Archive | Uncategorized RSS feed for this section

Mexico, Drug Trade, and Illicit Arms

25 Jan

The Mexican government has recently released updated drug war death toll figures, reporting 47,515 deaths in drug-related violence since 2006 when President Calderon began a military assault on drug cartels. The so-called ‘war on drugs’ has ravaged the security sector and continues to present a dangerous challenge to the US as drug cartels battle over control of the lucrative US consumption market. The factors associated with this struggle are plenty and can be evaluated both in isolation as well as collectively– the role of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity surely contribute to the allure of drug trafficking. Such societal stresses have perpetuated the illicit business and enticed the hopeless and struggling into a black market that, although highly risky, dangerous, and gruesome, can offer high financial returns.

The endemic contributors to drug trafficking aside, the role of illicit arms and its relationship with drug trafficking may not necessarily be causal, but illicit weapons surely perpetuate and enable the drug-related violence that has become a blight on the world community. In a year when the UN General Assembly will negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons, it is important to focus on why it is international standards for export and import matter. The consequences of unregulated trade, which lead to societies awash in illegal weapons used for criminality, violence, and intimidation, are dire. Nowhere is this more evident than in Mexico. As noted by Daniel Avila Camacho in a report for the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), drugs and arms often account for the largest sections of the black market and often use the same transport roots. Possession of arms by drug traffickers is more than a common practice and has become a sort of requirement for protection and security reasons when moving about areas of operation. Possession of arms is often involved from primary production by drug growers to the couriers accompanied by armed bodyguards. The financial symbiosis is also evident– drug trafficking often generates vast proceeds creating a financial base for criminal and terrorist groups to conduct illegal traffic in arms and vice versa creating a synergistic relationship between the two activities.

The sincere hope of many working for a ‘robust ATT’ is that the treaty will not only regulate the legal trade in arms between governments, but will also prevent and contribute to the eradication of illicit trade in arms (hopefully to include small arms and light weapons [SALWs], which is the type of weapon generally referred to here as related to drug and gang violence). The example of drug-related violence brings to light the critical importance of adopting a strong humanitarian perspective in an ATT so that it is more than a commerce agreement between states. The conflation of the business of arms trade (which does have a legal market in government-to-government transfers of military equipment and arms) and human rights concerns comes via the issue of diversion — the movement of weapons from the legal to the illicit market for purposes of criminality, insurgency, to violate the human rights of civilian populations, or to line the pockets of corrupt government officials.  It is diversion that must be ‘flagged,’ addressed, and eliminated through the framework of a strong and legally-binding ATT that takes care to disallow loopholes and bypassing of its provisions by criminal networks and corrupt individuals.

States continue to reinforce the right to acquire arms for self defense as part of their innate state sovereignty. These references to Article 51 of the UN Charter will not cease and neither will trade in arms between states. Manufacturing and trade in arms is a business that accounts for billions of dollars of revenue for states. An ATT will have no power over this legal trade insofar as creating a mechanism that would limit legal trade between states, something that has been expressly warned against during the ATT preparatory discussions. States are careful not to encroach on this right. Nonetheless, a central goal of an ATT, along with the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms (PoA), must be to address the human suffering related to the illegal trade in arms by preventing illegal diversion such that there are less weapons in the hands of drug traffickers.

–Katherine Prizeman

 

Tags: , , , , , ,

Following through on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

18 Jan

A recent editorial in the NY Times from 15 January proposed that the best way to prevent a ‘nuclear Iran’ is through a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East (WMDFZ). A 1995 resolution on the Middle East at the Review Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calls upon the states from the region to “take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.” Furthermore, a statement from the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. The outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference committed states parties to a 2012 conference on the establishment of such a WMDFZ and such a conference will be held later this year in Finland. Given this historical context and mindful of current political circumstances in the region, it is essential that the development of concrete proposals for treaty elements and confidence-building measures towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East are taken both seriously and expeditiously.

As explained by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull in their Times op-ed, a military attack on Iran will most likely encourage the Islamic Republic to more vigorously pursue nuclear weapons in the long run, even if its program is set back several years due to the attack. Such costs are high insofar as the likelihood of Iran’s more robust and intense pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as the chance that other Arab states will consider ‘going nuclear.’ The other major challenge (and danger) in the region is surely Israel’s policy of ‘opacity’ around its nuclear program– not acknowledging having nuclear weapons while the rest of the world operates under the assumption that they do, in fact, have such capabilities with little to no ambiguity around that fact. Therefore, the only clear path forward is the proposed (and promised) development of a Middle East WMDFZ.

