Tag Archives: peacekeeping

A New Source of Skills for Crisis Prevention and Management

14 Nov

Editor’s note:  The following is from Gord Breedyk, currently in residence at GAPW where he is exploring ways that the UN can connect with his own work at Civilian Peace Service Canada. GAPW has long been supportive of this civilian-based initiative and plans to stay connected longer term. We need more of the skills and competencies that Gord and his team help to assess. 

I have recently been given the privilege of working with Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) including observing and learning from UN meetings.  These meetings have ranged from Security Council briefings on Gaza, Mali, Syria and Ukraine to committee deliberations on: Human Rights; Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control; Interstate Arbitration and Enforcement of Decisions; Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support; International Law and Asymmetric Warfare; Women Redefining the Terms of Peace Negotiations; the Peacebuilding Commission’s response to Ebola; the Power of Entrepreneurship; and a Report on the Economic and Social Repercussions of the Israeli Occupation. And this is but a tiny sample of all the meetings taking place in a relatively typical fall week at the UN.

Hugely impressive to an outside observer is the breadth and depth of subject matter deliberated by UN delegates; also the overall dedication, civility and mutual respect  practised by most of them,  often despite deeply held and contradictory views, and often despite  significant frustration at the apparent inability of the UN as an institution to a) prevent what often seem to be relatively predictable catastrophes and b) adequately deal with them once they do materialize financially, operationally and, yes,  politically.

For example (paraphrased), “Why bother rebuilding Palestine …it may be destroyed again in months or years?,” two delegates recently asked the Commissioner General for UNRWA. The Commissioner answered, “It is a human imperative to rebuild – we must.”

Rebuilding is one thing. Prevention, even transformation of conflict-related threats that can minimize destruction is quite another. But where is the capacity and skill needed to prevent and mediate conflict going to come from?  We feel that the UN would be well-served by engaging Accredited Peace Professionals as a supplement to the UN’s own recent commitments to involve more civilians in its operations.

Like well-trained doctors, lawyers, engineers, soldiers, etc., Accredited Peace Professionals are practitioners in the field of international negotiation, mediation, arbitration and diplomacy. These practitioners are held to high professional standards through rigorous assessment of values and competencies in the peace field and, once qualified, formally accredited as meeting the required standards.

To quote Cameron Chisholm of the International Peace & Security Institute (IPSI): “Doctors are educated in both theory and practice before they ever enter the operating room. Why should peacebuilding be any less professional?”  And he goes on to say “It shouldn’t be!”

How would Accredited Peace Professionals supplement Peacekeepers and other UN capacity?  Whereas  UN Peacekeepers are primarily military professionals providing (increasingly complex) mandated peacekeeping services in areas of conflict, Peace Professionals are accredited for competencies and values in preventing, mitigating and transforming conflict in all aspects. As with any other profession (including the military) these professionals will have met the standards relevant for their peace/mediation vocation.  In other words, Peace Professionals have demonstrated skills in areas that Peacekeepers struggle to address as part of their increasingly complex mandates.

What difference could this additional assessed capacity make?  The UN and its agencies could benefit from the skills and energies of hundreds, ultimately thousands of highly trained, thoroughly assessed Accredited Peace Professionals, persons focused on reducing the number of violent conflicts and the levels of conflict (where they still occur) and, significantly, minimizing the impact on civilians including damage to their infrastructure.  Such professionals would also ease demands on UN and member state resources.  A reduction in civilian lives lost and/or in the numbers of IDPs and refugees would more than offset the cost of deploying Accredited Peace Professionals.

Civilian Peace Service Canada (CPSC) has developed and piloted an assessment and accreditation methodology that has withstood academic and professional scrutiny. Its rigour ensures dedicated and competent professionals ready for service in peace and mediation related fields. We are now looking to significantly grow the number of Accredited Peace Professionals to meet the growing capacity gaps at the UN and elsewhere. (More on this at: www.civilianpeaceservice.ca).

We are aware and supportive of the need expressed in different UN settings for more gender balance in areas of mediation and other peace processes.  But there is a broader need as well.  We simply don’t have enough capacity to handle all of the crises (and threats of crises) that are the focus of so many UN briefings and discussions.   Accredited Peace Professionals can help fill this gap.

Gordon Breedyk, Civilian Peace Service Canada

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Fire and Rain:  The Council Divides its Urgent Attentions

31 Aug

The world is, to reference the Washington Post and virutally every other media outlet, beset with crises.   From Mali to Ukraine, hardly a day goes by without at least one new eruption of hostility, one new warning that the armed violence we struggle to manage may well be entering a new and more potent phase.

At such times, eyes are cast towards the UN Security Council hoping that its ‘maintenance of peace and security’ mandate will translate into policies and actions that can put out some of the fires ranging across half the world, or at the very least lower their searing heat.

The Council is trying hard to do just that, but there are simply too many fires raging, too many escalating conflict zones, any one of which could take up Council members’ full attention.  We find the Council careening from one issue to another, focusing on Syria one week but not the next; obsessing on the ISIS threat while diverting attention from Gaza; assuming that a soon-to-be-deployed peacekeeping operation in Central African Republic will stop that bleeding while Libya disintegrates before our eyes.   Only Ukraine, and that in large measure because of the involvement of permanent Council members and their large militaries, tends to keep its Council focus.

Under the presidency of the United Kingdom, the Council had a busy and varied August, which including a ‘field trip’ to the Hague, Somalia and other locations; some forceful efforts to limit the length of statements, even by governments that have limited access to the Council and are party to grave conflict; and at least two important discussions – one on protection of humanitarian workers and the other on UN capacities for preventive response to violence prior to its full eruption.

Both of these discussions brought out a range of deep UN member state anxieties.   The loss of life from the community of humanitarian workers is shocking and worthy of both great honor and urgent response.  Most of us can barely imagine the challenges of bringing relief to people isolated by violence and abandoned by governments and insurgencies alike.  In the case of the prevention discussion, it is somehow reassuring to those who carefully follow Council deliberations that there be an acknowledgement of how untenable the current situation is, a situation that lends itself to short-term crisis management rather than the longer term crisis prevention which  is closer to our common hope.

In life as in policy, it is often the things left unsaid that are of more significance than those which are named.  This also pertains to webcast Council meetings where statements too often traverse well-worn paths that seem to be designed to ‘inform’ constituents more than sharing thoughtful policy assessment.  In these discussions, there is much text devoted to what Council members care about and occasionally even what they are prepared to do about it.   But much of that is in the form of general recommendations that offer neither kernels of lessons learned nor honest assessments of the failures of past policy.   When the Council speaks of the disintegration of Libya, for instance, while defending (or ignoring altogether) the Council’s resolution authorizing ‘all necessary means’ to stop Gaddafi and the ethnic chaos and the grotesque and highly fluid arms market that were left in its aftermath, it is natural to wonder if Council members are paying enough attention to the longer-term implications of their own decisions.   The rest of us, after all, can ignore the potential consequences of our life choices only at our peril.

So what about those unmentioned items with significant policy reference?   Briefly, two stood out.   In the case of humanitarian workers, we were hoping that someone on the Council would raise clearly the uncomfortable relationship for these workers being protected by peacekeepers who are increasingly seen as partisan, in part because of the expansion of peacekeeping mandates, especially regarding use of coercive force beyond the mantra of “self-defense and the defense of the mandate. “  Such forward projection of force, which in the DRC seem to have won the confidence of diverse UN officials, need to be more carefully vetted from the standpoint of their implication for the safety of already beleaguered humanitarian operations.  As we have seen in South Sudan and just this weekend with capture of Fiji and Filipino peacekeepers, there are legitimate concerns about playing with peacekeeper neutrality in a manner that can jeopardize the safety of more than peacekeepers.  The more that others – states as well as ‘spoilers’ — see PKOs as partisan forces, the more likely that affiliated UN humanitarian workers and other ‘country team’ members could be dragged into threatening situations caused by such ‘partisan’ conflict.

