Tag Archives: General Assembly

US gun policies – leading the world by example?

19 Dec

Editor’s Note:  This is the final blog for Marianne Rijke as our Disarmament Fellow.    Soon she will move to Vienna to work for the CTBTO and hopefully will stay fully connected to our office as well.  Here, Marianne addresses an issue that has caused pain and controversy in the US — gun violence and what to do about it.  Her piece is thoughtful and relevant, and GAPW will continue our struggle to find the most effective and viable policy options in her absence. 

December 14 may have seemed like an ordinary day to you and me, but for the people of Newtown (Connecticut) this day symbolizes a pitch black day in their towns history. It was on this day, one year ago in 2012, that Adam Peter Lanza shot and killed 26 people – of whom 20 children – at the Sandy Hook Elementary School.

Immediately after the shooting, there was talk again about how to prevent this kind of tragedy in the future, especially since it was hardly the first time this has happened in the US. From the beginning there was a great division in views. On the one hand, there were the people like President Obama, who said that getting a gun should be made a lot more difficult. And on the other hand, there were the people like the members of National Rifle Association (NRA), who proposed guns for everyone as protection. They argued that taking away the possibility to own guns would actually put the lives of children at risk because “the only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is with a good guy with a gun.”

In the year that has passed, several attempts have been made to make gun laws stricter in the US. President Obama suggested fingerprinting for gun permits as well ass background checks. These suggestions were shot down in Senate and stricter gun laws did not get the desired support in Congress. President Obama took the one year anniversary of the Newtown massacre as an opportunity to once again emphasize the need to do more to prevent dangerous people from getting a gun, and then added the need to heal troubled minds. In the year since Sandy Hook not much has been done. No federal gun laws have been changed and in several states gun laws have actually been loosened. And lawmakers in Kansas and Alaska have enacted laws nullifying federal gun regulations for guns manufactured and kept within state borders. In Colorado, where there was a shooting at a school exactly one year after the Newtown killings, a more strict gun law was recently reversed. This makes it even more clear that the present gun law system does not work, despite claims to the contrary.

The (mis)use of guns and other small arms is an often debated issue, not only in the US, but worldwide. During the United Nations First Committee debates, the need to combat the illicit transfer and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) was stressed. Several delegations stated that “SALW are the real weapons of mass destruction of our time” and that action is needed to regulate their movements and eliminate illicit supplies. Agreements were made and resolutions were signed which will (hopefully) help in the struggle against the illicit transfer and use of guns in the future worldwide. But they will not be sufficient to prevent another ‘Newtown killing’.

What makes the gun violence in the US different than the (mis)use of guns in the rest of the world is the legality of owning the guns used. Whereas private gun ownership is largely regulated and even prohibited in the rest of the world, in the US everyone has a right to own a gun. This ‘right of the people to keep and bear arms’ came into effect with the signing of the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the US on December 15, 1791. The American War of Independence had just ended (1783) and people were fearful of violence and wary of government. In this time, life in the US revolved around protecting yourself, your family and your land. Rule of law as we know it now, whereby the state is obligated to protect its citizens, did not exist as a principle guiding state conduct. Giving citizens the right to bear a gun to protect themselves made sense, at that time.

But over two centuries have passed and the US has grown into a world leader and is seen as one of the most prosperous and civilized countries in the world. The US takes the lead in several international security issues and positions itself as the protector of the free and safe world. It is difficult for me to understand that this ‘protector’ has a hard time enacting laws that keep ‘crazy’ or angry people from purchasing a gun. In our allegedly ‘free and safe world’, people are still dying every day (and needlessly) because of gun violence.

Since December 14 2012, over 32,000 people have been killed by gun violence in the US alone. Change is needed — getting hold of a gun should be made a lot more difficult, if not forbidden. To make the world a safer place for coming generations, the US should take up its leadership role and start leading the world by example. It was Mahatma Gandhi who said it so wisely: “Be the change that you wish to see in the world.”

Marianne Rijke – Disarmament Fellow GAPW

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Rescuing the Functional Legitimacy of the C34

4 Nov

At no given time would the malfunctioning of the UN’s ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ (or its shortened name – the C34) be a welcome development for the world of international peacekeeping. However the signs from this year’s Fourth Committee’s discussion on the substantive question of peacekeeping operations indicate that it couldn’t have happened at a more inopportune time.

In the interests of providing some ‘geography’ to this post, the ‘Fourth Committee’ is one of six committees that work under the umbrella of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Peacekeeping, however, is one of many subjects the Committee discusses (its full name is the ‘Special Political and Decolonization Committee’). The ‘C34’ works under the Fourth Committee, and is the UN’s intergovernmental body mandated specifically to discuss areas of peacekeeping practice, and make policy recommendations to the UN secretariat. Created in 1965 (under General Assembly Resolution 2006) the committee works to produce a report which aims to distil the various views of the 147 member states involved in one way or another in Peacekeeping operations (Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs), funders, equipment providers, policymakers) into recommendations which are then taken to the UN’s General Assembly[1].

Trouble has been brewing in the C34. In the 2012 session, the report was subject to a prolonged six-month negotiation process before publication[2].  In 2013 things got worse, and negotiations broke down, resulting in no agreement on what should be included in the substantive report. Therefore, no 2013 report went to the General Assembly, and the 2012 report was merely reissued[3]. Therefore, there has for the past year been no formal reflection on peacekeeping policy and practice from the C34.

This failure has been reflected in member states’ statements to the Fourth Committee. The failure to produce anything was met with ‘regret’, ‘profound regret’, and ‘profound disappointment’, as well as hope that the committee could work better in the forthcoming year.

There are, however, very important and interlinked reasons why this committee is fundamental at the present time. These thematic areas have been picked up through member states’ statements.

