Tag Archives: General Assembly

UNDC 2013: Memory Lane

19 Apr

Among the proposals emerging from this year’s session of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), there were two that particularly caught our eye. The Swiss proposals presented during the opening exchange of views calling for more involvement by experts in the work of the UNDC is one that Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) has discussed in other commentary and fully supports in practice.

The other proposal that we wished to highlight was provided in a working paper by the Egyptian delegation, often among the most thoughtful delegations on disarmament matters. While their proposals specific to both substantive working groups will no doubt help to frame discussions during the third and final year III of the current UNDC cycle, the opening paragraphs of their paper (A/cn.10/2013/WP.1) are perhaps the most actionable in terms of their implications for the ongoing deliberative potential of the UNDC.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Egyptian paper highlight an ongoing problem for both the UNDC and many other parts of the UN system — a lack of institutional memory.  Given the turnover in diplomatic missions and ODA staff, and given the lack of interest in or invitations to NGO experts with a deep interest in supporting the efforts of the UNDC (Reaching Critical Will and GAPW are generally the only NGO monitors in the room — when we are allowed to be there), it is difficult if not impossible to keep track of what the Egyptian working paper calls “unfinished business,” including both proposals not implemented and consensus not reached.   Aside from information and commentary posted on the Reaching Critical Will, there has been little effort to summarize key discussions, insights or proposals.   As RCW recognizes, it is difficult to “nurture” (to quote the Egyptian paper) new ideas when you can’t remember what those ideas are, let alone track their development.

Delegates with a longer term engagement with the UNDC will recognize the degree to which deliberations have followed a well-worn path. Moreover, the nature of involvement with the UNDC has changed over the years, with fewer delegations consisting of experts from Geneva and more and more of the deliberative burdens falling on already overworked diplomats from New York missions. There has been less and less energy around the UNDC in recent years, which to our mind requires some urgent remedial response. GAPW would like to endorse, consistent with the Swiss and Egyptian proposals, that the UNDC promote side events in partnership with NGO experts to more thoroughly investigate substantive and procedural matters that are germane to the mandate of the UNDC but also at times impede its progress.

It may be, as some NAM-affiliated delegations have suggested, that the UNDC will require a more robust overhaul, perhaps within the context of another Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). But until that issue is resolved, the UNDC would do well to establish procedures for reporting and stakeholder engagement that can preserve institutional memory and allow interested observers in and out of government to track both UNDC progress and impediments over time.

There are, as Egypt notes, some fairly simple ideas that can enrich the experience of the UNDC for both participants and observers.  Having more sets of trusted eyes in the room for future UNDC sessions would certainly help ensure that the best of the Commission deliberations can find more suitable, trustworthy venues where they can be studied, assessed and even acted upon.

 

–Dr. Robert Zuber

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Looking to the Future of the ATT and Shifting Attention to Implementation

3 Apr

After more than a decade of advocating for and working towards a robust and comprehensive arms trade treaty (ATT), relevant stakeholders can now mark a conclusion to the first step in this process. This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the human suffering caused by the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—is prevented to the greatest extent possible.

Adoption of the treaty text

Last week, delegates to the “Final Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty” were unable to adopt, by consensus, an ATT due to formal objections by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRPK), Iran, and Syria. But the text was brought to a vote on Tuesday, 2 April through a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution sponsored by more than 100 states. An overwhelming majority of UN member states voted in favor of this resolution, thus adopting the ATT text. The final tally was an overwhelming 154 states in favor, 23 abstentions, and three votes against (DPRK, Iran, and Syria).

The adoption of the ATT at the conclusion of these two weeks, even if it was a few days after the close of the Diplomatic Conference, was surely due in part to the strong leadership and good management of the President of the Conference, Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. Ambassador Woolcott was able to bring forth a text that had enough support to garner easy passage quickly in the UNGA.

However, not all states were satisfied enough with the text to vote in favor of its adoption. After Tuesday’s vote, the so-called “skeptics” reiterated their well-known concerns and opposition to the text, noting substantive omissions and dissatisfaction with the process. The delegations of Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela were among those that took to the floor to offer explanations of vote (EOV).

Several of these delegations continued to regret the absence of a prohibition against the transfer of arms to unauthorized non-state actors, references to the principle of self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation, an independent section dedicated to definitions, and an accountability mechanism for exporting states. These states also expressed dissatisfaction with the overall imbalance of the text in the favor of exporters and, thereby, the possibility for political manipulation. The Russian delegate reiterated his delegation’s specific concern over the language of article 6(3) related to the knowledge-based test for atrocity crimes. Moreover, the delegations of Ecuador and Pakistan warned against attempts to re-define consensus and the Egyptian and Chinese delegations warned against setting a precedent of forcing a UNGA vote in such processes. Many of these delegations also noted that they would reserve the right to re-examine the text and its possible implementation back in their capitals.

On the other hand, many states expressed robust support for future development of the ATT and its strong implementation, support that will be crucial for the ATT’s future effectiveness. A statement from a diverse group of 98 states, delivered by the delegation of Mexico, noted, “At the beginning of this process we set out to make a real difference in people’s lives. This continues to be our commitment, which we will carry out through the implementation of this Treaty.” Indeed, “making a difference” is the sincere hope of this Treaty. Thus, attention must now shift to implementation. These 98 states also reinforced their commitment to making the Treaty stronger through implementation. In addition, the original “co-authors” of the first ATT resolution in the UNGA—Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the UK—also offered a joint statement noting that adoption of the text is just “one landmark” and the responsibility to support implementation remains.

