow then that flaws in working methods of the DC must be responsible, to some degree, for its lack of consensus outcomes and be one of the primary factors contributing to its failures over the last twelve years. If this argument is correct, and the problem is primarily structural rather than political, then clearly the operative methods of deliberating in the DC are not lending themselves to adequate consensus building and, therefore, must be altered, reinvigorated, or otherwise addressed.

In moving towards an adopted Programme of Work, the Chairman has offered his suggestions for two substantive agenda items. He has recommended, in addition to the item on nuclear disarmament that is required, to include one on conventional weapons rather than on the disarmament decade or a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). Ambassador Roman-Morey has indicated that the decade and SSOD IV are not likely to garner the same consensus as nuclear or conventional weapons and, for the sake of much needed progress in the DC this year, delegations should adopt items that are more likely to find consensus. The Chair’s intention is to create two working groups focused on the two primary agenda items with a third open-ended group to discuss agenda items for the next cycle.

Chair’s recommendations:

1)     Nuclear disarmament

  1. Recommendations for establishing the necessary framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons
  2. Recommendations on lessons learned and the legacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
  3. Recommendations on the role of the DC in addressing security challenges of the 21st century and reducing nuclear risks

2)     Conventional weapons

  1. Recommendations on strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the UN regional disarmament centers
  2. Recommendations on effective confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

Arguably even more important than the individual agenda items, the DC must find a way to achieve consensus on recommendations this year as it begins a new cycle of work and also celebrates its 60th anniversary. In the absence of clear recommendations, the DC’s path towards irrelevance will become harder and harder to divert.  And while the DC’s role has been obscured by years of inaction, diplomats still understand the value added of the DC is its ability to put forth general guidelines and recommendations on points of agreement among member states that can lay the groundwork for fruitful resolutions in the General Assembly and even negotiations in the CD.  In order for progress to ensue, it is essential to maintain a clear perspective on the function of the DC.  It is intended as a forum for introducing new proposals and suggested pathways forward, not a formal negotiating body – a flexible mandate that makes it possible for the DC to exceed expectations, not only disappoint them.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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2012 Substantive Session of the Disarmament Commission: Eager for Consensus

30 Mar

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is hailed as the ‘sole, multilateral deliberative body’ mandated to make recommendations on two or three specific issues related to disarmament, one of which must pertain to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. At the 2011 session the US delegation referred to the UNDC as a “deliberative think tank on arms control.” The UNDC, universal in its representation, a significant characteristic to note in contrast to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that does not include the participation of all member states, is tasked to formulate consensus-based recommendations to be delivered to the General Assembly prior to the start of the First Committee such that those recommendations will be considered and integrated as part of the Committee’s agenda of work.

Unfortunately, the UNDC has been unable to agree upon and subsequently adopt any recommendations in more than a decade’s time. The conclusion of the 2011 session, without adoption of any substantive recommendations, marked the twelfth year of no agreement on any of the agenda items– nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a declaration of the 2010s as the next disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures around conventional weapons. After three weeks of plenary meetings and working groups, many delegations were outspoken about their discontent, disappointment, and frustration. The Mexican delegation noted that this continued failure is unacceptable when the world is “threatened by nuclear weapons and excessive accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons” stating that the only tangible result of the UNDC has been the expenditure of resources by taxpayers.

Frustration around the multilateral disarmament fora is not unique to the UNDC. The other obvious point of contention and frustration is, of course, the CD that has fought since 1998 to agree on a programme of work. The seemingly intractable stalemate in the Geneva-based body has become an alarming concern for member states, civil society, and the Secretary-General himself who has publicly stated that the CD is “no longer living up to expectations.”  Proposals for working outside of the CD have come to bear among delegations, particularly in terms of negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Nonetheless, arms control and disarmament are not without their elements of optimism. The forthcoming Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations, although wrought with its own set of complexities and challenges, represent a majority opinion that arms transfers should be regulated by a set of common international standards. There is little doubt that such a treaty should exist, although the strengthen and scope of the future treaty remain unclear. Similarly, the Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA) is a consensus-based framework, adopted by all member states in 2000, for national, regional, and international provisions for preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Implementation of the PoA has had a mixed record overall, but the review process has nonetheless had marked success and continues to seek ways of strengthening implementation, most recently with last week’s Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference. The Prep Com was able to achieve its goals of setting an agenda of work, adopting rules of procedure, and endorsing a Chair for the Review Conference (Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria).

