Tag Archives: UN

Germany as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: An Evaluation

16 Jan

The Coordinator of our Media Initative (Matching:Points), Ms. Lia Petridis Maiello, recently authored an article detailing and evaluating the role of Germany as a non-permanent member of the Security Council over the last two years. Germany just completed its tenure in December 2012. She evaluates the issue-specific work of Germany in the following areas: Afghanistan; Children and Armed Conflict; Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions; Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament; Climate and Security; Libya; and Assessment.

An excerpt from her article is below with access to her full evaluation available here.

“In the past two years, the German government has been represented as a non-permanent member at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Despite a closely defined scope reserved for non-permanent members at the SC, the European middle power managed to inject new momentum and nuance to both established and new policy concepts. Following the departure of Germany from the SC and with the beginning of the new year, the inventories and analyses begin, particularly with regard to the perception of Germany by its international partners at the UN.

The last public meeting of the SC on international peace building just before Christmas, gave theoutgoing German Ambassador to the United Nations, Peter Wittig, once again the opportunity to thank the German partners for the excellent cooperation within the Security Council – with a subtle tone of melancholy in his voice. Wittig can be sure of his popularity among colleagues in the diplomatic circles of New York City. He is regarded as an “extraordinarily competent,” “objective,” “humble,” and a “very kind” representative. Many regret his departure and appreciate the Ambassador’s savoir vivre, a feature oftentimes missing in the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle.”

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Highlighting the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

3 Jan

The debate around nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament has taken many forms over the last several decades as the shifting security circumstances of the post-Cold War era have demanded a change in the discourse surrounding these indiscriminate and massively destructive weapons. Although the examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continue to remind all of humanity of the catastrophic and holocaustic consequences of the use of these weapons, continual references to the necessity of a nuclear “deterrent” as well as the claims of some states so-called prerequisite of first “creating the conditions” for nuclear disarmament often eclipse the focus on the disastrous nature of these weapons and ultimately the need to eliminate them at the earliest possible moment. It is incontestable that nuclear weapons have the capacity to threaten the survival of humanity and their mere existence ensures that this risk remains. The notion that a “limited nuclear exchange,” in itself a contraction in terms (as noted by several delegations during the 2010 NPT preparatory committee), is a valid argument for sustaining a nuclear “deterrent” is wholly inadequate.

Each year, delegations to the First Committee of the General Assembly continue to call for nuclear disarmament and, even more bluntly, a “world without nuclear weapons” through plenary statements and annual resolutions. The Non-Aligned Movement sponsored a new resolution during the 2012 session calling for a High-Level Meeting on nuclear disarmament to underscore its importance on the global security agenda. Furthermore, President Obama’s commitment to such a goal in April 2009 in a speech in Prague is continuously referenced as a bold and paramount change in the commitment to global nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, as nearly four years have passed since President Obama made this commitment, little tangible progress has been made in the disarming of these weapons by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and proliferation risks remain, not the least of which in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference represents concrete steps that must be taken to achieve nuclear disarmament, in particular full implementation of Article VI. Nevertheless, agreeing to steps is not the same as taking them.

The discussion often missing from the many times abstract discussion of these weapons is that of the tangible, humanitarian consequences that would ensue if these weapons were indeed used by any of the possessor states. These consequences include those of a medical, environmental, and humanitarian nature. One of the most important takeaways from the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT was the joint statement delivered on behalf of sixteen delegations (Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland) on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament in May 2012 at the UN in Vienna.

At this session, the government of Norway also announced that it would host an international conference on this topic in Oslo in March 2013. The discussion around these consequences has grown over the last few months leading up to the Oslo conference among governments as well as civil society. Civil society will also engage in a forum in Oslo prior to the government sessions to discuss the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons.

Research on the humanitarian dimension has also grown over the years. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has already concluded that international organizations providing emergency relief following a nuclear explosion would be unable to adequately fulfill their mandates and other studies have shown that the radiation by a single nuclear weapon affects populations, resources, infrastructure, and agriculture over a vast area constituting a serious threat to many generations to come. Indeed, some would argue that the ability of States and civil society to address successfully the current, security-related challenges facing the majority of the global community, including poverty eradication, health accessibility, climate change, terrorism, and other aspects of transnational crime, is limited at best . Others have noted that the financial demands of maintaining nuclear arsenals directly drain resources from other social and economic programs for development. As 2015 draws nearer and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) agenda is revised and reformulated, the spending on maintaining and even modernizing nuclear arsenals seems even more irresponsible. Clearly, a nuclear detonation on top of existing humanitarian obligations would cause unthinkable problems.

