Tag Archives: General Assembly

The Importance of Importance:   The UN General Assembly Reasserts its Cross-Cutting Value, Dr. Robert Zuber

4 Sep

689982Culture

UN Photo

One of the things I marveled at during my months (long ago) as a hospital chaplain in Harford, CT was the ability of emergency room medical staff to perform “triage” on incoming patients.

The principle is simple in the abstract if not in practice:   In a system under constant stress, professionals must be able to distinguish quickly between patients requiring urgent attention and those who can wait a bit – albeit often uncomfortably – for their turn at treatment in the hope that full health can be restored.

This “triage” is hardly confined to hospitals; parents make these judgment calls all the time, sequencing the lives of children so that they get more of what they need when they need it, especially during times of urgency.   And of course many of these judgments point down a life-long road – sealing the relationship linking healthy diets, prompt health care, home reading and other nurturing activities, and the promotion of future self-directed adults able to contribute much to families and communities.

The UN has its own versions of “triage” though the public face of this is largely confined to Security Council meetings where “matters of importance” take place, including assessments and responses to threats that literally leap on to the front pages of our media.  There are, indeed, matters of gravity punctuating the Council agenda – Syria and Yemen are only the most notable – and the Council is learning again about both the potential and limitations of its policy solidarity.  Thankfully, Council members are also spending more time in the field – as we write this, they are in South Sudan – in part in an attempt to better grasp some of the practical consequences of their sometimes inadequate decision making to maintain (or restore) peace and security.

What the Council has most in common with emergency rooms and families is the expectation of relevant potency.   While hardly omnipotent, the decisions of ER doctors and parents are clearly binding within their “areas of jurisdiction.” For its part, the Council is one of the few modalities within the UN that has a mandate to “make states do things” that they might not do otherwise.  While the effectiveness of Council responses has been and should continue to be challenged, the assumption reflected within the Council’s mandate is that if states do not abide by its resolutions, more or less coercive measures may well follow – sanctions, travel bans, peacekeepers or even overtly military operations.

For many people, this coercion is a critical dimension of “importance.”   If we can’t make governments and other entities abide by rules of law and conduct, if we can’t force states to keep their treaty or resolution promises, then “triage” is little more than the creation of a priority list for institutional impotence.   What good, for instance, is it to create (as the UN is seeking to do this week) massive ocean refuges beyond national jurisdiction in an attempt to heal the seas if there is no trusted mechanism of enforcement – if there is no “ocean police” to ensure that fish stocks are not depleted, biodiversity is preserved, plastics and toxins are not carelessly dumped into increasingly compromised waters?

But it is not at all clear to what degree the UN’s use of coercive tools have actually modified the behavior of recalcitrant state and non-state entities.   Moreover, it seems to us, as it now seems to many UN member states, that there are many “soft power” options that have been – and remain – largely underutilized in this institutional space – tools such as mediation and good offices, to be sure, but also what we might call the “power of importance,” the resolve that comes from knowing you are placing priority on the most urgent matters with the most far-reaching consequences.

We don’t get many compliments in this office (few of us at the UN do) but the kindest remark ever paid to us was by a diplomat who noted, “You folks always show up for the most important discussions.”   For us this year, “showing up” has largely meant following the exhausting itinerary of the president of the 70thGeneral Assembly (PGA), Denmark’s Mogens Lykketoft.  This PGA has run a marathon during his year of service, refocusing and empowering the General Assembly while offering (even insisting upon) tangible support to other key UN functions, including the Financing for Development mandate of the Economic and Social Council  and the peace and security mandate of the Security Council.   He has lent the support of his office (and his personal presence) to a host of issues on the UN agenda that must stay firmly on our collective radar – pandemic threats, the rights and well-being of migrants and refugees, our urgent climate challenges, the political participation and employment of the world’s largest-ever generation of youth, the elevation of peacebuilding skills and architecture, the healing of our oceans, the transparency of the current Secretary-General search and its full inclusion of women candidates, the end to discrimination against disabled persons, indigenous women and far too many others.

We have few if any quibbles with the PGAs triage.   With or without the power of formal coercion, he has focused the attention of the GA on the issues about which we will learn to cooperate more fully or perish more rapidly.

And he saved some of his time and energy to focus on his own office – its needs in relation to the extraordinary expectations now placed upon it. Part of this has involved exposing the hypocrisy of a system that demands more and more of its key leadership without the funding commensurate with those responsibilities.  Lykketoft recognizes the advantages of coming from a wealthy country anxious to subsidize his success.   Other PGAs have not been so lucky.  Others have had to cut corners and make deals, often in ways that sow suspicions.   Plugging the institutional gaps in the system closest to the PGA is both a gift to his able successor (Fiji’s Amb Thompson) and to our collective ability to sustain interest in the most important policy priorities which the PGA and his VPs have energetically highlighted.

This past week the PGA hosted a “culture of peace” event in Trusteeship Council.  It’s a bit of a “mushy” topic, to be sure, but the event did underscore the diverse responsibilities of peacemaking beyond the control of weapons and coercive responses to wrongdoers.  It also gave UN officials and others the opportunity to share some of what drives their commitment to this place and keeps them energized to fulfill its multi-lateral potential.  From Nicaragua’s insistence on poverty reduction priorities and Italy’s call for youth inclusion to Malaysia’s urging of political moderation efforts and Indonesia’s call to find pathways out of “fragility,” many states welcomed this space for the kind of deeper reflection that keeps our policy deliberations on track, the kind of reflection on which good policy triage depends.

Also during this event, Tunisia’s Nobel Laureate Wided Bouchamaoui noted that, despite the slow pace of change, we must keep our focus on the reform that “alters destinies,” a reform that requires humility, the renunciation of despair and a commitment to concrete outcomes. Albania directly referenced Mother Teresa, warning that “we have forgotten that we belong to each other.”  On a similar note, SG special adviser David Nbarro, a key architect of the UN’s Ebola response and now focused on the Sustainable Development Goals, reflected that “human beings can respect themselves better as they learn to respect others better.”

These contributions are not a substitute for good policy, but they reference attributes of the human experience essential to good “triage,” keeping our eyes and energies fixed on matters of urgency in these gravely challenging times. We thank PGA Lykketoft for his year-long lesson on what truly matters.