The 2012 session of the UNDC will begin a new three-year cycle and will meet for three weeks in both plenary and working group sessions chaired by Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru. Consensus on its provisional agenda remains elusive. Some delegations have expressed interest in including an agenda item that includes an “introspective look” at the Commission’s role in the broader disarmament machinery and examines its working methods. However, there is no consensus on this point as some member states contend that the obstacle to adopting recommendations is not in the working methods, but rather the political will of states. There have also been calls for more specific subjects to be vetted rather than the generic and repetitive discussions often held in the UNDC rendering it irrelevant to the wider international security discourse.

The UNDC has the unique opportunity to deliberate disarmament and arms control issues in a universal forum prior to the start of the First Committee in the fall. Recommendations offered from the UNDC could help streamline and focus the vast spread of issues that need to be covered in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) as well as underscore issues that are most important to member states. Moreover, as the CD has garnered much of the attention of the international community, albeit exclusively negative attention because of its current state of stalemate, the UNDC has the flexibility to arguably work with less politicization, and “fly under the radar” of sorts, while enjoying universal participation.

The UNDC must use this new cycle as a point of departure from the methods and habits of the last decade (such as generic statements of support for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) to tackle the obstacles to consensus that have prevented the formulation of any principles, guidelines, or recommendations. In order to do so, it is important that member states address both the political will and the working methods issues. The stalemate is surely due in part to the lack of will of governments to commit to recommendations (even non-binding ones as they are). Likewise, the work of the UNDC has also been impeded by its methods insofar as member states continue to discuss the same issues in the same manner, ultimately leading to the same results year after y ear. It would be logical to explore alternative methods of work. It would be worthwhile to explore other ways of deliberating, such as inclusion of expert panels, NGO statements, or other specialized presentations that could contribute to the conversation.

Many member states identify disarmament and arms control, related to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, as among the most pressing priorities on the international agenda. As such, the UNDC’s path towards irrelevance must be altered if these priorities are to be genuinely addressed in all forums available to the international community.

–Katherine Prizeman

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PoA on Small Arms Prep Com Wrap Up: Looking Forward to August

26 Mar

As the Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) for the second Review Conference for reviewing the progress made on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms (PoA) has come to a close, member states are prepared to meet again in August to take a more detailed look at the successes and failures related to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The small arms process is a critical forum for discussing the many human security-related implications of the proliferation of illicit arms as well as the diversion of arms from legal sales. Small arms are indeed an issue to be dealt with in multiple security discussions from sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict to the commission of mass atrocity crimes. Therefore, regular and transparent reviews of the PoA are a vital component of improving security on the national, regional, and international levels.

The second Review Conference for the PoA to be held in August is based on a universally-accepted General Assembly resolution (66/47), thus granting the process a healthy degree of credibility and consensus. Although controversies exist around expansion of the PoA, such as granting it a legally-binding status and expanding its scope to include ammunition, there is little argument that the PoA’s provisions, if adopted according to national needs and conducive to individual challenges, can and will prevent the illicit trade in SALWs and its dire consequences for international peace and security. Successful implementation of the PoA, as it is not legally-binding and puts forth a comprehensive blueprint of national, regional, and international measures to combat illicit small arms trade, requires robust trust and capacity building among member states and other relevant stakeholders such that national implementers have sufficient capacity and investment levels to adopt these measures.