Moreover, inherent in the discussion of the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons is that of the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) (see more here in an article by John Burroughs, Charles Moxley and Jonathan Granoff). Many international lawyers, civil society advocates, and government officials have rightly asked the question—can the use of weapons with such horrific effects on humanity be compatible with IHL? When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion in 1996, the court affirmed the applicability of IHL to these weapon systems. IHL applied to these devastating weapons is but another tool that must utilized to deconstruct the argument that possession of these weapons does not pose a threat to the survival of humanity and, even more, somehow contributes to peace and security. Even the threat to use such weapons arguably has its own set of IHL-related problems as it has been established by many that such weapons cannot be used compatibly with established law.

With the Oslo conference and the corresponding civil society forum, the global community has the opportunity to underscore the urgency of ridding the world of these weapons in a timely and responsible manner through a total, irreversible, and verifiable process. This event represents the latest opportunity to put the devastating humanitarian consequences of weapons of mass destruction at the forefront of discussions on steps to bring about nuclear disarmament.

—Katherine Prizeman

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The Way Forward for the Arms Trade Treaty: UNGA First Committee Resolution

4 Dec

One of the most anticipated items on the First Committee agenda this year, the resolution entitled “The arms trade treaty” (A/C.1/67/L.11), was adopted on the whole by a vote of 157-0-18, thereby authorizing a new round of ATT negotiations for March 2013. The resolution, which was tabled by the original “co-authors” group of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom, was co-sponsored by more than 100 delegations. As the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference ended without adoption of a consensus treaty setting common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms, the fate of renewed negotiations has rested on the formulation of a General Assembly resolution detailing a way forward. Although no delegations voted against the resolution and all have expressed some degree of support for continuing the ATT process next year, there remains contention over the status of the President’s draft treaty text from 26 July 2012 as well as the operative rules of procedure. As such, a separate vote was requested on operational paragraph (OP) 2, which describes the rules of procedure for the “final” 18–28 March 2013 Negotiating Conference as “utilizing the modalities, applied mutatis mutandis, under which the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty of 2 to 27 July 2012 operated.” The result was 153-1-18 with the delegation of Iran dissenting. Likewise, a separate vote was also conducted on OP3, which designates the President’s 26 July text as “the basis for future work on the Arms Trade Treaty.” The result of this vote was 148-1-22 with Iran again representing the lone vote against retaining the paragraph.

Many delegations chose to offer explanations of vote (EOV) on the ATT resolution. Expressions of support were widespread as the representatives of Morocco, Norway, and Nigeria called on member states to support the resolution and remain committed to the continuation of negotiations. Nevertheless, discontent over some specifics within the President’s draft text was expressed by the Nigerian delegation, which underscored the need to more adequately address diversion and ambiguities in the Treaty’s scope. In addition, the delegation of Indonesia noted its abstention to OP2 and OP3 as the draft text “does not reflect its views and those of many other member states,” in particular on the matter of territorial integrity. Several delegations expressed their opposition to treating the President’s text as the sole basis for negotiations, including Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Syria. The representative of Egypt called the draft “a work in progress,” while the delegation of Belarus warned that the document would prejudice the results of the work of the upcoming March conference. The representative of Iran also offered an EOV on his delegation’s vote against OP3 noting that the draft text is “vague and full of loopholes” and also provides for far too much subjectivity in application of assessment criteria. In particular, Iran noted that the parameters explicitly allow arms-exporting states on their own volition to export as many arms as they want to any country or region if in their view it can “contribute to peace and security”. Likewise, he complained that the current draft text gives too much preference to the commercial interests of exporting states than the security of importing states and other states in their regions.

With regards to the rules of procedure, as laid forth in OP2, delegations expressed their support for consensus, although some offered more detailed caveats. The Mexican delegation reiterated its well-known concern over allowing consensus to be interpreted as the right of one or a few delegations to impede general agreement. Similarly, the representative of Morocco supported consensus as “an effective tool” so long as it is not abused or misinterpreted as veto power or a demand for unanimity. Other delegations, including Egypt and India, also warned against placing artificial deadlines or timelines on negotiations.

