Tag Archives: General Assembly

‘Small-5’ Propose GA Resolution on Improving Working Methods of the Security Council

17 May

Known as the ‘Small-5,’ Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland presented a draft resolution that seeks to improve the working methods of the Security Council without proposed amendments to the UN Charter. As such, these states advocate that this resolution will have no bearing on the ongoing and separate negotiations for reform and expansion of the Security Council. Member states such as India and Brazil have opposed the resolution given their interest in and support for an amendment to the Charter that would expand the Security Council’s membership and give their delegations a permanent seat. The P5 members have also made clear their opposition noting that they do not see a role for the General Assembly in offering recommendations to the Security Council.

Led by the mission of Switzerland and its Permanent Representative Ambassador Paul Seger, this group has worked for improvement in the working methods of the Security Council since 2006. In March 2012, the S-5 tabled a resolution and have since undertaken several rounds of consultations with member states, in particular the P5, to identify a way forward with regards to these recommendations. This effort has been pursued both in the General Assembly and through cooperation with the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. The S-5 had decided it is time to bring the resolution to a vote in the GA and allow member states, although the adoption of such a resolution would not be binding, to communicate a political and moral message on improving the accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of the Council. However, as of Friday 18 May, Ambassador Seger of Switzerland decided to withdraw the resolution after increasing pressure from opponents of the resolution. Faced with the prospect of procedural wrangling that would “engulf the entire Membership and leave everyone confused”, he said the S-5 had decided to withdraw the text.

Ambassador Seger addressed the GA this week under the agenda item “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit” offering remarks on the content of the resolution. He gave a similar presentation in April 2012 describing the S-5’s proposals.

The principle recommendations include:

  • A greater role for the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and those that make large financial contributions in the preparation and modification of mandates for peacekeeping missions
  • Standing invitations to the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in relevant debates and, when appropriate, informal discussions
  • Better access for interested and directly concerned States to subsidiary organs
  • Establishing a working group on lessons learned in order to analyze reasons for non-implementation or lack of effectiveness to suggest mechanisms aimed at enhancing implementation of decisions
All the proposals are based on long-standing dissatisfaction with the way in which the Council does its work. In particular, GAPW would welcome strong and institutionalized methods of ‘assessment’,  particularly on questions of implementation, of resolutions and decisions of the Council.  The lack of assessment was no more apparent than in the case of Libya in which the Council lost control of the ‘narrative’ after adoption of the original resolution. This was indicative in part by the fact that the resolution barely surfaced in the discourse around NATO’s implementation of it. It wasn’t until the operation itself ended that the resolution was cited. In its aftermath, both Russia and China expressed serious concerns over the implementation of Resolution 1973, which has undoubtedly contributed to the decision by these P5 members to veto an subsequent Western-sponsored resolution threatening sanctions against Syria for the killings of civilians.
It seems the most ‘controversial’ proposals deal directly with the use of the veto. The S-5 proposes what they consider to be “nothing radical or revolutionary” noting that they fully respect the Charter-based right to the veto. P5 states are called to:
  • Explain the reasons for resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so by circulating a copy of the explanation as a separate Security Council document to all member states
  • Refrain from using the veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (as legally defined in the Rome Statute for the ICC)
  • Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring  that when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution it does not constitute a veto thus allowing the P5 member to cast a negative vote while not blocking the action altogether

Many members of civil society have advocated for such a provision to be added to the veto power– requesting that P5 members consider refraining from using their vetoes on action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, warm crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. Civil society and member states alike cite paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, stating that “the international community, through the UN, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; and that when a state is manifestly failing, the international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive response, including measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.” Nonetheless, it goes without saying that garnering support for recommendations to change the highly politicized issue of the veto are fraught with challenges. In order to combat this spirit of contention, the S-5 has tried to make clear that their intention is not to abolish the veto, but to provide recommendations only on how and when it should be used.

It seems that the primary concern of the S-5 is the lack of access for non-members of the Security Council to the Council’s work due to weak transparency and accountability measures, rather than a concern over the composition of the Council. The S-5 has tried to make clear that what they propose is a way forward through which Council members can seek the view of member states outside the Council without prejudice to the need for often timely action on sensitive  matters. Striking this balance is a difficult, but important goal for moving forward successfully with these recommendations.

—Katherine Prizeman

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2012 Disarmament Commission Opens as Deliberations on the Agenda Continue

3 Apr

The President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the new High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the opening of the 2012 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission (DC), all of whom expressed concerns over the lack of progress made in formulating and adopting consensus recommendations, guidelines, and proposals in the DC over the past twelve years. While there was affirmation that the DC plays an important role in the overall UN disarmament machinery as it provides a forum for deliberating on specific disarmament-related agenda items, the current impasse has contributed to growing frustrations related to a lack of political will, inadequate working methods, and a general and growing resistance to compromise. With each year that concludes without any consensus recommendations, progress will become more challenging and delegations will become even less engaged as frustration will grow over the lack of concrete results.

