Tag Archives: disarmament

Following through on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

18 Jan

A recent editorial in the NY Times from 15 January proposed that the best way to prevent a ‘nuclear Iran’ is through a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East (WMDFZ). A 1995 resolution on the Middle East at the Review Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calls upon the states from the region to “take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.” Furthermore, a statement from the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. The outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference committed states parties to a 2012 conference on the establishment of such a WMDFZ and such a conference will be held later this year in Finland. Given this historical context and mindful of current political circumstances in the region, it is essential that the development of concrete proposals for treaty elements and confidence-building measures towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East are taken both seriously and expeditiously.

As explained by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull in their Times op-ed, a military attack on Iran will most likely encourage the Islamic Republic to more vigorously pursue nuclear weapons in the long run, even if its program is set back several years due to the attack. Such costs are high insofar as the likelihood of Iran’s more robust and intense pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as the chance that other Arab states will consider ‘going nuclear.’ The other major challenge (and danger) in the region is surely Israel’s policy of ‘opacity’ around its nuclear program– not acknowledging having nuclear weapons while the rest of the world operates under the assumption that they do, in fact, have such capabilities with little to no ambiguity around that fact. Therefore, the only clear path forward is the proposed (and promised) development of a Middle East WMDFZ.

As expressed on numerous occasions by government officials, a nuclear Iran is not an option for Israel or the United States, while Israel continues to operate outside the NPT framework and therefore is not obligated to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Moreover, Israel’s escalating tensions with Turkey and even Egypt (with which Israel has a peace agreement) are indicative of a worsening situation in a region home to some of the most protracted and deep-seeded conflicts in history. Iran’s recent inflammatory actions, including its threatening to shut down access to the Strait of Hormuz because of sanctions imposed against its developing nuclear program, are a sign that the current trajectory is at best alarming and a new pathway to peace must be seriously pursued. A WMDFZ would ultimately force all the major stakeholders to task– Israel’s nuclear program would have to become a viable discussion point and Iran would be subject to legitimized monitoring in terms of its uranium enrichment program for energy production, which the Islamic Republic strongly contends is as far as its production goes.

There are no illusions in terms of how difficult, complex, and unique a WMDFZ in the Middle East actually is. The zones that already exist, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Mongolia, clearly do not have the same political challenges that the Middle East must grapple with. The negotiations around the zone will be long, complicated, and frustrating to be sure, but it is essential to not only international peace and security, but to a sustained regional peace that will never come to fruition if the threat of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons are on the table. Negotiations to develop and implement a WMDFZ must operate in concert with complementary steps toward regional peace as collective security agreements cannot be viably and permanently de-linked from peace agreements. Disarmament and arms control issues must be negotiated simultaneously. Nonetheless, it is important to caution that although a dual peace and arms control process is important, the WMDFZ will have to be negotiated even if a comprehensive peace agreement has not yet been reached in the region (at least to start) .

It is also important to understand the WMFZ negotiations in the context of other international disarmament and arms control processes such as ratification of the CTBT, other biological, chemical and nuclear treaties, the UN Programme of Action on small arms, and IAEA inspections. Compliance with these measures are essential in order to increase confidence in regional security and trust in the preparatory process (which is sure to be long) leading to the creation of the zone.

The time is now for honest and robust efforts towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Such a zone will have positive ramifications for the region and the world at large by eliminating the option of the antiquated Cold War-style nuclear deterrence for ‘mutually assured destruction.’ It’s time for all stakeholders to be held accountable and for a transparent framework that limits the dangerous double standard and acceleration of tensions that currently exist.

–Katherine Prizeman

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2012 and Conventional Weapons: Balancing the PoA and the ATT

5 Jan

For those that follow processes related to conventional weapons disarmament, 2012 is proving to be a busy and significant year with its own set of opportunities and challenges. This July, diplomats will come together at the UN headquarters in New York and negotiate treaty language for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that seeks to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons. Just four weeks later, many of those same diplomats will gather for a Review Conference to assess implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects (UNPoA).