While the ATT resolution has been adopted and a pathway forward has been identified towards a March Conference to finish work on common international standards for the transfer in conventional arms, there remains significant disagreement over the substance of the future treaty text on many issues from scope to criteria to enforcement mechanisms. This calls into question the status of the President’s draft text as the single basis for negotiations, as some states continue to express their unease with many of its contents.

 

—Katherine Prizeman

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Security Council Holds Open Debate on International Criminal Court

25 Oct

On 17 October the UN Security Council (SC) held an open debate on the subject “Peace and justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court”. In addition to the five permanent members of the SC – China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States – as well as the ten non-permanent members – Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa and Togo -, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Judge and President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Song Sang-Hyun, and a representative of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Court, Phakiso Mochochoko, also made statements at the debate. Many other non-members of the SC offered statements as well.

The majority of the speakers praised the good timing of the debate, as this year the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, celebrates its tenth anniversary. Furthermore, perhaps even more symbolic, Guatemala, which is presiding at the SC this month as president, is the latest state that has ratified the Statute. Therefore, at the initiative of Guatemala, this debate on peace and justice and the ICC was held this month. Many states, realizing the vitality and the sensitivity of the issue, expressed their wish to hear from the ICC at the SC on a more regular basis.

As Mr. Sang-Hyun and Mr. Mochochoko argued in their statements, and what was later on repeated by the vast majority of speakers at the debate, there cannot be peace without justice and there cannot be justice without peace. If the international community is aiming for sustainable peace, justice cannot be overshadowed and be seen as a secondary matter in any conflict resolution. As oftentimes justice has been sacrificed in order to reach peace, there is a prevailing “culture of impunity”  in many conflict-torn countries across the world. As General-Secretary Ki-moon noted, this is a new age of accountability and “the perpetrators can no longer be confident that their crimes will be unpunished”.

Another issue that was widely discussed among the speakers was the relationship between the SC and the ICC as well as their distinct mandates. While the UN SC is essentially a political body, which makes its decisions based often subjected to political aspirations and biases,, the ICC represents an international criminal law enforcement tool, which was set up to function completely independent and uninfluenced by the political currents often endemic in the SC. The separation of distinctive mandates is essential when speaking of referrals. When a state is not a party to the ICC, the SC, seeing that grave crimes have been committed and thus  a potential threat to an international peace and security has been identified, can refer the case to the ICC. The referral to the ICC should be impartial, therefore, as Pakistan pointed out, prepared with diligent scrutiny and never be a default process when an injustice occurs. On the other hand, the final decision would be made by the ICC whether to initiate an investigation or not.

Another issue widely addressed at the debate was the cooperation between the two institutions and how it should and could be improved. As non-SC members, such as New Zealand, Australia, Bangladesh and Lithuania pointed out, when the referral has been made, the SC has to act with the utmost commitment and support in order to make sure that the referral will be followed through upon. Failure in an execution of arrest warrants is a great example where there has been a lack of commitment.

Another important issue brought up during the debate was the Syrian case. Such states as Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Slovenia mentioned that mass breaches of human rights and grave atrocities against the Syrian population should be to the ICC. Keeping in mind how impotent the SC has been in acting on the Syrian case due seemingly intractable country positions, it would be unlikely to expect that this time things will go differently. Uruguay, on the other hand, brought up an important point – it raised a question, whether or not it would be fair and right if the permanent SC members would restrain from their veto power when dealing with such issues as crimes against humanity..

As international humanitarian law continues to gain more attention and legitimacy worldwide, the debate at the UN SC was timely and necessary. Many important issues have been addressed and the support that states declared for the ICC is encouraging and promising. A lot is still left to do to ensure global peace and justice, but fighting the “culture of impunity” and preventing future human rights violations through collaboration between the UN SC and the ICC is one of the ways to do it.

 

—Donata Saulyte

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That They May Like ‘US’

24 Sep

This is a guest blog post from one of our former interns, Nnamdi Iheakaram, Esq.

