Tag Archives: disarmament

An Open Letter to UN Permanent Representatives — Give the Disarmament Commission Another Chance

20 Mar

Editor’s note:  For many years, GAPW has lamented the decline in productivity of the UN Disarmament Commission.  Given some recent hopeful signs in disarmament and the fact that the DC is in the third year of a 3 year policy cycle, we believe that the upcoming UNDC is an opportunity for meaningful deliberations warranting the attention of diplomatic missions that might well choose to put their energies elsewhere. 

Excellencies:

As most of you are aware, April 7 marks the beginning of the 2014 UN Disarmament Commission, the third year of its current policy cycle.   Ambassador Drobnjak has met with delegates to brief them on his own hopes and expectations for the three-week session and will convene another preparatory meeting on March 24. As he does so, we recall Ambassador Grima’s assertion from last April that the 2013 session did much to rebuild trust among delegations as a precondition for meaningful deliberations on nuclear disarmament and confidence building in the field of conventional weapons. This assertion may be as much an aspiration as a fact, but Ambassador Grima’s words at the very least underscore the need for more trustbuilding in disarmament matters as well as to increase the resolve of the UNDC to ‘test’ strategies that can build even more trusting and policy-effective relations among delegations tasked with disarmament matters.

Excellencies, this letter is a request to all of you to consider supporting another push for effectiveness in the UNDC in April, prioritizing time and energy from your missions to help support the possibility of deliberative movement that can provide real guidance to First Committee delegates. The UNDC now stands at risk of being overtaken by events as governments and civil society increasingly look outside the UN for the means to carry forward focused and technical deliberations on critical and emerging disarmament issues. A successful UNDC, resulting in clear if modest recommendations, can help erase the frustration of many inside and outside the UN that our disarmament structures are now simply and stubbornly inflexible.  

We recognize the challenge in asking for this commitment.  Our sense while speaking with many representatives of missions is that the UNDC feels too much like a long and tedious obligation that, as we all acknowledge, has failed to produce tangible results in many years.  GAPW has noted with concern many changes in the makeup of delegations to the UNDC over the years, the smaller numbers of diplomats who make the trip from Geneva or national capitals, the reduced ranks of diplomats assigned to cover the DC and its working groups, especially after the formal statements have been concluded.

With all that delegations need to accomplish on issues ranging from disabilities and the status of women to atrocity crime prevention and post-2015 development goals — not to mention other disarmament obligations — it is understandable that many of you would choose to minimize mission involvement in such a protracted and, especially in recent years, largely unfulfilling process.  But we also recognize that disarmament structures have undergone change in the past, they can be changed again, and it is worth our while to seize current opportunities to change them further.

As you all know, the UNDC is a deliberative body not a negotiating body.  It makes political judgments regarding the best paths forward on disarmament but neither creates nor endorses binding agreements. As such, there is little pressure regarding the establishments of precedents in disarmament negotiations, important given that the UNDC will be followed this year by the precedent-laden NPT review and the 5th Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms.   In addition, there is little pressure for the UNDC to issue comprehensive guidelines on disarmament matters.  Concrete, if modest, suggestions for how to move disarmament processes forward would be both sufficient and welcome.   As much as the global public craves solutions on disarmament matters, they can be provisionally satisfied with tangible policy movement of the sort that should by now be the UNDC’s specialized domain.

Failure to use this final year of the UNDC’s cycle to productive ends will further erode delegate interest.  It will increase the likelihood that states will no longer see the value in funding these sessions.  And, perhaps most important, failure of the UNDC might well encourage the Security Council to take up disarmament more frequently as a thematic consideration in a manner that marginalizes GA initiatives. The apparent inability of yet another GA process to live up to expectations will only embolden those who see the Council and the Council alone as the only effective body to take up these concerns.

GAPW’s clear position is that we need to keep disarmament firmly as a GA function.  But we also need to demonstrate that GA disarmament structures, especially the UNDC, can be less prone to gridlock or held hostage to an inflexible view of ‘consensus’ that belies the UNDC’s purely deliberative functions.  With all that is taking place inside and outside the UN, it is no longer clear that the UNDC will continue to have a key role in disarmament affairs if we cannot take measures now to make modest, limited recommendations to other parts of the GA which are more directly responsible for establishing and promoting disarmament obligations.

Excellencies, with all due respect for the multiple, important agendas taking up the time of you and your mission colleagues, we urge you to give ample attention to this session of the DC. We have noted with deep appreciation recent “openings” on regulating the global arms trade, fact-based discussion on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, hopeful collaborations among states as part of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, Iran’s still-tentative recalibration of its own nuclear ambitions, efforts to address the impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, building transparency and confidence in outer space activities, and more.  With all that is now attempting to bloom, this could also be the season when we can replace structural immovability with a more flexible and collaborative tone.  This could be the year for deliberation that yields suggestions for moving forward on disarmament obligations that people worldwide are yearning to see.

Excellencies, you have assurances of our highest consideration as well as our support as the UNDC navigates its current challenges and opportunities.