Connecting Some Difficult UN Dots:  The Risks Worth Taking, Dr. Robert Zuber

15 May

This was one of “those weeks” at the UN – a time when complementary discussions were taking place in multiple conference rooms and when it was difficult to know where the most important discussions were actually taking place.  For instance, President of the General Assembly Lykketoft held an important, two-day High Level event on Peace and Security, in part designed to find ways to engage UN member states beyond the Security Council in diverse aspects of conflict prevention and resolution.   On the second day, barely 50 paces away, that same Security Council under Egypt’s leadership was holding a valuable general debate for UN members on strategies for combating terrorist narratives.   Venezuela was one of the few Council members to directly reference the General Assembly meeting nearby, but none risked referencing the needless overlap forcing interested parties to divide their attention between two related discussions that both warranted full and undivided attention.

A similar overlap occurred this week with respect to matters of abuse, the means to address which the UN community is taking stronger (if seriously belated) notice.  One setting for such discussions is the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, one of our very favorite annual UN events.  The Forum combines diverse cultural expression and high-quality activism with sober reflection on abuses forgotten, land stolen, cultures denigrated, voices denied, ecologies poisoned, resources exploited.   And yet there is gratitude in evidence here as well.  A colleague reported that speaker after indigenous speaker at the Forum began by giving thanks – not for the abuses and humiliations, of course, but as a way of honoring the ancestral owners of the land and sea on which this Forum was happening, opportunities that we can embrace now because of all that happened before us.

This ritual gratitude is no mere ritual.  It is an effort to keep living connections between our current strivings, those before us who gave us contexts and challenges, and those after us who will have to live with the consequences of our sometimes thoughtless legacies.   It is this grateful awareness of multi-generational impact — this attentiveness to a world that we did not make ourselves and that others are destined to inherit — that helps bring meaning and power to situations too often characterized by rights abuses uninvestigated and unpunished, cultural and resource thefts justified by trade agreements to which indigenous peoples were not party, and other violations of respect.

It is too bad that these indigenous representatives are not present at the UN more often, and also too bad that there is no time – or perhaps invitation – to share their lenses on meaning and power in other conference rooms.   One such room this week was a briefing for diplomats, again under the auspices of the General Assembly, and this time devoted to updates on the UN’s efforts to address sexual violence by UN personnel, especially peacekeepers.

There was some gratitude expressed by UN officials during this briefing – mostly to the peacekeepers who do difficult jobs under even more difficult circumstances, who largely do those jobs free from scandal and abuse, and who labor under mandates that are often unclear, unmanageable — even  grandiose.  After all, we do not “protect civilians” in the same sense that fire departments respond to all fires. We protect “some” civilians, except in those gruesome instances when we do the exact opposite.

My office colleagues, two of which have been closely following the Indigenous Forum, found this particular GA discussion rather unfulfilling.   They largely reject the “bad apple” theory of abuse that ignores structure and context and allows senior leadership to avoid scrutiny.   They reject the idea that anyone – soldiers included — should be lauded for refusing to sexually abuse constituents, regardless of the other challenges they might be facing.   They reject the idea that we can focus solely on the (quite helpful) measures now being taken to eliminate abusive behavior without a serious (and apologetic) examination of why it has taken so long to counter a problem that we have known about for some time.   They reject the idea that the reputation of the UN should be our primary consideration rather than the well-being of victims. They wonder if our approach to all this is too much about “damage control” and not nearly enough about “damage confession” while embracing the political risks necessary to try and make things right.

There were lots of powerful words spoken at this particular GA briefing.   But those few of us non-diplomats in the room (sadly including no indigenous representatives we could identify) came away largely unconvinced that bold words and proposed programmatic reforms would be sufficient to overcome the UN’s aging habits of policy distraction and policy spin.  We don’t seem to have (or have lost) that longer view to which we can attach longer commitments, based in part on gratitude for those who struggled before us and responsibility towards those who will follow. Eliminating (not merely addressing) abuses, as both the Under-Secretary General and Special Coordinator pledged to accomplish, will require culture shifts as well as policy adjustments.  We must take needed steps more urgently, but then stay a considerably longer (and honest) policy course that keeps victims (and our collective history of creating and responding to them) at the center of our concern.

In the GA briefing, there were many important statements from member states following the formal UN presentations.  But Norway had it quite right, we thought.   They expressed clear “impatience” at the pace of change.   They also noted the likelihood that more allegations will be forthcoming as more attention is paid to the issue of abuse by UN personnel and national contingents.   We’re not out of these woods by any means. Moreover, we’re not likely to make matters better if we cannot risk more fundamental changes to the way we do our own business.  Addressing abuse goes beyond training manuals and force-generation strategies, beyond troop strengths and the comprehensiveness of mandates.  It surely involves, as Tanzania noted during the briefing, a commitment by states to avoid the “blame game” and to accept the risks of “collective responsibility” to justice and recovery services for victims.

Collectively, we seem to be losing our capacity to take values-relevant risks.  One colleague at the UN recently told me a story of how she helped someone in distress find assistance on a late-night New York street, only to be verbally “accosted” by a few of her peers, mostly in a related policy field, apparently upset that someone they know would put themselves in that sort of position.   As though that isn’t precisely the type of risk we who say we “care about the world” should be encouraging each other to take!

The lessons of the week seem clear:  if we are to collectively solve problems from terrorist narratives and discrimination against indigenous persons to peacekeeper abuse we’ll need to peer (and act) beyond the edges of the prevailing consensus.   This implies, among other things, venturing into policy rooms beyond our specific brands, and then being willing to take a few more risks once we get there.

Doing and Enabling: Broadening the Peacebuilding Tent, Dr. Robert Zuber

1 May

First off, blessings to all our Orthodox friends and colleagues who celebrate Easter today.

This past Wednesday (April 27) a rather remarkable if under reported event occurred: the Security Council and the General Assembly (in that order) approved a joint resolution designed to strengthen the structure and activities of UN Peacebuilding.  Based on a special report authorized by the UN Secretary-General, this joint resolution was perhaps the clearest, recent example of key UN agencies authorizing and encouraging each other’s work rather than defending institutional turf.  To see operational language like this in a UN resolution was a sight for these sore eyes:

To serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, including from Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions and country teams, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, women’s groups, youth organizations and, where relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and information to improve their coordination, to develop and share good practices in peacebuilding, including on institution building, and to ensure predictable financing to peacebuilding.