This week’s Prep Com provided member states with the opportunity to adopt rules of procedure and an agenda as well as hold an exchange of views, in light of the time constraints of just five days, on potential elements for discussion in August. Substantive discussion was focused in large part on the need for more robust and comprehensive international assistance and cooperation for full implementation of the PoA. Additionally, member states addressed the follow-up mechanisms of the PoA, in particular the role of future meetings such as Meetings of Governmental Experts (MGE) on technical implementation capacities such as marking, tracing, recordkeeping, and activities around border controls. However, as noted by several delegations during the week, the Prep Com and subsequent Review Conference also provide for a valuable reaffirmation of commitment to strengthening and enhancing implementation of the PoA and the fight against the scourge of illicit weapons.

A Final Report was indeed adopted, although it is entirely procedural and technical in nature. Several delegations also submitted helpful Working Papers over the course of the week that enhanced the exchange of views during the week as well as for future deliberations. These papers included one from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on international assistance and cooperation, one from Japan on follow-up mechanisms, and two more comprehensive papers covering all aspects of the PoA’s implementation from the European Union and Germany, respectively. These Working Papers will certainly add to the bounty of documents to be used during the inter-sessional period between the Prep Com and the Review Conference as the Chair and member states hold informal consultations to determine the best way forward in more effectively implementing the PoA’s provisions. Background documentation for the Review Conference will also include the Chair’s summary from the MGE from May 2011, from Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, representing the first of its kind. Many delegations expressed interest in more meetings of this nature to dissect in more technical terms how implementers from capitals can better adopt the PoA’s measures in practice. The Chair’s summary, under the authorship of Chair Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria, laid forth views expressed by member states during the week according to the structure of the PoA itself—measures to combat illicit trade at the national, regional, and international levels; international cooperation and assistance; follow-up mechanisms to the Review Conference; and review of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The summary was not a consensus document, but did its best to summarize views and recommendations made by member states to improve implementation and does serve as a beneficial starting point for discussions both in informal consultations and in August’s Review Conference.

In looking forward, it is important to bear in mind the significance of the PoA. The PoA directly addresses the scourge of illicit weapons and seeks to garner control over their proliferation by concrete measures including stockpile management and disposal, border control mechanisms, and firearms marking and tracing. This is an instrument, accepted by the international community on the whole, that can in fact prevent and eradicate human suffering associated with armed violence and other forms of conflict committed with SALWs, which is no small contribution to international security.

There are many aspects of the PoA that require further elaboration and information exchange among all member states to deal with this complicated and comprehensive challenge. However, there are several issues that, in our view, merit particular attention:

  • Developing national action plans (NAP) on SALWs would serve as an excellent confidence-building measure, although not without its difficulties given the example found in the women, peace and security framework.  Such NAPs have not been entirely successful in the context of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 as most states still have not formulated a NAP in the almost twelve years since the Resolution’s adoption;
  • Focusing on the need for peacekeeping operations to address safe storage and disposal of SALWs as part of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs;
  • Discussing SALW issues in other UN frameworks  and mandates including 1325, the Special Representative on children and armed conflict, and the Special Representative on conflict-related sexual violence, among others;
  • Setting up and institutionalizing other MGEs in the PoA small arms process such that there are regular gatherings of national, technical experts directly responsible for implementing the PoA’s provisions;
  • Identifying which of the PoA/ITI commitments will require further elaboration in a diplomatic setting and setting up meetings and agendas to address them in the appropriate forum

The Prep Com offered much hope for addressing the deadly consequences of illicit SALWs. It accomplished its procedural goals as well as initiated a substantive discussion that, although will require much more diplomatic wrangling in order to identify points of viable consensus, was wrought with important security themes. Diplomats and non-governmental stakeholders alike must use the inter-sessional period to prepare in the best way possible for the Review Conference by vetting proposals already presented as well as formulating new ones.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Discussion over Chair’s Summary at the Final Day of the PoA Prep Com

23 Mar

The final day of the Prep Com was devoted to a review of the Chair’s Summary, which incorporated much of the previous days’ discussions and seemed to find considerable informal and formal support by states. There were objections of course. In some cases, delegations both lamented the lack of time needed to digest the Draft and then provided very specific criticisms of its contents. This seems incongruous on the surface but perhaps not as much as initially assumed.