Dr. Robert Zuber

zuber@globalactionpw.org

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Rule of Law in Disarmament Discourse

30 Jan

The UN Secretary-General (SG) maintains that rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”[i]

Generally, strong rule of law mechanisms can promote robust national constitutions which grant equality to all, dependable security and judicial institutions, transitional justice and strong civil society.[ii] “These are the norms, policies, institutions and processes that form the core of a society in which individuals feel safe and secure, where legal protection is provided for rights and entitlements, and disputes are settled peacefully and effective redress is available for harm suffered, and where all who violate the law, including the State itself, are held to account.”[iii]

The important role that the UN plays in the promotion of rule of law has been highlighted in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The principles highlighted in the UN Charter of maintaining international peace and security and peaceful settlement of disputes go to the heart of robust rule of law policies and mechanisms.[iv] The role of peaceful settlement of disputes within rule of law discussions was highlighted at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, as Global Action has previously reflected.[v] If robust institutions and policies exist that protect the security and rights of individuals, and if alternative dispute resolutions exist to peacefully resolve conflict, then modern day uprisings that rise to the level of threats to international peace and security may be limited and even eliminated.

In addition, the so-called “International Bill of Human Rights” accords to individuals a set of rights that must be respected at the international and national levels. The work of treaty bodies to implement these commitments and rights is key to strengthening strong rule of law by promoting robust national-level legislation and mechanisms that protect basic human rights obligations.

More recently, the concept of rule of law was further developed in the High Level Declaration on Rule of Law. The Declaration reinforced the rule of law as a cross-cutting issue linking peace and security, human rights and development, and likewise acknowledged “strengthening justice and security institutions that are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals and which build trust and promote social cohesion and economic prosperity.”[vi] Additionally, the Declaration “emphasize[d] the importance of the rule of law as one of the key elements of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.”[vii]

With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the Secretary-General’s 2013 report on Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention focused on strengthening mechanisms to prevent mass atrocity crimes. Amidst the many risk factors that can contribute to the commission of mass atrocity crimes, the SG highlighted that “the risk of genocide and other atrocity crimes can be increased by a Government’s lack of capacity to prevent these crimes and the absence of structures or institutions designed to protect the population. Risk factors include…. weak legislative protection of human rights; and weaknesses in the judiciary, national human rights institutions and the security sector.”[viii] Among the options highlighted to prevent atrocity crimes include strengthening national institutions that promote rule of law through human rights protections, as well as effective security forces.[ix]

Building on this focus, the relationship between the security sector and the rule of law is timely and important given a series of disarmament processes in the spring 2014. As Former High Representative Sergio Duarte noted in his 2008 address to the American Bar Association Section on International Law, the rule of law has contributed to disarmament by essentially providing the framework and the tools to shape, interpret and implement commitments.[x] More specifically, it provides a set of legal instruments that shape the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and constrain the flow of conventional arms.[xi]

The forthcoming Disarmament Commission (DC) has been mandated to propose recommendations to the GA on diverse issues within the disarmament agenda and is set to discuss during its April session recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

While it is generally known that the DC has not been able to reach consensus in proposing recommendations since 2000, nevertheless as the opening of the Commission is fast approaching, it is timely to underline that any outcome reached could also prove imperative for strengthening rule of law, in addition to advancing the broader disarmament agenda.

Specifically in the context conventional arms, one need not think long to realize the pervasive, negative effect of weapons, especially the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons, on local communities, including disrupting feelings of safety and security; getting in the way of peaceful settlement of disputes; and interfering with the maintenance of strong and reliable security sectors.

A recent Chair’s Paper on confidence-building measures (CBMs) outlines obligations to instruments ranging from the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons to the Arms Trade Treaty etc.[xii] Ideally, the objective of CBMs around conventional weapons would be to promote transparency, implementation of the obligations therein, principles of good faith, and “eliminating the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding, and miscalculation with regard to conventional weapons.”[xiii]

Transparency within and between States and compliance with disarmament commitments can contribute to strengthening security institutions, responding to the needs and rights of individuals to feel safe and fully participate in society, and promoting the rule of law at the national level.

– Melina Lito

 

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A Game of Drones

20 Dec

Editor’s Note:  For the past three months, Tereza Steinhublova has focused her attention on peace and security matters related to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. While writing for Reaching Critical Will’s First Committee Monitor, she focused particularly on the issue of drones which, as she notes, must continue to receive much more policy attention, not only in the disarmament community, but in the human rights community as well.

The word drone comes up frequently in numerous contexts. Not only are drones brought up in the security world, but they are slowly growing in popularity in other fields as well. For instance, the computer game SimCity, which allows you to build your own virtual city, now comes with an option to replace the city’s entire security forces with drones. In fact, replacing the traditional police and security forces with drones gives the player many benefits! In the real world, Amazon announced its proposal of using small drones to deliver packages to customers within 30 minutes of their order. Similarly, big companies such as Google and Apple have also expressed their interest in robotics. Finally, the Internet continues to be flooded with political cartoons depicting controversies surrounding drone use.

Drone use is primarily justified as a counter-terrorism measure, including intelligence gathering. To what extent this is an effective method to fight terrorism is debatable. Although several high-ranked members of terrorist groups have been killed thanks to drone strikes, they have always been replaced instantly. Often in these cases the person taking over has more hardline views, thus posing a greater terrorism threat. Besides, many of those killed and identified as belonging to terrorist organizations are low-ranked members, rather than leaders. Furthermore, there have been instances where civilians have been killed either because of targeting errors or as ‘collateral damage’. On December 12, 2013, missiles from a US drone attacked a wedding procession in Yemen, killing over a dozen people. The drone is said to have mistaken the wedding vehicles for a militant convoy.  In response to this tragic event, the Yemeni parliament called for an end of the use of US drones in Yemen. This isn’t the only occasion of when a drone mistakenly killed civilians. On October 6, 2013, the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, criticized NATO for its drone use, as five civilians died as a result of an airstrike. Earlier this fall a Pakistani family, who survived a drone attack that unfortunately killed their grandmother, came to Washington DC to speak to Congress about how drones are really affecting those living in areas where drones are frequently deployed.