Each process has its own difficulties– the objective of an ATT is still unclear as to whether it is a treaty with a strong humanitarian perspective aimed at preventing human suffering caused by illicit trade in conventional weapons or, rather, merely a treaty to regulate commerce of arms; the PoA still suffers from weak implementation without benchmarks or enforcement power. Moreover, advocates of a robust ATT fear that small arms and light weapons (SALWs) will not be covered under the scope of the treaty, while many states that have tried to implement the UNPoA framework still lack the coordination and technology necessary to provide the marking, tracing, and record keeping of weapons that is necessary to eliminate illicit trade. As such, the challenges in both processes are vast. However, in a year that provides forums for improvements in both processes, we would be wise to make good use of them by advocating and underscoring linkages and complementary qualities that exist between the two.

The UNPoA is a political (non-legally binding) framework document that covers a wide variety of activities involving SALWs– international transfer, brokering, manufacture, stockpile management, marking, tracing, and record keeping. The UNPoA provides a framework for implementing adequate national laws, regulations, and adminstrative procedures around these activities as they relate to illicit trade. An ATT, as a legally-binding treaty of international law, would cover only internati0nal transfers of conventional weapons such as tanks, military vehicles, naval vessels, missiles, and missile systems and provide for a list of criteria to which signatories would be bound when determining if an arms transfer will be permitted.

Although the two instruments seem disparate, there are clear areas where an ATT could and should support the UNPoA framework. One element severely lacking in the UNPoA is benchmarks. The ATT could help with this lack of accountability by dictating, in a legally-binding manner, how states signatories must comply with international transfer standards. Additionally, an ATT has the ability to clarify some UNPoA ambiguities with regards to transfers (although it is still unclear as to whether this will include SALWs, which may or may not be in the scope of the treaty).  Most importantly, the ATT has the opportunity to build on national commitments to arms control and conventional disarmament measures by providing (hopefully) a clear reporting process on transfers (including denials), a formal monitoring system, and some form of a secretariat to provide administrative support to signatories in their national implementation of the treaty’s provisions.

While the ATT will neither dry up any existing stockpiles nor cover weapons already in circulation, it will address (how strongly and explicitly is still uncertain) diversion of weapons into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and corrupt officials by providing common international trade standards. In concert with the UNPoA that does provide a framework for drying up stockpiles and eliminating weapons in circulation, the ATT has the opportunity to curb human suffering and armed violence caused by new instances of illicit trade in conventional weapons. It seems the two have more in common than has been generally thought by addressing illicit trade through different lenses.

The argument that an ATT will be a drain on resources and cause reporting fatigue for signatories is a weak one at best. It is a generally accepted notion that the lack of common standards for international trade in conventional weapons must be addressed in a more robust and consistent manner than currently exists in the UNPoA that addresses only small arms in a non-binding framework. Therefore, it is clear that both instruments are relevant and it is important to ensure the effectiveness of both in the upcoming year.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Assessing the 2011 GA Session

27 Dec

The President of the 66th General Assembly (PGA), Ambassador Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser of Qatar, recently hailed the plenary body of the UN for its collective work on the most pressing global issues of our time noting that the GA has adopted nearly 300 resolutions and decisions during its main session. The main pillars of the 66th session, as laid forth by the PGA, have been peaceful settlement of disputes; UN reform and revitalization; improving disaster prevention and response; and promoting sustainable development and global prosperity. The PGA made particular mention of the importance of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and the key requirement of breaking the stalemate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament that is considered to be the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament. Other achievements underscored by the PGA were the actions taken on Libya, the political declaration adopted on the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases, and the application by the Palestinian Authority for full membership.

In light of the conclusion of the main session of the GA, it is important to assess not only the substantive accomplishments of the body, but the role of the GA writ large. Long after the heads of state and heads of government have returned to their capitals in September, the GA must settle down to the difficult and complex work of its committees to address challenging global issues. The higher profile issues of this year’s session have surely stolen  many headlines, in particular the Palestinian membership question, and have often eclipsed some of the less controversial, albeit still extremely significant, work of the GA. The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) is still grappling with the task of breaking the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating, among other important treaties, a Fissile Cut-Off Material Treaty (FMCT); the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) must deal with challenging issues related to macroeconomic policy questions such as international trade, financing for development, poverty eradication, and human settlements; the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) encompasses some of the most difficult questions of human rights, the advancement of women, indigenous peoples, and treatment of refugees.