While the Chair acknowledged the problem associated with diplomats having to respond to a Draft without sufficient guidance from capitals, it is assumed (by us at least) that most of the controversial matters would already have been vetted with diplomatic colleagues back home. The Draft, after all, is intended to provide guidance not (as some delegations seemed to imply) to create a controversial or preemptive blueprint for summer negotiations. Our view is that, as a rule, objections not raised are more toxic to a consensus disarmament process than those put on the table. In the case of the Arab Group and others, objections should be seen both as an effort to keep consensus options fully in play and as a statement of willingness to be fully active at the summer Review Conference.

As Mexico noted, the Draft is not a consensus document. It is useful as a guide to the Review Conference but does not seek to bind the hands of delegations. For us, this seems to be a document with contents largely consistent with the PoA process itself – implementation that is hopeful but incomplete, effective but not fully binding. When Pakistan spoke of the need to consolidate implementation in local and regional contexts, this is of course the core value of this endeavor. And nothing happened this week to jeopardize future progress. No funding was pulled off the table. No objections were raised that were deal breakers for delegations. No existing commitments were dismantled. No irreparable rifts between stakeholders took place.

It wasn’t perfect. It didn’t solve all problems. But it did no harm. And it reinforced for many delegations the degree to which illicit small arms are, indeed, the true weapons of mass destruction. This Prep Com represented another opportunity for delegations to learn how to work together to enhance what is for now an effective process with no legal standing, but with much creativity and generosity with which to conduct its work.

Moving forward, delegations have at their disposal a Draft that can both organize and promote a successful meeting in August. This is not a Draft to dodge, but a draft to use as guidance to build a new generation of PoA related commitments.

–Robert Zuber

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Reviewing for the Purpose of Strengthening the PoA on Small Arms

23 Mar

After a week-long session of the Prep Com for the August Review Conference on the Programme of Action (PoA) on small arms discussing thematic issues such as international assistance and cooperation, follow-up mechanisms, and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), member states must now channel their efforts towards concrete preparations for a successful second Rev Con in just over five months time. A key discussion among member states on Thursday was determining what exactly the mandate of the forthcoming Rev Con stipulates—to review progress made on the implementation of the PoA or to also strengthen its implementation in addition to reviewing it. The discussion over what on the surface may seem to be a small difference in wording is critical to the long-term success of the PoA and, ultimately, combating the deadly effects of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs).  This distinction is also crucial to the formal small arms review process at large. Reviewing and strengthening cannot be decoupled activities as they both, in tandem, contribute to controlling the spread of illicit SALWs.

The discussion initiated around wording contained in the introductory paragraph of the Draft Report describing the mandate of the forthcoming Rev Con. The discussion began when the representative of Algeria stated that the mandate of the Prep Com does not explicitly include a reference to strengthening or enhancing the PoA and, therefore, member states should only consider the strengthening task if the mandate explicitly indicates this function. A solution was found by including the direct quotation from General Assembly resolution 66/47, which states: “…at the second review conference, to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, and, subject to the agenda of the conference to be agreed by the preparatory committee, encourages them to explore ways to strengthen its implementation…”

Although a way was found to move forward on the Draft Report, the larger question of ‘reviewing’ versus ‘strengthening’ deserves more attention.  Concerns by members states over expanding the PoA, such as seeking coverage for ammunition or to make it a legally-binding instrument, is a separate and potentially larger and more animated conversation. Furthermore, reviewing implementation of the PoA is not an end in and of itself and, therefore, cannot be conducted in a vacuum. The review process must serve a larger goal—the goal of strengthening implementation of the PoA’s provisions in national contexts so that all member states, in the context of their individual national constraints and unique needs, can more robustly prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in SALWs.  As was stated many times by delegations over the course of the week, particularly during the debate on international assistance and cooperation, the Rev Con and relevant meetings (including possible future MGEs) should serve as forums to review PoA implementation in order to better exchange information and views on best practices and lessons learned to strengthen its implementation.