Firstly, Peacekeeping operations are working in complex operating environments. Existing operations have seen an unlikely resurgence in conflict in their areas of deployment. For example, peacekeepers from the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) (set up in 1974 to manage interstate conflict between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights) have had to deal with a significant deterioration in safety due to the conflict in Syria, including the kidnapping of Filipino peacekeepers earlier this year. Recent deployments are entering environments with more diverse threats to security. The operation in Mali, MINUSMA, was recently attacked by a suicide bomber, resulting in the death of two Chadian Peacekeepers and a number of civilians. The dangerous operating environment in Mali was outlined by Under Secretary-General Herve Lasdous’ speech to the 4th Committee, where he noted that ‘careful reflection’ was needed on how peacekeeping can ‘adapt to effectively fulfill its multidimensional mandates’[4]. The examples used by the USG to underline this point – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere – were notable not so much for their peacekeeping presence (Somalia being one possible exception), but for their counter-insurgency focus. Such challenges to peacekeeping, and the implication on mandates provide the first reason why oversight, reflection and policy recommendation is critical at present.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that although such challenges are very much due the ‘changing nature of conflict’, they could in part be attributed to the UN Security Council’s willingness to mandate operations to deploy into environments where there is little peace to keep. This brings up the second challenge – that of the relationship between the Security Council and peacekeeping practice.

The Security Council, as the body charged with maintaining international peace and security, mandates peacekeeping operations as a response to crises. The Council is guided by principles in setting up operations[5], but arguably there exists room to manoeuvre within them. Moreover, there are only 15 member states on the Security Council, and the extent to which these states are involved in peacekeeping varies. This leads to the issue of the processes involved mandating and deploying peacekeeping operations, and the extent to which 15 member states can effectively make decisions on behalf of a much broader peacekeeping constituency.

A number of statements in the 4th Committee questioned the extent to which such decisions are made with the full participation of the TCCs and PCCs, and advocated more consultation in this area. Moreover, the recent deployment of the ‘Force intervention Brigade’ (a force designed for ‘neutralize and disarm’ armed rebel elements in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) was referred to by diplomats as it ‘blurred the lines’ between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement. For instance, the Argentina delegation noted that discussion on the brigade by the broadest range of actors was a necessity. The Security Council has recently produced guidelines on consultation with TCCs and PCCs, and mechanisms are sought to increase effectiveness in the build up to mandate formulation for new missions. However, the lack of a functioning body (such as the C34) to track these efforts, and make systematic policy recommendations may mean that these efforts will be ad hoc.

This ad hoc nature is a concern to a number of member states, who note the Security Council’s willingness to expand its policy making with regard to peacekeeping operations. This unease is probably best summed up by the Indian delegation’s statement:

Peacekeeping’s agenda today is generated mostly outside the General Assembly. Major Peacekeeping initiatives get on-boarded outside the C34. This encourages a reliance on factors outside the confines of the General Assembly. Moreover, this allows ourselves to be judged by those who do not even take part in peacekeeping. Over a period of time this has distorted peacekeeping’s policy universe[6]

A wide constituency of peacekeeping contributors share this unease. The Non Aligned Movement (representing 120 member states, including many of the top TCCs and PCCs) called on the secretariat to ‘refrain from working on streams of policy that have not been agreed in an intergovernmental process’[7]. The role of the Security Council in extending its powers into areas previously ‘off limits’ to the body has been critically analysed by observers in the system. Phillip Cunliffe’s 2009 observations in ‘International Peacekeeping’ are just as pertinent now:

[T]he Council’s expanded consultation procedures since the end of the cold war reflect the extension of Council authority, which now draws on a broad variety of ‘constituents’… In other words, this signals not the uplifting of poor contributing states as much as their being locked into a new means by which the Council has consolidated its control over UN procedure and institutional politics.[8]

This links to the third and final reason why a functioning of the C34 is critical: it provides an important valve in the relationship between the Security Council and the TCCs and PCCs. Peacekeeping relationships are not only driven by doctrinal and mandate functions, but also by the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the process of deploying and undertaking peacekeeping operations. Member states raised strong concerns with issues of troop reimbursement, issues of contingent-owned equipment, safety and security of peacekeepers in the field, and the extent to which expectations are placed on TCCs/PCCs without appropriate consultation. The UN Secretariat is formulating working groups on both issues, but again, a lack of a fully functioning formal body to constructively debate and distill these issues, and move towards a consensus-based approach may mean that the anxiety expressed in statements may not go anywhere positive within the UN system.

On the bright side(!) it does appear from member states that there will be renewed efforts to kick-start the C34, including agreement on the working methods of the ‘Group of Friends of the Chair (Ambassador Joy Ugwu of Nigeria). The C34 may not be perfect, but its function is important. It provides a space where member states with stakes in the peacekeeping enterprise can formulate policy, thus ensuring a broad constituency has effective buy-in to policy-making procedures. Critically, this mitigates against an unhealthy balance towards the Security Council.

With this in mind, it was reassuring to hear member states encouraging the use of conflict resolution techniques in order to move the process onwards. In this, the words of the Swiss delegation are notable. They argued that effective partnership ‘can only exist if every group and delegation is able to understand the needs of others, to negotiate in good faith, and especially to compromise’[9]. One can hope these sentiments are acted upon

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] UN, General Assembly and Peacekeeping, (found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm)

[2] UN Department of Public Information, Growing Demand, Emerging Conflicts Dominate Debate as Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Opens 2013 Session: Members Hear From Heads Of Peacekeeping, Field Support As Chair Urges ‘Spirit Of Give And Take’ To Avoid Repeating 2012 Impasse (GA/PK/2012), 19 February 2013, (found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gapk212.doc.htm)

[3]  UN Department of Public Information, Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations Adopts Procedural Report, Concluding 2013 Substantive Session (GA/PK/2016), 6 September 2013 (found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gapk216.doc.htm)

 

[4] UN, Statement by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous to the Fourth Committee, 28th October 2013 (Found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/131028-USG-Ladsous-Statement-4C-AS-DELIVERED.pdf)

[5] UN, Role of the Security Council in Peacekeeping, (found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolesc.shtml)

[6] Statement by Mr. Mohammed Adeep, Honorable member of Parliament and Member of the Indian Delegation, on Agenda Item 53: Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 30th October 2013, (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703760/item-53-india.pdf)

[7] Statement by The Delegation of Arab republic of Egypt On behalf of

The Non-Aligned Movement before The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) Item 53: Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 28th October 2013 (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703927/egypt-28-oct.pdf)

[8] Cunliffe, Phillip, The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, 16:3, 326

[9] Étude d’ensemble de toute la question des opérations de maintien de la paix sous tous leurs aspects Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 29th October 2013, (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703626/statement-by-swizerland-fr-item-53.pdf)

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The Sixth Committee Talks Terrorism

10 Oct

The Sixth Committee (hereinafter 6C) of the General Assembly opened this week with measures to eliminate international terrorism as the first agenda item. The general discussion focused on a wide-range of issues, including support for the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and convening a high-level conference under UN auspices. Member states noted the significance of international law, especially international humanitarian law (IHL), international refugee law (IRL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in combating terrorism. In this regard, member states emphasized that terrorism is not affiliated with any particular race, ethnic group or religion, and a distinction should be made between terrorism and the legitimate struggle for people’s self-determination.