It is crucial to note that not all drones are used solely for combat purposes. However, surveillance drones still pose questions about the extent to which these invade privacy and violate state sovereignty.  There are also questions about how to assess legal responsibility in cases where person are killed without cause.

In comparison with the frequency of drone appearances in the news, games or popular media, international policy deliberations on the use of drones remain surprisingly thin. During this year’s session of First Committee, I paid much attention to drones and fully autonomous weapons and much to my surprise the discussion on drones was minimal. The topic was mentioned by a shockingly low number of states, with most input from the delegation of Pakistan. Also, the First Committee did not create a single resolution focused on drones. This comes as a surprise, not only because of the many civilian casualties involved, but also due to the continuing controversy surrounding drones. In November, the 2013 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) produced a mandate to discuss killer robots, which is a great development forward in the field of robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles. Nonetheless, the issue of armed drones as they exist now was once again unaddressed. I believe there needs to be a thorough discussion on drones in order to provide a basis for  a broader  dialogue on fully autonomous weapons.

Although drones are predominantly associated with the US, approximately 87 countries possess drones mostly used for purposes of spying. While the number of countries with armed drones remains low, it does not mean that this number will not grow. Much of the focus in the international policy sphere remains on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for instance, while drone proliferation remains largely unaddressed. Warfare technology is already being developed in many states and if armed drone use continues, it is highly likely that more states will develop armed drones as well.  More importantly, if terrorist groups or non-state actors already considered as a security risk were to develop an armed drone, this would create a serious international peace and security issue, because drones would be used directly against civilians. The world could therefore ‘log on’ to this ‘game of drones’ before it has adequately prepared for it or attempted to prevent it from occurring in the first place.

Unfortunately, there are many political strings attached to the drone debate. With most armed drone use carried out by the United States, the number of states willing to officially criticize this policy remains low. However, it is important to consider how this debate would change if the affected countries’ roles were reversed, if the states using drones for military purposes had to deal with drone attacks themselves.  Drones carry many ethical and legal questions, namely with humanitarian and human rights law. The fact that drones are controlled through a computer from a base already creates controversy and brings up a debate about the wisdom of the ‘distancing’ of warfare. The relationship between drones and international law remains precarious. It is often argued that drones do not comply with international law, because they undermine state sovereignty and are incompatible with the legal definition of the zone of conflict. The international community therefore needs to work to create a space for a dialogue, which would clarify existing doubts and develop new guidelines. The international community must work towards establishing a reliable system of governance for these weapons before the ‘game of drones’ plays out beyond the reach of state’s control.

Tereza Steinhublova, Junior Associate

 

 

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FES’s Fall Academy Takes on Disarmament Issues

14 Nov

Editor’s Note:  The following was presented on a panel organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung as part of their excellent, annual Fall Academy.

I have been asked this year by Volker Lehman of FES to do something different than in years past, not to speak so much about the NGO community at the UN — about which I am not always a huge fan – but to provide a critical perspective on the work of disarmament led by folks such as Fikry Cassidy of Indonesia and Thomas Markram, of UN Disarmament Affairs , two people I have known for some time and respect greatly.

Being critical, of course, does not mean being negative.   We’ve certainly butted heads in the past with a number of delegations and with disarmament affairs, and that isn’t likely to change.   We take peace and security challenges seriously; we know many people worldwide who have suffered devastating consequences when those challenges are not taken seriously enough. We make no apologies for insisting – including insisting of ourselves – that these challenges are taken up with as much serious and wise purpose as possible.

That said, most of our relationships with governments here in New York and with Secretariat officials, are quite positive.   We deeply value what they do.   Most diplomats work very hard,  harder on average than many of the NGOs trying to sell them on one policy or another.   We respect and honor their commitment, even when we differ on the paths chosen or on the assessment of our results.

We (GAPW) are an office completely independent of government and UN money.   We give the best advice we can give, we do it privately whenever possible, and we blend advice with concern about the lives people here are living, the personal sacrifices they often make to be here.   Sometimes our ideas are good; sometimes they are just plain nonsense.   But they are as clear, thoughtful and attentive as we can make them.   We know that lives are at stake in the decisions made at headquarters.  We also recognize that we don’t get a vote.   We can help make better decisions, but we don’t make decisions ourselves.

There are three core values that govern our security-related work.   First is the recognition that, as UN-based NGOs, we represent a mere sliver of the global ideas and perspectives that need to find a place at the policy table.  Despite the inferences of too many of my NGO colleagues, this is not about us.  We are not gatekeepers.  As a group of largely white, English speaking offices which are often much too cozy with our government benefactors, we are surely the least diverse pillar of the UN system. There are many governments that rarely if ever see familiar national or ethnic faces at the back of conference rooms.   We can talk more collectively about why that is so.  But believe me, diplomats notice.  And issues like disarmament are impacted by a lack of diverse policy perspectives.

Second, we must recognize that the UN system is fundamentally imbalanced, that the playing field is heavily tilted –even in the Security Council — and that states in control of the game have largely mastered the skill of coercive management out of the spotlight.   Why we value the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) so much, even when we are occasionally  at cross purposes on policy, is that the NAM represents a key, core challenge to the policy inequalities of this system, the degree to which all states at headquarters really don’t play by the same rules.   The implications of this disparity come up in disarmament discussions all the time, as states plead for consistency in application, transparency in motivation, and an even-handed assessment of the implications and power imbalances that will very possibly accrue from our implementation of negotiated agreements.