As such, behind the more pronounced, headline-grabbing issues are a litany of concerns that are so complex that they appear on the GA’s agenda year after year. These issues are neither small agenda items nor easily evaluated and accomplished tasks. Nonetheless, the value of discussing these transnational issues in the only truly global forum is paramount. Equality in representation gives the GA process an innate value independent from its lack of enforcing power and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. As previously mentioned, the GA often counts among its most impressive accomplishments ‘political declarations’ that, although they have no legally-binding provisions, carry considerable weight by symbolizing the general sense of the international community on a given global issue.

It follows, then, that while it is admirable that the program of work for the 66th session has been far-reaching, the more concrete the goals of the GA are the more easily it is to assess and ultimately evaluate the progress of the body such that improvements can be made year to year. The trade-off for universal membership, however, appears to be this concrete evaluation and enforcement power. It is also clear that any sort of ‘evaluation’ of the UN’s work, especially from the perspective of the general public, is done through a peace and security lens. Often through this lens, the deficiencies of the UN are glaring– the inability to eliminate nuclear weapons, to curb the illicit arms trade, to ensure women’s full participation in all peace policies and processes, and to provide robust early warning and diplomacy to respond to the threat of atrocity crimes. Nevertheless, these security concerns are indivisible and have implications for all of the UN’s work from human rights to development such that this narrower lens of evaluation is not so skewed as to be entirely devoid of value.

As is often argued by observers of the UN, there is currently no alternative available as a viable multilateral system for addressing international issues on a broad spectrum. Therefore, it is important to continue to work within the framework that exists, while simultaneously pushing for improvements to fill in and ultimately improve on the ‘cracks’ in the system. The hope is that the GA will continue to improve its process and make honest overtures towards addressing its very lengthy list of global concerns.

-Katherine Prizeman

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Security Sector Challenges and Women’s Participation

20 Dec

Global Action recently had the opportunity to co-organize a meeting of Andean region governments on combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The conference covered many aspects of the illicit trade from regional cooperation and information exchange to the current status of implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA). Representatives of Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia engaged in an open and honest discussion about how to strengthen regional security and eliminate illicit weapons wreaking havoc on communities.

As Global Action is accustomed to doing, a women, peace and security lens was integrated into the conversation to push forward a  more robust human security agenda that is adequately inclusive of both women and men. At a macro-policy level, the links between a strong security sector and inclusive participation in political processes, peace negotiations, and other forms of civic engagement in helping to keep the peace are inarguable.  It is essential that the security sector is sufficiently robust to enable active and meaningful participation from all constituencies, including women, without fear or intimidation. The linkages between effective security sector reform and women’s participation, in particular, is a key component to a robust human security agenda that can prevent and well as address conflict in all forms. Furthermore, not only is it theoretically important to include the skills and talents of all citizens, such inclusion also practically contributes to the well being of the society.

In practice, the proliferation of illicit small arms continues to facilitate grave community-based crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence as well as other forms of domestic abuse which are often committed at gunpoint. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is not a stand-alone issue to be addressed in isolation, but surely facilitates other trafficking and security challenges faced by policymakers, police and the military.

Moreover, it is inaccurate to classify women as solely victims of gun violence perpetrated by men with arms. This approach neglects the active role women have played, and continue to play, in global, regional, and civil-society driven conflict prevention and disarmament initiatives. This narrow approach has also neglected the role women sometimes play as gun users, combatants, and traffickers.

SCR 1325 is proving to be an effective mandate for small arms policy and implementation by encouraging women’s participation in decision-making as well as by identifying specific entry points for gender analysis—such as reform of national security recruitment practices, implementation of small arms initiatives in collaboration with women’s organizations, and policy training and education to increase women’s participation in issues critical to the UN PoA. In order to address the real causes of societal insecurity, it is essential that participation in all peace and disarmament processes are representative of the whole of the population.