In addition, the importance of strong rule of law mechanisms was recognized as well as more attention on the financing of terrorism and ransom payments. References were also made to arms proliferation including support for the Arms Trade Treaty.  Moreover, welcomed attention was given not only to relevant General Assembly Resolutions, but to the Security Council and the sanctions committees, especially regarding the listing/de-listing process. Finally, Liechtenstein noted in its statement the complementarity between the work of the Security Council, General Assembly, the Secretariat and the contributions of the 6C therein. Given the forthcoming counterterrorism discussion in the GA plenary, Liechtenstein suggested that the 6C consider the terrorism agenda item on a biannual basis so as not to overlap with the GA’s agenda.

Procedurally, one of the main items considered in this agenda was the adoption of a working group, which ultimately failed to be adopted.

The General Assembly had recommended the creation of a working group in 2013 to both facilitate the drafting of a convention and carry on discussions about the high level conference.[i] The working group was also recommended by the ad hoc committee in its report to the 6C.[ii] The ad hoc committee was created in 1996 to “elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings” and nuclear terrorism; this would build on existing instruments and develop “a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism.”[iii] In 2000, the Committee’s mandate on the convention was extended and the conference was added as an agenda item “to formulate a joint organized response of the international community to terrorism.”[iv] In 2012, A/RES/67/99 extended the Committee’s mandate with a report due to the 68th session.[v]

The report provides draft text for the preamble and articles 1, 2, and 4-27, which address jurisdiction issues, conflict of laws, extradition, adopting relevant domestic legislation, etc.  Speaking as Vice Chair of the ad hoc committee, Guatemala noted that while the committee provided an opportunity to engage in discussions, they were not able to reach a conclusion. More political will is necessary to address the challenges. In its statement, South Africa raised concerns about continuing to hold meetings especially in instances when consensus has not been reached; nevertheless South Africa hopes that consensus will be facilitated before next year.

From the report, it appears that one of the outstanding issues surrounds the scope of the convention, including the definition of terrorism, the actions of the state military, and actions of “armed forces” vs. that of “parties,” etc.[vi] Regarding the conference, the objective is to increase political support for negotiation of the convention.[vii] While there doesn’t seem to be much opposition to the conference per se, there appears to be a preference among delegations to hold it after negotiations are completed.[viii]

Overall, most welcomed are the references to human rights especially since the right to self-determination is provided for in appropriate human rights instruments including the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively. References to the ATT are of course welcomed, but it is important to also give attention to complementary instruments like the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, which provides for commitments to eradicate, prevent and combat the illicit flow of small arms. Procedurally, it remains to be seen how this agenda item will develop and to what extent there will be more coordination and collaboration with the GA plenary.

–          Melina Lito, Legal Adviser on UN Affairs

ENDNOTES

[i] A/RES/67/99, OP.24.

[ii] A/68/37, para. 12.

[iii] A/RES/51/210, OP.9.

[iv] A/RES/54/110, OP. 12.

[v] A/RES/67/99, OP. 25 and 29.

[vi] A/68/37, para. 23-29.

[vii] A/68/37, para. 37.

[viii] A/68/37, para. 39.

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The State of Nuclear Disarmament in 2013: The First High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament and Links to Civil Society

3 Oct

Editor’s Note:  This is the first post by GAPW’s disarmament fellow for Fall 2013, Marianne Rijke.  Marianne will be working on several disarmament projects and covering the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.  She will make frequent posts in this space.

Even though they have only been used twice in the course of warfare, by the United States (US) at the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have posed a threat to mankind ever since their creation. Since these bombings, there have been over two thousand detonations for testing and demonstration purposes. Every time a bomb is detonated human communities and environmental health are both put at risk. There have been several attempts by the international community to stop these tests, to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure total nuclear disarmament. So far these attempts have not resulted in the desired outcome because certain state parties refuse to honor their agreements to dismantle their nuclear weapons.

In 1970 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS): US, Russia, United Kingdom (UK), France and China (also known as the P5 states). The Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995 and will be reviewed every five years. The 2010 NPT Review Conference resulted in a Action Plan, agreed upon by state parties, which contains measures to advance nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and regional issues, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

With the 2015 NPT Conference around the corner and frustrations building up by the lack of substantial progress in nuclear disarmament, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries participated with the office of the GA president in organizing the First High-Level Meeting (HLM) of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (September 26, 2013). The original draft resolution which called for the HLM was approved by a vote of 165 to none, with five abstentions. The countries that abstained were the P3 states (US, UK and France), Israel and Ukraine. During the HLM, the P3 gave a combined statement in which they expressed the view that the HLM was essentially a waste of time and energy. In their eyes there are already enough efforts to speed up nuclear disarmament and states should focus on the 2010 Action Plan. This statement received a lot of criticism, as the first deadline of this Plan, the convening of a weapons of mass destruction free-zone (WMDFZ) in Middle East, was already missed.

This missed deadline was acknowledged at the HLM, and the states, once again, insisted on the need for this WMDFZ. One problem with attaining this zone, is a lack of involvement of Israel in the disarmament conversations. Even though Israel neither denies nor confirms having nuclear weapons, there is a wide belief that they do posses them. These undeclared weapons form a key impediment to a WMDFZ in the Middle East. “All countries in the region”, as stated by Saudi Arabia, “should call on Israel to open its doors for the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency”. Israel has not yet opened its doors and since they have the support of the US, it is also crucial for the US to be more involved in talks related to the formation of the zone.