As expressed on numerous occasions by government officials, a nuclear Iran is not an option for Israel or the United States, while Israel continues to operate outside the NPT framework and therefore is not obligated to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Moreover, Israel’s escalating tensions with Turkey and even Egypt (with which Israel has a peace agreement) are indicative of a worsening situation in a region home to some of the most protracted and deep-seeded conflicts in history. Iran’s recent inflammatory actions, including its threatening to shut down access to the Strait of Hormuz because of sanctions imposed against its developing nuclear program, are a sign that the current trajectory is at best alarming and a new pathway to peace must be seriously pursued. A WMDFZ would ultimately force all the major stakeholders to task– Israel’s nuclear program would have to become a viable discussion point and Iran would be subject to legitimized monitoring in terms of its uranium enrichment program for energy production, which the Islamic Republic strongly contends is as far as its production goes.

There are no illusions in terms of how difficult, complex, and unique a WMDFZ in the Middle East actually is. The zones that already exist, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Mongolia, clearly do not have the same political challenges that the Middle East must grapple with. The negotiations around the zone will be long, complicated, and frustrating to be sure, but it is essential to not only international peace and security, but to a sustained regional peace that will never come to fruition if the threat of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons are on the table. Negotiations to develop and implement a WMDFZ must operate in concert with complementary steps toward regional peace as collective security agreements cannot be viably and permanently de-linked from peace agreements. Disarmament and arms control issues must be negotiated simultaneously. Nonetheless, it is important to caution that although a dual peace and arms control process is important, the WMDFZ will have to be negotiated even if a comprehensive peace agreement has not yet been reached in the region (at least to start) .

It is also important to understand the WMFZ negotiations in the context of other international disarmament and arms control processes such as ratification of the CTBT, other biological, chemical and nuclear treaties, the UN Programme of Action on small arms, and IAEA inspections. Compliance with these measures are essential in order to increase confidence in regional security and trust in the preparatory process (which is sure to be long) leading to the creation of the zone.

The time is now for honest and robust efforts towards a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Such a zone will have positive ramifications for the region and the world at large by eliminating the option of the antiquated Cold War-style nuclear deterrence for ‘mutually assured destruction.’ It’s time for all stakeholders to be held accountable and for a transparent framework that limits the dangerous double standard and acceleration of tensions that currently exist.

–Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , , ,

Clarifying (again) the Goals of an ATT

10 Jan

It has become the habit of many of those working for a robust Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to explain, on a regular basis, just what an ATT will and will not accomplish as the immense ignorance around this issue continues to grow. Opinions as to whether someone is for or against an ATT aside, it is the responsibility of all global citizens to do the research on what an ATT will actually entail before making wrong and unhelpful assumptions about a piece of international law that has yet to even be penned in its first draft form.

Case and point: Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky recently began circulating a survey to stop the ‘UN Gun Ban.’ Senator Paul goes on to say that the Obama administration has decided to work with the UN on this ‘small arms treaty’ that is part of a ‘global gun control scheme.’ The Senator’s four main points of contention are that the treaty will:

  • Enact tougher licensing requirements making it harder for Americans to obtain a firearm legally
  • Confiscate and destroy all ‘unauthorized civilian firearms’
  • Ban the trade, sale, and private ownership of all semi-automatic weapons
  • Create an international gun registry that will ‘set the stage for full-scale gun confiscation.’

All of these assumptions are plain wrong. Senator Paul and his supporters clearly do not understand the goals, provisions, and limitations of the proposed ATT. From the outset, negotiations with respect to an ATT are focused exclusively on international transfers of conventional weapons between member states of the UN and have nothing to do with individual citizens, private ownership, or the Second Amendment of the US Constitution. Documents from the ATT preparatory committees have expressly disclaimed any intention to interfere with the right of states to self defense as well as national regulation of firearms within its own territory. Furthermore, all 193 member states as a unit, including many that are still highly skeptical of an ATT, would never allow a treaty to be penned that would encroach on such basic rights of sovereignty.