A foreign policy that is based on a state’s ability to project force will tend to pursue unilateralist goals. The immense benefit derivable from this strategy is evident when weaker states readily abandon non-essential legitimate claims rather than engage a state that has power advantage and the will to exploit that advantage.  Undeniably, it is well-known that war is more likely when conquest is easy.  However, the interest in question must be essential, such as the threat to a state’s sovereignty, to warrant any state risking the possibility of a direct military conquest. Because most interests are non-essential, it becomes attractive for stronger states to resort to their military might in the event of more essential threats to their interests.

The US has always had a power advantage which it has employed in securing its interests. Not long ago, in 2009, a new US foreign policy approach based on mutual respect of other states and their cultures was pitched to an enthralled audience in Cairo, Egypt. The goal was to reassure the Muslim community that the United States was not an enemy and that the new US government would seek to work closely with all peace loving states in ensuring international peace and security. To give effect to these declarations, the US government gave direct support to protesters all across North Africa and the Middle East during the 2010 Arab Spring and even called on the Egyptian President, an ally, to relinquish power as demanded by the protesters.

While this support may seem appropriate to passionate advocates who are committed to democracy and the self-governance of all people, an objective analysis of the situation may show that supporting a rebel movement that is not clear on its objectives, violates the laws of a legitimate government, and seeks military assistance to unseat a government, is itself unlawful and counterproductive. Accordingly, it was unwonted when the US called on its Egyptian ally to relinquish power as opposed to reestablishing effective control and initiating a constitutional review that would bring about a more representative government structured around the rule of law and secularism. But the US interference, which was based on a new commitment to democratic rule, was undermined by its inconsistent treatment of similarly situated states.

Thus, just as it was difficult to identify any supporters of the continuation of the government of Col. Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, it was equally difficult to identify any law that could support an intervention in Libya while requiring non-interference in Saudi Arabia. The reason is simple: the Libyan government had effective control of its territory while effective control in, for instance, a state likeSaudi Arabia was enabled by external interests. In the 2011 Libyan intervention, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, developed to avoid mass atrocity crimes, was tarnished as it appeared to have been adopted only to justify and legitimize interference in the domestic affairs of a state, which included removal of the head of that state, thereby exposing one of the fundamental flaws of the concept.  While Qaddafi had been accused of killing less than a thousand rebels at the time the “no-fly-zone” was imposed, commentators such as Jordan Street have been clear that “the bombing that NATO embarked upon to protect their initial mandate has also shown to be flawed due to the high mortality rates among civilians.”  .  The killing of Libyans, it appears, is justifiable when effected under an internationally approved political program.

This is the legal and moral quagmire that is encountered when scholars attempt to interpret popular rules or principles of international law without considering the historical backgrounds and the socioeconomic factors determining the purposes or grounds for their application. Accordingly, it is imperative that international action (or more specifically, intervention in states) be framed in a way that makes it consistent and predictable as opposed to flexible and heteronomous. The former (which is consistent and predictable) would ensure that US policies seek to maximize and protect US interests without undermining or diminishing the welfare of other states, while the latter (which is flexible and heteronomous) would ensure that US policies seek to maximize and protect US interests, largely regardless of consequences. The benefit of taking the first approach is that policies aimed at the maximization and protection of interests are not knowingly detrimental to other states and thus, are in line with international law , while the second approach brings about policies that use other states as means to the goal of maximization and protection of interests.

The recent attacks on US interests in Libya and elsewhere, call for concern for the safety of all diplomats. It is unacceptable that individuals representing their nation’s interests should be imperiled for the mere fact that they accepted a responsibility to serve a diplomatic purpose.. There is no justification for the protesters or anyone to take the lives of others on the righteous pretext that the uncivil and supposedly heretical actions of some bigoted, attention-seeking artists provided  sufficient provocation.

Matters regarding religion are emotive and until the denigration of the faith of others is discouraged by non-coercive measures, extremists of various faiths will actively continue to take matters into their own hands in defense of their beliefs. When economic grievances are rooted in sociopolitical problems that cannot be effectively and easily framed as a rallying cry for action, religion is employed as a tool for rallying otherwise diverse groups against an allegedly ‘common enemy.’  Whether such actions are justified is dependent upon the rationale or factuality of their grievance. But one fact remains indisputable, despite the high cost of the US involvement in the Middle East, there is a clear reluctance to adjust the current US Middle East policy. The implication is that conditions which will likely lead to the reoccurrence of violence persist.