-Katherine Prizeman

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Looking Towards the ATT in 2012

17 Nov

As the First Committee of the General Assembly has come to a close, delegations appear ready, some enthusiastically and others more hesitatingly, to move towards the final negotiations. Whether this negotiating will be based on the most recent Chair’s Paper from Ambassador Moritan or not, it seems that member states are anticipating transition from the preparatory process to concrete Treaty text.  It is to be assumed that the very ambitious Chair’s Paper from July 14, 2011 will not be entirely replicated in the text, but it surely lays forth the existing proposals that will require honest and practical vetting over the three-week period of the Conference. Ambassdor Moritan’s presence at the First Committee enabled member states to hear, once more, the various proposals and divisions that still exist around the ATT underscoring the vast challenges that lie ahead. Ambassador Moritan is under no illusions regarding the complexity of the process as he noted the levels of ambition regarding the ATT are vastly different. The final PrepCom in February will be focused on the parameters and so-called rules of engagement for negotiations rather than a broad thematic discussion of scope and content specifics.

We continue to advocate for strong emphasis on diversion risks as this issue remains at the heart of curbing the illicit arms trade. Addressing this issue will require special attention to the practice of diverting arms from legitimate end users to non-state and unauthorized parties who may use such weapons for criminal, corrupt, and abusive purposes. It is often in this indirect, and sometimes unintentional on the part of governments, manner that the arms trade becomes a harmful practice. The strength of the language on this issue in the Treaty text is still undecided. As the Chair’s Paper from July 2011 noted, “A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms if there is a substantial risk that those conventional arms would…” undermine peace and security in various forms such as to commit violations of international human rights law. One major question for advocates of a strong humanitarian instrument in the ATT is whether the words “shall not” will be changed to “should not,” which inherently alters this responsibility from obligation to suggestion.

This issue of diversion language is but one example of difficult work ahead. We submit that the first iteration of the Treaty may not be ideal for all states parties, but it is the responsibility of all negotiators to take into account that such a Treaty should function as a floor and not a ceiling for improving state arms transfer controls. Implementation of ATT language in national practice will be just as important as the text itself for without implementation the language is empty wording. Therefore, sufficient discussion next year must be focused on implementation support and corresponding structure. We also encourage delegations to put in place a sound review process that will allow for ATT negotiations to continue well passed 2012 such that the ATT can effectively respond to changing international security risks.

The overwhelming trend in conversation in this year’s Committee has been support for both the preparatory process and the leadership of Ambassador Moritan as well as the inarguable need for better regulation of the arms trade. Building on these consensus points, we are hopeful that next year’s conference will, in fact, yield an ATT that will improve the global arms trade process. The question of its robustness and expansiveness, however, remains unanswered.

For more information on the ATT, follow @DisarmDialogues, @controlarms, @TheIANSA, and @VinoThorsen on Twitter and follow the ATT blog featuring various contributors from different organizations working on this issue.

-Katherine Prizeman

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The CCW4 and Cluster Munitions

15 Nov

Currently, in Geneva, diplomats are convening the 4th Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW4) Review Conference. The Convention, negotiated by 51 states in 1980, seeks to outlaw specific types of conventional weapons used in armed conflict to protect military personnel from inhumane injury as well as non-combatants from harm. When the treaty entered into force in 1983, it covered  incendiary weapons, mines and booby traps, and weapons designed to injury through very small fragments. In 2001, the Convention was voted to cover intrastate conflict as well as international ones under all its provisions. There are five protocols in force: (1) Non-detectable fragments, (2) Landmines, booby traps, and other devices, (3) Incendiary weapons, (4) Blinding lasers, and (5) Explosive remnants of war.  A related piece of international law, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), comprehensively bans the use of cluster munitions and was signed and ratified by 111 states.