The original General Assembly resolution that called for negotiations to begin on an ATT explicitly and exclusively calls for ‘common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’ without mentioning, even once, internal domestic policy regarding gun ownership or confiscation, destruction, or limitation on civilian firearms. The standards refer to criteria and parameters regarding transfers of weapons from one state (government) to another. Moreover, the most recent paper from Chairman of the ATT negotiating process, Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, from July 2011 recognizes the sovereign right of states to regulate internal transfers including ‘national constitutional protections on private ownership.’ As such, there is zero potential for an ATT to affect US domestic licensing laws or civilian firearms possession let alone give anyone the authority (certainly no imaginary UN enforcing squad) to confiscate and destroy civilian firearms.

As for the contention that the ATT will ban the sale, trade, and ownership of semi-automatic weapons is also, not surprisingly, entirely false. Firstly, the ATT explicitly refers to large conventional weapons used for military purposes, which include: tanks, military vehicles, military aircraft, naval vessels, missiles, missile systems, and military helicopters among others– with no mention of rifles whatsoever. Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) are not currently accepted by all UN member states as part of the scope of the ATT. The question as to whether they will be included under the scope of the treaty is still very much up in the air. Secondly, even if SALWs were to be included under the scope of the ATT, private ownership of such weapons is entirely unaffected as the ATT deals only with the regulation of state-to-state transfers.

Lastly, concern over an ‘international gun registry’ is entirely unfounded. None of the proposals tabled and considered throughout the ATT negotiating process contemplate creation of any such enforcement bureaucracy. The US delegation has made clear its position that oversight of the ATT’s provisions must remain under the control of national governments and should not be subject to international scrutiny as US law already provides for comprehensive regulation of international arms transfers. Many other states agree. As the ATT process is a consensus-driven one, all member states will have to come to agreement before any treaty will be accepted making acceptance of any ‘international policing unit’ utterly impossible. The main proposal under consideration is an International Support Unit (ISU) that would serve as a repository for annual transfer reports from signatories, assist states in implementing the treaty’s provisions when requested to, serve as a clearinghouse for requests for international cooperation and assistance regarding implementation, and promote understanding of the treaty and its provisions. There is no mention of ‘international policing,’ ‘a global registry’ of all firearms owned throughout the globe (which, moreover, is entirely unrealistic), or powers bestowed to some external UN body that will allow it to determine who should or should not have the right to own a firearm within the confines of their own national homeland.

It seems clear to me– there is neither a ‘small arms treaty’ nor a ‘global gun control scheme’ in the works. Advocates of a robust ATT are fighting for strong humanitarian language regarding arms transfers in order to prevent illicit diversion to terrorists, criminals, and other human rights abusers and ultimately limit human suffering. Even the most skeptical of member states do not disagree that such black market trade is harmful to the world at large and that international standards for state-to-state trade in conventional weapons are direly needed. No one is pushing for confiscation of civilian firearms in any individual country and any ATT would certainly have no impact on existing domestic law in any member state.

Therefore, before anyone starts brandishing the yet-to-exist-ATT a global conspiracy to ban all gun ownership, it is worth a look at the documentation of the process that proves nothing of the sort.

–Katherine Prizeman

 

2012 and Conventional Weapons: Balancing the PoA and the ATT

5 Jan

For those that follow processes related to conventional weapons disarmament, 2012 is proving to be a busy and significant year with its own set of opportunities and challenges. This July, diplomats will come together at the UN headquarters in New York and negotiate treaty language for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that seeks to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons. Just four weeks later, many of those same diplomats will gather for a Review Conference to assess implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects (UNPoA).

Each process has its own difficulties– the objective of an ATT is still unclear as to whether it is a treaty with a strong humanitarian perspective aimed at preventing human suffering caused by illicit trade in conventional weapons or, rather, merely a treaty to regulate commerce of arms; the PoA still suffers from weak implementation without benchmarks or enforcement power. Moreover, advocates of a robust ATT fear that small arms and light weapons (SALWs) will not be covered under the scope of the treaty, while many states that have tried to implement the UNPoA framework still lack the coordination and technology necessary to provide the marking, tracing, and record keeping of weapons that is necessary to eliminate illicit trade. As such, the challenges in both processes are vast. However, in a year that provides forums for improvements in both processes, we would be wise to make good use of them by advocating and underscoring linkages and complementary qualities that exist between the two.