High Representative Angela Kane noted in her opening remarks that “fresh thinking and new ideas are needed.” She referred specifically to the Chairman’s proposal from the 2008 session on procedural and organizational changes, such as the possible participation of experts in the work of the DC. The Chairman of this year’s session, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru, has agreed to submit a Chairman’s summary documenting the exchange of views from the general debate, including discussion related to working methods. He has made clear that he does not intend to include working methods as a stand-alone agenda item. In whichever form, such discussions on working methods must be taken seriously as the workings of the DC over the last decade have been at best lackluster and at worse irrelevant.

The Chair has made clear in various forums that “business as usual” will not suffice. Inclusion of expert panels would surely contribute to more robust discussions on the substantive agenda items. Additional technical and conceptual expertise could buttress the formulation of recommendations for adoption by consensus. Injection of new perspectives and information by experts would be a welcome addition to the often generic statements delivered by delegations on the same agenda items carried over from year to year. For example, there is little argument among member states that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is an international security priority. As recommendations for achieving this goal do not enjoy the same consensus, the DC should be used as a forum for deliberating on (not negotiating) specific proposals and recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly on precisely this issue. The DC should not serve as just another forum for reaffirming general support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Roman-Morey has argued that the argument of “lack of political will” is not valid for the DC given its deliberative nature, as opposed to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that functions as the negotiating body for disarmament matters. Ambassador Roman-Morey has concluded that the role of this DC is in part to break the current deadlock by identifying recommendations that may contribute to solving the CD stalemate. It would be wise to use the DC as a means forward in helping to lay the conceptual groundwork for future multilateral agreements to be considered in the CD and related fora. Nonetheless, if the obstacle to progress in the DC is not, in fact, the lack of political will as expressed by the Chair, it would follow then that flaws in working methods of the DC must be responsible, to some degree, for its lack of consensus outcomes and be one of the primary factors contributing to its failures over the last twelve years. If this argument is correct, and the problem is primarily structural rather than political, then clearly the operative methods of deliberating in the DC are not lending themselves to adequate consensus building and, therefore, must be altered, reinvigorated, or otherwise addressed.

In moving towards an adopted Programme of Work, the Chairman has offered his suggestions for two substantive agenda items. He has recommended, in addition to the item on nuclear disarmament that is required, to include one on conventional weapons rather than on the disarmament decade or a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). Ambassador Roman-Morey has indicated that the decade and SSOD IV are not likely to garner the same consensus as nuclear or conventional weapons and, for the sake of much needed progress in the DC this year, delegations should adopt items that are more likely to find consensus. The Chair’s intention is to create two working groups focused on the two primary agenda items with a third open-ended group to discuss agenda items for the next cycle.

Chair’s recommendations:

1)     Nuclear disarmament

  1. Recommendations for establishing the necessary framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons
  2. Recommendations on lessons learned and the legacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
  3. Recommendations on the role of the DC in addressing security challenges of the 21st century and reducing nuclear risks

2)     Conventional weapons

  1. Recommendations on strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the UN regional disarmament centers
  2. Recommendations on effective confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

Arguably even more important than the individual agenda items, the DC must find a way to achieve consensus on recommendations this year as it begins a new cycle of work and also celebrates its 60th anniversary. In the absence of clear recommendations, the DC’s path towards irrelevance will become harder and harder to divert.  And while the DC’s role has been obscured by years of inaction, diplomats still understand the value added of the DC is its ability to put forth general guidelines and recommendations on points of agreement among member states that can lay the groundwork for fruitful resolutions in the General Assembly and even negotiations in the CD.  In order for progress to ensue, it is essential to maintain a clear perspective on the function of the DC.  It is intended as a forum for introducing new proposals and suggested pathways forward, not a formal negotiating body – a flexible mandate that makes it possible for the DC to exceed expectations, not only disappoint them.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Disarmament and the General Assembly’s high-level plenary session: who said what?

30 Sep

As usual, Reaching Critical Will has done a fabulous jobs of monitoring and tracking mentions of disarmament at the General Assembly’s 66th opening high-level plenary session. RCW’s index highlights the issues to be detailed during the Assembly’s First Committee, starting on 3 October.

SG Ban Ki-Moon‘s opening address spoke of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, for the international community “to keep pushing on disarmament and non-proliferation … [and to fulfill the dream of] a world free of nuclear weapons.”