The Security Council vote was unanimous, short and sweet.  The GA process, however, provide ample opportunity for key peacebuilding actors and other member states to share their hopes and aspirations for more effective UN conflict prevention and resolution efforts.  Many statements indicated that delegations understood just how momentous the moment was.  For instance, Mexico noted the need to change the “epicenter” of peacebuilding from post-conflict response to conflict prevention. Sierra Leone cited the diverse contexts in which peacebuilding occurs, contexts that can be enhanced and even effectively coordinated by UN efforts.   Australia urged that core UN “bridge building” efforts towards a sustainable peace reach out more resolutely to women stakeholders. And Kenya’s Amb. Kamau urged a flexible role for UN peacebuilding that spanned the terrain from prevention to conflict relapse, that distanced peacebuilding from military response, and (along with Sweden) that provided support to states beyond the few that were formally “configured” within the Peacebuilding Commission.

There was much more, of course, virtually all of it designed to broaden the space for peacebuilding in ways that respect diverse national and community contexts, space that intentionally includes the skills, passions and aspirations of its many stakeholders.

Indeed, it is this “authorizing” element that seemed so critical to us.   We have written previously about the negative implications of UN turf wars, urging agencies to concentrate less on what they do and brand, and more on what they share and leverage.  The attitude we urge turns out to be one that is quite conducive to the revised philosophy and architecture of UN peacebuilding.  Indeed, our office is in touch regularly with a myriad of activities that qualify as peacebuilding in every aspect:  efforts to protect courageous but besieged journalists; uphold human rights standards in the justice systems of the Caribbean; help women farmers in Central Africa to grow crops for healthy, local consumption; promote democracy in communities under strain in North Africa;  explore models of UN peacekeeping that can more effectively protect civilians and eliminate prospects for abuse; find ways to end the trafficking and human displacement in Central America that threatens the community fabric and compromises development.

There is so much more taking place beyond our knowledge and capacity to leverage, people dedicated to causes that have not yet sufficiently acknowledged their value.  This must change and change quickly.

A woman well known to the UN and its social justice advocates came to me recently to ask some advice on how to get more involved in peacebuilding.   The irony of course is that she has been doing peacebuilding all along — so many of you have also.  You may not have access to Commission meetings or be able to tap into peacebuilding funds, but your activities inspire reflection and hope towards more peaceful futures.

The resolutions this week seemed much more important than the usual normative text.  They were, in their own way, an invitation to millions of people who put their lives on the line each day for justice and access to essential services, for climate health and sustainable development, for food security and legal accountability.  Under the new rubric articulated in the SGs report and articulated in this week’s resolution, peacebuilding is becoming a very large tent indeed.    Large enough, we trust, for all the work we do and, perhaps more importantly, all the work we come to know about.

Temperate Zones:   The UN Celebrates its Climate Covenant, Dr. Robert Zuber

24 Apr

This past Friday the UN once again made history.   Heads of State and other High Officials from 175 states added their signatures to the Paris Climate Agreement, the largest number of states ever to sign a UN agreement on any single day.

The opening ceremony was mostly a lovefest and not without reason.   To create this consensus agreement was a truly massive undertaking, one that required states to overcome latent climate skepticism while working through some intense political considerations, including the concern that states finally finding their economic footing are being asked to break their carbon habits while the large states make only modest efforts to combat their own carbon addictions.   That states were able to overcome (or at least overlook) these and other obstacles to reach this agreement will go down as a truly historic undertaking in this age of climate trouble.  People outside the UN can only imagine the degree of difficulty associated with bringing a large number of diverging state interests together in an agreement of this complexity and magnitude, albeit with its multiple, notable limitations.

The ceremony was not entirely about hugs and congratulations.  There were warnings as well from inside and outside the UN.   In addition to the seemingly endless “we must move to action” yearnings, several more pointed critiques were made.   For instance, Bolivia was noteworthy in calling attention to the root causes of the climate crisis which in the mind of its president are linked to individualism, greed and militarism and which will allegedly require a thorough re-acquaintance with indigenous lifestyles if the Paris agreement has any chance to succeed.   Special guest Leonardo DiCaprio was equally blunt in urging states to “leave the carbon in the ground,” and transition more rapidly than at present to a more sustainable energy matrix.

Beyond UN confines other warnings abounded, often with greater intensity.  While the ceremony was taking place in the UN General Assembly hall,   twitter was exploding with images of melting ice caps, “bleached” coral and other difficult – if-not-impossible problems to reverse.  The Stimson Center in Washington DC was referring to our oceans as “the world’s largest crime scene.”   As I’m sure was the case with many others, our twitter account was engaged by groups far from New York weighing in on the “temperate” measures being suggested by UN member states for a planet besieged by massive storms and droughts, a planet now thought by many in the scientific community to be at a dangerous tipping point.

Indeed, early on, the negotiations for the Paris Climate agreement exposed an uneven sense of urgency, as large industrial (and polluting) states hedged their bets, newly developing states sought to continue their growth trajectories, and small island states sought to counter what for them is more akin to an existential threat, even in the very near term.   And despite urgings on Friday from French President Hollande for states to overcome what remains of “narrow interests,” there is legitimate concern about how much agreement implementation will actually be able to transcend the rhetorical and self-referential.  During the opening ceremony, it was only Canada’s Trudeau who specifically called for special support for the most vulnerable states, the states which, as a group, bear the least responsibility for the climate mess we now find ourselves in.

During the daylong activities, several states – quoting from the Secretary General’s climate agreement assessment – also noted that “the unthinkable has become the unstoppable.”   As I watched the ceremony, I thought about what is needed – beyond the agreement itself – to keep up our sense of urgency to reverse current trends and replace climate crisis with climate health.  And as is often the case, my mind wandered to concerns that are mirrored in more common human practices.

For instance, in counseling it is common to speak of “bargaining,” clients who agree to make changes that are not so terribly important while escaping responsibility for the more fundamental changes that they really need to make.   This tendency to focus on what matters less in order to avoid commitment to what matters more occurs in many contexts and creates numerous, well-documented problems for families and communities.

In the context of the climate agreement, bargaining by states might well spell the end for life as we know it, substituting carefully-crafted by largely token gestures for the more fundamental shifts on which, as Italy and others noted, the existence of our children and grandchildren depends.   The gifted Tanzanian youth who spoke to the assembled UN dignitaries made clear the stakes of the moment noting, almost as a warning, “I am not alone.”   If the climate agreement is to meet its full potential, states (and other stakeholders) will have to suspend all vestiges of bargaining and be willing to live with some of the highly inconvenient consequences of a climate challenge created largely on our watch.