On prevention, the ‘debate’ style format elicited many comments from non-Council members, most of which were laced with anxiety about the state of the world and the Council’s often tepid responses.  From our standpoint, there needed to be more commentary from Council members about the dangers of continually ignoring the smoke that signifies potential danger.   We would also have liked to see more representation in the debate from the people who manage the understaffed and too often ignored preventive architecture of the UN system.

We are extremely grateful to outgoing High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and felt that her presence at the debate added considerable value.   But there are others who also should have been in that chamber, including the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. The Council is unlikely to successfully shift its distracted gaze towards prevention responsibilities without routinely acknowledging and consulting with those already tasked with preventive functions.

As our understanding of conflict-related threats continues to grow, opportunities for Council over-stretch will grow likewise.   The discussions this month pointed again to the grave need for Council members to engage the full measure of the UN’s preventive capacity as well as to demonstrate to an anxious global public why they believe that the  current crop of Council resolutions and related responses to the many violent outbreaks now on its agenda are both sufficiently mindful of the needs of humanitarian workers and also more likely to suppress violence in the end than to inflame it further.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Regions of Hope

2 Aug

On the last Monday in July, under Rwanda’s leadership, the Security Council held an open debate on peacekeeping operations, specifically on an examination of the evolution of relationships binding the UN with regional operations such as those developed and maintained by ECOWAS and the African Union.

This issue of ‘regionalization’ had come up earlier in the year when the Council was set to authorize a peacekeeping operation for the Central African Republic, now scheduled for deployment in mid-September.   This authorization, which would involve substantial ‘rehatting’ of troops already committed to the African-led International Support Mission (MISCA), bred some discontent.  At the time of authorization in April, AU officials expressed concern that the Council was undermining the authority of MISCA, authority that would be crucial over the coming months of perilous duty required to protect as many civilians in CAR as possible while patiently awaiting deployment of the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSCA).

While AU representatives were less challenging of the Council during the July debate, it is clear that fault lines persist.  Among those lines, the following should receive more policy consideration:

First, there is general agreement that authorization of regional peacekeeping activity by the Security Council increases its legitimacy.  And, as Russia, China and others noted, it is critically important for regional security organizations to stay connected to the Council.  But at what point does ‘connection’ look too much like ‘permission?’   The Council must find the right balance between fulfilling its Charter obligations and supporting, in the words of the US, the actions of ‘neighbors’ taking responsibility for protecting each other.

Second, the Council must continue to refresh its list of core peacekeeping partners including, as urged by Pakistan, the League of Arab States.   In this context, the apparent willingness of the European Union to consider a return to a more robust engagement with UN peacekeeping is a suggestion that should be readily seized.  Moreover, the increasing capability of regional security organizations, including UNASUR in Latin America, gives comfort that, under the right circumstances and with sufficient confidence building, we can sustain the capacity needed to prevent and protect.

Third, there has been much discussion about the need for ‘rapid response’ capacity, which seems to have evolved steadily from a focus on standing UN capacity to regional iterations. Given the slow speeds at which an over-burdened Council often makes decisions, at what point does the need for authorization undermine the benefits of rapid response?  In other words, at what point in a protracted negotiation with a regional organization seeking to respond to the threat of conflict is ‘rapid’ no longer rapid?

With fires raging on so many regional fronts, it is clear that the Council needs to integrate and support as many partners as possible, not only in Africa but wherever competent, accountable, rapid-response capacity can be found.   It is equally clear that more attention to fire prevention and less to fire extinguishing remain in order, both for the UN and its growing roster of regional partners.

However, the Council has generally and, as noted recently by Jordan, Luxembourg and other members, given short order to early warning, mediation and other prevention measures.   Later this month, the UK as Council president for August will convene a general debate on prevention.   In this effort, partnership development is important, both with existing UN capacities such as the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect as well as with regional entities organized and committed to diverse and robust forms of violence prevention.

At this upcoming debate and elsewhere, the Council must find ways to give places of honor to both sets of partners.   The pattern of addressing conflict past its formative phases and with capacity that is both late arriving and insufficient to some of the massive conflicts that peacekeepers and other agents of UN response are expected to address is one that simply must evolve.    In this context, we especially welcomed Argentina’s recent call for more ‘strategic thinking’ with the entire UN membership that could lead to fewer ‘emergency Council meetings,’ thinking that can help us find the ways and means to fight fires before they actually ignite.  Such thinking could also increase the participation and confidence of member states with their own strategic ties to the regional organizations that have become so critical to the success of UN peacekeeping efforts.

For so many victims or those fearing to become victims, timing is everything; getting the right capacity into the right positions as quickly as possible.   The Council has a moral imperative to ensure diverse and timely capacity to regions in conflict, but an equally critical imperative to ‘maintain’ the peace and not only react once the peace has been shattered.   There is hope that more regional engagement and more preventative measures, together with a Council increasingly seized of its own burdens and limitations, can result in a more effective spectrum of response in these dangerous times.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Reservations for Five:   Building Confidence in the UN’s Peacekeeping Response

5 Jul

GAPW was fortunate to be present in Conference Room 1 on July 3 for a special panel “United Nations command and control arrangements: Progress, opportunities and challenges,” for an audience consisting largely of senior diplomats and military advisers.

The meeting featured Ambassadors from Ireland (the Sponsoring Government) Pakistan (a frequent contributor to PKOs) and Rwanda (current Security Council president) along with USG Henri Ladsous and Lieutenant General Joseph Owonibi, a former field commander from Nigeria.   These five shared perspectives on the range of responsibilities now undertaken by PKOs and how command and control (C2) structures must further adjust if they are to be trusted to meet those challenges.

In many ways the tone of the discussion was framed by USG Ladsous and General Owonibi.  Ladsous had the fewest ‘reservations,’ taking the view that peacekeeping operations are mostly functioning as they should.  He expressed particular pleasure (as he has done in the past) with the Force Intervention Brigade, part of MONUSCO’s operation in the DRC.   As much as we hold DPKO in high regard and have expressed great admiration for its capacity to navigate increasingly complex and demanding mandates with limited resources, we continue to have our own reservations about the implications of the Brigade, about the lack of a robust, preventive architecture at the UN, as well as some of the specifics regarding how the Security Council discharges its ‘business’ of formulating, issuing and assessing peacekeeping mandates.

As the one panelist with significant field experience (and given that there were few contributions from the audience), it was largely up to General Owonibi to provide a dose of ‘field reality.’   Owonibi admitted that PKO demands and challenges have increased since he was in the field, and he was thus properly modest in his assessment of DPKO’s level of response to such demands. Nonetheless, he was able to pinpoint some of the communications problems, mandates inconsistencies, and layers of Troop Contributing Country (TCC) resistance that combine to hamper PKO effectiveness.

One issue that came up was related to training, or more precisely its absence.   Owonibi and others described the almost unimaginable scenario of field commanders responsible for troops with whom they have not previously trained.   To summon up what for some might be a compelling, current analogy, this would be like a football coach sending a team onto the pitch without anyone having a clue regarding the strengths, limitations, career backgrounds, playing habits, etc. of his/her players.  In the life or death scenarios increasingly faced by PKOs, such knowledge limitations can be deadly for troops and civilians alike.