The concern of some states that the PoA will ‘overstep’ its bounds and become a different type of instrument, whether due to its shifting legal status or its expanded scope, is a valid one that merits a robust and productive discussion among diplomats. Although there were calls this week by some delegations to have ammunition included in the PoA and ITI, there was clearly no consensus on this issue. Moreover, this Prep Com was not necessarily the appropriate forum for vetting such proposals given the time constraints and the distinct mandate to prepare the agenda for the August Rev Con. As such, as it stands now, the work of the upcoming Rev Con must focus on improving and strengthening what already exists in the PoA and ITI—a strong set of provisions and comprehensive frameworks at the national, regional, and international levels for eradicating the illicit trade in SALWs.

The hope is that the PoA would at some point become a legally-binding instrument or that it might also include ammunition such that the multi-dimensional, disastrous consequences of the illicit trade in SALWs would be more effectively prevented. Advocating for an expansion of the PoA is important and should not be overlooked in the Rev Con. Nonetheless, this ‘separate, but equal’ debate should not cloud the purpose and mandate of the August Rev Con, which is to review progress made in implementing the PoA in order to identify ways in which member states can strengthen their national implementation practices and better prevent the illicit trade in SALWs.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Prioritizing the UNPoA on small arms

14 Mar

As member states gather next week for the Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference to assess progress made on the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), there is much work to be done on evaluating the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of implementation of the PoA and the separately adopted International Tracing Instrument (ITI). As more than a decade has passed since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, member states must be serious about using 2012’s forums—the Prep Com as well as the Review Conference—to thoughtfully and thoroughly identify where weaknesses remain in the implementation of the PoA and promote strong and transparent measures to address these weaknesses through information exchange, international assistance, and solid reporting measures. The PoA offers the unique opportunity to tackle an issue that affects all member states—whether as manufacturer or importer of arms, in post-conflict or conflict-laden societies, or as supplier or consumer.

Following a very successful Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in May 2011 under the leadership of Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, member states must now fight the ‘negotiating fatigue’ that is sure to be a factor this year with the PoA Review Conference held just a few weeks after the month-long ATT Negotiating Conference in July. It is significant to highlight that the MGE was both a success for the PoA and a breakthrough achievement for arms-related processes on the whole as it was the first of its kind. The hope is that this type of meeting will be institutionalized and made to repeat in the PoA process and perhaps other arms control processes as well. The technical discussions held among national implementers who directly apply these methods in their capitals was a true value added as member states could share best practices and lessons learned in marking, tracing, and record keeping with regards to the PoA and the ITI. It is hoped that this positive momentum will be carried through into next week’s Prep Com, now under the able leadership of Nigeria’s Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu.

The importance of the PoA ‘blueprint’ for international, regional, and national action on preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) cannot be understated. It important to note, as has been pointed out by many in the diplomatic and civil society communities, that the PoA lays the groundwork for drying up existing stockpiles of weapons as well as those weapons already in circulation, something that the hoped-for, future ATT will not have the ability to do. Therefore, it is crucial that the PoA be robustly supported in concert with the current work on the ATT. It is critical that this Prep Com—in addition to the Review Conference—be prioritized as an important opportunity for progress on the PoA’s implementation. Moreover, as the PoA is a non-legally binding document that lacks clear benchmarks for success, it is vital that member states use the Prep Com as a means of evaluation to push forward implementation mechanisms in the most vigorous way possible. Furthermore, it is imperative that member states discuss a wide expanse of SALW-related issues in evaluating the illicit trade, including border controls, ammunition, intermediary brokers, and civil society cooperation in addition to the technical aspects of marking, tracing, and record keeping in order to improve implementation. These issues provide a valuable context for devising a comprehensive strategy for the control, prevention, and eradication of trade in SALWs, but also a strategy that is realistic in its implementation related expectations.