While the West viewed the Arab Spring as an effort by an oppressed citizenry to  rid itself of autocratic leaders, anti-western elements viewed it as aimed at removing less effective Western political acolytes. Having declared the Arab Spring a success, it is unclear how a US Ambassador could be assassinated in Benghazi, a city that was the stronghold and capital of the US-supported rebel forces that fought against Qaddafi. What is not in dispute is that the West has interests in the Gulf and has chosen to selectively interfere in the affairs of states in order to secure those interests. The rationale for this position is subject to debate; however, it can be asserted that a legal, purpose-driven approach that seeks to protect the interests of all involved will be more effective in securing long-term peace than a value-driven approach that is subject to the whims and caprices of self-interested foreign interveners.

Thus, instead of trying to capitalize on the current violence for political purposes, US leaders must use the on-going presidential campaigns to develop, articulate and communicate a realistic and reassuring foreign policy aimed at absolute respect for the rule of law on the international scene and less reliance on force as a means of securing interests. Such a change ensuring that power is not an advantage and that weakness is not a disadvantage is necessary in persuading states like Iran and North Korea to abandon realist security measures which increase the risks of devastating  conflict. It is suggested that only a change in US policy will positively affect the perception and attitude of these states, not an increase in its military might.  The US must choose between the better peace that flows from its support for universally recognized, just policies or a fragile peace held together by the fear of its military might.. A just foreign policy may or may not improve the welfare of other states, but an unjust foreign policy will deliberately diminish the welfare of other states.

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Discussing New Media at International Day of the World’s Indigenous People

14 Aug

On 9 August 2012, the annual conference commemorating the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples was held in the ECOSOC chamber at the United Nations. This year’s conference was focused specifically on new media efforts. Representatives from indigenous groups discussed projects they had created to disseminate information, while UN officials offered brief comments on those projects.

Unfortunately, at times, it seemed as though the event was something of a formality from the UN perspective. The Secretary General’s very short opening comments, which received respectful applause, appreciated all the progress that indigenous communities have achieved thus far using new media. It did not contain specific recommendations moving forward or comment extensively on the international community’s role in addressing the needs of indigenous people.

The many achievements that the Secretary General alluded to were elaborated on throughout the day. Speakers included founders of internet news coalitions, Native American TV stations, video productions about local initiatives, a hip hop artist, and many radio stations from all over the world. A full list of speakers can be found here.

Still, along with celebrating progress, and showing many video clips to exemplify that progress, the indigenous speakers had some major criticisms of UN policy. This disapproval rose to the surface in the question and answer period. Many called for more international funding and support for the new media projects that were being celebrated. Other questioners criticized the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People for “having no teeth,” for implicitly claiming that indigenous people had lost their sovereignty, and for not acknowledging that it lacked a mechanism by which indigenous communities could regain political control. Finally, one questioner from West Papua asked the UN why it had taken no notice of the massive human rights violations in his reg.

Ultimately, the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples was a successful afternoon. It’s likely that the most important result of the session will be the networking opportunities it created. After almost every question, a panelist or fellow attendee would note that they should connect to the speaker after the event. In fact, the introductions and mingling began even before the session ended during the closing remarks. In a room where strangers rarely chat, this level of communication was a sight to see.

In his opening statement, Grand Chief Edward John (Chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues) was clear that in discussing new media, communication, stories, and languages were all at stake. One indigenous language, he told the attendants, dies every week. He highlighted the important role that the media can play in telling stories. Everyone was in agreement that mainstream media sources in their respective countries had failed to communicate properly due to corruption and negligence. Through alternate new media forms, indigenous people all around the world have ironically made productive steps balancing immensely varying pasts. It’s a step in the right direction for indigenous communication that the UN is very right to celebrate. One can only hope that UN officials listened to everything that was communicated in the ECOSOC chamber.

–Henry Neuwirth

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The Question of Palestine: Divisions at the Top and Human Insecurity at the Bottom

31 Jul

The Security Council (SC) debated on 25 July 2012 whether or not Palestine could become a Member State of the United Nations in a debate entitled “The Question of Palestine.” Yet, the standard rhetoric clouded the issue and buried it within the ongoing Israel-Palestine and Israel-Arab world divides. Several other divides also surfaced stemming from historic occurrences, present actions and current ongoing conflicts that continue to produce gaps and stall peace negotiations. These divisions reveal the underlying fundamental issue: the divide between State security and human security and the disconnect that exists between high-level officials and the human perspective.