The controversy now rests in the negotiations of a new protocol on cluster munitions for the CCW (Draft available here). Many advocates are concerned that this will severely undermine the ban under the CCM by providing cover for the future use of cluster munitions, which ultimately causes indiscriminate harm as well as the threat of explosion well beyond the end of the conflict in areas inhabited by civilians. Arms control advocates are arguing that this protocol will “provide a specific legal framework for their use.” The US and allies such as Israel, Brazil, India, and China, cite the ‘humanitarian’ provision in the protocol draft that bans the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980, although post-1980 munitions also cause indiscriminate harm to civilians and these older munitions would most likely have to be destroyed regardless of the protocol because of their age. The most recent use of cluster munitions reported in April 2011  used in civilian areas in Misurata by Qadaffi loyalists were contemporary weapons surely produced after 198o. The draft also allows for a deferral period of 12 years, which ultimately allows for use of weapons that will eventually be banned by the protocol.

As a back drop to adoption of a framework that allows for the use of cluster munitions is a larger normative problem: adoption of an instrument of international humanitarian law that is weaker than a previously (and generally accepted) adopted law. This is a dangerous undertaking that we hope the US and others will reconsider.

For up-to-date information on the negotiations, follow @marywareham, @banclusterbombs, and @nashthomas on Twitter.

-Katherine Prizeman

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Arms to Syria: Fueling the Fire of Violence

14 Nov

On Saturday, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria’s membership revoking the country’s voting rights, while also seeking to impose sanctions. Furthermore, the UN has reported  more than 3,500 deaths since the protests against President Bashar al-Assad and his government began underscoring just how tense and precarious the situation remains. It is clear that violence is undoubtedly facilitated by the flow of weapons, which not only are used in the clashes among parties to the conflict, but also to intimidate and to create a culture of fear destabilizing communities and stymieing any chance for a peaceful resolution. The flow of arms is surely ‘adding fuel to the fire’ and is strikingly irresponsible behavior as the death toll rises with no sign of a negotiated end. Onlookers are increasingly frightened by these heightened tensions and the Assad government’s severe lack of willingness to negotiate.

The Russian Federation just announced its intentions to honor all arms contracts with Syria despite the continued government crackdown. Citing the lack of official restrictions (i.e. an arms embargo) against Syria, Russian officials have affirmed their commitment to uphold their ‘business transactions.’ Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, deputy head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, warned against a repetition of the “Libyan scenario.” Dzirkaln also noted that the Russian government is keen to resume arms sales to Libya– both existing and prospective deals. However, it is clear that selling arms to a country in the midst of severe violence is much more than a business transaction and has ramifications far beyond an exchange of weaponry for a monetary price. Libya stands as a glaring and recent case in point. The proliferation of new arms and the unregulated flow of exisitng ones continue to wreak havoc on the political transition in Libya (see prior post “Controlling arms in the new Libya: The bigger picture.”) Many of the so-called anti-Qadaffi rebel groups have refused to disarm for fear of losing leverage and bargaining clout perpetuating the cycle of instability and fear of violence. Reports of missing weapons and unaccounted for ammunition stockpiles are a grim reality with which the new Libyan government must deal and a situation that is making a difficult situation even more grueling and intractable.

As a backdrop to continued arms sales to Syria, a political stalemate at the UN remains. There is certainly a hesitation, most notably on the Security Council from the Chinese, Russians, and South Africans, to re-create any situation resembling Libya in any form from military intervention, referral to the ICC, or even adoption of a resolution condemning the violence. Dissatisfaction with the implementation of Resolution 1973 has become the ‘elephant in the room’ in the Council chamber seemingly halting any action on Syria whatsoever.

The ambivalence to move forward on Syria is both glaringly apparent and dangerous. Exacerbating this ambivalence is the continual flow of weapons fueling violent outbreaks on the parts of both the government and the anti-Assad protesters. First and foremost, the violence must stop. And so does the proliferation of arms.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Disarmament and the General Assembly’s high-level plenary session: who said what?

30 Sep

As usual, Reaching Critical Will has done a fabulous jobs of monitoring and tracking mentions of disarmament at the General Assembly’s 66th opening high-level plenary session. RCW’s index highlights the issues to be detailed during the Assembly’s First Committee, starting on 3 October.

SG Ban Ki-Moon‘s opening address spoke of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, for the international community “to keep pushing on disarmament and non-proliferation … [and to fulfill the dream of] a world free of nuclear weapons.”