It is also important, as several states noted during the opening ceremony, that climate health is seen as a full-spectrum responsibility and not merely one of state and even corporate concerns.    The refrain from within the UN of “common but differentiated responsibility” can be put in somewhat more familiar terms – unless we get many more capable and committed hands on deck, this “ship” will take on more and more water, agreement or no agreement.

Easily said, but there are many obstacles to filling this deck – including deep, well-cultivated habits of consumption and media distraction that impede both the development of skills that can contribute meaningfully to address the current crisis, and the strength of character to push us to continue contributing through disappointments and setbacks.  Much like teenagers behave with parents, it is just too easy for all of us to externalize blame on to states and other stakeholders, eschewing the full-spectrum engagements and commitments that bring into sharp relief just how difficult and complex the climate mitigation task actually is. Reversing habits that threaten our survival is every bit as energy and time consuming as forming those habits in the first instance.  There is no time like the present to get started on this difficult but life saving work.

At one point during the opening ceremony, the Secretary-General noted that “we are running behind schedule,” thus delaying the actual agreement signing.   For some, this seemed almost metaphorical – a response to climate threats that many fear might be just a bit too little and just a bit too late.   Others commented on the “footprint” of the signing ceremony, a huge UN room full of officials and their entourages who chose, yet again, to fly in rather than Skype in to express their climate concerns.   Like citizens and their governments, the UN also has habits to address, habits that motivate some to turn their backs on a problem we simply cannot solve without them.   People – skeptical and otherwise — need to know that the policy community, too, is willing to wrestle with and amend our habits for the sake of our common future.

As the Prime Minister of the small island state of Tuvalu made clear at the UN, climate impacts are now a global phenomenon.    Sea waters in every ocean are rising, storms are intensifying, drought and flood zones alike are expanding, traumatized climate refugees are desperately seeking safer ground.   We’re all in this now.   We must all be in this now.  GA President Lykketoft specifically cited the role of civil society groups (like our own) in keeping states on track regarding their climate responsibilities.  Clearly, we on the non-governmental side also have our own, long road to walk on climate impacts before any “all clear” signals are likely to be heard.

The aggregate message conveyed on this Climate signing day was simple and clear:  This is going to be a hard task.  The hour is getting very late.

Let’s get busy.

A Delicate Balance:  The Sixth Committee Considers the UN’s Rules and Reputation, Dr. Robert Zuber

18 Oct

As most of our readers are aware, this blog is an extension of our Twitter feed (@globalactionpw) – our attempt to provide a sense of how much activity takes place within UN headquarters, and to explore changes in structure and methods of work that can improve overall performance of the UN system.  And, indeed, this was yet another week where those seeking to cover a range of UN processes were running from one end of the campus to the other.   The Security Council under Spain’s leadership held a debate on Women, Peace and Security that lingered on through a second afternoon and also hastily called a meeting on Middle East violence, while the General Assembly (GA) voted 5 new, non-permanent members to join their 10 Council colleagues at the start of 2016.

Meanwhile, the GA’s Third Committee took up the rights of women and children and the Fourth committee wrestled with issues as diverse as non-self-governing territories (i.e. Western Sahara) and efforts to rid conflict countries of landmines.   The Second Committee took up the need for South-South cooperation as a component of Sustainable Development priorities to end poverty and address inequalities both within and between states.  UN “side events” ranged from ensuring access to legal services for girls to commemorations of World Food Day and the International Days of Rural Women and of Older Persons.

All of this (and much more) required every ounce of available diplomatic and NGO energy, with plenty of content to incorporate in the pursuit of international peace and security, and the fulfillment of core obligations to the poor and vulnerable. If some of these many forums and presentations can lead to hopeful and relevant activities in the world, we have a decent chance of dodging climate, resource and weapons scenarios that are unsettling at best and frightening at virtually every other level.

And then there was the Sixth Committee of the GA, dealing with grave matters that are indispensable to the functioning and credibility of the UN, including Rule of Law, responses to international terrorism, and International Justice.   These are matters both heady and consequential if the UN is to maintain the confidence of member states and the publics they serve.  Sixth Committee efforts to establish a more level playing field for states, to eliminate impunity for grave crimes against civilians committed by some of those same states, to ensure that our responses to terrorist threats are proportionate and human rights-based, and to insist that the behavior of UN staff and consultants in the field – including and especially peacekeepers – conforms to the values that lie at the core of the UN’s charter mandate,  these and related topics  are truly fundamental  to the lifeblood of the UN system.

And yet, in the vastness of the Trusteeship Council, you had to strain to hear even the echoes of policy relevance.   There were many empty seats in the rows of delegations.   There was virtually no one seated in the section reserved for UN agencies, apparently designations based on protocol more than on interest.   As for the NGOs, most of the rows (let alone seats) in the back were completely empty.  Indeed, the most movement in the room much of the time was the line of tourists filing through the back aisle, much to the (understandable) chagrin of conference services.

The point of this is not to be snarky, but to wonder what it is about this committee, and indeed this community, that fails to produce an attentive audience for such core considerations.   Friday was a case in point as the Sixth Committee took up issues related to the conduct of peacekeepers in the field;  how to promote “zero tolerance” — not a particularly high bar according to our peacekeeping fellow – and ensure that states are vigilant in their investigation and prosecution of abuses committed by their nationals (which may be a higher one).   Given the many layered implications of this discussion, including for Women, Peace and Security, it was odd that so few appeared to support committee efforts to rescue this dimension of the UN’s sometimes shaky reputation.

And there certainly was much of system-wide value to digest, including Malaysia’s call for more preventive measures emanating from the UN, not only directed at sexual violence but also the trafficking in persons and armaments that increase civilian threats and complicate response options.  Kenya underscored the degree to which abuse allegations within a few peacekeeping operations (PKOs) undermine confidence that future deployments will, as urged by Liberia, duly exercise their fundamental duty to care for persons in crisis.  And Ecuador, speaking on behalf of CELAC, cited “excessive use of force” by PKOs as a potential abuse also worthy of the UN’s full policy attention.