When discussing Israel and Palestine the underlying systemic issues dividing the Middle East and the international community surface. The continual divide between Israel and the Arab world; Iran’s alleged enrichment of nuclear weapons; and the Syrian Conflict – a subject within which there are multiple high-level divides – collectively clouded the focal issue on Wednesday and continue to form the broader backdrop against which the Palestine-Israel issue is framed.

The topic of peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel has been ongoing since 1967. A stalemate in negotiations between Palestine and Israel has endured since 2010. The “Question” of Palestine has been reviewed several times at Security Council meetings. Israel refused to attend the last Council meeting fearing it would only result in countries ganging-up on them from multiple sides. This was the reality at the 25 July 2012 meeting.

The meeting began with Robert Serry, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process. Serry expressed that a continued stall in peace negotiations is perilous and an effort to restart direct talks between Israel and Palestine is critical. The “worrying issues on the ground” make this timing of the utmost importance. A Two-State agreement is vital to reaching peace and security in the region and on a global scale.

The stalemate in the peace process between Palestine and Israel is based on four main issues: Israel’s continued construction and encroachment of settlements, destruction of agricultural and orchard lands, violations of multiple international laws and the six year blockade in Gaza; the internal divides that exist within Palestine stemming from the ousting of Fatah from Gaza by Hamas in 2001,resulting in tensions  between the Hamas-lead government under Ismail Haniya and the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas; the pre-1967 boundaries; and a diminished or nonexistent level of trust due to enduring violence and conflicts as well as terrorist attacks in the region.

The Palestinians, as well as Egypt, Qatar, Iran, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Tunisia and Syria agreed that Palestinians were specifically targeted for war crimes and ethnic cleansing through the use of “demographic change via geographical expansions” and that it represents a “collective punishment” by the “colonizers.”

The majority of the SC, including four of the P-5 (excluding the United States), agreed that Israel’s illegal settlements as well as the blockade erected in 2004 were the main cause of the stalled peace negotiations, with Iran specifically stressing that Israel should immediately return all of its occupied territories – meaning their past military occupations of lands within Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

The U.S. delegate stressed that “unilateral decisions were contrary to reaching a two-State agreement,” which is essential to the end goal of creating an “independent Palestinian State living in peace and security alongside a Jewish democratic State.” The U.S. also did not support expansions of outposts. In response, Russia specifically suggested that the U.S. has been supporting Israel’s expansions– an accusation based on the U.S. veto of the 2011 UN Resolution which was to declare Israeli settlements illegal.

Israel was further accused of detaining multiple Palestinians illegally – many of which are children and not allowing visits from Palestinian families. Only recently was one visit allowed. Reports of continued hunger strikes by Palestinian prisoners continue and allegations of torture ensued at the meeting. This is a grave and sensitive issue which fuels anger on the Palestinian side and further increases human and State insecurity in the region.

Palestine was blamed – mostly by Israel for engaging in, supporting and continuing acts of violence.  Israel blamed Hamas for carrying out continued terrorist attacks on Israeli soil and accused them of engaging in rocket launches. The majority of speakers at the meeting condemned such actions. All states at the meeting stated they condemned any and all acts of terrorism.

Israel also blamed Iran for supporting terrorism throughout the Middle East and specifically accused them of the attacks in Bulgaria. Accusations significantly escalated between Iran and Israel, with Iran later accusing Israel of targeting and killing its own citizens in order to blame and frame Iran. Further, Iran’s alleged uranium enrichment was raised and continues to trump the Palestine “Question” yet it is directly linked to the high-level divisions which exist on both topics – creating national, international and intra-national divides.

A majority of States blamed the SC, the Quartet and the international community for continually failing to find a solution to resolve the issues in Palestine and Israel.

Amidst all the finger pointing, disagreement and accusations, the actual purpose of the meeting was buried. Many States did not address the “Question,” whether or not they supported the Palestinian application for Statehood. The meeting merely demonstrated continued stalemates at the top levels. It illustrated the inability of high-level officials to properly address on-the-ground issues and reach any sort of standing resolution that will bring peace to a region that has been in the midst of conflict for decades.  While the top remains divided, human suffering and insecurity on the ground endure.  A connection between State and human security is missing.