Third, we recognize the degree to which none of the key weapons-related issues impacting the UN system is likely to be solved until and unless all of the relevant stakeholders are engaged.  For us, that means looking to the many complementary issues and offices that help to define our security commitments. For instance, Illicit small arms fuel violence against women, impede development, keep children at home instead of at school, dampen prospects for the prevention of mass atrocity violence, negatively impact the health of state security sectors, and create cultures of suspicion that ultimately impact other negotiations, such as efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, efforts which we all agree must remain at the top of the UNs agenda.

A word on the Arms Trade Treaty, which was never conceived as a disarmament treaty per se and on which we worked very hard alongside many diplomats and a couple of the NGOs that considered thoughtfulness a more helpful contribution to Treaty negotiations than cheerleading   There is, all the hype notwithstanding, little reason to believe that this Treaty will result in any significant diminution of arms manufacturing or trade.   The gushing references to the ATT by so many First Committee diplomats is understandable given the success of these negotiations amidst UN disarmament mechanisms that continue to be frozen or rendered virtually irrelevant.   But as with the rest of life, this is a ‘be careful what you wish for’ moment for the UN.  We have a positive outcome over which we all lost lots of sleep.   But it is not a great treaty by UN standards, it does not effectively balance rights and obligations of manufacturers and recipients, it will be challenging to change provisions that turn out to be ineffective once the treaty comes into force, its implications for disarmament are unclear at best, and the opportunity costs of this treaty have been high in terms of energy expended and trust invested.     There is much heavy lifting still to do which will require much sober resolve.  Cheerleading just won’t cut it.

To conclude, we fully acknowledge the right of sovereign states to pursue their own security needs, but our goal is directly tied to the Charter idea of security at the least possible levels of armament.  To achieve this goal, disarmament itself must remain at the forefront of our common policy agenda.  The UN has many gaps in effectiveness to be addressed, and weapons have for too long been the vehicles through which states have pursued both domestic and cross-border interests.  We are convinced that these gaps can be filled, the playing field can be leveled, and thus states will find more and more reasons to embrace collective security with the same fervor that they now embrace its national equivalents.  For as long as our office exists, these are the goals and the hopes that will guide our activities and recommendations.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Reflections on First Committee’s Debate on SALW

12 Nov

After a month of meetings, side-events, resolutions, discussions and arguments, by state delegations and NGO representatives, it seems like peace and quiet has returned to the United Nations (UN). The General Assembly (GA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security has ended.

Looking back on the past month, I must say that I have mixed feelings. During First Committee, countries had time to share their concerns and standpoints on different disarmament issues. In my belief it is a good thing to discuss disarmament and security on a broad scale: every country can elaborate on their views and needs during the general and the thematic debates. I also believe that it is a good thing to have these meetings on a regular basis: decisions can be made, resolutions can be adopted and actions can be followed up on. These are the reasons why I think First Committee debates are needed and important but they are also the reasons I believe, that the way we organize these discussions limits the potential benefit of the work of First Committee. Due to the fact that the meetings are organized on a wide scale and for only a few days a year, country delegations try to squeeze in all of their concerns into a general and a few thematic statements, all of which are supposed to last no longer than 5 to 10 minutes (though this time limit was rarely honored). This results in countries being forced to choose to focus on a few subjects to address in First Committee and thus other security-related subjects may be pushed to the background with less than the attention they deserve.

This year, as part of my responsibilities for the First Committee Monitor organized by Reaching Critical Will, I focused my attention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), a subject that is, in my view, very important to address. Everyone knows what SALW are and what they can do. It is the kind of weapon children learn to ‘use’ while playing with toy guns and later while playing videogames, laser games or paintball. People use SALW to protect themselves, to commit petty crimes but also to commit murders. SALW are easy to get your hands on and easy to use and are, therefore, the most functionally dangerous weapons in the world. In the United States more than 30 people are shot and killed every day. In South Africa the number is as high as 40 casualties a day.

During First Committee several delegations mentioned the specific problem with the use of SALW. They called SALW ‘the real weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of our time’ and stressed the need to work together to stop the illicit trafficking of SALW. The representative of Croatia emphasized that ‘small arms and light weapons are neither small nor light in their impact’ and called for a strong and united response to this challenge. Even though most delegations addressed SALW in some fashion, and even at times mentioned the UN’s Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the topic was generally mentioned briefly and was overshadowed by several other disarmament issues, such as continued possession of nuclear weapons. On the one hand this makes sense given that these weapons, if ever used, would have an immense impact on the world’s population. Entire cities and populations can be wiped out by the use of one single nuclear weapon. So it is important to make sure that these weapons will not be further developed, tested and used. But, as I pointed out earlier, I also believe that SALW problems are important to address. I understand that it is much harder to attain the political will needed to control the trafficking and use of SALW than is the case with nuclear weapons, since the impact from the use of SALW is not immediately experienced by the entire world community. Nevertheless, even though entire cities or populations cannot be destroyed by a single use of SALW, such weapons are already used to wipe out segments of populations all over the world.