1. Consequences of nuclear testing and conflict

It was saddening to hear from a few countries whose citizens had suffered greatly from nuclear testing and weaponry used on their territories. Laos and Lebanon still suffer from the impact of cluster munitions and explosives contamination – and urged the international community to do more. The Marshall Islands made it clear that fallout from nuclear testing on its territory is ongoing and that justice has been limited.

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and other treaties / conventions

Many states expressed a commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ultimate goal to eliminate nuclear weapons. A number of states expressed alarm over nuclear weapons programs in DPR Korea, Iran and Israel. Support was also shown for a number of other treaties and conventions: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. General opposition to Weapons of Mass Destruction and concern for nuclear terrorism was also expressed by many states. While Uruguay urged the international community to make the most of recent progress on nuclear disarmament talks and the Mauritius called the current political environment as ‘the best ever’, the Central African Republic suggested that the nuclear powers need to assume full responsibility. Key statements of action came from: Kazakhstan – as chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – will use the opportunity to focus on international and regional security, building Islamic-West relations and enhancing the regimes of non-proliferation of WMD; and Ireland who “will continue to push for the UN’s disarmament machinery to become more responsive to 21st century imperatives”. Australia, Poland and Austria expressed reservation about the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament (with the latter suggesting the need for a new body).

3. Nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZ) 

Brazil, Iraq and Palau made it clear that their constitutions disallow nuclear weapons, which in Iraq’s words is a ‘clear position’ and a demonstrates a ‘commitment’. Cambodia, Ukraine, Kygristan, Papua New Guinea, Uruguay and Kazakhstan all spoke about major achievements at their respective regional level nuclear-free status’s; Mongolia was adamant that its nuclear free status could serve as an “impetus” for expanding NWFZs. Egypt, Syria, Oman and the UAE expressed commitment to a Middle East NWFZ. More generally, Cambodia, Nepal and Vietnam mentioned positive (Asia-Pacific and ASEAN) regional efforts aimed at disarmament and confidence building; and Taijkistan spoke about their efforts towards establishing a Landmine Free Central Asia.

4. Small arms and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries highlighted the importance of combatting the small arms trade in the region where ‘criminal groups’: traffickers, narcotic gangs and others operate, making it “one of the most violent areas on earth” – in the words of Nicaragua‘s delegate. Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, the Bahamas and Barbados spoke of the importance of the ATT, and backed up by Jamaica who is “committed to ensuring that the 2012 Diplomatic Conference on the ATT results in a legally binding, comprehensive, objective and transparent Treaty.” Others, notably Antigua and Barbuda, mentioned the significance of the CARICOM Declaration in the context of regional progress on combatting small arms. A number of African delegates were equally vocal concerning the small arms trade and the urgent need for ATT progress. Mali and Nigeria spoke of serious arms issues in their sub-regions; Niger suggested that further sub-regional efforts were required; Burundi spoke of national-led progress on disarming criminals; and Ghana considered the ATT as an “indispensable step [to prevent] the flow of conventional arms to destinations where they are likely to wreak havoc and mayhem by either fueling conflict and undermining both national and regional peace, security and development or exacerbating tensions.”

5. Militarization and Military Spending

Iran‘s leader spoke of other countries’ high military budgets, stockpiling of nuclear warheads, supporting chemical weaponry, and role in arms sales, bombing and occupation. In similar rhetoric Venezuela spoke about US militarization but also called for a “broad peace-based alliance against war: with the supreme aim of avoiding war at all costs.”  Many other states also raised the issue of high military spending, with some contrasting to a lack of human development spending: Montenegro called it ‘unjust’; Poland expressed concern over a new ‘arms race’, while Kazakhstan reiterated its initiative to redirect spending to a peacekeeping fund.

Many words were used to describe alternatives to militarism –  cooperation, dialogue, war prevention, mediation, diplomacy, multilateralism – which came from many different states. The Republic of Korea and China for example spoke for need for ongoing dialogue with DPR Korea; St. Vincent and the Grenadines suggested that the role of mediation should be a ‘firm resolution’ of the General Assembly.

Be sure to follow our work, and that of Reaching Critical Will,as these issues will be detailed in the General Assembly’s First Committee, starting on 3 October, 2011.

– Kees Keizer

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GA High-level Meetings for September

23 Aug

1. High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases (19–20 September 2011) 

2. High-level Meeting of the General Assembly addressing desertification, land degradation, and drought in the context of sustainable development and poverty reduction (September 20)

3. High-level Meeting to Commemorate 10th anniversary of Durban Declaration and Program of Action (September 22)

4. Conference on the Facilitation of the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT (September 23)

 

 

-Katherine

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