The UNPoA is a political (non-legally binding) framework document that covers a wide variety of activities involving SALWs– international transfer, brokering, manufacture, stockpile management, marking, tracing, and record keeping. The UNPoA provides a framework for implementing adequate national laws, regulations, and adminstrative procedures around these activities as they relate to illicit trade. An ATT, as a legally-binding treaty of international law, would cover only internati0nal transfers of conventional weapons such as tanks, military vehicles, naval vessels, missiles, and missile systems and provide for a list of criteria to which signatories would be bound when determining if an arms transfer will be permitted.

Although the two instruments seem disparate, there are clear areas where an ATT could and should support the UNPoA framework. One element severely lacking in the UNPoA is benchmarks. The ATT could help with this lack of accountability by dictating, in a legally-binding manner, how states signatories must comply with international transfer standards. Additionally, an ATT has the ability to clarify some UNPoA ambiguities with regards to transfers (although it is still unclear as to whether this will include SALWs, which may or may not be in the scope of the treaty).  Most importantly, the ATT has the opportunity to build on national commitments to arms control and conventional disarmament measures by providing (hopefully) a clear reporting process on transfers (including denials), a formal monitoring system, and some form of a secretariat to provide administrative support to signatories in their national implementation of the treaty’s provisions.

While the ATT will neither dry up any existing stockpiles nor cover weapons already in circulation, it will address (how strongly and explicitly is still uncertain) diversion of weapons into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and corrupt officials by providing common international trade standards. In concert with the UNPoA that does provide a framework for drying up stockpiles and eliminating weapons in circulation, the ATT has the opportunity to curb human suffering and armed violence caused by new instances of illicit trade in conventional weapons. It seems the two have more in common than has been generally thought by addressing illicit trade through different lenses.

The argument that an ATT will be a drain on resources and cause reporting fatigue for signatories is a weak one at best. It is a generally accepted notion that the lack of common standards for international trade in conventional weapons must be addressed in a more robust and consistent manner than currently exists in the UNPoA that addresses only small arms in a non-binding framework. Therefore, it is clear that both instruments are relevant and it is important to ensure the effectiveness of both in the upcoming year.

–Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , , ,

Assessing the 2011 GA Session

27 Dec

The President of the 66th General Assembly (PGA), Ambassador Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser of Qatar, recently hailed the plenary body of the UN for its collective work on the most pressing global issues of our time noting that the GA has adopted nearly 300 resolutions and decisions during its main session. The main pillars of the 66th session, as laid forth by the PGA, have been peaceful settlement of disputes; UN reform and revitalization; improving disaster prevention and response; and promoting sustainable development and global prosperity. The PGA made particular mention of the importance of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and the key requirement of breaking the stalemate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament that is considered to be the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament. Other achievements underscored by the PGA were the actions taken on Libya, the political declaration adopted on the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases, and the application by the Palestinian Authority for full membership.

In light of the conclusion of the main session of the GA, it is important to assess not only the substantive accomplishments of the body, but the role of the GA writ large. Long after the heads of state and heads of government have returned to their capitals in September, the GA must settle down to the difficult and complex work of its committees to address challenging global issues. The higher profile issues of this year’s session have surely stolen  many headlines, in particular the Palestinian membership question, and have often eclipsed some of the less controversial, albeit still extremely significant, work of the GA. The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) is still grappling with the task of breaking the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating, among other important treaties, a Fissile Cut-Off Material Treaty (FMCT); the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) must deal with challenging issues related to macroeconomic policy questions such as international trade, financing for development, poverty eradication, and human settlements; the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) encompasses some of the most difficult questions of human rights, the advancement of women, indigenous peoples, and treatment of refugees.

As such, behind the more pronounced, headline-grabbing issues are a litany of concerns that are so complex that they appear on the GA’s agenda year after year. These issues are neither small agenda items nor easily evaluated and accomplished tasks. Nonetheless, the value of discussing these transnational issues in the only truly global forum is paramount. Equality in representation gives the GA process an innate value independent from its lack of enforcing power and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. As previously mentioned, the GA often counts among its most impressive accomplishments ‘political declarations’ that, although they have no legally-binding provisions, carry considerable weight by symbolizing the general sense of the international community on a given global issue.