Looking at actions on draft resolutions, it was interesting to see that the first-ever Security Council (SC) resolution (2117) exclusively dedicated to the issue of SALW, which was hailed as a success by several delegations, got deleted from the GA resolution entitled, Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them, before this resolution was adopted without a vote. The reason for this can be found in the fact that resolution 2117 was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor to none against, but with one important abstention of the Russian Federation. During First Committee it was decided that SALW resolutions should be decided by consensus; thus the progress made in the SC on the issue of SALW was not officially acknowledged by the GA resolution.

Contemplating the future, much needs to be done to tackle the problem of the illicit use and trafficking of SALW. Countries need not only talk about the dangers and effects of SALW but actually see them as another form of WMD. Only when the international community sees its real dangers and SALW are no longer seen as weapons with ‘minor’ effects, can the use of SALW be halted. SALW deserves, in my opinion, the same amount of attention as other WMD and more in-depth talks on efforts to curb illicit SALW are needed. In addition to this, countries such as the United States where everyone has the ‘right’ to own a gun, need to consider strong control legislation. The issue of SALW needs to be addressed internationally and then the same laws and obligations need to be applied in every country if real progress is to be made in the process to stop the illicit use and trafficking of SALW.

 

Marianne Rijke, Disarmament Fellow

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Memory Lane: The United States Documents Disarmament Progress

15 Oct

A recent memo from Randy Rydell from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs announced the launch of the “Documents on Disarmament” series based on materials provided by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (posted at:  http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/documents_on_disarmament/).  Given Rydell’s long service to the UN it was appropriate that this announcement came from his email account.

The ACDA documents are a welcome reminder (especially for those of us who have been here a while) of the challenges, frustrations and sometimes high drama that have accompanied negotiations on weapons and weapons systems.   Only small segments of that affect come through in official documents.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember the ways in which triumphs in the disarmament field (CD, NPT, ATT and others) which we rightly celebrate and then so often proceed to ‘over sell’ can eventually lead to disappointment. This is especially likely to take place when we forget the following: 

  • That the political climate that largely influenced the content of these successes can also be their undoing, especially as ‘like-minded’ becomes a substitute for ‘clear minded.’
  • That the successes themselves are less like permanent, inflexible commitments and more like invitations to address longstanding security needs that people have long been clamoring for and expect global policymakers to address
  • That the solutions to current disarmament obstacles become more likely through both a consultation with the historical record and an honest clarification of future objectives.

For me, the ACDA documents were also a reminder of a larger truth and concern about the UN – the systematic shrinking of its institutional memory.   In fields both relevant to and far removed from disarmament, UN analysis often reminds me of the Oklahoma plains where I spent many early years – flat as far as the eye can see. As youths impacted by this type of environmental stimulus, we tended to have a better sense of what we needed and wanted than where we had come from and where we were headed. 

This is not really the best way to live, and probably not the best way to make policy either. 

As a system characterized by high turnover, shrinking term contracts, insufficient commitment to a leveling of its power dynamics, and NGOs too often content to play at the surfaces of policy, the UN has a growing memory deficit.   We have collectively embraced a ‘current events’ mentality that is increasingly disconnected from either past preparations or broader implications for the future of the planet.  Moreover, our mistakes often come in patterns, in part because we don’t sufficiently consult the people who have made similar mistakes in the past, and in part because people who have made those mistakes don’t appear to have learned enough to prevent them a second (or third) time around.

Longevity in any institution is clearly no guarantee of wisdom, of seeing the longer view.  But more institutional memory in more policy contexts might well help to ‘fill out’ some of our policy pronouncements so that people have important information not only about want we want and need but ‘where we came from’ and the direction that we want global security policy to go. 

“Where are we going?” is a question that we ask often in our private lives, and there are serious (and in my view justifiable) trust implications when we don’t get a suitable answer.  We need to ensure, all of us, that there are ample occasions to do more than simply replicate the present policy dynamics.  As part of that, we must be willing to think harder about goals and directions beyond ways to get as quickly as possible from policy challenge through national interest to adopted resolution. 

The billions of people who will have to live with what we collectively decide in this place need to know that we have done due diligence thinking through the implications of even our wisest pronouncements. In this task, our institutional memory — in the form of both documents and persons – can make a most precious contribution.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Fueling the Syrian Conflict From All Sides

29 May

As the conflict in Syria rages on, ostensibly slipping further and further into an increasingly grievous civil war, the European Union decided on 28 May 2013 to lift an arms embargo thereby allowing for the option to provide arms to the Syrian rebels fighting against President Bashar Al-Assad and his government. The decision to lift the embargo was supported mainly by the UK and France. Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, remarked that the non-renewal of the arms embargo comes with certain conditions—weapons can only be sent to the so-called moderate Syrian National Coalition and the affiliated Free Syria Army and can only be used to “protect civilians.” While the embargo sets the stage for weapons transfers to the Syrian rebels, there is no immediate plan to begin authorizations of weapons as the earliest possible time for such transfers would be August 2013 (after a conference is to be held in Geneva next month to negotiate a peace agreement). Nevertheless, this policy change is indeed a worrisome development in the context of a bloody, prolonged, and seemingly intractable civil conflict in a region of unsettling politics and violence. Several countries have rightly argued that more weapons will inevitably mean more death and destruction no matter to which parties to the conflict they are intended.