Looking back over the process

The ATT text represents a convergence, albeit a compromised one, of the majority view that the arms industry needs regulation in the form of a legally-binding instrument. Undoubtedly, the text and the process that came before it have represented the emergence of new international norms that the transfer of arms must be denied when there is serious risk of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and when there is a likelihood that such arms would undermine peace and security. Furthermore, the undertaking of the ATT process has also underscored the need for greater transparency and accountability in the arms trade, bringing it out of the shadows and more prominently in the public domain. It is clear that the ATT writ large has been a worthy endeavor, if flawed, in attempting to consolidate the international drive towards these goals. The treaty has the potential to serve as a useful tool to continue to work towards these goals of reducing risk and increasing some levels of transparency.

Nevertheless, despite the good will of many of the stakeholders that have been dedicated to this process over the last decade, undisputed victory cannot be claimed. The text is not the ideal iteration of what an ATT could be or even the version that the group of 116 states called for in a joint statement during the second week of the Final Conference. These states called for a treaty with a comprehensive scope of items and activities, reflective of existing international legal obligations and norms, and one that enhances transparency and prohibits the transfer of arms when there is “substantial” risk of serious violations of international law, including IHL and IHRL or risk of diversion. Unfortunately, the text’s provisions do not live up to these standards nor fulfill the calls from the vast majority of the governments, international organizations, and civil society groups. This is, of course, in part due to the tremendous compromising power of consensus.

Indeed, the text that has been adopted is a product of a consensus process whereby progressive states had to compromise to keep certain states “on board” with the final product. Any process that is subject to this constraint will indubitably be forced much closer to the lowest common denominator than the highest aspirations, even if the majority of states support the latter. The ATT process has been no exception, with the concerns and interests of a few states being reflected despite opposition from most other states (in particular, the retention of “overriding risk” and the exclusion of ammunition/munitions and parts and components from the full scope of the treaty).

The question becomes: is the text that has been adopted going to, in practice, not only set norms and goals, but positively change arms transfer policy so that it will make a difference in the lives of those who suffer armed conflict and armed violence? Ultimately, the jury is still out. As many states and civil society representatives have noted, the adoption of a treaty is not a victory in-and-of-itself, but step one of a longer process. The real work of evaluating its impact will have to begin immediately. Therefore, the work of the Conference of States Parties (CSP), the national implementation of treaty obligations, and the ongoing interpretation and implementation of its provisions will be all the more important.

A final look at the text

Many significant issues remain unchanged and new ambiguities have been introduced, making the treaty much less reflective of the majority opinion of states and more reflective of minority interests. Nevertheless, positive aspects of the treaty deserve underscoring in terms of looking forward to implementation:

  • Ammunitions/munitions, parts, and components are covered by prohibitions and export assessment, and are required to be regulated by national control systems.
  • Prohibitions have been set forth that require denial of authorization of transfers if there is knowledge that such arms would be used for the commission of mass atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes and attacks against civilians.
  • Binding criteria for export assessment include if the transfer would undermine peace and security, facilitate serious violations of IHL or IHRL, acts of terrorism, or acts relating to organized transnational crime. Moreover, the text also includes a binding criterion for preventing gender-based violence (GBV). States shall not be permitted to authorize the transfer where there is an “overriding risk” the weapons will be used to commit or facilitate GBV.
  • A detailed article on diversion lays forth measures that states parties should take in cooperating with one another in order to address diversion risks and enhance the practice of effective anti-diversion measures.
  • States parties involved in transfers must take measures to prevent diversion of items in the scope.
  • The provisions on international cooperation encourages that states parties jointly support others in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures pursuant to the treaty. Likewise, states parties are encouraged to provide assistance in concrete areas related to the arms trade, notably stockpile management, model legislation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR).
  • The CSP has the ability to review implementation of the treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arm as well as to consider issues arising from the interpretation of the treaty. This thus allows, at least in a limited fashion, that the treaty can be adjusted to respond to evolving technological and security advances.
  • Amendments can be adopted, as a “last resort,” by a three-fourths majority should adoption by consensus fail.

Despite the retention of these positive provisions, some loopholes and weaknesses still remain that will continue to pose challenges in the implementation of the ATT. These weaknesses and loopholes will have to be dealt with, to the greatest extent possible, during the follow-up meetings of the CSP.

  • Ammunition/munitions and parts and components are not covered by the obligations under import, brokering, transit or trans-shipment, or reporting.
  • The “floor” of the definitions of the items in the scope is limited to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and “other relevant United Nations instruments” at the time of entry-into-force and, therefore, states can “freeze” definitions established more than two decades prior.
  • Non-commercial activities such as gifts, loans, and leases are not expressly covered under the definition of “transfer.”
  • There is no explicit prohibition against transfers that would violate human rights.
  • Inclusion of the term “overriding risk” ostensibly allows states to proceed with a transfer even if there is substantial risk of violations of IHL or IHRL if there is some other risk (political, economic, or otherwise) is noted to “override” these risks.
  • References to socio-economic development and corrupt practices were dropped from export assessment criteria.
  • When states parties become aware of new information, they are not required to revoke or suspend an authorization, but are merely “encouraged to reassess the authorization” after possible consultations with the importing state.
  • Public reporting is not mandatory and states parties can exclude any information deemed “sensitive” from a national security standpoint from reports to the Secretariat.