A key element of the success of the PoA, and thus also of tracking the progress on implementation, is honest and reliable reporting—something that is still starkly lacking among many member states. More than thirty member states have never submitted a report and others have only done so once or twice over the 11-year period since the PoA’s adoption. Although many states are, in fact, implementing the lion’s share of PoA undertakings, the lack of official and comprehensive reporting makes for a difficult process of analysis of progress made, which is the very goal of this Prep Com and subsequent Review Conference. National reports allow for better matching of needs and resources so that adequate international assistance can be provided to those states that need support in adopting measures in line with the PoA commitments. As such, it is important that this Prep Com encourage those states that have been remiss in their reporting duties to recommit to doing so. Moreover, the lack of benchmarks and of a formal monitoring system is often perceived as a major weakness of the PoA. Improvements in national reporting would certainly help curb the negative implications of the limited oversight mechanisms that exist within the PoA framework as well as help generate greater public awareness around the small arms process.

Illicit trafficking in SALWs is at the forefront of minds this year as many in the diplomatic community are set to tackle this issue through both the PoA and ATT processes. It would be wise to bear in mind the distinctive importance of the PoA in addressing the current challenges of communities awash in weapons and suffering severely from armed violence and other abuses committed at gun point. Illicit SALWs are a true blight on the security of communities by limiting and often preventing the ability to create and sustain a robust security sector with implications for the participation of women, the education of children, and much more. Building on the positive energy of the MGE, the Prep Com must continue its work of evaluating where weaknesses in implementation exist and, in turn, providing the support and pressure necessary to fill those gaps.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Worry on Many Fronts for the #Armstreaty

22 Feb

The ATT preparatory committee completed its work last week during the fourth and final session of its series of meetings. Diplomats were able to adopt rules of procedure and a report on its work during all four preparatory meeting.

With each passing day, there seemed to be more urgency and anxiety around completing the preparatory process of the ATT—making state positions clearly known on substance, gathering and approving the necessary background documents, and adopting some semblance of rules of procedure. Also prevalent in the undertones of many statements and interventions was an air of worry over tackling too much or too little in the months remaining until the negotiating conference.

Some delegations focused this angst on completion of a comprehensive compendium of views from all four of the previous preparatory committee sessions. Cuba’s delegate made the case that national experts—military, trade, and legal—would benefit from this sort of document in their deliberations back in capital prior to the negotiations in July.  The European Union and Swiss delegations expressed doubt over the usefulness of this burdensome task for the Secretariat claiming that statements and positions are already available on the UNODA website. Algeria’s representative, whose delegation first brought up the idea of a compendium during the last Prep Com, disagreed stating that such statements on the UNODA website were incomplete and member states should have access to alternatives not reflected in the Chair’s Paper from 14 July 2011. Likewise, the Nicaraguan representative reiterated support for a compendium document reflecting updated states’ views. Belize’s delegation stated that any document, including such a compilation, would have to be reviewed and approved by member states before its inclusion in background documentation for the negotiating conference. The Iranian delegation reiterated the need to have all documents related to the conference—the SG’s report on states’ views, the Report from the GGE, and the Draft Report on the Prep Com among others—to be available to all member states in the interim.

Other delegations focused intently on completing and adopting rules of procedure before close of discussions for fear that negotiations will seriously be hindered without clear and agreed upon provisions. The Costa Rican delegation noted that the rules of procedure must facilitate negotiations rather than hinder them. The Indonesia delegate referred to a certain level of awkwardness that may come about if during the July negotiations the rules of procedure would need to be amended. As such, the delegate called for including a stipulation in the rules of procedure that they could be changed by consensus. More generally, Morocco implored all member states to stay focused on the rules of procedure and the Chairman’s report.