Particularly in light of the recent adoption of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in the UN General Assembly (set to be open for signature next week on 3 June 2013), the dangers of transferring conventional arms to governments (or, in this case, entities) with the potential to violate international humanitarian law, international human rights law, undermine peace and security, or be used to commit acts of gender-based violence or violence against children are highly relevant to the debate over supplying arms to “stabilize” a conflict versus “exacerbating” the violence. The original intent and impetus of an ATT—preventing the human suffering associated with the unregulated and illicit arms trade—are interestingly on display in the Syria case. The human suffering apparent in the Syrian context is indisputable. The UN estimates that nearly 80,000 individuals have died in addition to the dire refugee and displacement crises and the overall disruption of livelihoods. Such violence has been committed with imported (legally and illicitly) weapons of all kinds as arms flow into and within the region. Moreover, the dangers of “legitimate” arms falling into the hands of “non-legitimate” entities are even more severe in the context of Syria given the lack of information on the rebel groups and the instability of the region writ large. The determination of which groups are the “legitimate” representatives of the Syrian people is hardly clear.

Applying the ATT to the Syrian case is not straightforward, but an interesting case study nonetheless. Export assessment criteria represent the linchpin of the ATT operability insofar as these criteria must be examined prior to any arms authorization by the exporting states party. The agreed criteria in the ATT do provide an interesting backdrop to the discussion of whether or not such export authorizations are in line with international legal obligations. Of course, a major difference (and ultimately a major complication and what would seem a “loophole” in the Syria case) that must be noted is that the ATT covers inter-governmental transfers and does not explicitly elaborate on criteria related to transfers to non-state actors. A prohibition against transfers to non-state actors was a hotly debated issue during the ATT negotiations and, ultimately, was not included in the final text. Many of the loudest objectors to the text, including many Arab states and the three states that formally objected to the text at the conclusion of the March 2013 negotiations (the DPRK, Iran, and Syria), noted the absence of this prohibition as a major oversight in the drafting. They noted that although the majority of states called for this prohibition, it was purposefully left out. Therefore, the ATT, even if it had already entered into force and the relevant parties were state parties, would not apply in this case. If instruments such as the ATT are to have a real impact, then treaty criteria must be incorporated into all export decisions and not just those which are explicitly referenced. Otherwise, a policy of criteria avoidance could be easily adopted and implemented.

In the same week that the EU lifted the embargo, the Russian government announced that it would move ahead with the transfer of anti-aircraft missiles to the sitting Syrian government as a “stabilizing factor” that would “deter” foreign intervention into the conflict. It is clear that arming either side—the Assad regime or the rebel groups—is doing little to bring the violence to an end or address the dire humanitarian crisis. The Syrian conflict has ultimately moved from a rebellion to a civil war to a regional war by proxy with external forces such as Iran and Russia eager to counterbalance moves by the EU and the US.

The insertion of more weaponry on either side has little hope for changing the political or practical dynamics of the conflict and, thus, instigating hopes for bringing forth a negotiated peace. As Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted to the Human Rights Council in Geneva recently, “The message from all of us should be the same: we will not support this conflict with arms, ammunition, politics or religion.”

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations

13 May

The forthcoming Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), which will convene in Geneva for fifteen working days this year, has its first session from 14-24 May (with follow-up sessions 27-28 June and 19-30 August). The OEWG is a result of resolution A/C.1/67/L.31 tabled at the 2012 session of the First Committee by Austria, Mexico, and Norway entitled “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.” This initiative was one of the more concrete results from the sixty-eighth session of the First Committee as it offered a tangible method of seeking to break the impasse currently paralyzing much of the UN disarmament machinery, including and most importantly, the so-called single, multilateral negotiating body for disarmament—the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The resolution called for the established of an OEWG (open to the participation of all member states as opposed to the limited membership of the CD) to “develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons” as well as for the submission of a report to the next session of the General Assembly reflecting the discussions held and proposals made whereby a record of the work of the OEWG would be available to impact future discourse. The OEWG will be chaired by Costa Rican Ambassador Manuel Dengo.

While the mandate of the OEWG has never been entirely clear, it is assumed that the group will take up substantive issues rather than procedural ones. Ambassador Dengo wrote in his letter to member states which included a draft program of work for 14-24 May session, “The main purpose of the May session will be to promote better knowledge and understanding of the different aspects of nuclear disarmament and the challenges faced by multilateral nuclear disarmament.” As noted in Ambassador Dengo’s memo, the OEWG will operate in an interactive manner consisting of thematic panels with a more general exchange of views held at the conclusion of each panel. The centrality of interaction among member states, experts, civil society representatives, international organizations, and other relevant stakeholders is a most welcome aspect of the process. Discussions on disarmament, even when they are labeled “debates,” rarely feature such interactivity. Themes to be covered by the OEWG include: multilateral treaty-based obligations and commitments; nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs); transparency, confidence-building measures and verification; the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons; and the roles and responsibilities of nuclear weapon possessing states and non-nuclear weapon states.

While this thematic discussion is important, it would seem counterintuitive to discuss substantive proposals for taking forward nuclear disarmament negotiations without specifically addressing the procedural questions around the stalemate that continues to plague the CD (the de-facto reason why the OEWG has been established in the first place). Separation of the substantive from the procedural will not provide the necessary comprehensive approach to breaking the negotiating paralysis in the field of disarmament.