Moving Forward

The time for substantive improvements of the text has passed. In moving forward with the ATT process, attention must shift to implementation and interpretation in order to ensure that the robust provisions that have been adopted are implemented in the best and most consistent way, while those that are still weak are not allowed to limit the overall effectiveness of the Treaty. Indeed, this is only the beginning of evaluating the ATT’s effectiveness.

This was an imperfect process that yielded an imperfect treaty. Nevertheless, the task now is to take what has been adopted and ensure that it has the most effective impact possible on the ground so that the negative consequences of the illicit and unregulated arms trade—the original purpose of and impetus for this process—are limited to the greatest extent possible. As noted by the group of 98 states in its joint statement following adoption of the text, “The hard work starts now. We must secure the rapid entry into force of this historic Treaty and implement it as soon as possible.”

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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International Media and the Arms Trade Treaty

22 Mar

The final round of the arms trade treaty negotiations (18-28 March 2013) has been attracting global attention, expressed by numerous press outlets worldwide, mainstream as well as alternative, signaling a growing and strengthening awareness process throughout the world and revealing a justified sense of urgency. An awareness of the illicit arms trade’s mortal consequences has manifested itself as a comprehensive matter of conscience, a situation that is as a result calling for global provisions now. It also shows the willingness to publicly negotiate and back a legal framework that has the strength and capability to regulate a global, $70 billion business. An idea that was initiated by a group of Nobel peace prize laureates in the mid-1990’s seems to have come to fruition.

The level of awareness demonstrates political will that affects the everyday citizen, who might not be part of a politicized environment via an organization or institution, but has the option to vote, donate, and maybe down the line, organize in a political fashion. Just as diverse in national interest and approach as are member states and civil society, so are media outlets that position themselves as voices in the process.

The Financial Times granted a forum to the foreign ministers of Denmark, Germany, Mexico, The Netherlands, UK, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Finland to call for an effective arms trade treaty, defining the negotiations an “historic opportunity” and appealing to the aspect of “common responsibility.” One paragraph explicitly addresses the fact that the treaty has no intention to “obstruct the legitimate trade in arms.” Furthermore it points out that the treaty is meant to “fully recognize every state’s right to legitimate self-defense.” Additionally, “Neither does the treaty set rules for domestic arms regulation nor laws on the possession of arms; this is categorically a matter for national authorities to determine.”

Despite national sovereignty on domestic arms regulation, the US based National Rifle Association (NRA), which promotes the rights of citizens to bear arms, made it a tradition to claim that the UN is trying to end private gun ownership in the US. This strategy is primarily geared towards fundraising from NRA constituents. Not only has fear proven to be a hot seller, the US Constitution’s second amendment is an extremely sensitive and emotionally charged topic.

UK journalist Karen McVeigh focuses on NRA rhetoric in her story “NRA accused of stirring ‘anti-UN panic’ in campaign against Arms Trade Treaty,” from 17 March 2013in The Guardian. “For years, the NRA has painted the UN as a bogeyman figure, claiming in its literature and fundraising drives that there is an international conspiracy to ‘grab your guns’. Last July, when negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty broke down – in part because of US resistance to global regulations on gun sales – the gun lobby group claimed victory for ‘killing the UN ATT’.” Rick Gladstone from the New York Times states in the context of an ATT and the NRA, that in February of this year, the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights published a report describing that the ATT, as currently drafted, “did not exceed the scope of American trade statutes that already regulate the import and export of weapons.” Gladstone points out that the study clearly outlines, “U.S. ratification of the treaty would not infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment.” In the Huffington Post, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane pointed out, “This absurd but often-repeated claim requires a strong rebuttal.”

The German media outlets Deutsche Welle and die tageszeitung focus on the fact that the current ATT text from July last year would undercut not only European, and particularly existing German regulations, as they relate to the arms trade and therefore describe the need of stronger language.

This year’s ATT host country, Australia’s media outlets have been vocally promoting the process back home, at times lending media platforms to civil society. National Director of Amnesty Australia, Claire Mallinson,took the stage with an op-ed piece for The Australian on 18 March. Here she describes the ongoing illegal arms transfers from Russia to the Assad regime in Syria and the failure of the UNSC to impose an arms embargo. Mallinson continues, “This strong evidence and the indiscriminate nature of conflict shows that even with the best of intentions, as it currently stands, Australian organizations and individuals that sell weapons and defense technology have no way of controlling where these devices end up.” Meanwhile Dr. Helen Szoke of Oxfam Australia is urging her government on ABC TV to “help close off any loopholes” in the existing draft.

The African news network AllAfrica named, in the article “Africa: Curbing the Arms Trade?” from 19 March, a few grave obstacles to a “strong treaty without major loopholes.” Firstly there is, “The fact that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are among the largest exporters of conventional arms,” which impacts decision making and ultimately the strength of a treaty framework. Secondly, the concern that, “In the United States, the powerful National Rifle Association is campaigning against the treaty.” It is a legitimate concern, since the author is referring to a non-profit that, according to the Washington Post, was able to spend $32 million in 2012, lobbying their one and only objective.