For more analysis on the debate, as well as a reflection on the need for a “bottom-up” approach to the conflict, please click here.

— Cara Lacey

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The ATT: Moving on and moving forward

30 Jul

As the mandate for the arms trade treaty (ATT) Diplomatic Conference expired on Friday afternoon, delegates and civil society alike were disappointed at the failure to adopt a treaty after four weeks of negotiations and, perhaps more importantly, the inability to address the lack of internationally-adopted common standards for the unregulated trade in conventional arms. The President’s draft treaty text was adopted as an annex to the Report of the Conference, although there was no clear indication of how that text would be treated in the future either in the General Assembly (GA) First Committee in October or elsewhere. While many delegations expressed regret over the lack of a consensus document, there was general agreement that the process is not over. In a statement to the plenary delivered by Mexico, a group of 90 countries expressed the desire to bring the current text to the GA First Committee to “finalize our work” to achieve “a strong and robust Treaty.” The Nigerian delegation explicitly called for a new mandate from the GA to complete the work of the ATT on the basis of the President’s most recent draft text with further consultations. The delegations of Germany, CARICOM, and Spain called for an ATT to be adopted “in the near future,” while others, including Peru, said there was “near unanimity.”

While this large majority of delegations is correct and commendable in their desire to continue to identify a way forward to achieve the still elusive goal of an ATT, it is difficult to imagine how, even with more consultations, the present text would become more robust or that member states would be able to reach “unanimity” on the major issues still left unresolved. After four weeks of hard work and difficult, political wrangling, there is much to be disappointed over.

The President’s most recent draft text still has significant loopholes and is far from the robust ATT that was aspired to by many delegates and civil society advocates—ammunition and munitions are lacking in the core items listed in the scope; the implementation measures provide for a superseding of the criteria by the vague references to “other instruments” and “contractual obligations under defence cooperation agreements;” records of authorizations do not need to be made public; and amendments can only be adopted through consensus leaving very little flexibility for substantive future changes in the Treaty. The language pertaining to criteria is particularly weak given the structure of the ATT as it will be driven primarily by national implementation responsibilities (and thus biases related to national interest). Diversion remains a “secondary” consideration in paragraph 6.4 (national assessment) requiring that states only “consider taking feasible measures” to avoid it. These are not insignificant weaknesses, but rather, compromise the Treaty and its ability to combat and eradicate the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms in a consistent, universal, and legally-binding manner.

Although the particulars of the text could certainly continue to be debated, the question now becomes how to proceed with the process writ large. Although the overwhelming majority of member states have made apparent their intention to continue the ATT process, the specific path forward (and on what basis) does not enjoy the same clarity. The most obvious option would be to bring the draft treaty to the First Committee in October and request another mandate to continue work through a new Diplomatic Conference. This is a position that, although not detailed explicitly on Friday afternoon, would seem to garner significant support among delegations given the commentary in the room. The French delegation noted that states “should not start from zero,” which would indicate support for using the draft text as the base forward.  Likewise the Chinese, Moroccan, and UK delegations called the President’s text “a good basis for future negotiations.”

As member states prepare to bring the ATT to the GA this fall, and they must at the very least report back to the body on the progress made, it is important to remember that the rule of consensus, and ultimately the de facto veto power of each member state, will not necessarily apply to future negotiations. As such, the majority of member states that have called for an ATT with stronger provisions than the ones found in the President’s text (presumably more than the 2/3 majority required for adoption of resolutions in the GA), should propose a text that encompasses more of the provisions that these member states have fought for throughout the negotiations, most notably inclusion of ammunition and munitions in the scope and clear, legally-binding criteria for national risk assessment. The group of 90 states on Friday noted, “Compromises have had to be made, but overall the text you [the President] put forward yesterday has the overwhelming support of the international community as a base for carrying forward our work.” Ultimately, if the rules of procedure change, then so should the Treaty such that these compromises be re-evaluated if they only apply to a few select states and a new, stronger text should be presented.

The goal of a universal, legally-binding treaty for the trade in conventional arms was and remains a noble one. A global ATT would certainly serve as a complement to already-existing, but mostly non-binding, agreements such as the UN Programme of Action on small arms, as well as future instruments seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the UN’s multilateral security framework.  As the next “phase” of this process begins, delegates and civil society should seize the opportunity to adopt a Treaty that can make a robust contribution such a framework.