Another problem for nuclear disarmament is the fact that neither the P3 states nor Russia seem willing to engage in multilateral dialogues about this subject. This produces an insolvable problem, since it is strongly maintained by some parties that nuclear disarmament must start with the US and Russia before the rest will follow. They refer to the NWS as falling behind due to the lack of new ideas from these countries and their unwillingness to participate in new disarmament initiatives. The P5 states decided not to be part of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), which was convened by the General Assembly in October 2012 to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. This decision to ignore the OEWG was referred to by some parties as the “P5 digging their own grave”. At the side event, organized by United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES), with the support of the Indonesian Permanent Mission to the UN, the OEWG was hailed as a success with a minimum of ‘blaming and shaming.’ However, the realization was there that there were a lot of interesting ideas, but a lot also needs to be done to turn good ideas into concrete action plans.

UNIDIR stated that for the HLM to fulfill its mandate there has to be a change in national security doctrines of both the NWS and the umbrella states (states that ‘benefit’ from extended nuclear deterrence). These states need to realize that nuclear weapons are no longer needed to ensure their security. “Only if the majority of a given country’s population is convinced that nuclear weapons are no longer required to ensure its security, and may indeed decrease rather than increase it, will the government of that country be encouraged to begin to adapt its security doctrines”.

At the side event, the role of civil society and the importance of getting it more involved was also emphasized, but the way to do so was not clear. Some parties stressed the importance of partnerships between civil society and states. Others believe that talking to governments is a waste of time and that the existing structures will not have the preferred outcome because civil society has no say within a lot of states, including some P5 states. A way for these groups to be involved is by building partnerships between civil societies in different countries and by connecting stakeholders within regions to build a movement at the grassroots level. There was also talk of reaching out to institutions in non-nuclear states that are not yet on board to get their support to persuade the NWS to give up their nuclear weapons. There seems to be a lot of frustration within non-nuclear states about being excluded from the actual disarmament talks and feeling powerless due to this process. It was underlined that all states and stakeholders need to be engaged in the disarmament discussions if disarmament is to succeed.

It was interesting to see that there was only a little talk about making connections to other pressing global issues we are facing such as regional conflicts, human rights, poverty and climate health. Global Action to Prevent War stresses that security issues, such as nuclear weapons, are always connected to these other security concerns. To make these linkages, it might be helpful if these meetings were more accessible to people from outside the nuclear weapons community. People not working primarily on nuclear disarmament could possibly add some fresh ideas to the table. It seemed that the meetings, mostly containing the ‘like-minded’, may have gotten into a stalemate on how to actually develop and execute plans that would help the nuclear disarmament process. The overall impression these meetings left on me, was the lack of such plans. I believe that it is a good thing to get civil societies more involved to strengthen the international community’s call for disarmament. But I am afraid that if there are no actual plans to follow up on, these meetings will function as just another ‘talk shop’.

Marianne Rijke

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The UN’s Annual Presidential Party

1 Oct

Sitting across the street from the North Lawn Building at UN Headquarters on a Sunday morning, the neighborhood looks a bit like what I imagine to be a night club at 5AM.   While there are still speeches to be heard and events on migration and other matters to be attended, the limousines have mostly left the streets.  The barricades have largely been dismantled.  The tent through which passed many heads of state and foreign ministers is being carted off.   Tourists are milling around as though anticipating access to spaces that had been shut off from them.

All in all, despite some exhausted security guards and some frayed tempers (including my own) it was a pretty good week.   Iranian president Rouhani’s speech at the High Level event on nuclear disarmament energized discussions with the US that may result in a more cautious and transparent approach to any nuclear ambitions that Iran might have been harboring.  On Syria, Security Council resolution 2118 offers hope for the timely elimination of one of the world’s largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. It also gives the now splintering opposition some reasonable expectation of a resolution to the conflict that does more than preserve a deadly and destabilizing status quo.

Also, there was abundant energy around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, more specifically, a new round of post-2015 goals that are currently being developed.   These events gave opportunity for many segments of the UN leadership and other stakeholders to affirm their commitment to both fulfilling existing development obligations and broadening those obligations after 2015 to benefit more of the world’s population.

Invitations to the many events taking place this week were generously bestowed and our office was fortunate to be able to take advantage of many of those.   The following comments are mostly my own, though they do reflect colleagues’ assessment of some of the other events that we were privileged to attend.

Aside from the infectious enthusiasm in evidence around post-2015 development goals, the human rights-oriented events were perhaps the most satisfying in part because of the willingness of high level speakers to move the discussion beyond narrow disciplinary confines and towards a more complementary human security framework.   Of special note was UN special representative Mary Robinson’s efforts to highlight climate change as a major concern for the human rights community, and USG Adama Dieng’s efforts (with the governments of Belgium and Ghana) to highlight the integrity of elections – beyond ‘free and fair’ – as an important step to keep states from lapsing into conditions ripe for mass atrocity violence.  There were also important discussions held on issues germane to gender justice including an acknowledgment of the broad range of agencies and governments now taking up a gender lens on human security.

By comparison, disarmament remains a bit of a ‘dismal science,’ and there were several events that captured high level attention but might not result in high level attainment.   The High Level event on nuclear disarmament, ably organized by Roman Hunger and the office of the president of the General Assembly, resulted in many sincere speeches by heads of delegations, but covered little new ground.   One of the problems with nuclear disarmament discourse is the degree to which it still remains locked in conceptual silos that keep the issue isolated from a host of development, human rights, small arms and gender considerations to which it is linked and from which it should be drawing (and to which it should be contributing) more support.   We do, indeed, want a world ‘free of nuclear weapons.’   We also want a world free of poverty, discrimination, environmental degradation, gender-based violence, species extinction and much more.   The small numbers of NGOs who gathered in the Trusteeship Council to listen to the nuclear weapons speeches gave evidence that most advocates with access to the Conference Building were content to invest their energy elsewhere.

On small arms and arms trade, the news was a bit better.   The ATT high level event was also conducted in a considerably less than full room with ample celebratory language (especially given that the US earlier in the day signed the treaty) but fewer reminders of the long slog that lies ahead, not only before the treaty enters into force, but in making this particular treaty relevant to efforts to end diverted transfers and, in a larger context, eliminate violence from illicit weapons.   We were also surprised that there were so few references to the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), a most welcome program underwritten by Australia and Germany to help build capacity support for ATT implementation.