For all of the welcome references to the need for C2 flexibility to respond effectively to new and often sudden security emergencies (such as those emanating from terrorists), Owonibi also communicated the concern that field commanders too often operate in a bit of a policy vacuum, with little access to clear evaluations that can help commanders implement mandates (and protect troops from needless danger) more effectively. Authority, he noted, can be delegated, but it should not be divided.   He might also have added that the application of authority can and must be flexible, but the sources of that authority should be clear, consistent and, as noted by Pakistan, readily available for consultations and assessments as needed.

Another critical issue raised several times during the panel is that of national caveats, TCCs that identify ‘conditions’ for mission participation that become part of the equation that drive responses from field commanders, putting them in the position of not only responding to threats but attempting to do so in a way that does not undermine agreements with contributing countries.  Again, a football analogy is in order here – the puzzling scenario wherein coaches must take into account the contracted limitations of players before deploying them in the match.  While no specific troop or equipment-related caveats were stated by panelists, the need to reduce such caveats within Memorandum of Understanding has been recognized for some time (see for instance https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP973-Report.pdf).  It is challenging enough to find commanders who can lead effectively in multinational security environments. Reducing caveats that can complicate C2 and potentially deflect attention from compelling external contingencies (including civilians under siege) would seem to be the highest priority.

It should be noted that the ‘caveat’ problem was attributed by Owonibi to ‘national interest’ which of course is a persistent and anticipated component of any seconded force.   But perhaps ‘national interest’ as the singular rationale for caveats needs a bit of interrogation in its own right.  Perhaps it would also be wise to take more seriously the logistical and policy impacts when national contingents are deployed in dangerous situations under highly complex mandates with insufficient training and limited equipment, all of which are ‘authorized’ by permanent Security Council members whose direct involvement in PKO command and control is limited at best.  Such scenarios would legitimately raise ‘reservations’ for military leaders from many national contexts.  Clearly, if we want fewer of these ‘reservations,’ we need to demonstrate more sensitivity to their origins.

For many reasons, these are the sorts of briefings that ought to happen more often at UNHQ.   At the UN, among NGOs and within individual missions, there seems to be only modest interest in the logistical successes and challenges of PKOs.   Given how many diverse responsibilities are being heaped on PKOs, the deficiencies attributed to inadequate resources, and the impact of PKO success and failure on the public’s general assessment of the UN’s institutional legitimacy, more system-wide attentiveness inspired by events such as this one would seem to be in order.

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

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Shock and Awe: The C34 Finishes Its Report

9 Apr

After 30 days of negotiation, re-negotiation, and a little bit more negotiation, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — also known by its shorter title of ‘the C34’ — produced a report for 2014. The report, which examines the ‘whole question’ of peacekeeping – from DDR to policies on procurement – is meant to offer guidance on UN peacekeeping policy. (We will have more to say about the report shortly.) Thus we trust that some of the key recommendations will now be ‘operationalised’ primarily through the UN’s Department of Field Support, and Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As far as intergovernmental processes go, completing a report does not register much surprise. However, it is quite an achievement for the assorted members of the committee to produce this report after they failed to do so during the previous year’s session.

With the success of the process this year (delegates even managed to wrap things up by 17.30 on the final day), one could easily be deceived into believing that all is fine in the land of peacekeeping governance.  However, the development of peacekeeping over the last 6-12 months has demonstrated the degree to which the C34 process is in need of stringent examination, a process which continually reminds the actors involved in peacekeeping policy of the precarious situation that such policy now often finds itself in.

The state of peacekeeping policymaking at the UN can be visualized as three concentric rings, or cogs:

1)    First, Longer term policy developments – this is the slowest of the cogs in the UN system, as it involves the widest array of actors and policy issues. This is where the C34 comes in, supplementing the development of structural changes in the DPKO/DFS and doctrinal developments (‘principles and guidelines’) such as in the new Horizons Process. The fruits of this process often have to find agreement of a wider range of member states, as well as operationalization by the Secretariat.

2)    Second are Operational demands –These refer to responses to threats taking the form of mandates for peacekeeping operations through the Security Council and Secretariat, from the surge in operations at the beginning and end of the 1990s to current developments in Mali, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some of those operations have considerable ramifications for what we have traditionally come to know as ‘peacekeeping.’

3)    The final cog is comprised of ‘Shocks’ – these come in the form of often-avoidable events which shake up peacekeeping practice. For instance: The killing of US servicemen in Somalia in 1992, the Rwandan Genocide, the massacre in Srebrenica, the sexual exploitation and abuse scandals in the early 2000s, and the possible political and legal ramifications from the Cholera outbreak in Haiti. At times these shocks happen due to significant failures at a tactical level. However, sometimes they come about as a result of urgent operational demands working on a different timeline than longer term policy developments.

It can be observed that peacekeeping in the UN is currently stretched in such a policy dynamic: in particular the shorter-term operational and the longer-term policy seem to be working at dramatically different speeds. This is to be expected to a certain extent as, from time to time, urgent operational demands must overtake careful policy development. Moreover, longer-term policy cannot always spin on a dime, with the most coherent and effective policy sometimes taking a considerable time and patience to develop.

However, the past six months have seen operational demands which have significantly challenged the core principles of peacekeeping – the impartiality of a deployed peacekeeping force, the need for strategic consent from the host state, and changes regarding the minimum use of force (apart from self defence and the defence of the mandate). There is a clear and even stark contrast between operational developments – most clearly seen in the Security Council – and deliberations related to longer-term planning — seen through statements from the C34 in which member states consistently refer back to the prominence of core principles.

For instance, in his briefing to the Security Council about the UNMISS operation in South Sudan, USG for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, failed to acknowledge the role of consent as a pillar of the UNMISS operation, while outlining his plan to withdraw capacity building for the government and opposition and focus purely on the impartial protection of civilians. As laudable as the protection of civilians is in South Sudan, the deafening silence concerning host nation consent sets the operation on a precarious path, particularly when the UN’s own reports cite the host government as a primary coordinator of attacks against UNMISS. In the larger picture of peacekeeping policy development, this is even more problematic – if a peacekeeping mission can continue to be deployed without host nation support, what does this mean for peacekeeping’s claim of impartial response?

Additionally, the assessment of UNMISS, and planning for deployment in the Central African Republic are both taking place at the same time as the UN is undertaking tricky negotiations over reimbursement rates for peacekeepers. Levels of financial reimbursement are being closely linked by some states to levels of preparedness of peacekeepers and the equipment that accompanies them in the field. Moreover, Troop Contributors wish to see an even higher rate of reimbursement in situations where they send soldiers into particularly hazardous environments. Linking this to debates in the Security Council where peacekeepers are being mandated to deploy in areas with high levels of insecurity, with little formalized peace processes in place, and (as in the case of MONUSCO) with part of the mission recalibrated to launch offensive combat operations against belligerents, gaps in the timing of policy formulation – including policy on reimbursement — are more pronounced.