There was more to this discussion that invited a wider interest.  Both Algeria and the European Union urged much more rapid investigations and prosecutions after abuse allegations are made.  India suggested more state oversight of contributed troops and swift justice to those who abuse their positions.  The US called for more community based capacities that could help expose abuses of all kinds at earlier stages.  Guatemala urged special consideration for abuse allegations that involved minors, and South Africa noted that as the size of UN field staff and the complexity of their responsibilities grow, the need for more regular conduct reviews grows as well.

Two other suggestions with system-wide implications stood out from this conversation, both involving Norway speaking on behalf of the Nordic states.    First, with the European Union, Norway urged that sanctions and other measures be considered for use against states that fail to provide credible reports to the UN regarding state investigations and prosecutions of allegations of abuse by their citizens.  In the second instance, Norway joined with El Salvador and others to urge protection for “whistleblowers” seeking to highlight instances of abuse that some in the UN system would much prefer to ignore or dismiss.

As El Salvador made clear, the culture of “defending the UN at all costs” must come to an end.  We cannot improve, let alone heal, what we are unable or unwilling to face.   And there is no indication of this unwillingness as harmful to the integrity of any institution as the urge to “kill the messenger.”

As global challenges and their stakes both rise, tendencies to “kill” rather than consider will generally follow suit.  In such an environment, it will be harder to achieve what the Swiss suggested in 6th Committee – to take every possible action necessary to eliminate cycles of abuse in all UN operations.

In this, all of us have a role. The pleasure of our company is requested, in the Trusteeship Council chamber and elsewhere, in part because we know how elusive lasting change will be if we aren’t all bearing (and sharing) witness.  The doors to our policy participation and scrutiny are open.   We need to walk through more of them on a more regular basis and do whatever we can to help get abuse response and other key “rule of law” issues right.  It will be that much more difficult to achieve our security and development goals if we as a community fail fundamental tests of law and justice.

Sky King:  Policy and cultural consequences of the chaos circling our planet, Dr. Robert Zuber

16 Aug

Space Junk

At the end of July, the European Union hosted an event that was hopeful in content but also a bit jarring for some states regarding process.  A week-long session to push forward Multi-National Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities was held inside the UN with assistance from the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

As articulated by Mr. Jacek Bylica of the European External Action Service, the proposed Space Code of Conduct includes confidence-building measures that cover both civilian and military outer space activities.  The welcome goal is to “prevent space from becoming an area of conflict” in part by providing a voluntary framework to resolve disputes in outer space by peaceful means.

There is much value to be gained from such an activity. Where weapons are concerned, the UN is often accused of lagging far behind the negotiating curve, restricting weapons, as it were, that no state still covets, while turning a mostly blind eye to weapons innovations that are soon to dramatically change the security landscape.  The militarization of space would certainly qualify as a security “game changer,” though the proposed Space Code suggests no outright prohibitions against space weaponry, nor does it presume to propose standards that are “legally binding” in any relevant sense.  That states are attentive to some of the negative implications of the misuse of space while seeking to create the means for resolving space disputes is to be commended, though there are clearly urgent security-related dimensions of space use that such a Code is not yet prepared to address.

The trick moving forward is, as a number of states have brought out, to find the best means to merge the EU Code with relevant General Assembly measures, especially with regard to resolution 65/68 (which directly references the EU Code); as well as to any potential discussions that might take place in the Conference on Disarmament about “preventing an arms race in outer space.”  In this instance as in others, “doing the right thing” means doing it the “right way.”  Despite discouragement regarding how the UN copes with weapons challenges which has led to more efforts to pursue disarmament agreements outside of UN conference rooms, the EU surely recognizes that the path towards full, enthusiastic state negotiations on a Code of Conduct requires ongoing, supportive engagement with all relevant UN processes.

Listening to a good bit of the Code of Conduct discussion, my mind wandered in another direction.  It seemed as though the “space: beyond the outer reaches of our planetary biosphere was being described in these meetings as one might describe a messy apartment – clutter that impacts functionality and even breeds dangers.   But an apartment is a “home” as well as a locus of functionality as much as the sky beyond the clouds has psychic and cultural meaning beyond being a storage facility for communications equipment, spy satellites and abandoned spacecraft.

In this city (New York) where “quality time” with the sky is elusive at best, we live with the psychological consequences of restrictive urban vistas–specifically the tendency to behave as though we are the center of the universe rather than a spec in cosmic vastness.  To gaze skyward is to remind ourselves that our personal compromises and petty grievances are simply that – the growing proclivity to turn something casually important into major human drama.  There are satisfactory psychological explanations for this tendency, but the failure to see a larger picture is more a function of our limitations of habit than of psychic capacity.   We too often “practice petty” in our daily urban interactions, and thus the resulting social structures to which we contribute encourage more pettiness than is in our best and healthiest interest.

The ability to see a bigger picture and keeping that picture in focus as we attend to the concrete needs of persons and communities, should be a prerequisite for diplomatic and NGO service in multi-lateral frameworks.  That we so often mistake our particular aesthetic and moral preferences for universal interests represents a failure of our education and our politics.   We have been trained to pursue narrow self-interests not global ones, or even worse to equate narrow policy interests with universal consensus.  We have been trained to micro-manage outcomes rather than explore their many possibilities.  We have habituated ourselves to stare at the sidewalk (or into smaller and smaller digital spaces) rather than seek vistas where we can still gaze into the incomparably vast (though at this point apparently shrinking) cosmos. Hopefully we can continue to find places for gazing can both re-calibrate our often intensely limited contexts, and maybe even increase our commitment to keeping space free of deadly weapons and other needless junk.

This last point illustrates another, more ominous reason to gaze skyward now, as our windows into eternity are littered with debris and danger – debris from all the matter we have launched into space that both enables and threatens this digital age, and danger from all of the “dual use” and single-focus devices that spy and coordinate attacks on our “enemies.”  Space might well be, as the Star Trek introduction puts it, “the final frontier.”  But more and more that “frontier” is brimming with both space junk and deployed (and projected) weapons systems, systems that will forever alter traditional security equations and that threaten to fundamentally change what remains of our positive, healthful and even romantic relationship to sky.

As one who has thrived on relatively unimpeded galaxy views from Oklahoma to South Africa, I mourn the ongoing encasing of our planet in more and more dangerous junk. Indeed, that old television phrase “look out below” will never have more relevance than at the point when we master the ability to rain destruction from the heavens on the unsuspecting, merely at the push of a button.  This newest level of militarized abstraction will inevitably increase levels of public insecurity, perhaps dramatically so. It will surely also compromise the wonder and benefits of gazing into the heavens, a source of awe and inspiration for so many millions over so many centuries.