Additionally, in the Security Council, Australia’s leadership was essential to passing resolution 2177, the first time in five years that the Council has taken up the issue of illicit small arms.   Generally speaking, we are skeptical of Council efforts to remain seized of yet another issue as we don’t believe that the degree of the Council’s legislative effectiveness on such issues (not to mention its willingness to ‘play’ collaboratively with other relevant UN stakeholders) has been sufficiently established.  Moreover, the resolution seems to place considerable burden on already overstretched peacekeeping operations to enforce arms embargoes, a move that we can’t imagine was taken based on wild enthusiasm emanating from DPKO.  We hope that the Council will also remain seized of these serious limitations as the resolution moves forward towards implementation.

But the biggest ‘take away’ for me in all these meetings was less about policy and more about psychology. This is the time of year when most of us here at headquarters are reminded of how little we matter in the grand scheme of things.   Governments from capitals run this show, none nearly at the level of the US, but all of them more than the diplomats who populate the missions and certainly more than the NGOs who gather around the gates clamoring for admission to events over which we have virtually no say.  This ought to be a humbling business each and every day, but it is especially hard to escape this feeling during this ‘presidential party’ season at the UN.

Of course, being humble doesn’t mean being silent about what we wish to see beyond what we have seen. Back when I used to attend parties, I took some advantage of the context to let sides of my personality, even my ideas, escape the confines of my emotional habits and need for control.    While the events we attended at the UN last week are probably too ‘public’ for leaders to speak with full frankness and take policy risks that might not play well back home, it would be helpful if at least we could hear more about where government leaders think we’re headed as a global community as well as the priorities of states going forward. Perhaps most importantly, we would all do well to hear more about the concrete and specific contributions that states — all states —  are willing to make to help the ‘world we want’ become the ‘world we have.’

 Dr. Robert Zuber

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Civil Society and RtoP: Prevention and Strong State Capacity

16 Sep

On September 9, 2013 the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES-NY), the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), and the Stanley Foundation held the event titled Civil SocietyPerspectives: Building State Capacity to Prevent Atrocity Crimes. This was held as a pre-meeting to the 5th annual General Assembly informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, scheduled for September 11, 2013. Dr. Jennifer Welsh, the newly appointed Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect, as well as Mr. Adama Dieng, the Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, were both present. The event was also attended by many civil society representatives as well as diplomats from numerous Permanent Missions. The event featured civil society representatives who shared their experiences in working towards the prevention of atrocity crimes as well as their recommendations on strengthening domestic capacity. Ms. Valnora Edwin, the Director of the Campaign for Good Governance, provided first-hand experience of RtoP in practice. She explained the post-conflict work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the transitional justice process through the Special Court for Sierra Leone. She also explained how her organization is engaging with the Sierra Leonean government in order to prevent future atrocities.

Both this event and this year’s UN dialogue are focused on Pillar 1 of the Responsibility to Protect, which states, “The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing”. This is reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s latest report on RtoP, State Responsibility and Prevention.  In the opening remarks Mr. Keith Porter, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stanley Foundation, stressed that one of the key aims of the dialogue was to discuss how civil society can contribute to the building of societies where mass atrocities are not an acceptable means of holding power. Although the current situation in Syria was widely acknowledged as a challenge, the debate did not focus on it. Instead, Syria was referred to in order to clarify the norm. Dr. Welsh acknowledged that RtoP has been operationalized in the Syrian conflict through the form of sanctions, the acceptance of refugees by surrounding states, and the work of civil society groups as well as UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council and other humanitarian organizations. Nonetheless, the effect of Syria on the future of RtoP was not fully addressed.

In the keynote speech by Dr. Welsh, emphasis was placed on civil society’s role in advancing RtoP and affirming the need for prevention. Dr. Welsh addressed the next steps that need to be taken in the norm’s development including: the necessity for the development of a clearer framework which would facilitate early warning and response, the fact that regional and sub-regional organizations need to take greater ownership of the agenda, the need to strengthen interaction with the members of the Security Council, and that member states should work together to remind the Security Council of its responsibility to prevent atrocities. Moreover, apart from continuing to advance Pillar 1, Dr. Welsh argued that it is time for the General Assembly to pay greater attention to the Pillar 2, or the idea that the international community needs to support states in carrying out their responsibility to protect their citizens.

The first panel of the meeting was chaired by Ms. Angela Bruce-Raeburn, the Program Officer of the Stanley Foundation. The panelists discussed how their organizations work to influence political actors to cooperate in strengthening institutions. Rev. Cannon Thomas Muyya Godda emphasized the need for a common sense of equality and that key causes of conflict, such as poverty, must be addressed. Mr. Kyle Matthews highlighted some of the internal political obstacles to successful RtoP implementation. Referring to Canada he explained how although once a leader of RtoP, Canada has lost this position due to the fact that the current government views RtoP as the work its predecessors – the opposition. Finally, Mr. Noel Morada explained the ‘bibngka approach’ or the necessity for cooperation between the top and bottom – just like when cooking a rice cake, the cooperation of the pan on top with the fire on the bottom is key.

Although all panelists presented great examples of how civil society encourages national legislatures, Ms. Bruce-Raeburn asked a thought-provoking question of what happens when a government changes? In other words, what happens to atrocity prevention when those supporting it are no longer in power? The panelists generally did not provide an answer to this question; nevertheless Mr. Matthews explained how civil societies in Canada try to overcome this issue. Despite his statement, no substantive answer was given. Another issue discussed by the panelists was the relationship of RtoP and sovereignty. There was a general consensus among the speakers that RtoP needs to be presented as a friend, rather than an enemy of sovereignty. The problem of sovereignty often arises in relation to RtoP discussions primarily regarding Pillar 3 or the use of force if a government is not fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens. Panelists and Dr. Welsh agreed that rather than restricting sovereignty, RtoP actually has a sovereignty enhancing purpose. This is where the work of civil societies in aiding the strengthening of states and the implementation of RtoP principles into legislatures remains highly important.

The second panel chaired by Mr. Tibi Galis, the Executive Director of the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, focused on reconciliation and peacebuilding as important factors in atrocity prevention. In many post-conflict situations a relapse into violence is highly likely unless appropriate action is taken to address the key issues that caused violence in the first place. Important peacebuilding efforts such as the inclusion of women in decision-making, the use of judicial processes and the development of good governance were also presented through the cases of Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Kenya. Although the presentations were relevant in content, at points the debate seemed to have gotten too specific and the message of how these case studies can contribute to the future general policy development of the RtoP was a bit lost. The overarching issue remains to be the fact that there are very few cases of when RtoP was successfully used in atrocity prevention. Both Sierra Leone and Guatemala highlight situations of post-conflict violence prevention rather than the initial prevention of the opportunities for mass atrocities. Therefore, the Kenyan case, which is often celebrated as a prime example of effective diplomatic action under the RtoP banner, remains perhaps one of the only real examples of RtoP application. Regrettably, there are still cases where atrocities have happened or are now happening, yet where RtoP has not been invoked.