Some delegations focused their worry on particular substantive aspects of the treaty. Sweden’s delegation cautioned against an outright ban against arms transfers to non-state actors as industry would fall under this category and such cross-border industry cooperation is important and likely to increase among states. The delegation of Malaysia focused on the overall goal of the ATT and stated that reference to corruption, legal and victims’ assistance would serve to detract from the main objective of an ATT– completion of a legal and trade agreement. Contrastingly, the Chilean and Sierra Leonean delegation claimed that there is an undeniable humanitarian element to the ATT in addition to the legal regulations negotiated. Nigeria’s delegate took the opportunity to reiterate the necessity of including ammunition in the treaty’s scope.

It comes as no surprise that there is much anxiety still remaining on many fronts. As this final Prep Com concluded, delegations continued to make those anxieties known in the waning days of official preparations. The task at hand is complex and wrought with substantive and procedural challenges. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that the lack of international standards for the transfer of conventional arms is a severe blight on the world community and needs remedying. Furthermore, the distinct air of anxiety among diplomats illustrates just how important filling this crack in international law truly is.

For more reporting, analysis and documents from the Prep Com, please see Reaching Critical Will.

–Katherine Prizeman

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4th ATT Prep Com: Time to be Realistic and Concrete

7 Feb

As diplomats and civil society alike prepare for the final preparatory committee in the Arms Trade Treaty process, it is important to take note of the original intent and point of consensus behind the initiation of the process: despite difficult and complex political considerations, there is general and widespread support for negotiating an ATT indicating a majority opinion that arms transfers should operate according to a common set of international standards. How those standards will be negotiated, who will ‘monitor’ compliance with these standards, and how much latitude will be allowed for more robust and explicit ‘disarmament’ language remains to be seen.

There are many questions remaining, including the most basic of all: What is the goal and objective of such a treaty? Differing answers to this question present a complex challenge for both this Prep Com as well as the July Negotiating Conference. There is ultimately no philosophical consensus—some advocate for a treaty that can establish strong humanitarian standards for the transfer of conventional weapons that can combat, prevent, and eradicate the illicit transfer of such weapons where they can facilitate destabilizing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, while others wish to negotiate strictly on the grounds of trade. How a member state characterizes the core objective of a future ATT will likely impact all relevant positions adopted and thus will influence the success of drafting and adopting the treaty. Therefore, it is necessary that the upcoming negotiations and these final preparatory consultations seek a realistic and pragmatic solution to this philosophical difference of opinion. Without such a harmonization of purpose, the ATT negotiations will forever be divided between schools of thought that seem less reconciled than they might actually be.

It is also important to highlight the difficulty of the ATT process in the context of the other disarmament challenges that are to arise in 2012. During a year that is punctuated by many disarmament and arms control challenges, such as the Review Conference on the Programme of Action on small arms and a conference on establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, creation of a legally-binding ATT will require some degree of political capital investment, especially in light of the provision of consensus decision-making and acceptance of at least minimal international oversight of national control systems. Large manufacturing states will have to be active and productive participants in the ATT process if the treaty is to have any real impact on the arms trade – both cooperating with the provisions as well as providing international assistance to smaller states for the necessary national implementation capacity. There is an inherent responsibility on the part of the major exporters to negotiate an honest and robust ATT based on the fact that they account for the lion’s share of total arms manufactured, and thus in circulation.

As the ATT preparatory phase comes to a close and official negotiations begin, it is important to take into account the following recommendations that will make for a more robust and better implemented treaty over the longer term:

  • It is wise to incorporate a concrete review process that establishes regular meetings of the states parties to assess and adjust the ATT to better reflect evolving security circumstances as well as provide opportunities to make the treaty stronger to hopefully include some or all of the ‘additions’ that still remain contentious and perhaps are too difficult to include in the initial treaty.
  • It is essential that negotiations on an ATT focus on a structure that can support and even monitor national implementation once a treaty has been adopted. Member states must look realistically at the security, communications, and oversight challenges that lay ahead for treaty implementers. There is no obvious mechanism that currently exists to coordinate ATT-related logistics.
  • Even those member states that vigorously contend that any ATT should neither encroach on territorial sovereignty nor interfere in the ability of states to conduct arms transfers cannot argue against the dangers of diverting otherwise legally transferred weapons to non-state and illegitimate actors, such as criminal or terrorist elements, as well as through reselling weapons to line the pockets of corrupt officials. Delegations should address diversion directly in formulating a robust treaty that sufficiently highlights, monitors, and addresses all facets of this risk.