It follows, then, that while it is admirable that the program of work for the 66th session has been far-reaching, the more concrete the goals of the GA are the more easily it is to assess and ultimately evaluate the progress of the body such that improvements can be made year to year. The trade-off for universal membership, however, appears to be this concrete evaluation and enforcement power. It is also clear that any sort of ‘evaluation’ of the UN’s work, especially from the perspective of the general public, is done through a peace and security lens. Often through this lens, the deficiencies of the UN are glaring– the inability to eliminate nuclear weapons, to curb the illicit arms trade, to ensure women’s full participation in all peace policies and processes, and to provide robust early warning and diplomacy to respond to the threat of atrocity crimes. Nevertheless, these security concerns are indivisible and have implications for all of the UN’s work from human rights to development such that this narrower lens of evaluation is not so skewed as to be entirely devoid of value.

As is often argued by observers of the UN, there is currently no alternative available as a viable multilateral system for addressing international issues on a broad spectrum. Therefore, it is important to continue to work within the framework that exists, while simultaneously pushing for improvements to fill in and ultimately improve on the ‘cracks’ in the system. The hope is that the GA will continue to improve its process and make honest overtures towards addressing its very lengthy list of global concerns.

-Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , ,

Security Sector Challenges and Women’s Participation

20 Dec

Global Action recently had the opportunity to co-organize a meeting of Andean region governments on combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The conference covered many aspects of the illicit trade from regional cooperation and information exchange to the current status of implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA). Representatives of Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia engaged in an open and honest discussion about how to strengthen regional security and eliminate illicit weapons wreaking havoc on communities.

As Global Action is accustomed to doing, a women, peace and security lens was integrated into the conversation to push forward a  more robust human security agenda that is adequately inclusive of both women and men. At a macro-policy level, the links between a strong security sector and inclusive participation in political processes, peace negotiations, and other forms of civic engagement in helping to keep the peace are inarguable.  It is essential that the security sector is sufficiently robust to enable active and meaningful participation from all constituencies, including women, without fear or intimidation. The linkages between effective security sector reform and women’s participation, in particular, is a key component to a robust human security agenda that can prevent and well as address conflict in all forms. Furthermore, not only is it theoretically important to include the skills and talents of all citizens, such inclusion also practically contributes to the well being of the society.

In practice, the proliferation of illicit small arms continues to facilitate grave community-based crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence as well as other forms of domestic abuse which are often committed at gunpoint. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is not a stand-alone issue to be addressed in isolation, but surely facilitates other trafficking and security challenges faced by policymakers, police and the military.

Moreover, it is inaccurate to classify women as solely victims of gun violence perpetrated by men with arms. This approach neglects the active role women have played, and continue to play, in global, regional, and civil-society driven conflict prevention and disarmament initiatives. This narrow approach has also neglected the role women sometimes play as gun users, combatants, and traffickers.

SCR 1325 is proving to be an effective mandate for small arms policy and implementation by encouraging women’s participation in decision-making as well as by identifying specific entry points for gender analysis—such as reform of national security recruitment practices, implementation of small arms initiatives in collaboration with women’s organizations, and policy training and education to increase women’s participation in issues critical to the UN PoA. In order to address the real causes of societal insecurity, it is essential that participation in all peace and disarmament processes are representative of the whole of the population.

-Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , , ,

Women, RtoP and the Media

21 Nov

 

In a recent interview posted on The Daily Beast, Abigail Disney recently interviewed Major General Patrick Cammaert to comment on the pervasive and distressing issue of rape as an instrument of war. In response, Major Cammaert described ways in which we can act to deal with such crimes as through increasing women’s participation in policy, through training sessions, and through media—in particular using films as tools to educate the public and promote accountability. But, what is missing throughout the interview is any notion of state responsibility to protect women from such crimes; ending impunity but also preventing them from occurring in the first place.  

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm was first affirmed in 2005 with the aim to protect civilians from crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. RtoP has three pillars: Primary responsibility to protect lies with the state. The international community has a responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this primary function. If a state proves unwilling or unable to protect civilians, then the international community can take collective, protective action, primarily to prevent violence but also to halt violence in situations where less coercive measures have failed to do so.