In addition to these gaps, a trend exists which considers the Security Council as the primary anchor point in peacekeeping policy, particularly visible among advocacy groups. For instance, advocacy around the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has seen a considerable level of activity at the UN Security Council (most pertinently around operations), but nothing comparable at the C34. No statement from the joint office on R2P/genocide prevention has been made at the C34; the concept is not referred to at all in this year’s C34 report, nor does it appear in other iterations of the UN’s peacekeeping policy machinery (for instance the Principles and Guidelines). The level of ‘impact’ from advocacy at Security Council level may potentially be greater, but there is a danger in neglecting other capacities established to develop peacekeeping policy, thereby reinforcing the belief by Security Council membership (in particular Permanent Members), that they are the only drivers of such policy.

From our perspective, strengthening the role and functionality of the C34 is essential – that this year’s report was approved is no small feat. However, work towards the strengthening of the report, the level to which the report’s policy recommendations can be operationalized, is a task for the coming year. Secondly, there needs to be a bit more humility from those member states in the Security Council who too often feel that their idea of peacekeeping is the only viable way forward. Statements made regarding the CAR as being a ‘new type of operation’ seemed to ride roughshod over years of (admittedly imperfect) peacekeeping development which began at the end of the 1990s. Thirdly, contributors to the C34 need to develop and utilize their own strengths to facilitate peacekeeping research. The growth of peacekeeping training centers within a growing number of states brings with it opportunities of spreading “lessons learned” and cultivating more nuanced levels of understanding. Finally, those advocacy groups seeking policy relevance solely through tracking Security Council resolutions and debates may have to revisit their strategies, or at least examine the extent to which they can also support the longer term policy approaches represented by the C34.

The fear is that if longer term policy and shorter-term operational demands continue to move at such radically different speeds, then the UN could find itself in a similar position as the beginning of the 1990’s. As those who follow the history of peacekeeping knows, the 1990’s contained plenty of shocks.  Another generation of preventable ‘shocks’ is in the best interests of no one.

Dr. David Curran, GAPW Peacekeeping Fellow

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Goodbye Sierra Leone, Hello CAR: On ‘new’ peacekeeping not being so ‘new’

12 Mar

With Ban Ki Moon overseeing the wrapping up of the UNIPSIL peacebuilding operation, fifteen years of UN involvement in Sierra Leone through peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations has come to an end. This note will not go into much depth about that process, as there are some competent histories of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone[1]. Nevertheless, it’s aim is to highlight certain of its peacekeeping components (UNAMSIL), while demonstrating the value in reflecting on Sierra Leone operations as opposed to simply forgetting about them. Such reflection is pertinent in light of current proposals on a peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR), and wider debates on peacekeeping.

More or less at the same time as the UN is wrapping up its Sierra Leone’s commitments, the organization is preparing itself to deploy into the CAR. The descent of the CAR into the grave violence seen today has been well documented[2], as has analysis of the joint French (Operation SANGARIS) and African Union (MISCA) peacekeeping intervention.  The Security Council’s meeting on 6th March looked to directly address the worsening situation in the country through the establishment of a UN peacekeeping presence in the country. Contributions to the meeting came from heads of humanitarian agencies (OCHA and the UNHCR, both of whom appeared to be doing a great deal of work on very little money), the Foreign Minister of the CAR (who gave a considerably emotional and powerful speech), the African Union (who sought to outline MISCA’s achievements, and not have their efforts pushed side by an international presence), as well as a number of member states.

Regarding the probable establishment of a UN operation, the view is very much that the deployment would have to be ‘phased’ – i.e. – robust at first, followed by a larger, more multifunctional force when security was more established. This model of peacekeeping is logical if international peacekeepers are to be deployed. However, the approach was described as being a ‘new approach to peacekeeping’[3]. This description is problematic: the experience of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone demonstrates that phasing operations in this way is anything but ‘new’. The description could become even more problematic if lessons from previous phased operations are not incorporated into new resolutions.

On an organizational front, the Sierra Leone missions incorporated a range of phased actors.  Through the second half of the 1990’s ECOWAS’s military wing, ECOMOG led a robust intervention, largely via the regional hegemon (Nigeria). A considerable number of these forces were ‘re-hatted’ – i.e. forces acting under a regional banner and transitioning over to working under a UN flag[4]. Moreover, the deployment of the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation was supported by a robust, combat capable deployment from a P5 member – the UK. This allowed for a ‘phased approach’, wherein the UN/UK would push outwards to unsecured zones of operation to create secure conditions for a multifunctional peacekeeping force to undertake core peacebuilding functions.

Conceptually, this demonstrated the first signs of ‘post-Brahimi’ peacekeeping. UNSCR 1270 mandated the operation under Chapter VII to take ‘necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. At the time, Protecting Civilians in peacekeeping mandates was a new phenomenon – UNSCRs 1265 and 1296 being passed in 1999 and 2000 respectively[5].

The use of Chapter VII to authorize ‘necessary action’ allowed peacekeepers to undertake more robust approaches to their duties when faced with belligerent groups.  This linked to the significant doctrinal efforts of the time, in particular the evolution of the ‘Peace Support Operations’ concept[6], which espoused a robust, combat capable military presence to start a mission, which would be phased out by a multifunctional peacebuilding presence.  Indeed, the principle author of PSO doctrine, Phillip Wilkinson, saw Sierra Leone as a conceptual test of that idea[7].

Finally, efforts were put into the transition from peacekeeping – the provision of negative peace – into peacebuilding – the provision of more positive forms of peace. The transition from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL (later to become UNIPSIL) and the subsequent involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission demonstrated a commitment to longer-term peacebuilding

Sierra Leone demonstrates that ‘new models’ of peacekeeping have been undertaken in the past – but so what? The importance here is that the mission endured a significant range of challenges – some almost bringing the mission down. It is through acknowledging such failures that peacekeeping doctrine and practice develop, particularly useful in the context of establishing new operations.

Levels of enthusiasm towards ‘Robust peacekeeping’ varied considerably as the mission went on. Reports of contingents not willing to undertake offensive operations against rebels beset the operation throughout the first year of its deployment. This was compounded by issues of considerable in-fighting between contingents[8] linked to issues of re-hatting of ECOMOG Peacekeepers into UN ones[9]. The operation was also the ‘poster image’ for the oft-used concept of peacekeepers arriving in theatre with inadequate levels of training and equipment, a dilemma often faced when peackeepers are required to deploy rapidly. Even Secretary General Annan was quoted to have said ‘Anyone who believes, or says they believe, in multilateral affairs must be disappointed.’[10] These dilemmas were to contribute to the low point of the operation in the summer of 2000, when rebel groups took 300 peacekeepers hostage[11].

On a wider scale, issues with the Lomé Peace Agreement offered considerable lessons in the crafting of peace agreements[12], in particular, the awarding of Senior Ministerial Posts to those in the highest echelons of the principal rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front. Critiques over the minimal role of women in crafting peace agreements for Sierra Leone were also made. Moreover, assessments of the PBC engagement noted substantial difficulties with the coordination of peacebuilding, in particular the use of the Peacebuilding Fund without effective political agreement with the government on how the money would be used[13]. UNAMSIL was also one of the active missions to be highlighted in reports of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, at a time when the SEA went from being an issue swept under the carpet to one of the most damaging scandals to beset UN peacekeeping operations.

If history is constantly being reinvented by those who authorize and deploy operations, then there is a legitimate concern that the lessons of that history will not have been learned. This is not to say that the mission in the CAR is a ‘Sierra Leone’ engagement – no two conflicts are the same, neither should the response be. However, if the CAR operation runs into difficulties, suggesting that the difficulties are due to the fact that this is a ‘new’ type of operation will be neither honest nor sufficient. This is a critical matter when it comes to properly addressing and assessing significant security threats to human lives.