1. Consequences of nuclear testing and conflict

It was saddening to hear from a few countries whose citizens had suffered greatly from nuclear testing and weaponry used on their territories. Laos and Lebanon still suffer from the impact of cluster munitions and explosives contamination – and urged the international community to do more. The Marshall Islands made it clear that fallout from nuclear testing on its territory is ongoing and that justice has been limited.

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and other treaties / conventions

Many states expressed a commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ultimate goal to eliminate nuclear weapons. A number of states expressed alarm over nuclear weapons programs in DPR Korea, Iran and Israel. Support was also shown for a number of other treaties and conventions: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. General opposition to Weapons of Mass Destruction and concern for nuclear terrorism was also expressed by many states. While Uruguay urged the international community to make the most of recent progress on nuclear disarmament talks and the Mauritius called the current political environment as ‘the best ever’, the Central African Republic suggested that the nuclear powers need to assume full responsibility. Key statements of action came from: Kazakhstan – as chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – will use the opportunity to focus on international and regional security, building Islamic-West relations and enhancing the regimes of non-proliferation of WMD; and Ireland who “will continue to push for the UN’s disarmament machinery to become more responsive to 21st century imperatives”. Australia, Poland and Austria expressed reservation about the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament (with the latter suggesting the need for a new body).

3. Nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZ) 

Brazil, Iraq and Palau made it clear that their constitutions disallow nuclear weapons, which in Iraq’s words is a ‘clear position’ and a demonstrates a ‘commitment’. Cambodia, Ukraine, Kygristan, Papua New Guinea, Uruguay and Kazakhstan all spoke about major achievements at their respective regional level nuclear-free status’s; Mongolia was adamant that its nuclear free status could serve as an “impetus” for expanding NWFZs. Egypt, Syria, Oman and the UAE expressed commitment to a Middle East NWFZ. More generally, Cambodia, Nepal and Vietnam mentioned positive (Asia-Pacific and ASEAN) regional efforts aimed at disarmament and confidence building; and Taijkistan spoke about their efforts towards establishing a Landmine Free Central Asia.

4. Small arms and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries highlighted the importance of combatting the small arms trade in the region where ‘criminal groups’: traffickers, narcotic gangs and others operate, making it “one of the most violent areas on earth” – in the words of Nicaragua‘s delegate. Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, the Bahamas and Barbados spoke of the importance of the ATT, and backed up by Jamaica who is “committed to ensuring that the 2012 Diplomatic Conference on the ATT results in a legally binding, comprehensive, objective and transparent Treaty.” Others, notably Antigua and Barbuda, mentioned the significance of the CARICOM Declaration in the context of regional progress on combatting small arms. A number of African delegates were equally vocal concerning the small arms trade and the urgent need for ATT progress. Mali and Nigeria spoke of serious arms issues in their sub-regions; Niger suggested that further sub-regional efforts were required; Burundi spoke of national-led progress on disarming criminals; and Ghana considered the ATT as an “indispensable step [to prevent] the flow of conventional arms to destinations where they are likely to wreak havoc and mayhem by either fueling conflict and undermining both national and regional peace, security and development or exacerbating tensions.”

5. Militarization and Military Spending

Iran‘s leader spoke of other countries’ high military budgets, stockpiling of nuclear warheads, supporting chemical weaponry, and role in arms sales, bombing and occupation. In similar rhetoric Venezuela spoke about US militarization but also called for a “broad peace-based alliance against war: with the supreme aim of avoiding war at all costs.”  Many other states also raised the issue of high military spending, with some contrasting to a lack of human development spending: Montenegro called it ‘unjust’; Poland expressed concern over a new ‘arms race’, while Kazakhstan reiterated its initiative to redirect spending to a peacekeeping fund.

Many words were used to describe alternatives to militarism –  cooperation, dialogue, war prevention, mediation, diplomacy, multilateralism – which came from many different states. The Republic of Korea and China for example spoke for need for ongoing dialogue with DPR Korea; St. Vincent and the Grenadines suggested that the role of mediation should be a ‘firm resolution’ of the General Assembly.

Be sure to follow our work, and that of Reaching Critical Will,as these issues will be detailed in the General Assembly’s First Committee, starting on 3 October, 2011.