The current position of the nuclear non-Proliferation (NPT) nuclear weapon states (NWS), also known as the permanent 5 (P5), is that they will not participate in the OEWG, which is an unfortunate development. The P5 has generally opposed all initiatives and proposals that are perceived as “alternative” processes labeling them “distractions” from the measured, “step-by-step” approach they see as necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament. France, Russia, the UK, and the US all voted against the October 2012 resolution with China abstaining. During explanations of vote (EOV), the delegations of France, the UK, and the US offered a joint statement noting that the proposed OEWG seeks to “circumvent” established mechanisms such as the CD and the UN Disarmament Commission and does not clearly fit into the NPT framework and corresponding 2010 Action Plan. The same type of reasoning was offered with regards to the recent humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons conference held in Oslo in March 2012 that the P5 states jointly decided to boycott.

This reasoning is weak at best and hypocritical and contradictory at worst. The P5 themselves have started a so-called “alternative” and parallel process in the form of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) that began in Washington, DC in 2010, which was followed-up with another NSS in Seoul in 2012. Moreover, the argument that the work of the OEWG does not “fit into the NPT framework” is disingenuous. As is noted often and with an increasing sense of urgency and frustration by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) at NPT meetings, Article VI obligates the NWS to pursue good faith negotiations for the unequivocal and complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Establishing a body, not to mention one without a negotiating mandate, to discuss a range of themes related to Article VI obligations clearly fits within a larger framework of engagement and in no way threatens the (seemingly faltering) NPT regime.

The more pressing threat to the NPT regime is burgeoning frustration (embodied in the decision of the Egyptian delegation to withdraw from the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session) over the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East pursuant to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The Egyptian delegation ominously stated in its final remarks to the 2013 NPT PrepCom before withdrawing, “We cannot continue to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that do not get implemented, yet to be expected to abide by the concessions we gave for this outcome,” referring to the indefinite extension of the NPT in exchange for the promise of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. It would seem that this growing fissure in the NPT framework, the so-called “cornerstone” of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, is of much greater concern than the establishment of an OEWG, which is essentially an opportunity to discuss and brainstorm proposals without obligating any state to commit to binding agreements over already existing agreements (even those whose validity is now being seriously questioned).

The threats to the NPT regime, the increasing isolation of the P5 during the Oslo humanitarian consequences conference, the recent NPT PrepCom, and the forthcoming OEWG session, have all further opened up conversation among NNWS and civil society over the role these states should play in “taking forward” multilateral negotiations. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and others in civil society have advocated for NNWS to take the lead in establishing the necessary framework to obtain a world without nuclear weapons rather than continuously wait for the P5 to meet their Article VI obligations. ICAN has advocated for a “Ban Treaty” building on momentum spearheaded by the NNWS through the humanitarian consequences initiative that would hopefully change the global, political, and legal landscape surrounding the continued existence of nuclear weapons by negotiating and concluding a ban on the use, possession, stockpiling, trade, and manufacture of such weapons. Such a ban could be a simple treaty composed of general obligations with room for additional protocols to which the NWS could eventually sign, but would not necessarily have to negotiate. This course of action has been perceived as an approach different from a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), which envisages framing obligations not only to prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also to ensure their elimination through disarmament obligations and a verification regime (such as the obligations and verification mechanism in the Chemical Weapons Convention). A NWC, therefore, would necessitate the participation of the nuclear weapon possessors.

Whether there is a question of sequencing or whether a “Ban Treaty” could serve as a precursor to a NWC is not necessarily of the question of highest importance, but rather it is how to achieve nuclear abolition as comprehensively and quickly as possible. Perhaps a ban negotiated by the NNWS would inspire the P5 to negotiate an agreement among themselves to eliminate their arsenals in a reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the call to NNWS to take a more prominent and active role in pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament is essential to future progress towards this objective. Maintenance of the status quo is simply no longer an option given the stalemate across the UN disarmament machinery and the obstinacy on the part of the P5 with regards to any new proposals or initiatives seeking to address disarmament. Clearly they fear losing “veto power” derived from the consensus rule and the inherent imbalance in the NPT that ultimately privileges the NWS and their “step by step” process.

As the OEWG begins it work, there is some hope that the proposals gleaned from the discussions will provide the necessary injection of momentum to take forward disarmament negotiations that will genuinely make progress in nuclear disarmament, although it would seem that this will have to be done without the nuclear possessor states, which include the P5 as well as the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan (those outside of the NPT regime). “Nobody should assume that any regime structured on a have/have-not principle can be sustained forever,” argued Angela Kane, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at the Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation on 6 May 2013. It is time for an honest appraisal of strategies through the OEWG for nuclear disarmament that do not perpetuate a regime that maintains the status quo.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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UNDC 2013: Memory Lane

19 Apr

Among the proposals emerging from this year’s session of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), there were two that particularly caught our eye. The Swiss proposals presented during the opening exchange of views calling for more involvement by experts in the work of the UNDC is one that Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) has discussed in other commentary and fully supports in practice.

The other proposal that we wished to highlight was provided in a working paper by the Egyptian delegation, often among the most thoughtful delegations on disarmament matters. While their proposals specific to both substantive working groups will no doubt help to frame discussions during the third and final year III of the current UNDC cycle, the opening paragraphs of their paper (A/cn.10/2013/WP.1) are perhaps the most actionable in terms of their implications for the ongoing deliberative potential of the UNDC.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Egyptian paper highlight an ongoing problem for both the UNDC and many other parts of the UN system — a lack of institutional memory.  Given the turnover in diplomatic missions and ODA staff, and given the lack of interest in or invitations to NGO experts with a deep interest in supporting the efforts of the UNDC (Reaching Critical Will and GAPW are generally the only NGO monitors in the room — when we are allowed to be there), it is difficult if not impossible to keep track of what the Egyptian working paper calls “unfinished business,” including both proposals not implemented and consensus not reached.   Aside from information and commentary posted on the Reaching Critical Will, there has been little effort to summarize key discussions, insights or proposals.   As RCW recognizes, it is difficult to “nurture” (to quote the Egyptian paper) new ideas when you can’t remember what those ideas are, let alone track their development.