Obviously, press coverage often reflects or opposes national interests of individual member states, and therefore might individually pursue/back different levels of regulation or at times lack diversified, technical policy details at all. However, the nearly unanimous, international media echo in favor of a treaty does not only once more put the UN on the map as a global hub for political decision making, but reflects a strong, global concern that reaches far beyond a plea for arms business as usual.

 

—Lia Petridis Maiello

 

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GGI Policy Brief: Anticipating the “Final” ATT Conference: Proposals for Moving Forward

25 Feb

From 2 – 27 July 2012 the member states of the United Nations (UN) gathered in New York to participate in the UN Conference on the ATT. These four weeks of negotiations produced a draft treaty text, but no consensus could be reached on a final text for adoption. In this GGI Analysis, Katherine Prizeman and Niels van Willigen provide essential background and concrete recommendation for a last effort to negotiate a consensus treaty during the Final UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, scheduled to take place 18 – 28 March 2013.

To download the GGI Analysis,  please click here.

 

 

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The Way Forward for the Arms Trade Treaty: UNGA First Committee Resolution

4 Dec

One of the most anticipated items on the First Committee agenda this year, the resolution entitled “The arms trade treaty” (A/C.1/67/L.11), was adopted on the whole by a vote of 157-0-18, thereby authorizing a new round of ATT negotiations for March 2013. The resolution, which was tabled by the original “co-authors” group of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom, was co-sponsored by more than 100 delegations. As the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference ended without adoption of a consensus treaty setting common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms, the fate of renewed negotiations has rested on the formulation of a General Assembly resolution detailing a way forward. Although no delegations voted against the resolution and all have expressed some degree of support for continuing the ATT process next year, there remains contention over the status of the President’s draft treaty text from 26 July 2012 as well as the operative rules of procedure. As such, a separate vote was requested on operational paragraph (OP) 2, which describes the rules of procedure for the “final” 18–28 March 2013 Negotiating Conference as “utilizing the modalities, applied mutatis mutandis, under which the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty of 2 to 27 July 2012 operated.” The result was 153-1-18 with the delegation of Iran dissenting. Likewise, a separate vote was also conducted on OP3, which designates the President’s 26 July text as “the basis for future work on the Arms Trade Treaty.” The result of this vote was 148-1-22 with Iran again representing the lone vote against retaining the paragraph.

Many delegations chose to offer explanations of vote (EOV) on the ATT resolution. Expressions of support were widespread as the representatives of Morocco, Norway, and Nigeria called on member states to support the resolution and remain committed to the continuation of negotiations. Nevertheless, discontent over some specifics within the President’s draft text was expressed by the Nigerian delegation, which underscored the need to more adequately address diversion and ambiguities in the Treaty’s scope. In addition, the delegation of Indonesia noted its abstention to OP2 and OP3 as the draft text “does not reflect its views and those of many other member states,” in particular on the matter of territorial integrity. Several delegations expressed their opposition to treating the President’s text as the sole basis for negotiations, including Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Syria. The representative of Egypt called the draft “a work in progress,” while the delegation of Belarus warned that the document would prejudice the results of the work of the upcoming March conference. The representative of Iran also offered an EOV on his delegation’s vote against OP3 noting that the draft text is “vague and full of loopholes” and also provides for far too much subjectivity in application of assessment criteria. In particular, Iran noted that the parameters explicitly allow arms-exporting states on their own volition to export as many arms as they want to any country or region if in their view it can “contribute to peace and security”. Likewise, he complained that the current draft text gives too much preference to the commercial interests of exporting states than the security of importing states and other states in their regions.

With regards to the rules of procedure, as laid forth in OP2, delegations expressed their support for consensus, although some offered more detailed caveats. The Mexican delegation reiterated its well-known concern over allowing consensus to be interpreted as the right of one or a few delegations to impede general agreement. Similarly, the representative of Morocco supported consensus as “an effective tool” so long as it is not abused or misinterpreted as veto power or a demand for unanimity. Other delegations, including Egypt and India, also warned against placing artificial deadlines or timelines on negotiations.

While the ATT resolution has been adopted and a pathway forward has been identified towards a March Conference to finish work on common international standards for the transfer in conventional arms, there remains significant disagreement over the substance of the future treaty text on many issues from scope to criteria to enforcement mechanisms. This calls into question the status of the President’s draft text as the single basis for negotiations, as some states continue to express their unease with many of its contents.

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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The Arms Trade Treaty at the First Committee General Debate: Views on Where to Go Next

16 Oct

One of the most anticipated items on the First Committee agenda this session is the future of the arms trade treaty (ATT) negotiations. As the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference ended without adoption of a consensus treaty, many delegations have come to this session of the First Committee hoping for a mandate to continue negotiations in 2013. 62 delegations, nearly every delegation that took the floor, referenced the ATT during this week’s general debate either expressing support for an additional Diplomatic Conference, underscoring the importance of adopting universal conventional arms trade regulations and lamenting the inconclusiveness of the July Conference, or reiterating the necessity of transparency and non-discrimination in the negotiation of the future ATT. Despite the varying views on how to move the process forward, the process must indeed move forward by capitalizing on the momentum of the summer’s negotiations. Nevertheless, building on the progress made requires improvement and strengthening of the draft treaty text and not merely maintenance of the status quo or, worse, a weakening of the text. As Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand noted, robust support for continuing the ATT process is crucial to the human and humanitarian dimensions of security and, as noted by the delegate of the Republic of Korea, states must engage in “effective deliberation in the First Committee for constructive alternatives.”