New ‘Developments’ in the Council’s Sphere of Concern Dr. Robert Zuber

18 Jan

On Monday January 19, Chile (president of the Security Council for January) will lead Council members and other state representatives in a debate on Inclusive development for the maintenance of international peace and security.  It is anticipated that the Secretary-General will brief the Council as will Peacebuilding Commission President, Amb. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), and 2011 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Leymah Gbowee.

In preparation for the debate, Chile prepared and distributed a fine Concept Note that provided a rationale for Council deliberations on this important linkage at this critical time.  Indeed, consistent with Chile’s competent and comprehensive grasp of security issues, the Note squarely hit a number of high points, including a focus on women’s participation in all aspects of peacebuilding, a reaffirmation of the primacy of states in the prevention of conflict, and a clear signal of Council recognition regarding the corrosive influence of “exclusion” on efforts to preserve peace and security. Highlighting  contributions to these sorts of discussions from the 2010 Dili Declaration was also most appropriate.

From our standpoint, perhaps the most important affirmation in the Concept Note highlighted the role of armed conflict as an obstacle to development, noting its potential to destroy “the political, social, economic and cultural fabric of societies.”   Indeed, the impacts of armed violence on all dimensions of development – including environmental protection – are staggering.  This is in part what seems to be motivating so many in the development community to advocate for a ‘peace goal’ within the post-2015 framework as highlighted in, among other publications, WFUNA’s latest issue of Acronym.

In addition, as noted in our own forthcoming publication with Mexico’s Instituto Mora, in sectors of Latin America and other global settings the reverse is also the case – poverty, discrimination and broken development commitments exacerbating trafficking in narcotics, persons and weapons, all of which undermine social cohesion at many levels.   This ‘violence’ might not rise to the level of ‘armed conflict’ that triggers direct Council response, but its exacerbating characteristics are clear and compelling, precisely what Chile’s admonition to pursue more robust ‘early warning’ mechanisms should motivate us all to address more actively.

As usual, we will be in the Council on the 19th listening attentively to member state concerns, and there surely be many, from suggestions of enhanced linkages to concerns about Council over-reach.   We share these and other concerns.   Regarding linkages, there are few examples of Council engagement as ‘ripe’ for recognition of complementary efforts as this one.  Indeed, during the time of this Council debate, the GA will be meeting on stocktaking in the process of intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda.  The Disarmament Commission (not noted for its wide-ranging commitment to UN system complementarity) will also meet during this time to discuss its April session goals.   Moreover, the coming week is full of relevant side-events, including a Netherlands-sponsored event on Women, Peace and Security, “Seeking Synergy with the Reviews on Peace Operations and Peacebuilding.”

While recognizing that the Council is not structured to be a ‘bulletin board’ of overlapping events, the failure of the Concept Note to make more specific mention of the timely and far-reaching efforts by the UN system to harmonize the development and security pillars seems needlessly negligent to us.   The Concept Note does mention the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, and certainly with good reason. But given recent, dramatic, systemic efforts on post-2015 goals and growing, global concerns about security relationships (with or without support for a stand-alone ‘peace goal’), it would have been wise for the Note to have been more generous in its complementary recognitions, especially given the ‘downstream’ nature of much PBC activity and the compelling ‘upstream’ mood characteristic of so many post-2015 discussions.

And this leads to our second point, that the failure to recognize these other, active agents of change on security and development reinforces for some a concern that the Council still has not yet satisfied its ‘appetite’ for the control of thematic interests more skillfully engaged elsewhere in the system.  We have commented many times on why an expanding Council understanding of peace and security responsibilities must come attached to more humble and accountable ‘seizings’ coupled with a robust and generous recognition of related work taking place elsewhere in the UN system.   We strongly urge member states during Monday’s debate to offer this recognition at every relevant opportunity.

The Council simply must learn to better engage issues of interest without appearing to control policy outcomes or undermine colleagues active in other parts of the UN system.  As it rightly prepares for security-related challenges posed by development inadequacies and outright failures, the Council still has a small ‘development’ issue of its own to deal with.

A Call for Stable and Peaceful Policies

4 May

On April 25, Global Action joined with other civil society organizations (WFUNA, FES, WILPF) in launching an initiative to support the work of the Office of the President of the UN General Assembly in promoting the cross-cutting theme, “Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies.”  These organizations affirm the important value of this theme as the UN seeks adoption of a new (and hopefully expanded) set of sustainable development goals.

Our event immediately followed a day and a half long Thematic Debate in the General Assembly on ‘Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies’ that sought to field comment outlining both state aspirations and responsibilities within this dynamic normative framework.

As one might anticipate, the range of lenses that diplomats sought to include in their analysis of ‘stable and peaceful societies,’ was quite broad.   This is as it should be.  The normative framework suggested by this Thematic Debate touches on all facets of the UN’s work as diplomats were quick to acknowledge.   Some, like Qatar and Israel, noted the need for more ‘honest and responsible governance.’ Cuba underscored the deep divides that must be overcome between rich and poor.  Switzerland called for dramatic improvements in accessible public space.  Japan called for more attention to the management of ‘disaster risk.’ Australia, Nicaragua and others highlighted the need for more efforts to empower women.  Ecuador called for restraints on over-consumption and the end of what it called ‘speculative economies.’  Argentina affirmed the need for more attention to ‘rule of law’ obligations.  Egypt called for more efforts to address ‘massive refugee flows.’  Kenya noted challenges to peace represented by both illicit weapons and shortages of precious water.  The US and others clarified and solidified the linkages between violence and impediments to the fulfillment of development priorities.  Indonesia called for internal UN reforms to better serve the interests of a ‘rebalanced’ economic system.

On and on it went for over a day: states sometimes being provocative but mostly pointing out diverse elements of the massive, multi-dimensional undertaking that is ‘stable and peaceful societies.’   The Thematic Debate in the GA underscored the degree to which challenges associate with all three pillars that delineate the UN’s primary responsibilities – peace and security, human rights and development –   must be addressed in tandem.  Indeed, our growing populations and shrinking access to available resources; our increasingly sophisticated, digitally-driven military tools; and a new set of often-gruesome human rights responsibilities from Damascus to Bangui are more than sufficient to keep the policy community engaged at multiple levels.    The bar is set high here. The expectations for action coming from beyond UN headquarters are considerable.   This is not a ball we can afford to drop.