Understanding the inherent purpose of the ATT, as well as the broader disarmament context in which it is being negotiated, is important to the process. We hope that the final Prep Com will yield concrete negotiating points for July as well as a strong sense of enthusiasm and commitment from member states that will put diplomats in the strongest and most encouraging position possible for the diplomatic conference.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Mexico, Drug Trade, and Illicit Arms

25 Jan

The Mexican government has recently released updated drug war death toll figures, reporting 47,515 deaths in drug-related violence since 2006 when President Calderon began a military assault on drug cartels. The so-called ‘war on drugs’ has ravaged the security sector and continues to present a dangerous challenge to the US as drug cartels battle over control of the lucrative US consumption market. The factors associated with this struggle are plenty and can be evaluated both in isolation as well as collectively– the role of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity surely contribute to the allure of drug trafficking. Such societal stresses have perpetuated the illicit business and enticed the hopeless and struggling into a black market that, although highly risky, dangerous, and gruesome, can offer high financial returns.

The endemic contributors to drug trafficking aside, the role of illicit arms and its relationship with drug trafficking may not necessarily be causal, but illicit weapons surely perpetuate and enable the drug-related violence that has become a blight on the world community. In a year when the UN General Assembly will negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons, it is important to focus on why it is international standards for export and import matter. The consequences of unregulated trade, which lead to societies awash in illegal weapons used for criminality, violence, and intimidation, are dire. Nowhere is this more evident than in Mexico. As noted by Daniel Avila Camacho in a report for the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), drugs and arms often account for the largest sections of the black market and often use the same transport roots. Possession of arms by drug traffickers is more than a common practice and has become a sort of requirement for protection and security reasons when moving about areas of operation. Possession of arms is often involved from primary production by drug growers to the couriers accompanied by armed bodyguards. The financial symbiosis is also evident– drug trafficking often generates vast proceeds creating a financial base for criminal and terrorist groups to conduct illegal traffic in arms and vice versa creating a synergistic relationship between the two activities.

The sincere hope of many working for a ‘robust ATT’ is that the treaty will not only regulate the legal trade in arms between governments, but will also prevent and contribute to the eradication of illicit trade in arms (hopefully to include small arms and light weapons [SALWs], which is the type of weapon generally referred to here as related to drug and gang violence). The example of drug-related violence brings to light the critical importance of adopting a strong humanitarian perspective in an ATT so that it is more than a commerce agreement between states. The conflation of the business of arms trade (which does have a legal market in government-to-government transfers of military equipment and arms) and human rights concerns comes via the issue of diversion — the movement of weapons from the legal to the illicit market for purposes of criminality, insurgency, to violate the human rights of civilian populations, or to line the pockets of corrupt government officials.  It is diversion that must be ‘flagged,’ addressed, and eliminated through the framework of a strong and legally-binding ATT that takes care to disallow loopholes and bypassing of its provisions by criminal networks and corrupt individuals.

States continue to reinforce the right to acquire arms for self defense as part of their innate state sovereignty. These references to Article 51 of the UN Charter will not cease and neither will trade in arms between states. Manufacturing and trade in arms is a business that accounts for billions of dollars of revenue for states. An ATT will have no power over this legal trade insofar as creating a mechanism that would limit legal trade between states, something that has been expressly warned against during the ATT preparatory discussions. States are careful not to encroach on this right. Nonetheless, a central goal of an ATT, along with the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms (PoA), must be to address the human suffering related to the illegal trade in arms by preventing illegal diversion such that there are less weapons in the hands of drug traffickers.

–Katherine Prizeman

 

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