– Kees Keizer

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International Day Against Nuclear Tests, August 29th

19 Aug

Events associated with the observance of the International Day and 20th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site:

High-level Workshop: From here to 2015: Meeting the Targets of the NPT Action Plan

Thursday, September 1, 3-6pm, Conference Rm C in NLB (co-hosted by Mission of Kazakhstan and EastWest Institute)

Speakers:

Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Libran Cabactulan, Ambassador the Philippines and Chair of NPT Review Conference 2010

Marcie Ries, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for USA, Bureau of Arms Control

Annika Thunborg, Representative of Executive Secretary of the Prep Commission for the CTBTO

Informal Meeting of the GA to mark the observance of the 2nd International Day Against Nuclear Tests

Friday, September 2, 10am, Conference Rm 2 NLB

Speakers:

Amb. Joseph Deiss, President of UNGA 65

Asha-Rose Migiro, Deputy SG

Ermek Kosherbayev, Deputy Governor, East Kazakhstan

Geoffrey Shaw, Representative for Director of IAEA

Other member states, NGOs, etc.

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Some Final Thoughts on Social Media/Disarmament

28 Jul

As my days at GAPW come to a close, I’ve been doing a lot of reflecting about what I’ve gained here, how my projects fared, and if I’ve made an impression on the UN system (or at least convinced ODA that their outreach is b-o-r-i-n-g). Of course, I’ve spent a great deal of time working on our social media and disarmament project (I remember that meeting waaay back in November when I explained to ya’all what Tumblr was…)

I think it’s undeniable that social media is going to continue to play an important role in the future of almost every field–from corporations to NGOs–but the shape it has taken with regard to disarmament has continued to amaze me. Perhaps I was naive, but I was never particularly interested in disarmament–it’s just something I fell into. I was convinced I would end up working in something human rights related–in my undergrad, you were either interested in human rights (woo, Amnesty International) or security. I think my experience in school reflects a huge problem that we have (of course, I can only speak for my time at an American undergrad university)–students, who will inevitably become future diplomats/NGO & UN staff, are simply not growing up making these connections. On the other hand, those of us on the other side of the equation (the actual staff at these organizations) have been doing a poor job reaching out and engaging with the younger generation.

I’m always amazed by how terrible UNODA’s outreach is–I would bet that 4 out of 5 people on the street wouldn’t know of their existence. However, the problem starts to become apparent when 4 out of 5 future policy-makers are unclear about the work of ODA, as well as the field of disarmament.

Enter social media. I remain convinced that social media is the answer to these problems, and in particular,disarmament. The vast majority of users are young, ready to talk, and love to share/exchange information. And that is exactly what we need in the field of disarmament–an exchange of ideas–and an actual conversation. Rather than “educating” the “unenlightened,” we need to continue to ask difficult questions.

However, simply creating a Twitter or Facebook is not enough. As we’ve seen from our experience with DisarmDialogues, it is far too easy to engage with a small social circle of “insiders”–@Katherine–it’s easy to fall into the trap of tweeting for a few people. I’ve definitely seen this to be true during Arms Trade Treaty negotiations–there are a few “star” tweeters who actually care what the Fiji delegation has to say, and then there is the rest of the internet. We still need to figure out a way to engage with the rest of the internet.

That’s not to say DisarmDialogues hasn’t proved to be a useful tool for diplomats and NGOs, but I’d like to see even more engagement in the future. I think DisarmDialogues has the potential to be both a tool for diplomats/”insiders” as well as students (in particular, non-westerners), teachers, and just people, no matter what their professions. Disarmament is a somewhat exclusive club–there is certainly little transparency, and where there is transparency, there are not clear, reliable resources that are current.

Although posting on social media is often a task assigned to interns, it requires a lot of thought to write meaningful sentences in less than 140 characters. While links and facts are always appreciated, the success of DisarmDialogues will be contingent upon posting meaningful information. Hopefully, we will be able to continue the DisarmDialogues project through not just social media, but youth conferences and outreach. I can honestly say that as someone who is skeptical of A LOT of the work of the UN, I see DisarmDialogues as having a place in the future of disarmament.

-Jessica

PS I am forcing us to get Tumblr.

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