We know from the NGO side that we need to do more to support states and UN secretariat officials in keeping linkages relevant to the promotion of ‘stable and peaceful societies’ fresh among diverse stakeholders.  This involves a deeper level of partnership commitment, more than simply telling diplomats what’s missing and what ‘they’ need to do about it.    Through our own related initiatives, we seek to take more responsibility for goal setting and implementation, to do more to redress imbalances and end violence than merely pointing out the limitations of others.

As the presidency of the General Assembly shifts from year to year, we can do our part to be both facilitator and ‘institutional memory’ when it comes to ‘stable and peaceful societies.’     This involves a commitment to work closely and effectively with the new GA president’s staff on another round of diplomatic engagements with this thematic issue.  But it also involves a commitment to take account of broader fields of inquiry and their stakeholders, to perceive wider relevance and open doors to different kinds of constituent participation. ‘Stable and peaceful societies’ represents both a compelling aspiration and a profound test of our policy commitment and maturity.   This is one test we need to study hard for.

Dr. Robert Zuber

Shock and Awe: The C34 Finishes Its Report

9 Apr

After 30 days of negotiation, re-negotiation, and a little bit more negotiation, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — also known by its shorter title of ‘the C34’ — produced a report for 2014. The report, which examines the ‘whole question’ of peacekeeping – from DDR to policies on procurement – is meant to offer guidance on UN peacekeeping policy. (We will have more to say about the report shortly.) Thus we trust that some of the key recommendations will now be ‘operationalised’ primarily through the UN’s Department of Field Support, and Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As far as intergovernmental processes go, completing a report does not register much surprise. However, it is quite an achievement for the assorted members of the committee to produce this report after they failed to do so during the previous year’s session.

With the success of the process this year (delegates even managed to wrap things up by 17.30 on the final day), one could easily be deceived into believing that all is fine in the land of peacekeeping governance.  However, the development of peacekeeping over the last 6-12 months has demonstrated the degree to which the C34 process is in need of stringent examination, a process which continually reminds the actors involved in peacekeeping policy of the precarious situation that such policy now often finds itself in.

The state of peacekeeping policymaking at the UN can be visualized as three concentric rings, or cogs:

1)    First, Longer term policy developments – this is the slowest of the cogs in the UN system, as it involves the widest array of actors and policy issues. This is where the C34 comes in, supplementing the development of structural changes in the DPKO/DFS and doctrinal developments (‘principles and guidelines’) such as in the new Horizons Process. The fruits of this process often have to find agreement of a wider range of member states, as well as operationalization by the Secretariat.

2)    Second are Operational demands –These refer to responses to threats taking the form of mandates for peacekeeping operations through the Security Council and Secretariat, from the surge in operations at the beginning and end of the 1990s to current developments in Mali, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some of those operations have considerable ramifications for what we have traditionally come to know as ‘peacekeeping.’

3)    The final cog is comprised of ‘Shocks’ – these come in the form of often-avoidable events which shake up peacekeeping practice. For instance: The killing of US servicemen in Somalia in 1992, the Rwandan Genocide, the massacre in Srebrenica, the sexual exploitation and abuse scandals in the early 2000s, and the possible political and legal ramifications from the Cholera outbreak in Haiti. At times these shocks happen due to significant failures at a tactical level. However, sometimes they come about as a result of urgent operational demands working on a different timeline than longer term policy developments.

It can be observed that peacekeeping in the UN is currently stretched in such a policy dynamic: in particular the shorter-term operational and the longer-term policy seem to be working at dramatically different speeds. This is to be expected to a certain extent as, from time to time, urgent operational demands must overtake careful policy development. Moreover, longer-term policy cannot always spin on a dime, with the most coherent and effective policy sometimes taking a considerable time and patience to develop.

However, the past six months have seen operational demands which have significantly challenged the core principles of peacekeeping – the impartiality of a deployed peacekeeping force, the need for strategic consent from the host state, and changes regarding the minimum use of force (apart from self defence and the defence of the mandate). There is a clear and even stark contrast between operational developments – most clearly seen in the Security Council – and deliberations related to longer-term planning — seen through statements from the C34 in which member states consistently refer back to the prominence of core principles.

For instance, in his briefing to the Security Council about the UNMISS operation in South Sudan, USG for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, failed to acknowledge the role of consent as a pillar of the UNMISS operation, while outlining his plan to withdraw capacity building for the government and opposition and focus purely on the impartial protection of civilians. As laudable as the protection of civilians is in South Sudan, the deafening silence concerning host nation consent sets the operation on a precarious path, particularly when the UN’s own reports cite the host government as a primary coordinator of attacks against UNMISS. In the larger picture of peacekeeping policy development, this is even more problematic – if a peacekeeping mission can continue to be deployed without host nation support, what does this mean for peacekeeping’s claim of impartial response?

Additionally, the assessment of UNMISS, and planning for deployment in the Central African Republic are both taking place at the same time as the UN is undertaking tricky negotiations over reimbursement rates for peacekeepers. Levels of financial reimbursement are being closely linked by some states to levels of preparedness of peacekeepers and the equipment that accompanies them in the field. Moreover, Troop Contributors wish to see an even higher rate of reimbursement in situations where they send soldiers into particularly hazardous environments. Linking this to debates in the Security Council where peacekeepers are being mandated to deploy in areas with high levels of insecurity, with little formalized peace processes in place, and (as in the case of MONUSCO) with part of the mission recalibrated to launch offensive combat operations against belligerents, gaps in the timing of policy formulation – including policy on reimbursement — are more pronounced.

In addition to these gaps, a trend exists which considers the Security Council as the primary anchor point in peacekeeping policy, particularly visible among advocacy groups. For instance, advocacy around the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has seen a considerable level of activity at the UN Security Council (most pertinently around operations), but nothing comparable at the C34. No statement from the joint office on R2P/genocide prevention has been made at the C34; the concept is not referred to at all in this year’s C34 report, nor does it appear in other iterations of the UN’s peacekeeping policy machinery (for instance the Principles and Guidelines). The level of ‘impact’ from advocacy at Security Council level may potentially be greater, but there is a danger in neglecting other capacities established to develop peacekeeping policy, thereby reinforcing the belief by Security Council membership (in particular Permanent Members), that they are the only drivers of such policy.