Overall the event presented a good discussion on issues related to the role of civil society in working with states to strengthen their domestic institutions in order to successfully prevent mass atrocities. As the title of the event suggested, much emphasis was placed on the experiences of civil societies from different parts of the world in working together with national governments in order to strengthen measures for atrocity prevention. The debate reaffirmed the crucial role of civil society groups in pushing governments in strengthening their institutions in order to adopt RtoP principles into their national agendas. With many governments remaining skeptical about RtoP and its effectiveness, the role of civil society in keeping the norm at the forefront of government deliberations is key. RtoP is a noble concept yet it continues to go about unfulfilled due to hesitation by governments based in part on a failure to heed their legitimate concerns.

 

Tereza Steinhublova, GAPW Junior Associate

 

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Growing the Responsibility to Protect

24 Aug

On September 11, the General Assembly will hold what has become its annual rite of Late Summer – the ‘debate’ on the Responsibility to Protect norm.

As is usual for the GA, this isn’t really a ‘debate’ at all. Instead it is a series of parallel statements by governments that too rarely take account either of the opinions of other states or of the content of the remarks by the panel of experts.  Nevertheless, the discussion this year does allow for an official ‘coming out’ party for Professor Jennifer Welsh, the new UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.  It also allows the relatively small group of NGOs that take an active interest in RtoP to gauge the degree to which states are willing to offer public support (or express public concern) regarding the norm. 

GAPW has attended all of the GA’s RtoP focused debates to date.  We still think they are worth pursuing as an interim step, inasmuch as they allow states to comment on the various reports by the Secretary General on themes (regionalization, third pillar capacities, etc.) germane to the evolution and full implementation of the norm .  The debates also allow for limited NGO input, though the politics of NGO involvement on RtoP have never been transparent, nor has there been any clear role for NGOs aside from supporting what have largely been modest initiatives by states to begin to fill the RtoP toolbox, create focal points for state-based activities, and provide alternative narratives to help guide Security Council ‘use’ of the norm.

Clearly more is needed if the norm is to guide conduct more than provide rationalizations for conduct.  GAPW is quite supportive of the priorities of the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, though we have also maintained for some time that a more open-ended process that encourages diplomats beyond the Security Council to take regular account of the opportunities and challenges of RtoP would be to everyone’s advantage.  Moreover, the modest NGO community that engages with RtoP, by and large, has failed to provide leadership commensurate with efforts to ‘guard the gate’ from critics who would allegedly diminish the norm.  Such critics it seems can get on the ‘wrong side’ of the discussion merely by having the temerity to suggest that we must travel farther – and in some ways travel differently – if the norm is ever to achieve necessary levels of diplomatic trust and functional competence.

The International Coalition for the RtoP, which has done some good work expanding interest in the norm within diverse global regions, has recently shared their own assessment of what this September debate needs to accomplish.   Those recommendations appear at the end of this post.  There are some good (if vague) suggestions for what might grow from this debate, and we are particularly pleased with the gender references.  But our feeling is that we need to expect more from this flowering that, for now at least, blooms only once a year and for only brief periods of time.

Our own (arguably limited) sense from talking to persons worldwide who were originally attracted to the possibilities suggested by the norm is that the proverbial bloom is starting to come off the rose.  Thankfully, none of these discussions has indicated a serious reconsideration of the basic premise of sovereignty as responsibility, nor of the fundamental belief that the international community has a critical role to play in situations where states fail to protect populations.   The caution expressed is less a function of the norm itself and more of the political compromises of some of its caretakers, both institutionally authorized and self-appointed.  When people tell us that RtoP is ‘dead’ (it isn’t) they mean in part that those tasked with promoting and/or authorizing RtoP have planted at least some of their seeds in the wrong soil.

At some point in the future, it would be interesting to have a real debate focused on where this entire process of norm implementation is headed and the extent to which our structures and strategies are capable of getting us there.  Such a discussion would be rather un-UN-like and might possibly shake up the current ‘consensus’ working methods and civil society alliances which, in our view, have uncertain benefit for the credibility of the UNs commitments to prevent mass atrocity crimes and respond rapidly and with minimum coercive force in those situations (hopefully rare) in which diplomatic and other tools fail to halt the path towards violence.

If what we all say is true about the urgency of mass atrocity prevention, then clearly our emotional conveniences, political compromises, career interests and funding needs must always take a back seat.   More than any single responsibility, we need to find ways to lengthen the growing season for this norm and do more to ensure the right amounts of energy and commitment for it to reach full bloom.   At present, we seem to be in a developing situation that reminds us of the crocuses of early spring, a beautiful purple plant that has to work far too hard to force itself through cold soils and then threatens to disappear almost before we realize it is there.

ICRtoP 2013 GA Debate Recommendations

  • Conduct assessments and analyses of domestic capacities and best practices to prevent atrocities, so as to adopt, establish or strengthen existing mechanisms and state policies;
  • Develop a national plan of action for the prevention of atrocities and the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect and/or appoint a focal point tasked with integrating RtoP within national policies;
  • Establish or enhance existing domestic early-warning mechanisms and ensure that the information gathered is analyzed as well as shared with relevant international actors to guarantee swift, preventive action;
  • Adopt or further strengthen existing policies to ensure the full and equal participation of women and minority populations in all political, judicial, reconciliation, and peacebuilding activities, as well as safeguard the protection of equal rights for such populations;
  • Create processes that cultivate dialogue between the State and communities that allow open communication and mutual trust-building, mechanisms that can support an early dissimulation of tensions.
  • Promote a safe and dynamic space for civil society, which includes ensuring an independent and fair media, as well as continue to form key partnerships between government and civil society actors to contribute to the prevention of atrocities.

 

Dr. Robert Zuber, Director GAPW

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Body Building: Supporting Treaty Bodies at Headquarters

24 May

This past Wednesday afternoon at UN headquarters, there was (for me at least) a truly remarkable sight — the chairs of the human rights treaty bodies seated on the dais preparing to hold consultations with the 20 or so non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that gathered to consult with them.