This leads one to ask what ‘new’ actually means. States in the C34, and fourth committee have often sought to highlight how peacekeeping today is substantially different from what it used to be. The C34 committee contained statements – both tinged with skepticism and optimism – that peacekeeping just wasn’t like it used to be. Given that peacekeeping in Sierra Leone was being undertaken 15 years ago, this judgment about the relation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ peacekeeping should be interrogated more deeply. Again, peacekeeping operations are deployed into highly violent societies. Consistently claiming to invent the wheel when the wheel has long been present will not help us meet current peacekeeping challenges.

It is not up to this article to proclaim Sierra Leone as a ‘success’ – that is up to the people of Sierra Leone to decide. Nevertheless, its importance in developing peacekeeping doctrine and practice is not to be sniffed at. What the mission did, how it did it, and the challenges it faced should all be kept in mind, particularly as the UN seeks to establish a peacekeeping mission to the CAR.

By all means consign peacekeeping in Sierra Leone to the history book, but do not consign its lessons to the trashcan.

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] David Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, New York, Palgrave, 2005

[2] Gobal Centre for R2P, ‘Central African Republic’, http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/central_african_republic

[3] French Mission to the United Nations – 6 mars 2014 – République centrafricaine – Remarques à la presse de M. Gérard Araud, représentant permanent de la France auprès des Nations unies – found at http://www.franceonu.org/la-france-a-l-onu/espace-presse/declarations-presse/points-de-presse/article/6-mars-2014-republique

[4] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit – “Re-Hatting” Ecowas Forces As UN Peacekeepers: Lessons Learned http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/coe/referencedocuments/ECOWAS%20Rehatting.pdf

[5] Curran, D. M.; Woodhouse, T., Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: What can Africa contribute?, International Affairs. Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007 pp. 1055-1070.

[6] Joint Doctrine Development Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: Peace Support Operations. London: Permanent Joint Headquarters, 1998, (JDDC is now the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre – DCDC)

[7] Wilkinson, P, ‘Peace support under fire: lessons from Sierra Leone’, International Security Information Service briefing paper, June 2000

[8] Bullion, A, India in Sierra Leone: A case of Muscular Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.77–91

[9] The Guardian, Sierra Leone peace force accused of sabotage, 8 September 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone.unitednations

[10] See note 8.

[11] United Nations, Lessons learned from United Nations peacekeeping experiences in Sierra Leone, UN Best Practices Unit ‘Lessons learned’ report, New York,  United Nations, Sept. 2003

[12] Bright, D., ‘Crafting the Lomé Peace Agreement, Conciliation Resources Report, 2000, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2009_7Implementing%20the%20Lome%20Peace%20Agreement_2000_ENG.pdf

[13] Actionaid, CAFOD and CARE International, ‘Consolidating the peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’, London, CARE International, 2007

 

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Peacekeeping in South Sudan: Offering full-spectrum protection for civilians

13 Jan

The UN Security Council’s decision of the 24th December 2013 to reinforce the UNMISS[1] Peacekeeping operation in South Sudan represents a serious attempt to assist in the prevention of attacks on the civilian population within the country. On a wider level, the reinforcement of UNMISS indicates the role that peacekeeping is now expected to play in civilian protection, but it may also provide a warning to how much a peacekeeping operation can achieve without a comprehensive political process to back this up.

Resolution 2132, which reinforced UNMISS, is also representative of the UN’s stronger stance on what to do when violence breaks out in an area where an operation is already being deployed – a journey which began with the calamitous decision in 1994 not to reinforce the UNAMIR operation in Rwanda when it became clear that a systematic campaign of genocide was being planned, and ultimately undertaken. Therefore in many ways, the UN’s reinforcement of UNMISS is the ‘right thing’ to do, a product of a 20 year reflection and development on how to respond in situations where a mission is deployed and civilians are threatened. Moreover, the UN’s decision to reinforce has saved lives in South Sudan, in part as a result of the simple fact that there are now more peacekeepers deployed in the conflict zone to protect the civilian population. This is to be valued.

However, civilian protection at this tactical level could pose future difficulties for UNMISS.

The very presence of UN peacekeepers can sometimes offer enough of a deterrence to would be ‘spoilers’ to a peace process, including those considering attacking civilians. However, deterrence alone will not last forever, and this presents considerable difficulties where civilian protection mandates are concerned. If violence continues after reinforcements have been deployed, with peacekeepers being unable to effectively deter further attacks, then the UN will have difficulties, both logistical and in terms of legitimacy. Richard Gowan’s article for World Politics Review speaks to these challenges, where he outlines three possible scenarios for the UMISS peacekeeping mission in the near future[2]:

In the first and best scenario, the mission will manage to hold together militarily long enough for more-or-less sincere political talks to end the violence. In the second, it might muddle through in the face of half-hearted negotiations and spasmodic but serious violence, trying to save as many lives as possible. The third, worst-case scenario would involve the fragmentation and rout of UNMISS after repeated attacks on its bases, personnel and convoys.

This challenge in cases such as South Sudan, is partly the result of the undefined relationship between the original design of peacekeeping – deploying missions where there is actually peace to keep – and what operations are now being asked to do regarding protection of civilians. Ever since the first armed peacekeeping operation (UNEF I) was closed on the eve of the 1967 war in the Middle East, there has been an implicit admission that peacekeeping is only effective if the parties to the conflict actually wish for peace. Peacekeeping where there is no peace to keep is dangerous territory for the United Nations, and peacekeeping failures have often gone hand in hand with deployments into areas where UN peacekeepers are no more than bystanders in conflicts where combatants have no real interest in pursuing peace. In the case of South Sudan, it could well be that additional peacekeepers are to be deployed into an area where there is little peace to keep. This dynamic has not gone un-noticed by troop contributors[3].

There seems to be no getting around it:  a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians requires considerable political activity above and beyond the creation of short-term ceasefires and consolidation of battle-lines.

The necessity of a holistic political process is critical for full civilian protection. Importantly, this will require reflection on the evolution of structures and power dynamics wherein ethnic tensions are allowed to fester, civil society groups had little access to power-making structures, and allegations of corruption have been pointed at political elites[4]. It would be hugely beneficial if such reflection were to also examine the planning and execution of international statebuilding practices which no doubt influenced the actions at a national level. No conflict is contained purely within the borders of the state, safe from external influence. South Sudan is no different.

A more sustained, pre-deployment, process of reflection could lead to more attuned strategies for peace. The New York Times warns of the difficulties of devising a peace process without a significant understanding of the conflict, arguing that

Any push toward a tribally defined solution to the conflict — like a Bosnia-style ethnic power sharing deal — would be disastrous, for it would entrench and validate ethnic fissures, rather than give political power sharing a chance to smooth them over.[5]

An editorial in the Washington Post shares this sentiment, noting that power-sharing ‘could become just another division of the spoils, and elections could become another exercise in ethnic division’[6]. Thus in understanding international peacebuilding, a much broader constituency of stakeholders must be engaged at earlier phases. This – in the words of civil society actors from the region – will require political sacrifices from the conflicting parties[7].  Elsewhere, the role of religious leaders, civic leaders and former combatants in creating a durable peace have been highlighted as being critical in establishing a durable peace[8]. A United States Institute of Peace report from 8 January further elucidates this[9]

Strategies for protecting civilians in South Sudan are ultimately being undertaken too late in the political process and in a bit of a policy vacuum. International peacekeeping operations have limitations, particularly when their deterrent effect falters. In looking towards establishing a political solution to the conflict, a suitable testament to the civilians who have been killed, injured, or forcibly removed (and to those peacekeepers who have been killed and injured trying to protecting them) would be to do more (and earlier) to encourage a political system which has the ‘peaceful coexistence, progress, development and happiness[10]’ of the South Sudanese population at its heart. It is in these processes where effective, sustainable civilian protection lies.

 Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] UN Department of Public Information, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2132 (2013), Security Council Increases United Nations Mission’s Military Presence In South Sudan, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11230.doc.htm

[2] Gowan, Richard, Diplomatic Fallout: Can the U.N. Rebuild its Force in South Sudan? http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13460/diplomatic-fallout-can-the-u-n-rebuild-its-force-in-south-sudan

[3] Republica, Your war, our soldiers!, 07 January 2014, http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=67502

[5] New York Times, South Sudan’s Tangled Crisis, 05 January 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/opinion/south-sudans-tangled-crisis.html?_r=0

[7] Alliance for Peacebuilding, Statement of Sudanese and South Sudanese Civil Society on the Conflict in South Sudan, 30 December 2013, http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/12/statement-of-sudanese-and-south-sudanese-civil-society-on-the-conflict-in-south-sudan/

[9] Princeton N. Lyman, Jon Temin, Susan Stigant, Crisis and Opportunity in South Sudan, US Institute of Peace, 08 January 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/crisis-and-opportunity-in-south-sudan?utm_content=buffer2b45c&utm_

[10] Alliance for Peacebuilding, Statement of Sudanese and South Sudanese Civil Society on the Conflict in South Sudan, 30 December 2013, http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/12/statement-of-sudanese-and-south-sudanese-civil-society-on-the-conflict-in-south-sudan/

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Droning On: Inviting Straight Talk on Peacekeeping Operations

23 Dec

On the afternoon of December 19, the Permanent Mission of Pakistan and the United Nations Foundation presented an important, far-reaching seminar on United Nations Peacekeeping entitled “Blue Helmets: New Frontiers.”

The seminar featured a wide array of senior officials (including Susana Malcorra representing the Secretary-General), diplomats (including the Ambassadors of France, Guatemala, Croatia and Canada) and experts from academia (such as Richard Gowan of NYU and Jean Marie Guéhenno of Columbia University) tasked with planning and implementing what are increasingly complex peacekeeping operations.  The sobering backdrop for the conversation was fresh violence in South Sudan where three Indian peacekeepers were killed as local youths stormed the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base in Akobo.

The complexity of peacekeeping operations alluded to over and over by speakers has been fueled in part by the demands of global citizens and governments for the UN to take a more active role in resolving the many conflicts that flare up on our television screens and twitter feeds.  We’ve written previously (and likely will again) about some of the negative impacts of the politics of ‘doing something.’  But as more and more graphic images fill our homes and as people feel themselves further and further removed from any agency regarding responses to those horrors, the pressure on those who have understanding, skills and agency to ‘take care of’  effective responses to violence and the need for civilian protection continues to grow.

So, too, do the controversies.

Some of those controversies are specific to the architecture of robust peacekeeping response (peacekeeping in situations where there is really no ‘peace to keep’), such as the use of drones or the development of allegedly non-precedent-setting capacities such as the Intervention Brigade used in Eastern DRC.  Some governments, notably at this event the French, seem to be strongly convinced that, in the new world of peacekeeping, we must not be skittish about using force when force is called for.   ‘Living in the past’ where peacekeeping is concerned is tantamount to conceding relevance.   Using the technology at hand to increase the effectiveness and safety of operations is, at least for some governments and policymakers, a strategic imperative.

The French have a good point of course.   Changing times call for changing strategies.  Peacekeepers face different threats now as they respond to more complex and coercive mandates.  We all understand our responsibilities to protect civilians differently now. As a system, the UN now lives under the burdens of increasing expectations and (as Gowan noted) deployments that are likely to become more and more dangerous. But as other delegations and observers have noted, changes in how we conduct operations have implications for human lives that must also be taken into account.  The fact that we can ‘do something’ of a more coercive nature doesn’t automatically mean that we should, especially if we have not first considered alternatives that can both competently protect civilians and other stakeholders while bringing violence under effective control.

The issue here is not merely Brigades vs. Binoculars, coercion vs. passive observing.  The issue here, as it is in so many other parts of the UN system, is the degree to which we can both respond rapidly and effectively and at the same time reassure the skeptical – governments of member states, of course, but also persons victimized by a lack of timely and preventive response – that we are all committed to getting our protection strategies in the best possible order. More than the champions of coercive response (and perhaps even more than the champions of coercive restraint) recognize, this is a matter of trust as much as technical competence.

In a highly politicized environment (and more than one speaker noted the ‘political objectives’ attached to all PKOs) trust is an elusive agent.  Getting peacekeeping ‘right’ means applying the right tools to the missions to which we commit, and to apply those tools in the most timely, humane and effective manner, ensuring the safety not only of civilians but of humanitarian workers and peacekeepers themselves. But it also means doing all that is possible to head off threats before assembling the troops. (The best deployments, after all, are the ones that never have to be authorized.)  And it means giving credence to the skeptical, especially skeptical end users, some of whom are desperate for assistance but who also have long and vivid memories of unwelcome intrusions of all kinds in their not so distant past.   Skepticism isn’t always warranted of course.  And it should never become an excuse for inaction.   But ‘action’ comes attached to a long string of options, only some of which require offensively minded, coercive measures.

As Ambassador Rosenthal of Guatemala rightly noted, “just sending in the troops” to calm down any situation is simply not enough.  Indeed, at times it might be too much.    With due regard for the restraints imposed by sovereignty, the lack of definition of preventive capacity, and the absence of reliable, rapid-response deployments, the ‘situations’ alluded to by Ambassador Rosenthal are becoming more complex and more resistant to calm.   We need earlier, more attentive engagements by broader sectors of the UN system, along with more transparent assessments of the many areas where there is more work to be done to address our still evolving challenges.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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The Central African Republic: The politics of protecting

12 Dec

After considerable advocacy from a range of actors[1], the UN Council passed Resolution 2127[2], authorizing a joint French/AU operation in the Central African Republic. This has brought new attention to the country, the conflict, and ways to resolve it. As someone who deals in the broad field of peacekeeping, and not a subject specialist on the CAR, I felt a breakdown of the conflict dynamics in the CAR was beyond me, and best left to many others[3].  Moreover, in terms of the peacekeeping aspects, it will be difficult to note the effects of any operation for some time. Yes questions do exist – such as what will happen when the French wish to leave? Is a mandate predominantly under the headline of civilian protection been matched with necessary resources? What will a UN force look like if it is to deploy? Is this peacekeeping or peace enforcement? These questions though, may need a bit of time to answer.

To start, it is worth pointing out that the decision of the French Government, and contributing states to the AU mission is a welcome development. Conflicts of the most violent sort often require intervention from third parties, more so if the main target of such violence is the civilian population. Calls for rapid deployment of a UN Peacekeeping operation were unrealistic, given the UN’s slow timeframe of deployment (particularly into a landlocked country). Thus through their actions, French and AU forces are providing a critical contribution to the security of the civilian population of the CAR, thus heightening the chances of a cessation of violence.