The general debate underscored the nuances in state positions regarding how the July negotiations were viewed as well as specific text suggestions that delegations seek to address in future deliberations. Furthermore, the interventions also highlighted states’ positions on how and under what circumstances negotiations should move forward.

Interventions by delegations this week illustrated how states viewed the July Conference and, ultimately, how such views will affect decisions on moving forward. Some delegations noted July as a “failure,” including the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Percaya of Indonesia, who called the “recent failure” of the ATT disappointing and the representative of Cameroon who noted that “the failure of the ATT makes things harder” in the context of international security concerns. The Ambassador of Costa Rica called the lack of consensus “a blow to peace and human rights.” Other delegations chose to focus more explicitly on the progress made in July and appealed to delegations to “continue to push ahead,” as suggested by the representative of Malaysia. Ambassador Adamson of the UK asserted, “I want to make absolutely clear that the Conference did not end in failure. To say it did ignores the huge progress that has been made towards our ultimate aim…” The general and widespread consensus, nonetheless, was a sense of deep disappointment over the inability to reach consensus over the summer, although somewhat tempered by hope for future negotiations.

Despite varying views on whether or not July was ultimately a “failure,” the vast majority of states expressed support for continuing the process through continued deliberations to adopt a treaty in “the near future.” Some chose to underscore specific items that remain contentious, including issues of scope, criteria and parameters, as well as inclusion of specific principles. For example, the representatives of CARICOM, Colombia, and Peru all called for inclusion of munitions in the scope of a future treaty. The representative of Colombia also appealed to states for a comprehensive list of activities to be covered, including brokering, financing, export, and import. The representative of South Africa warned against becoming “side-tracked” by extraneous issues such as production and possession. Discussion also arose related to the principles and criteria to be included in the ATT. The representatives of the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement underscored that there must be “no undue restriction in the way of the sovereign right of states for self-defence,” while the ASEAN states highlighted that any ATT must ensure the rights of self-defense and territorial integrity. The Arab Group representative laid forth specific guidelines related to parameters of a future ATT noting, “Any criteria developed by the treaty to regulate arms exports must also be based on clear legal instruments…” Therefore, it is clear that such reiteration of state positions illustrates that many issues remained unresolved from July and will require further debate before adoption of a treaty.

In terms of the pathway forward, such a decision is expected to be taken in the coming weeks. The “co-authors” group of the original 2007 General Assembly Resolution on the ATT, composed of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya, Japan, and the UK, announced their intention to submit a resolution at this session of the First Committee seeking a mandate for an additional Negotiating Conference in early 2013. Ambassador Adamson noted that the Resolution sets the timing for “a short, final, consensus-based conference to finalize the work of the treaty” stating that as some states asked for “more time” to consider the President’s draft text, that time should be given. The EU, France, Guatemala, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and the US all supported a final conference in 2013 with negotiations based on the President’s draft text. However, other delegations chose to refer more loosely to the future ATT process. The representative of India said no treaty “should be rushed through” by an imposed timeline and the representative of Cuba noted that his delegations would “pursue discussions” on the ATT in a transparent manner.

While the issue of continuing discussion of the ATT was generally uncontested, the rules of procedure remain debatable. The representatives of Mexico and Norway rightly underscored the deadlock caused by the consensus rule in July. As the Ambassador of Norway noted, “We have seen the consensus format watering down or paralyzing important disarmament processes time and again.” Likewise, the Mexican delegation urged that delegations do not allow a small number of states to impede the entire process because of their own “political or economic considerations.” Holding hostage an entire process due to the demands of a few states is simply unacceptable and interpreting consensus as de facto veto power will seriously undermine, if not prevent, adoption of a robust ATT that seeks to have a concrete humanitarian impact. As the First Committee continues to debate the future of the ATT process, the requirement of consensus must continue to be debated such that a new conference does not yield the same unsatisfying and disappointing result that came in July.

For more information on the First Committee, see Reaching Critical Will.

–Katherine Prizeman

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UNPoA on Small Arms Review Conference Ends with Consensus Document

10 Sep

After the President of the Review Conference (RevCon), Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria, provided a third revision of the draft outcome document on Friday afternoon, delegations were able to adopt, by consensus, the compilation document. This document is composed of a Declaration, two implementation plans for the Programme of Action (UNPoA) and International Tracing Instrument (ITI), respectively, and a follow-up mechanism detailing a future schedule of meetings to guide the small arms process. As expressed by the President in her closing remarks to the Conference, the successful completion of the RevCon with a consensus outcome is a welcome achievement in helping to create positive momentum in the multilateral disarmament fora. As the representative of Algeria noted, this RevCon “achieved success where the ATT [arms trade treaty] couldn’t.” Likewise, the fact that member states were able to constructively engage and adopt a consensus document indeed represents a positive reaffirmation of the importance of the UNPoA framework to international peace and security and, more specifically, combating the scourge of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Undoubtedly, the UNPoA remains the only global framework of practical measures for combating illicit trade in SALWs and its dire humanitarian consequences.