While RtoP has gained additional acceptance since its initial affirmation, there are still issues regarding the use of force and the full participation of women in all aspects of RtoP policy and practice that remain unresolved. On the implementation side, there is widespread concern that the Security Council is unresponsive to ‘early warning’ signs of atrocities, preferring to respond to fires than heading the smoke. Moreover, the Council refuses to conduct vigorous assessment of resolutions and mandates that could help prevent ‘mission creep’ or ensure that all preventive measures have been exhausted before military options are proposed.

 And with regard to gender, there is concern that states have not done enough on the prevention end to eliminate any and all possibilities that rape could be used as a war tactic, nor has the international community been sufficiently robust in its efforts—despite welcomed legal attention by the ICC—to end impunity for gender violence, especially that authorized or committed by states and their agents.

However, in addressing these other concerns, women’s perspectives and voices must also be fully incorporated into the conversation to ensure that their needs are met practically and their skills and capacities are integrated successfully. Societies characterized by women who are full participants in social and political life can play a tremendous role in mobilizing other women to support more robust priorities towards increasing participation and ending impunity. As part of this mobilization, Major Cammaert notes, film can play an important role in educating local women about rape and inspiring women to work on behalf of victims. Likewise, in the broader discourse on gender and RtoP, media of all forms can do more to educate women about a state’s responsibility to protect, highlight the gender gaps in RtoP policy and implementation, identify work that still needs to be done in the protection area, and inspire cultures that promote and support “women as agents of change.”

 

For more information on the interview, please visit: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/07/rape-in-wartime-can-be-eradicated-u-n-peacekeeper-says.html

 

–         Melina Lito

Tags: , , , ,

Looking Towards the ATT in 2012

17 Nov

As the First Committee of the General Assembly has come to a close, delegations appear ready, some enthusiastically and others more hesitatingly, to move towards the final negotiations. Whether this negotiating will be based on the most recent Chair’s Paper from Ambassador Moritan or not, it seems that member states are anticipating transition from the preparatory process to concrete Treaty text.  It is to be assumed that the very ambitious Chair’s Paper from July 14, 2011 will not be entirely replicated in the text, but it surely lays forth the existing proposals that will require honest and practical vetting over the three-week period of the Conference. Ambassdor Moritan’s presence at the First Committee enabled member states to hear, once more, the various proposals and divisions that still exist around the ATT underscoring the vast challenges that lie ahead. Ambassador Moritan is under no illusions regarding the complexity of the process as he noted the levels of ambition regarding the ATT are vastly different. The final PrepCom in February will be focused on the parameters and so-called rules of engagement for negotiations rather than a broad thematic discussion of scope and content specifics.

We continue to advocate for strong emphasis on diversion risks as this issue remains at the heart of curbing the illicit arms trade. Addressing this issue will require special attention to the practice of diverting arms from legitimate end users to non-state and unauthorized parties who may use such weapons for criminal, corrupt, and abusive purposes. It is often in this indirect, and sometimes unintentional on the part of governments, manner that the arms trade becomes a harmful practice. The strength of the language on this issue in the Treaty text is still undecided. As the Chair’s Paper from July 2011 noted, “A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms if there is a substantial risk that those conventional arms would…” undermine peace and security in various forms such as to commit violations of international human rights law. One major question for advocates of a strong humanitarian instrument in the ATT is whether the words “shall not” will be changed to “should not,” which inherently alters this responsibility from obligation to suggestion.

This issue of diversion language is but one example of difficult work ahead. We submit that the first iteration of the Treaty may not be ideal for all states parties, but it is the responsibility of all negotiators to take into account that such a Treaty should function as a floor and not a ceiling for improving state arms transfer controls. Implementation of ATT language in national practice will be just as important as the text itself for without implementation the language is empty wording. Therefore, sufficient discussion next year must be focused on implementation support and corresponding structure. We also encourage delegations to put in place a sound review process that will allow for ATT negotiations to continue well passed 2012 such that the ATT can effectively respond to changing international security risks.

The overwhelming trend in conversation in this year’s Committee has been support for both the preparatory process and the leadership of Ambassador Moritan as well as the inarguable need for better regulation of the arms trade. Building on these consensus points, we are hopeful that next year’s conference will, in fact, yield an ATT that will improve the global arms trade process. The question of its robustness and expansiveness, however, remains unanswered.