Nevertheless, there are still areas where questions appear. These may not be so much related to the tough decisions peacekeepers make in a conflict zone, but more about the wider issues in deploying operations. The intention of this post is therefore to interrogate the use of narratives to explain intervention or justify past inaction. By doing so, the post (hopefully) will demonstrate where linkages appear between some of the wider critical assessment of peacekeeping, and the real-time actions of ‘policy world’.

Academic approaches to peacekeeping have, in the past 10 years, looked to apply a far more critical approach to understanding how peacekeeping works in global politics, questioning motivations of the actors in peacekeeping operations[4]. If one only focuses on the technical aspects of operations without questioning overall assumptions of the role that peacekeeping plays in global politics, then, in effect we are all missing the big questions concerning the ways in which ‘peace’ is implemented, and who ‘wins’ and ‘looses’ through such interventions. This line of inquiry is often criticized as moving away from ‘policy relevance’. It may also be open to the accusation of of criticizing an actor who is ‘doing the right thing’. In the case of responding to mass atrocity and civilian protection demands, this may be pervasive. France and the AU are saving lives – who are we to criticize that?

However, no intervention is apolitical – actors in peacekeeping and peace enforcement act for a reason – funders, contributors, those who give equipment, all have complex intentions. Actors also look to control the narrative and explain their actions in the most positive light.  Examples of this can be found in numerous studies (see for example critical reactions to the Tony Blair’s humanitarian rationale for intervention into Iraq[5]).

A more recent example of this can be noted from the Security Council meeting where UNSCR 2127 was adopted, in particular the opening statement by the French Permanent Representative, and Chair of the Council, Mr. Gérard Araud. In it, he stated that:

Hitherto, the Central African Republic had been a forgotten crisis of the sort in which the media were not interested. Given the crisis itself, however, indifference and inaction were not options. France felt it was our collective duty to support action by the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States to prevent mass atrocities[6].

He went on to say ‘In his statement at the general debate in September, the President of the French Republic was the first to sound the alarm and call for resolute action by the Security Council’.

Here the narrative of the UN action is that France, standing alone against global ambivalence, perpetuated by an indifferent ‘media’ took the initiative and prevented mass atrocities. To an extent, this can be taken at face value – as said, France is indeed deploying forces alongside the AU and ECCAS in a fundamentally dangerous conflict zone to protect civilians. However this is also problematic. In creating a causal link between media ambivalence and global apathy, the statement is excusing the myriad of international actors who have had a presence in the CAR for a considerable time, and had capacities to call attention to (and even do something about) the deteriorating situation. The New York Times report from November outlines the external intervention in the CAR over the past few years:

France has had an almost continuous military presence since the country gained independence in 1960, including the 400 soldiers deployed at the start of the current crisis. The European Union has a delegation in Bangui and has been the main donor for 10 years. United States Army personnel arrived in 2011 as part of efforts to capture Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, who has been indicted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court and is believed to be hiding somewhere in Central Africa[7].

Simply explaining that CAR was off the radar until September, until France raised it with the world misses the point at least slightly. A range of actors have been involved in the CAR, and many of those actors had capacities to (and in some cases did) at least monitor the deterioration of the state into the situation it is in now. An argument thus exists that in using this form of narrative, the Security Council has neatly negotiated the ‘history’ of external actors in this conflict. By doing so, any accountability for the failure of external actors has been avoided, and the media has been highlighted as a possible scapegoat if turns out that the deployment is deemed inadequate in one way or another. This highlighting of the media also ignores the myriad of reporting and monitoring from a range of NGO’s, advocacy groups[8], and yes… reports from media outlets[9].

Importantly, this ‘recitation’ of recent history could have serious implications for future actions. Christoph Vogel (who has written extensively about conflict in Africa) highlights this:

Well, now we could argue that at least it made the UN Security Council debate on it and send the French (who have been there anyways, before) in to restore order. However, whose order? The French order? The UN order? The order of a smouldering conflict in which genocide needs to be prevented? The public authority of the Central African State? The City administration of Bangui? The ousted government of a longtime embezzling Bozizé? The remainders of a disintegrated rebel movement running the country? Hard to tell, as a myriad of interests are at stake[10]

Vogel’s words (and article) are pertinent, and link back to the critical assessments outlined above – thus demonstrating that what at first looks like an abstract theoretical critique is in fact a valuable lens through which to see how interveners seek to justify their actions in conflict situations. Narratives of conflict, intervention and protection cannot be left unquestioned. To do so is not healthy for those who intervene, and possibly less healthy in the long term for the ‘end users’ – the most vulnerable members of a population under siege.

[1] Amnesty International, Central African Republic: UN peacekeeping mission needed to avoid mass slaughter, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/central-african-republic-un-peacekeeping-mission-needed-avoid-mass-slaughter-2013-12-02;

[3] For instance: Human Rights Watch, “I Can Still Smell the Dead” The Forgotten Human Rights Crisis in the Central African Republic, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/car0913_insert_LOWRES_WITH_COVER.pdf , Sept 2013; Global Centre for the R2P, Central African Republic,

http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/central_african_republic; Good Governance Afria, From Terror to tyranny, http://gga.org/stories/editions/aif-18-fault-lines-africas-separation-anxiety/from-terror-to-tyranny/?utm_source=OpenNetworksCRM&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=OpenNetworksCRM

[4] Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. (2004). Introduction: Thinking Anew About Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping, 11(1); Pugh, M. (2012). Reflections on Aggressive Peace. International Peacekeeping, 19(4), 37–41; Cunliffe, P. (2009). The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, 16(3), 323–336.

[5] Cooper, N, Review Article: On the crisis of the Liberal Peace, Conflict Security and Development, 7(4), 605-616; Pugh, M. (2004). Peacekeeping and Critical Theory. International Peacekeeping, 11(1).

[6] 5 December 2013 – CAR / Adoption of resolution 2127 – Explanation of vote by Mr. Gérard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/security-council/article/5-december-2013-car-adoption-of-7657

[8] For Instance, International Crisis Group, Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition, June 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.aspx

[9] Reuters, Central African Republic’s ex-rebels went on rampage: rights group, 10 May 2010 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/15/us-centralafrica-crisis-un-idUSBRE94E1CK20130515

Reuters, U.N. calls for sanctions on Central African Republic rights abusers, 15 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-centralafrica-rebels-idUSBRE9490RQ20130510

[10] Gencocide? Religious War? The inflationary use of Buzzwords in CAR’s violent imbroglio, http://christophvogel.net/2013/12/09/genocide-religious-war-the-inflationary-use-of-buzzwords-in-cars-violent-imbroglio/

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

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Rescuing the Functional Legitimacy of the C34

4 Nov

At no given time would the malfunctioning of the UN’s ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ (or its shortened name – the C34) be a welcome development for the world of international peacekeeping. However the signs from this year’s Fourth Committee’s discussion on the substantive question of peacekeeping operations indicate that it couldn’t have happened at a more inopportune time.

In the interests of providing some ‘geography’ to this post, the ‘Fourth Committee’ is one of six committees that work under the umbrella of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Peacekeeping, however, is one of many subjects the Committee discusses (its full name is the ‘Special Political and Decolonization Committee’). The ‘C34’ works under the Fourth Committee, and is the UN’s intergovernmental body mandated specifically to discuss areas of peacekeeping practice, and make policy recommendations to the UN secretariat. Created in 1965 (under General Assembly Resolution 2006) the committee works to produce a report which aims to distil the various views of the 147 member states involved in one way or another in Peacekeeping operations (Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs), funders, equipment providers, policymakers) into recommendations which are then taken to the UN’s General Assembly[1].