Though GAPW (in consultation with other human rights groups especially the International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture) only covers three of the treaty bodies (Human Rights Committee, Committee against Torture, and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) we have long believed that the full complement of treaty bodies represent the lifeblood of the UN system.  Despite severe resource challenges, the indifference of some diplomatic missions, and the hesitancy of some states to fulfill their human rights obligations, Committee sessions represent some of the few venues in the UN system where independent experts can directly and actively examine state conduct on key aspects and constituencies related to the UN human rights agenda – women, torture, children, refugees and much more.

This session followed one earlier in the day chaired by Ambassador Gunnarsdottir of Iceland and Ambassador Percaya of Indonesia who have consulted on and off with civil society groups and other stakeholders, mostly in New York and Geneva, regarding the most effective ways for the UN to select Committee members and for the Committees themselves to discharge their diverse responsibilities. Their responses to NGO comments, many of which are included in their “Way Forward” documents, were not always hopeful, citing the need to balance “budget savings and capacity reforms.”  These documents, largely intended for states, contain insights partially noted in a report issued in April 2013 and are available here.

Some of those commenting NGOs, including Amnesty International and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, have provided important guidance to Committee members on a variety of matters related to working methods, including strategies for maintaining the independence of members not only from state pressure but pressure from Secretariat offices and NGOs as well. While there is a general expectation, especially from the civil society side, that human rights are indivisible and must be upheld without reservation, many NGOs recognize that Committee members must be given significant leverage in the discharging of their responsibilities, including how they interpret state reports, the line of inquiry they pursue in formal Committee meetings, the ways in which they engage and incorporate testimony from local and international civil society groups, and how follow-up recommendations are crafted and pursued.

Such leverage is essential for several reasons, including preservation of the integrity of the investigative and interrogation processes, but also because Committee members along with diplomats and others involved with the promotion and protection of human rights must make judgment calls about how hard and far they can push states given limitations of time, available resources, and the will of states to honestly pursue improvements in human rights practices.  As anyone who has participated in Fifth Committee discussions knows well, there are many parts of the UN system clamoring for additional allocations from the regular UN budget.   Not all requests are granted and even fewer are granted in full.  And NGOs like ours are not always as sensitive as we might be to the political and fiscal tradeoffs that shadow the work of all aspects of the UN system, including the Committees.  While keeping a proper eye on the goal of universal adherence to human rights principles, we can do more to understand, appreciate and weigh in on the best ways to navigate these trade-offs, some of which require that we know more about related processes and issues than we generally care to know.

There is at least one other thing that we can do more of to help promote the Committees and communicate (though not always support) the difficult trade-offs that in part define their roles. In our view, the limitations noted above point to another, potentially fruitful dimension of NGO engagement, one that is complementary to discussions about integrated calendars, the frequency of reporting, the way in which Committee members are selected, and the best means of engaging civil society testimony.

As a number of readers of this blog recognize, GAPW engages a broad organizational mission that stresses the inter-relationships between security issues and seeks common engagement on core UN concerns – including human rights – by diverse stakeholders.    Our work highlights the gender implications of atrocity crime prevention, the security dimensions of development policy, the impact of illicit weapons on internally displaced persons, and other ‘cross-over’ concerns.

We, of course, are not alone in seeking complementary engagements.  It is important to many of our other partners that our discussions with diplomatic missions and other policymakers span a wide range of concerns – from UN media policy reform to reparations for victims of state-sponsored sexual abuse.  Diplomats, especially in the smaller missions, have to juggle what seems to be an endless stream of policies and the resolutions and treaties that seek to rationalize and bind our responses to them.   Diplomats need help juggling at times and can often receive that help from NGOs that are sufficiently attentive to their contexts and frames of policy reference.

One of those frames must have more to do with the treaty bodies, an indispensable UN contribution to which many diplomats pay less attention to than they probably should.   It is critical, while NGOs work to impact the diverse policy agendas of the missions, that Permanent Representatives and others are encouraged to receive regular updates on the issues, needs and challenges of Committee members – not only their expectations of state conduct but what is needed to ensure a robust engagement on the rights which the Committees do so much to uphold.

Those of us who regularly weigh in with missions on issues such as the arms trade, the Responsibility to Protect norm , nuclear disarmament and the dual obligations to promote women’s full participation and end impunity for gender violence can do more in those (and other) contexts to promote the essential work and testimony of the treaty bodies. We can, from our diverse organizational vantage points, insist that states engage more robustly with this vital and fundamental obligation to the entire community of states, an obligation that is essential to the integrity of the UN system and to the maintenance of trust worldwide.

The UN’s work in so many diverse fields intersects with both the policy and promise of the treaty bodies.   We all have a responsibility to build their capacity and enhance their reputation.  We urge Committee members to reflect more with us on their successes and frustrations and to also share more about their capacity needs in enhancing state practices with respect to their human rights obligations.   For our part, we need to recognize more fully the treaty bodies as a significant focus of organizational outreach and intent, even  if the term ‘human rights’ does not appear on our letterhead or in our organizational mission statement.

 

–Dr. Robert Zuber

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Highlighting a Human Security Approach

9 May

Co-sponsored by the Human Security Network (Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand, with South Africa participating as an observer) and the Human Security Unit (HSU) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), a high-level event was held yesterday at UN headquarters both underscoring the importance of a human security approach to multi-faceted challenges and celebrating the recent adoption of General Assembly resolution 66/290. This resolution adopted last September marks the first time the General Assembly (GA) was able to agree on a common understanding of the concept. The high-level event featured remarks from the Secretary-General as well as his Special Adviser on Human Security, Mr. Yukio Takasu, who was appointed in 2011.

Global Action is deeply invested in supporting a cross-cutting, broad-based approach to a robust human security agenda. As noted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his remarks to the event, it is imperative to identify comprehensive solutions to an inter-linked program of human security as it is impossible to end poverty without empowering women and girls, to ensure respect for human rights without addressing climate change, or to tackle security sector reform without guaranteeing equitable prosperity in communities. Global Action fully embraces this comprehensive approach and welcomes the inclusion of human security as a central factor, particularly with a view towards developing a robust post-2015 development agenda, which can help address a plethora of interlinked security challenges. The GA resolution provides a solid, basic framework for moving the concept forward and mainstreaming its characteristics across the range of UN activities to better address shifting peace and security concerns.