For more information on the ATT, follow @DisarmDialogues, @controlarms, @TheIANSA, and @VinoThorsen on Twitter and follow the ATT blog featuring various contributors from different organizations working on this issue.

-Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , ,

Where are the Women Mentors in the Media?

16 Nov

As a young professional working in the field of ‘Women, Peace and Security,’ I continue to be surprised by the lack of mentors available to women and young girls and, in particular, the lack of media attention- at least among popular media outlets—focused on educating women and young girls on these issues in order to inspire a generation of active participants.

It has become obvious to me just how narrowly women are portrayed in popular media, from music videos to periodicals. These sources tend to focus their attention on body image issues or trying to instill an image of self-confidence, which in turn only works to make women more self-conscious about their appearance. While body image and self-confidence are important issues, there is not much attention on the barriers that affect women’s participation- where is the attention on the barriers that rural women face in accessing resources, education, employment? Where is the support for those women trying to have a voice at decision making tables? Where is the education for those trying to overcome the community stigma of having fought in combat? Where are the mechanisms for overcoming the cultural stigma that prohibits women’s participation in patriarchal societies? Thinking practically, we all face the same challenges. For example, domestic violence is an issue that affects all women, regardless of their ethnic or social backgrounds. The circulation of weapons and small arms that often leads to women as victims of gun violence is an issue of worldwide concern, yet you rarely see this covered in popular media. Accessibility issues, along with institutionalizing women’s participation at decision making tables, and the stories of how these women overcome such difficult circumstances, are not typically covered by the more popular periodicals.

Here at GAPW, we work to promote women’s full participation in social and political life and promote women as agents of change. Our work is solidified by the emphasis and promotion of women mentors who encourage and support women in their struggles of participation. But, this hard work becomes even harder without the support of the media. Media outlets are a viable source for showcasing mentors and inspiring adoption of a norm of ‘women as agents of change’ rather than strictly victims. The need for highlighting women mentors is necessary to educate future generations that to be a confident woman is not just about body image, but also about how to change and overcome the barriers that get in the way of full participation.

-Melina Lito

Tags: , , , , , , , ,

The CCW4 and Cluster Munitions

15 Nov

Currently, in Geneva, diplomats are convening the 4th Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW4) Review Conference. The Convention, negotiated by 51 states in 1980, seeks to outlaw specific types of conventional weapons used in armed conflict to protect military personnel from inhumane injury as well as non-combatants from harm. When the treaty entered into force in 1983, it covered  incendiary weapons, mines and booby traps, and weapons designed to injury through very small fragments. In 2001, the Convention was voted to cover intrastate conflict as well as international ones under all its provisions. There are five protocols in force: (1) Non-detectable fragments, (2) Landmines, booby traps, and other devices, (3) Incendiary weapons, (4) Blinding lasers, and (5) Explosive remnants of war.  A related piece of international law, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), comprehensively bans the use of cluster munitions and was signed and ratified by 111 states.

The controversy now rests in the negotiations of a new protocol on cluster munitions for the CCW (Draft available here). Many advocates are concerned that this will severely undermine the ban under the CCM by providing cover for the future use of cluster munitions, which ultimately causes indiscriminate harm as well as the threat of explosion well beyond the end of the conflict in areas inhabited by civilians. Arms control advocates are arguing that this protocol will “provide a specific legal framework for their use.” The US and allies such as Israel, Brazil, India, and China, cite the ‘humanitarian’ provision in the protocol draft that bans the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980, although post-1980 munitions also cause indiscriminate harm to civilians and these older munitions would most likely have to be destroyed regardless of the protocol because of their age. The most recent use of cluster munitions reported in April 2011  used in civilian areas in Misurata by Qadaffi loyalists were contemporary weapons surely produced after 198o. The draft also allows for a deferral period of 12 years, which ultimately allows for use of weapons that will eventually be banned by the protocol.

As a back drop to adoption of a framework that allows for the use of cluster munitions is a larger normative problem: adoption of an instrument of international humanitarian law that is weaker than a previously (and generally accepted) adopted law. This is a dangerous undertaking that we hope the US and others will reconsider.

For up-to-date information on the negotiations, follow @marywareham, @banclusterbombs, and @nashthomas on Twitter.

-Katherine Prizeman

Tags: , , , , , ,

← Older Entries
Newer Entries →