Delegates with a longer term engagement with the UNDC will recognize the degree to which deliberations have followed a well-worn path. Moreover, the nature of involvement with the UNDC has changed over the years, with fewer delegations consisting of experts from Geneva and more and more of the deliberative burdens falling on already overworked diplomats from New York missions. There has been less and less energy around the UNDC in recent years, which to our mind requires some urgent remedial response. GAPW would like to endorse, consistent with the Swiss and Egyptian proposals, that the UNDC promote side events in partnership with NGO experts to more thoroughly investigate substantive and procedural matters that are germane to the mandate of the UNDC but also at times impede its progress.

It may be, as some NAM-affiliated delegations have suggested, that the UNDC will require a more robust overhaul, perhaps within the context of another Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). But until that issue is resolved, the UNDC would do well to establish procedures for reporting and stakeholder engagement that can preserve institutional memory and allow interested observers in and out of government to track both UNDC progress and impediments over time.

There are, as Egypt notes, some fairly simple ideas that can enrich the experience of the UNDC for both participants and observers.  Having more sets of trusted eyes in the room for future UNDC sessions would certainly help ensure that the best of the Commission deliberations can find more suitable, trustworthy venues where they can be studied, assessed and even acted upon.

 

–Dr. Robert Zuber

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The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

17 Apr

For the last two weeks (9-18 April 2013), states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been meeting at The Hague for the third CWC Review Conference. The CWC, adopted in 1993 and now comprised of 188 states parties, has been hailed a success by many disarmament civil society advocates and member states alike for setting a high multilateral disarmament standard. In particular, the CWC’s robust verification regime implemented through the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been identified as the type of verification measure that should be required for all comprehensive and universal disarmament measures, namely a similar convention on nuclear weapons.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was on hand to deliver opening remarks to the Review Conference and urged complete chemical weapons disarmament before the next meeting scheduled for 2018. Also noteworthy, non-governmental organizations addressed a CWC Review Conference for the first time in an official plenary setting.

The previous two CWC Review Conferences (Rev Con), as well as the current third session, are mandated by the Treaty itself to “undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific or technological developments.” This Rev Con, covered capably by colleagues at The Hague (see: cbw-events.org.uk for up-to-date and current analysis and summary), has seen the emergence of some several themes, some more contentious than others. As reported by colleagues present at the Rev Con, some of the important issues arising from the current debate include

Syria

As expected, the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria has been treated at the Rev Con. The government of Syria, which is not a CWC state party, has requested that the Secretary-General investigate allegations of use by the rebel groups. The Syrian government submitted allegations of chemical weapons use by rebel groups on 20 May. However, the investigation has not yet taken place nor the investigating team dispatched to Syria. Allegations concerning both parties in the conflict have ultimately complicated and delayed the investigation. States parties have been debating how precisely to treat this issue in the forthcoming Final Document. It remains to be seen how this current issue will appear in the document.

Post-Destruction Era

As set forth in the Convention, all chemical weapons were to be destroyed within ten years of entry-into-force of the Treaty (29 April 2007) with a possible extension of five years. This original deadline has not been met. A “Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 2012” taken by the Conference of States Parties (CSP) in 2011 refers to the states parties Libya, Russia, and the United States that have not yet fully destroyed their remaining stockpiles. This decision requires that these possessor states report (albeit in closed sessions) to each regular session of the Executive Council on measures undertaken to accelerate progress or overcome problems related to destruction programs. As these issues of destruction are particularly sensitive, these discussions have been challenging to engage. Nevertheless, it has been argued by some NGO colleagues that it is not a lack of political will that has been inhibiting destruction and that states parties with existing stocks have, in fact, been working towards destruction. Rather, technical and economic reasons have been identified as the main contributors to the delay in destruction activities.

Furthermore, given that stakeholders are now discussing a ‘post-destruction era’, the future role of the OPCW is being debated. The responsibilities of verification, consultation, and cooperation will inevitably be shifted as universal destruction of all existing chemical weapons is fully realized over the next (hopefully) few years.

Advancements in Science and Technology

Article XI of the Convention concerning economic and technological development has also been addressed. Wide recognition that the CWC must keep pace with scientific and technological developments is clear and the work of the Scientific Advisory Board has been specifically underscored. Such “future-proofing” of the CWC is an important component of its long-term success in maintaining a world free of chemical weapons.

The CWC in the Context of Multilateral Disarmament Failures

The success of the chemical weapons regime is encouraging in the broader disarmament field that often struggles with a lack of consensus and a deficit of political will necessary to eliminate such egregious weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that elimination of an entire category of WMD is possible through universal participation and robust verification. This helpful and successful strategy must be vigorously pursued in other disarmament contexts.

The current stalemate that seems almost endemic to various parts of the UN disarmament machinery—the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament—as well as other perceived failures in multilateral disarmament such as the slow progress made in implementing the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan and the failure to convene a 2012 conference on a Middle Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made so-called “successes” in disarmament difficult to come by. Nevertheless, the hope is that the CWC will be just the first of many future multilateral disarmament instruments that strengthen the rule of law and eliminate such heinous weapons with the potential to wreak unthinkable havoc on humanity.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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