The human security concept provides a useful entry point for dealing with prevailing security issues. First introduced in 1994 through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the “UN Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security,” the term has evolved over the last decade. The 1994 UNDP report highlighted four characteristics of human security—universal, people-centered, interdependent, and early prevention – as well as seven interconnected elements, namely economic, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. Subsequently, in 2001, an independent Commission on Human Security was established to elaborate on the understanding of the term and to develop it further as an operational concept. In 2004, the HSU was established under the auspices of UNOCHA to mainstream the human security concept in UN activities, which also manages the UN Trust for Human Security (UNTFHS) that finances activities carried by the UN and/or UN-mandated organizations to translate the human security approach into practical actions.

The importance of the consensus adoption of UNGA resolution 66/290, “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome,” rests in its inclusion of a common understanding of the notion of human security. The resolution also welcomes the “Secretary-General’s Report on Human Security” (A/66/273) from 2012 upon which a GA plenary meeting was held in June 2012 and around which consultations were held. The resolution outlines the following characteristics of human security—(a) freedom to live in dignity and free from poverty and despair; (b) a people-centered, contextual, comprehensive, and prevention-focused approach; (c) recognition of the inter-linkages between peace, development, and human rights; (d) clear distancing from the responsibility to protect norm and its implementation; (e) non-inclusion  of the use or threat of use of force and ; (f) national ownership and governmental responsibility. The resolution also calls on the Secretary-General to submit a report to the sixty-eighth session of the GA on the implementation of the resolution seeking first the views of member states.

A strong commitment to mainstreaming human security and a common understanding of the concept, while allowing some flexibility in its implementation, are welcome developments that will serve the international community well in addressing diverse, root causes of insecurity. The translation of a somewhat abstract concept, human security, into concrete action is also an important exercise that is often not seen in many others aspects of UN work. The UNTFHS has carried out over 200 activities in 80 countries increasingly applying this concept in field operations across all global regions under the primary ownership of local individuals. This conversion of the abstract into the concrete is a challenge for many working simultaneously on security and development issues.

Ultimately, a robust human security agenda cannot be pursued in silos, but rather must take into account cross-cutting contributors to insecurity. As the international community continues to embrace a more well-defined human security concept, the world will be better equipped to humanize the concept of security and help it evolve into one that is much more reflective of today’s transnational challenges.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Green Lantern: UNGA Informal Debate on ‘Harmony with Nature”

23 Apr

As a nod to Earth Day 2013, the UN General Assembly was the setting for an ‘informal debate’ focused on ways to more effectively promote planetary ‘harmony’.

A half-full conference room listened to a short presentation from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and more passionate speeches by the UN General Assembly President, Mr. Vuk Jeremić of Serbia, and by Ministers from Bolivia and Ecuador, two ‘left-leaning’ governments that tend to exercise a great deal of control over national economic outcomes.

There were some valuable reminders shared by these four speakers during what was a bit of an ideologically-imbalanced opening session.   From our own organizational standpoint, it is good to be reminded that consumption in the developed world is largely optional and has increasingly deleterious impacts on natural health in all global regions.  In addition, we should recognize that too much of the ‘green’ movement has been co-opted by those who seek to institutionalize levels of developed world consumption while attempting to ‘manage’ levels of growth in less developed nations.

At the debate, there were also renewed calls for a ‘universal declaration’ of the rights of nature tied to an alleged, if helpful, ‘right to recovery’ for nature that has been ravaged by a preponderance of short-term economic resource use disconnected from any reasonable capacity for future generations to access (and preserve) the same resources.

Our economic situation has been increasingly dark in recent times – inequities and shortages abound, as do the toxic effects of our mindless exploitation.    While it is not yet clear how ‘nature rights’ could be properly identified and enforced, nor is it clear how economic reform would result in locally based economies rather than state structures attempting to micro-manage large scale economic development, it is critically important to shine a light on alternatives that are urgent, viable and fair.  Needless to say, we don’t have sufficient alternatives at present. We need to keep the lantern lit as much as possible.

An office like ours has very limited access to deliberations on economic futures.   From our experience in meetings such as this one, it is clear that States too have limited options, more limited than they generally acknowledge.  Economic decisions, more and more, take place beyond the reach of states in board rooms and investment houses.  Whatever one thinks of “Occupy’ and other movements to expose economic inequities, including in economic decision making, it is clear that this current system is being driven by self-interested and unaccountable forces.   If such forces were merely accumulating wealth, there would be sufficient cause for general concern.  That accumulated wealth is driving so much planetary dysfunction should be cause for the loudest general alarm.

Simply put, there are biological limits to economic growth.   And those limits are not being acknowledged, let alone respected.   As one of the ministers from Ecuador wondered aloud and with some urgency, “Who precisely is going to bell this cat?”  How will that be accomplished? The cat has a defensive, nasty disposition and sharp claws.  It will take some real courage to bell it.  Until that happens, though, the rest of us will largely remain ignorant (willfully or otherwise) of the ways that our lives are about to become more painful and toxic than they need to be!

Our collective disenchantment with our economic system seems to grow daily.   At the same time, our resistance to economic change borders on the neurotic.   We have deep addictions to unsustainable and largely optional patters of consumption that remain stubborn in their remedial application and are also quite devastating to our long-term biological prospects.

On Earth Day, we need to shine more light on the structures and choices that undermine a ‘green’ agenda – unequal economic access, unsustainable (and largely optional) patterns of consumption, and more.  We also need to renew our connections with some of our more ‘intimate’ ecological processes – how our food is grown, where our drinking water comes from, what happens to our waste when we are ‘done’ with it.

Our ignorance of basic environmental processes as well as our insistence that we own everything we use are both planet-defeating attitudes. Our preference for owning a neighbor’s land to having a neighbor undermines community integrity.   Our relentless pursuit of non-essential consumer goods represents a psychologically defective, wasteful application of time and resources.   Our ability to simultaneously express a deep love for our children while contributing to the demise of the system that supports their lives is a dangerous inconsistency.  Clearly, we must continue to shine a light on these and other discontinuities, and then organize a viable, participatory strategy to overcome them.

 

–Dr. Robert Zuber

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