Trouble has been brewing in the C34. In the 2012 session, the report was subject to a prolonged six-month negotiation process before publication[2].  In 2013 things got worse, and negotiations broke down, resulting in no agreement on what should be included in the substantive report. Therefore, no 2013 report went to the General Assembly, and the 2012 report was merely reissued[3]. Therefore, there has for the past year been no formal reflection on peacekeeping policy and practice from the C34.

This failure has been reflected in member states’ statements to the Fourth Committee. The failure to produce anything was met with ‘regret’, ‘profound regret’, and ‘profound disappointment’, as well as hope that the committee could work better in the forthcoming year.

There are, however, very important and interlinked reasons why this committee is fundamental at the present time. These thematic areas have been picked up through member states’ statements.

Firstly, Peacekeeping operations are working in complex operating environments. Existing operations have seen an unlikely resurgence in conflict in their areas of deployment. For example, peacekeepers from the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) (set up in 1974 to manage interstate conflict between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights) have had to deal with a significant deterioration in safety due to the conflict in Syria, including the kidnapping of Filipino peacekeepers earlier this year. Recent deployments are entering environments with more diverse threats to security. The operation in Mali, MINUSMA, was recently attacked by a suicide bomber, resulting in the death of two Chadian Peacekeepers and a number of civilians. The dangerous operating environment in Mali was outlined by Under Secretary-General Herve Lasdous’ speech to the 4th Committee, where he noted that ‘careful reflection’ was needed on how peacekeeping can ‘adapt to effectively fulfill its multidimensional mandates’[4]. The examples used by the USG to underline this point – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere – were notable not so much for their peacekeeping presence (Somalia being one possible exception), but for their counter-insurgency focus. Such challenges to peacekeeping, and the implication on mandates provide the first reason why oversight, reflection and policy recommendation is critical at present.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that although such challenges are very much due the ‘changing nature of conflict’, they could in part be attributed to the UN Security Council’s willingness to mandate operations to deploy into environments where there is little peace to keep. This brings up the second challenge – that of the relationship between the Security Council and peacekeeping practice.

The Security Council, as the body charged with maintaining international peace and security, mandates peacekeeping operations as a response to crises. The Council is guided by principles in setting up operations[5], but arguably there exists room to manoeuvre within them. Moreover, there are only 15 member states on the Security Council, and the extent to which these states are involved in peacekeeping varies. This leads to the issue of the processes involved mandating and deploying peacekeeping operations, and the extent to which 15 member states can effectively make decisions on behalf of a much broader peacekeeping constituency.

A number of statements in the 4th Committee questioned the extent to which such decisions are made with the full participation of the TCCs and PCCs, and advocated more consultation in this area. Moreover, the recent deployment of the ‘Force intervention Brigade’ (a force designed for ‘neutralize and disarm’ armed rebel elements in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) was referred to by diplomats as it ‘blurred the lines’ between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement. For instance, the Argentina delegation noted that discussion on the brigade by the broadest range of actors was a necessity. The Security Council has recently produced guidelines on consultation with TCCs and PCCs, and mechanisms are sought to increase effectiveness in the build up to mandate formulation for new missions. However, the lack of a functioning body (such as the C34) to track these efforts, and make systematic policy recommendations may mean that these efforts will be ad hoc.

This ad hoc nature is a concern to a number of member states, who note the Security Council’s willingness to expand its policy making with regard to peacekeeping operations. This unease is probably best summed up by the Indian delegation’s statement:

Peacekeeping’s agenda today is generated mostly outside the General Assembly. Major Peacekeeping initiatives get on-boarded outside the C34. This encourages a reliance on factors outside the confines of the General Assembly. Moreover, this allows ourselves to be judged by those who do not even take part in peacekeeping. Over a period of time this has distorted peacekeeping’s policy universe[6]

A wide constituency of peacekeeping contributors share this unease. The Non Aligned Movement (representing 120 member states, including many of the top TCCs and PCCs) called on the secretariat to ‘refrain from working on streams of policy that have not been agreed in an intergovernmental process’[7]. The role of the Security Council in extending its powers into areas previously ‘off limits’ to the body has been critically analysed by observers in the system. Phillip Cunliffe’s 2009 observations in ‘International Peacekeeping’ are just as pertinent now:

[T]he Council’s expanded consultation procedures since the end of the cold war reflect the extension of Council authority, which now draws on a broad variety of ‘constituents’… In other words, this signals not the uplifting of poor contributing states as much as their being locked into a new means by which the Council has consolidated its control over UN procedure and institutional politics.[8]

This links to the third and final reason why a functioning of the C34 is critical: it provides an important valve in the relationship between the Security Council and the TCCs and PCCs. Peacekeeping relationships are not only driven by doctrinal and mandate functions, but also by the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the process of deploying and undertaking peacekeeping operations. Member states raised strong concerns with issues of troop reimbursement, issues of contingent-owned equipment, safety and security of peacekeepers in the field, and the extent to which expectations are placed on TCCs/PCCs without appropriate consultation. The UN Secretariat is formulating working groups on both issues, but again, a lack of a fully functioning formal body to constructively debate and distill these issues, and move towards a consensus-based approach may mean that the anxiety expressed in statements may not go anywhere positive within the UN system.

On the bright side(!) it does appear from member states that there will be renewed efforts to kick-start the C34, including agreement on the working methods of the ‘Group of Friends of the Chair (Ambassador Joy Ugwu of Nigeria). The C34 may not be perfect, but its function is important. It provides a space where member states with stakes in the peacekeeping enterprise can formulate policy, thus ensuring a broad constituency has effective buy-in to policy-making procedures. Critically, this mitigates against an unhealthy balance towards the Security Council.

With this in mind, it was reassuring to hear member states encouraging the use of conflict resolution techniques in order to move the process onwards. In this, the words of the Swiss delegation are notable. They argued that effective partnership ‘can only exist if every group and delegation is able to understand the needs of others, to negotiate in good faith, and especially to compromise’[9]. One can hope these sentiments are acted upon

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] UN, General Assembly and Peacekeeping, (found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm)

[2] UN Department of Public Information, Growing Demand, Emerging Conflicts Dominate Debate as Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Opens 2013 Session: Members Hear From Heads Of Peacekeeping, Field Support As Chair Urges ‘Spirit Of Give And Take’ To Avoid Repeating 2012 Impasse (GA/PK/2012), 19 February 2013, (found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gapk212.doc.htm)

[3]  UN Department of Public Information, Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations Adopts Procedural Report, Concluding 2013 Substantive Session (GA/PK/2016), 6 September 2013 (found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gapk216.doc.htm)

 

[4] UN, Statement by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous to the Fourth Committee, 28th October 2013 (Found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/131028-USG-Ladsous-Statement-4C-AS-DELIVERED.pdf)

[5] UN, Role of the Security Council in Peacekeeping, (found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolesc.shtml)

[6] Statement by Mr. Mohammed Adeep, Honorable member of Parliament and Member of the Indian Delegation, on Agenda Item 53: Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 30th October 2013, (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703760/item-53-india.pdf)

[7] Statement by The Delegation of Arab republic of Egypt On behalf of

The Non-Aligned Movement before The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) Item 53: Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 28th October 2013 (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703927/egypt-28-oct.pdf)

[8] Cunliffe, Phillip, The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, 16:3, 326

[9] Étude d’ensemble de toute la question des opérations de maintien de la paix sous tous leurs aspects Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 29th October 2013, (Found at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703626/statement-by-swizerland-fr-item-53.pdf)

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