From our perspective, strengthening the role and functionality of the C34 is essential – that this year’s report was approved is no small feat. However, work towards the strengthening of the report, the level to which the report’s policy recommendations can be operationalized, is a task for the coming year. Secondly, there needs to be a bit more humility from those member states in the Security Council who too often feel that their idea of peacekeeping is the only viable way forward. Statements made regarding the CAR as being a ‘new type of operation’ seemed to ride roughshod over years of (admittedly imperfect) peacekeeping development which began at the end of the 1990s. Thirdly, contributors to the C34 need to develop and utilize their own strengths to facilitate peacekeeping research. The growth of peacekeeping training centers within a growing number of states brings with it opportunities of spreading “lessons learned” and cultivating more nuanced levels of understanding. Finally, those advocacy groups seeking policy relevance solely through tracking Security Council resolutions and debates may have to revisit their strategies, or at least examine the extent to which they can also support the longer term policy approaches represented by the C34.

The fear is that if longer term policy and shorter-term operational demands continue to move at such radically different speeds, then the UN could find itself in a similar position as the beginning of the 1990’s. As those who follow the history of peacekeeping knows, the 1990’s contained plenty of shocks.  Another generation of preventable ‘shocks’ is in the best interests of no one.

Dr. David Curran, GAPW Peacekeeping Fellow

UN General Assembly President John Ashe on Climate Change: The Need for Swift and Collective Action

25 Jan

The sitting president of the 68th United Nations General Assembly John Ashe, a trained bio-engineer from the Caribbean islands Antigua and Barbuda, has for a long time dedicated his energy and expertise to the causes of climate change and sustainability.

According to a biographical note published by the UN Department of Information:

Ashe successfully led negotiations that resulted in Chapter X of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and co-chaired the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012. In 2004, he presided over the thirteenth session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, the body responsible for reviewing programmes on the implementation of Agenda 21, the blueprint for rethinking economic growth, advancing social equity and ensuring environmental protection. He was the first Chairman of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ashe also chaired the Convention’s Subsidiary Body on Implementation and, most recently, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.

According to Ashe: “I still have a passion for these topics. I am no longer involved in the day to day negotiations as far as climate change goes, but I still do follow the issues. The most recent event where I was involved in my capacity as President of the General Assembly was the climate conference in Warsaw.”

He set the stage for sustainability post 2015 by making this issue the last General Assembly’s main theme. Early on he warned that climate change can have severe, disruptive consequences for economies across the globe, a topic that will be discussed at this week’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland.

In an interview with news channel Al Jazeera, Ashe pointed out:

“In the Caribbean, one of the biggest dangers — and it’s frequently overlooked — is the effect of a hurricane on the economy. One hurricane can set back a country’s economy by decades. And if a scientist predicts that these are going to be more frequent, you can imagine the alarm bells that are ringing down there in terms of climate change.”

When you move on from the GA president’s office, how do you hope to stay involved with the urgent matters of sustainability and climate change you have dedicated so much time and expertise to?

I don’t know what happens on September 16, 2014, but the interest in the issues will certainly not die away; I will still find some way to stay engaged.

A recently leaked draft report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, published last week by the New York Times, described the following, “Another 15 years of failure to limit carbon emissions could make the problem virtually impossible to solve with current technologies, experts found.” How would you comment on this statement? What should be the immediate consequences?

These findings are not new. Just today Secretary General Ban Ki-moon gave a briefing to member states on his priorities for 2014 and he reminded member states that he intends to convene the climate change summit here at UN headquarters in September of this year. (A summit that will prepare member states for the climate change convention in Paris in 2015.) In my summing-up of the meeting, I reminded member states that the goal we all hope to achieve is a legally binding agreement, attained by all parties to the climate change convention in 2015, at the conference in Paris. But it should not be an agreement for the sake of having one. It should be ambitious in content with defined targets and timelines for every single party, irrespective of whether it is classified as an industrial country or a developing country.

An NBC report from yesterday notes that the number of Americans who don’t believe in climate change is rising. How do you explain that trend?

They say leadership starts at the top. Recent developments here in the US would lead one to the sad conclusion that the interest within the current US administration seems to be waning. It was never going to be easy, but I think with the other concerns that have risen, particularly on the political front, it doesn’t leave one with much hope that we will suddenly see an upwelling of interest in the climate change issue here in the US. One would hope that this would not be the case, but if one looks at the climate change induced events that have taken place outside of the US, I think it would be a sad commentary if citizens of this country did not at least take note.

Once a clear environmental leader but now consumed by the looming economic crisis, the European Union is likely to set a more cautious tone for the global debate on climate with new green energy guides released this week. What would you wish from Europe in terms of climate change, reduction goals in carbon emissions, and expansion targets for renewable energies?

I am not aware of this particular development, but if that is the cause of action taken by the EU than I think the message sent would be negative. We who have followed this debate for quite some time got quite used to the EU being in the forefront. I simply hope that that would continue to be the case, especially because the seminal conference will take place in Paris in 2015.

Recently I heard the German scientist Ulrich von Weizsaecker speaking at the Open Working Group on SDG’s about the possible need to provide a psychological crutch for the global North regarding the implementation of reduced consumption and carbon emission, if the South would signal the willingness to cooperate. Is there a bit of a global North-South, South-North blame game going on? And if yes, how could that be avoided, going forward?

There have always been differences in approach regarding the climate change question between the North and South and that probably will be so for quite some time. There is a feeling that the industrialized countries were supposed to take the lead and they have not yet done so. I am sure those would argue differently. And until that happens, developing countries, where the emphasis has always been on the eradication of poverty, should not be asked to assume additional burdens. We have a global problem that requires a global solution, and for that to happen each and every country has to assume some sort of responsibility. I think time is certainly running out and until the proverbial all hands are on deck we will be forever looking back and say twenty years from now, we should have acted faster. And certainly we should have done so, collectively.

How effective in your opinion has the 68th GA session been in order to present and push the agenda for sustainability efficiently within the UN system and publicly?

The theme of the 68th session is the post 2015 development agenda. We are looking at the broader development question and development agenda and climate change could be a key part of it. We should keep in mind that climate change, as far as negotiations go, are handled outside of the GA as per the wish of its member states. But at some point in time, it will all go together, hopefully in 2015.

Lia Petridis Maiello, GAPW Media Consultant

The original interview was published with The Huffington Post.