Many delegations took the opportunity to praise the work of the Conference on Friday afternoon, including the representative of Mexico who noted how this success represented a significant step forward since the first RevCon in 2006, and the German delegate who welcomed this “landmark” document. Similarly, the delegation of Switzerland affirmed the document as an impetus for success in the area of disarmament that is “crucial to the work of international peace and security.” While it is true that this RevCon can be hailed as a general success, due in large part to the great skill and dedication of the President as well as the four facilitators, the RevCon on the whole did not thoroughly take stock of progress achieved nor did it provide for an in-depth assessment of implementation to date in order to draw lessons for the future. As has been previously expressed in this Monitor, a reiteration of previous UNPoA or ITI commitments is not sufficient. The various components of the review cycle, including this RevCon, should be integrally linked so that they can incrementally build upon the specific findings and discussions of the preceding debate in the context of the current security circumstances. As noted by the delegate of the UK in his concluding remarks, although the RevCon achieved a significant success in the consensus document, “ambition” in the document was left wanting.

The third revision, and subsequently adopted text, was identical to the previous version with the exception of a paragraph in Annex 1 (under the UNPoA implementation plan) referring to the risk of diversion in the context of export authorizations which was deleted. Following the adoption of the document, many delegations expressed regret over the lack of inclusion of certain elements as well as weak language on others. In particular, many delegations noted with regret the exclusion of language on a gender perspective in UNPoA implementation (EU, Germany, Mexico,) as well as on munitions (Colombia, ECOWAS, Guatemala, Switzerland), parts and components (EU, Ghana, Guatemala, UK),  and a lack of strong language on diversion (CARICOM, Trinidad and Tobago, UK). Also missing from the document were strong references to monitoring and assessment and evidence-based research on implementation as the text refers only to measurability in the context of international cooperation and assistance. Moreover, there were no references to monitoring and assessment of casualties of armed violence through which states could better understand the effects of illicit use of SALWs. Rather, such language was weakened to “…enhancing their ability to monitor and analyze the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of illicit small arms and light weapons and their misuse,” not an altogether terrible substitution, but weaker nonetheless.

While the document was hailed as “fair and balanced” and the best possible representation of consensus, states must use the next 6-year review cycle to achieve more in the way of practical implementation.  Moving forward, the ongoing discussion of how to ensure full and effective implementation of the UNPoA will persist as many delegations called for a return to the many issues previously mentioned that were not addressed in this RevCon. More alarming, however, will be the ongoing debate and inability to convince some delegations of the difference between “reviewing” the UNPoA in order to strengthen its implementation by applying a fresh context in light of changing dynamics and circumstances and “re-writing” the UNPoA.  If left unresolved, it is expected that this division will continue to challenge the process and undoubtedly limit the effectiveness of the subsequent meetings of the review cycle. Adoption of the latter approach, limiting and constraining the process to only that which is explicitly found in the 2001 document, is precisely what future review meetings must seek to avoid.

Prior to adopting the outcome document by consensus, the delegate of Iran stated that although his delegation would not “stand in the way of success,” the document was unsatisfactory as it “lacked clarity and accuracy and at times went beyond the scope of the PoA.” The representative of Syria echoed this sentiment when he shared “reservations” about certain proposals adopted in the document that “were not in the PoA.” Likewise, the delegation of Cuba called references to resolutions related to women as well as the term armed violence “selective and outside the specific framework of the PoA.” This central debate—how to balance reiteration and re-commitment to the “old” language of UNPoA with infusion of “new” forward-looking language that addresses challenges related to national implementation that introduces concepts and recommendations not explicitly found in the original 2001 document—is absolutely crucial to future success. Finding this balance is imperative if the UNPoA can continue and even strengthen its relevance to ending the scourge of illicit trade in SALWs.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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The ATT: Moving on and moving forward

30 Jul

As the mandate for the arms trade treaty (ATT) Diplomatic Conference expired on Friday afternoon, delegates and civil society alike were disappointed at the failure to adopt a treaty after four weeks of negotiations and, perhaps more importantly, the inability to address the lack of internationally-adopted common standards for the unregulated trade in conventional arms. The President’s draft treaty text was adopted as an annex to the Report of the Conference, although there was no clear indication of how that text would be treated in the future either in the General Assembly (GA) First Committee in October or elsewhere. While many delegations expressed regret over the lack of a consensus document, there was general agreement that the process is not over. In a statement to the plenary delivered by Mexico, a group of 90 countries expressed the desire to bring the current text to the GA First Committee to “finalize our work” to achieve “a strong and robust Treaty.” The Nigerian delegation explicitly called for a new mandate from the GA to complete the work of the ATT on the basis of the President’s most recent draft text with further consultations. The delegations of Germany, CARICOM, and Spain called for an ATT to be adopted “in the near future,” while others, including Peru, said there was “near unanimity.”

While this large majority of delegations is correct and commendable in their desire to continue to identify a way forward to achieve the still elusive goal of an ATT, it is difficult to imagine how, even with more consultations, the present text would become more robust or that member states would be able to reach “unanimity” on the major issues still left unresolved. After four weeks of hard work and difficult, political wrangling, there is much to be disappointed over.

The President’s most recent draft text still has significant loopholes and is far from the robust ATT that was aspired to by many delegates and civil society advocates—ammunition and munitions are lacking in the core items listed in the scope; the implementation measures provide for a superseding of the criteria by the vague references to “other instruments” and “contractual obligations under defence cooperation agreements;” records of authorizations do not need to be made public; and amendments can only be adopted through consensus leaving very little flexibility for substantive future changes in the Treaty. The language pertaining to criteria is particularly weak given the structure of the ATT as it will be driven primarily by national implementation responsibilities (and thus biases related to national interest). Diversion remains a “secondary” consideration in paragraph 6.4 (national assessment) requiring that states only “consider taking feasible measures” to avoid it. These are not insignificant weaknesses, but rather, compromise the Treaty and its ability to combat and eradicate the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms in a consistent, universal, and legally-binding manner.

Although the particulars of the text could certainly continue to be debated, the question now becomes how to proceed with the process writ large. Although the overwhelming majority of member states have made apparent their intention to continue the ATT process, the specific path forward (and on what basis) does not enjoy the same clarity. The most obvious option would be to bring the draft treaty to the First Committee in October and request another mandate to continue work through a new Diplomatic Conference. This is a position that, although not detailed explicitly on Friday afternoon, would seem to garner significant support among delegations given the commentary in the room. The French delegation noted that states “should not start from zero,” which would indicate support for using the draft text as the base forward.  Likewise the Chinese, Moroccan, and UK delegations called the President’s text “a good basis for future negotiations.”

As member states prepare to bring the ATT to the GA this fall, and they must at the very least report back to the body on the progress made, it is important to remember that the rule of consensus, and ultimately the de facto veto power of each member state, will not necessarily apply to future negotiations. As such, the majority of member states that have called for an ATT with stronger provisions than the ones found in the President’s text (presumably more than the 2/3 majority required for adoption of resolutions in the GA), should propose a text that encompasses more of the provisions that these member states have fought for throughout the negotiations, most notably inclusion of ammunition and munitions in the scope and clear, legally-binding criteria for national risk assessment. The group of 90 states on Friday noted, “Compromises have had to be made, but overall the text you [the President] put forward yesterday has the overwhelming support of the international community as a base for carrying forward our work.” Ultimately, if the rules of procedure change, then so should the Treaty such that these compromises be re-evaluated if they only apply to a few select states and a new, stronger text should be presented.

The goal of a universal, legally-binding treaty for the trade in conventional arms was and remains a noble one. A global ATT would certainly serve as a complement to already-existing, but mostly non-binding, agreements such as the UN Programme of Action on small arms, as well as future instruments seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the UN’s multilateral security framework.  As the next “phase” of this process begins, delegates and civil society should seize the opportunity to adopt a Treaty that can make a robust contribution such a framework.

More analysis and reporting from the month-long negotiations can be found here on Reaching Critical Will with the previous editions of the daily ATT Monitor.

–Katherine Prizeman

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The Arms Trade Treaty: Anticipating ‘Redlines’

20 Jun

As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations are set to begin in just over a week, member states and civil society alike are examining and speculating on possible configurations of a consensus treaty text. These configurations inevitably beg the question—is a weak ATT better than no treaty at all? Would a weak treaty do more harm than the harm caused by opting out of the process altogether? Where are the ‘redlines’ that would warrant any state to consider abandoning negotiations in July? Are there alternatives for negotiating an ATT within the UN system, or perhaps outside of it?

In a new policy brief, I highlight contentious issue areas and apparent ‘redlines’ that exist among the prominent and most outspoken stakeholders with regards to each issue– SALWs, ammunition, human rights, victims’ assistance, brokering, among others. While states will obviously make decisions on ‘staying or leaving’ based on their own national interests, I also offer  recommendations focused on whether or not these issues should, in fact, be a negotiating ‘redline’ as well as on how best to treat such issues during the negotiations.

The full policy brief is available here.

—Katherine Prizeman

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The Arms Trade Treaty: No Treaty, Weak Treaty, ‘Plan B’?

25 May

As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) preparations are drawing to a close and diplomats and civil society alike anxiously await the July Diplomatic Conference, much of the attention has turned to the possible configurations of a (hopefully) forthcoming consensus treaty. Some would argue that it is best to focus on making the negotiations a success rather than prematurely anticipating their failure. As such, the levels of pessimism and optimism vary according to whom one is talking, whether a member state delegation or civil society advocate.

One could continue to debate the ‘nuts and bolts’ of treaty language from scope and final provisions to the strength of the humanitarian references included. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is absolutely necessary at this point to, at the very least, objectively evaluate and consider the possible scenarios of the 4-week Diplomatic Conference and the corresponding consequences of each circumstance irrespective of one’s position on the desired outcome. Such an evaluation would be useful insofar as it would essentially reveal the net effect of each outcome, whether positive or negative, on what I see as the most desirable outcome of the ATT process—a robust instrument of international standards to regulate the global business of the transfer of arms that is fully implementable to include a comprehensive scope, primary attention on diversion, provisions and structure to facilitate international cooperation and assistance that will ultimately stop transfers of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty, and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Questions on the minds of many who have dedicated themselves to this process for over a decade are clear— is a weak treaty better than no treaty at all? Would a weak treaty do more harm than the harm caused by opting out of the process altogether? Where are the ‘redlines’ that would warrant such an abandonment come July? Are there alternatives for negotiating an ATT within the UN system, or perhaps outside it? In order to address these inquiries it is important to contextualize the ATT debate. To my mind, the ATT process will encompass much more than the month of July. It is essential to assume a long-term perspective, in particular a process through which states commit to a review process that establishes regular meetings of states parties to assess and adjust the ATT to better reflect evolving security circumstances. Moreover, as with all multilateral negotiations, the ATT has not and will not be formulated in a vacuum. In 2012, member states are faced with parallel disarmament and arms control challenges—high stakes for a Conference on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, a continued stalemate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament now stretching over 15 years, and a 13th straight year without consensus recommendations in the Disarmament Commission. Furthermore, a failed negotiation on an ATT would, in turn, also cast a long shadow over the Review Conference of the UNPoA, which is scheduled to take place in August after the ATT negotiations have concluded.

What, then, are the possible scenarios for the ATT Conference? It seems that two of the principle scenarios—adoption of a weak treaty or adoption of no treaty at all—will have significant negative consequences. The only outcome that would not have negative effects would be adoption, by consensus, of an ideal treaty characterized by high levels of state accountability (especially on weapons diversion), oversight capacity for an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), and strong, binding humanitarian language. However, as this process is subject to a consensus rule, a provision that was introduced by the US as a precondition for taking part in the negotiations, this scenario is highly unlikely. Some member states, including the US, have already made clear that a high level of oversight, or any oversight, will not be acceptable and that it is entirely a national prerogative to determine how to manage national export controls in response to any international standards adopted in the ATT. Other member states have continuously asserted that the ATT is a trade treaty seeking merely to regulate the legal business of arms transfers and will not seek to limit the right of member states to sell or purchase arms by overburdening them with treaty-specific reporting obligations.

Therefore, I highlight two principle scenarios and what effect each would have on the long-term process. There are strong arguments that an ATT deemed ‘weak’ is better than no treaty at all. Some would argue that a strong review process with the possibility for improving on the first iteration of the ATT would be a generally positive outcome. Similar to the evolutionary process of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the argument would be that the ATT will most likely require sequential refinement under the auspices of a regular cycle of review conferences in order to achieve even close to its full potential, but that such refinements are possible and preferable to abandoning to the process altogether.

It could also likewise be argued that prospects for success of an ATT next July, as opposed to this July, is not any higher (especially given the consensus provision); thus any postponement would be futile, especially given the weight of the consensus provision. In light of other related UN processes such as the UNPoA, a completely failed ATT Conference would be severely detrimental to the other, in many cases already broken, parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery dealing a major legitimacy blow to the system. Even if the ATT is not universally considered a disarmament treaty per se it is certainly being treated as such by civil society and some member states. A failed process would indubitably be a serious blow to a system desperately in need of tangible victories.

In contrast, there are those that argue, and rightfully so, that a weak treaty would have far greater negative effects in the aggregate. A weak treaty— a simple list of principles which member states should bear mind in when transferring weapons without any accountability or implementation mechanism—could be used as cover for future transfers of questionable character. Signatories could argue that they are acting in accordance with their international law obligations as parties to the ATT, have evaluated a given transfer according to this list of principles (‘bearing them in mind’), and have nonetheless decided to continue the dubious transfer. Moreover, a weak ATT could potentially be used as the basis for states seeking to curtail UN efforts to advocate for better controls of illicit small arms or for stronger application of international humanitarian and human rights law related to the production or use of armaments. Either of these outcomes would fuel considerable skepticism regarding the viability of the UN in regulating the global arms trade, not to mention anger at the UN for creating ‘cover’ for bad behavior rather than eliminating said behavior.

Universality of the ATT process will have a direct effect on its strength—the more member states that subscribe to it, the weaker it will inevitably become. This debate begs the question, then, when is it better to walk away from the process than to proceed with a weak treaty? What are the points that are ‘non-negotiable’? For each member state, the answer to this question will vary. The CARICOM states have placed tremendous emphasis on the inclusion of SALWs in the scope, while the UK has recently underscored the arms trade as the ‘greatest threat to development, beyond disease and disaster’. Brazil, on the other hand, has continuously asserted its marked opposition to references to corruption, development, and stability in the criteria. Needless to say, the ‘redlines’ are not uniform and vary according to national interests, but it is absolutely essential that delegations know what those lines are before formal negotiations begin in July. Delegations must evaluate when the best course of action would be to ‘walk away’ from the process and seek alternatives elsewhere.

If delegations choose to ‘walk away’ from the process in July, alternative forums for negotiating an ATT are available, but also with their own set of limitations. There is the option to take the issue to the General Assembly in the fall and seek a new resolution and form of recourse to get negotiations back on track. Some like-minded states have discussed, unofficially, the possibility of opting out of the universal process in order to pursue a more comprehensive ATT, but one that will inevitably have fewer signatories. Foregoing a universal forum for ATT negotiation could call into question the future relevance of universal negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms control, which is already in serious jeopardy given the CD paralysis. Furthermore, such an approach would meet the same difficulties as have been encountered with regards to international efforts to ban cluster munitions and landmines. While such courses of action of like-minded states contribute to norm-setting, they likely fail to provide a universal framework for addressing the issue at hand. The value added of an ATT that is not universal, most especially one that does not legally bind the primary arms manufacturers and exporters, is not altogether lost, but certainly substantially diminished. The states subject to such treaties negotiated outside the universal process are usually those already committed to the regulations.

What, then, is the best scenario? The best scenario is, as previously mentioned, a robust and comprehensive instrument with full implementation capacity. However, this is not the only question that should be asked. The focus now should not be just on what is the best scenario, but also on the best path towards the ideal scenario, even after July negotiations conclude, by objectively evaluating the consequences of each of the most likely negotiating outcomes.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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