More analysis and reporting from the month-long negotiations can be found here on Reaching Critical Will with the previous editions of the daily ATT Monitor.

–Katherine Prizeman

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The ATT won’t be a panacea, but let’s be fair

4 Jun

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will not be a panacea for all the world’s weapons-related human rights abuses, but shouldn’t we give the UN and ATT advocates a bit more credit than Mr. Bromund does in his 30 May 2012 editorial in The Commentator, “When the UN Arms Trade Treaty fails, what next?” Mr. Bromund explains why the upcoming ATT negotiations will not solve all the problems related to the flow of weapons to autocratic regimes. He also argues for why the upcoming negotiations are a bad idea in the first place. We can agree that the ATT will not be a cure-all for the complex problems of the diverted arms trade, but have strong disagreements with the second notion.

Mr. Bromund admits that even if the negotiations fail to produce a Treaty in July,  such a Treaty might well come to fruition perhaps at a later stage within the UN or perhaps outside the UN system altogether. At the same time, he sees ATT advocacy as a push to make the UN “do things it was not designed to do, things that would destroy the system…” This is a categorical and perhaps ideologically-driven claim that does not fairly assess the potential of the UN system for establishing new norms and standards (though not always coherent practices) on matters of international security, including on arms transfers and specifically on the need to end diversion of legally traded weapons. Diverted weapons have a direct and demonstrable impact on criminality, terrorism, insurgency, and corruption. Which of these does Mr. Bromund approve of in practice? Obviously none. One can make the case that at ATT, especially in its earlier iterations, will not have sufficient ‘teeth’ to deal with all aspects of diversion, but Mr. Bromund offers no alternate path and our government, the US, is one of several states willfully undermining the ability of the ATT to deal with this critical challenge to international peace and security – which is, after all, a primary role and responsibility of the UN.

Mr. Bromund is right when he states that many ATT ‘insiders’ are increasingly concerned that the initial Treaty will be far from “bullet proof.”  Mr. Bromund concedes that the ATT will at least create the principles to guide the creation of national systems for controlling arms imports and exports in order to raise overall, international standards for the transfer of conventional weapons. Our sense is that this list of “principles” that states should bear in mind prior to a transfer would be the weakest possible outcome for negotiations. Such principles “considered” by States without any accountability or implementation mechanism could arguably be used as cover for future transfers of questionable character. Signatories could maintain that they are acting in accordance with their international obligations as parties to the ATT, have evaluated (born in mind) a given transfer according to the adopted list of principles, and have nonetheless decided to continue the dubious transfer. Therefore, it is important to advocate for an ATT that does have some “teeth,” at least enough “bite” to highlight the diversion potential of certain transfers and alert sellers publicly of the risk.

As Mr. Bromund seems to be writing from a perspective that essentially supports the current US negotiating position, it is important to note that the US standards on weapons transfers are already high; thus the point of a Treaty would be to get other national standards up to a high level insofar as this is fiscally and technologically feasible. The US would not have to change much in the way of its practices under an ATT, though there is now much chatter, largely uninformed and largely from the NRA and other pressure groups, that an ATT will require a large and controversial program of civilian disarmament.  Nevertheless, the US and other larger powers would certainly be required to acknowledge more than they now do a responsibility to do more to get smaller (and many recipient) nations up to a new international code.

That being said, non-governmental organizations that have worked vigorously for an ATT for more than a decade, and that are fully dedicated to a “binding, bulletproof” Treaty that will advance human rights, should not be altogether dismissed for being unrealistic or naïve as Mr. Bromund implies. Vocal ATT proponents are in no way the “deadliest enemies” of the UN system by advocating for a Treaty with strong oversight and pushing states, very publicly, to be held accountable during the negotiation process. NGOs holding all states accountable for where they transfer weapons do not in any way “destroy the [UN] system they claim to be defending and promoting.” The UN system, even with a “veto”option [it seems Mr. Bromund is referring to the P-5 veto in the Security Council put in place because of a demand made by Stalin as a condition for Soviet membership], is entirely capable of implementing a new treaty that seeks to prevent the flow of weapons to societies (whether directly or through diversion) with a high risk of fueling human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. The ‘veto’ to which Mr. Bromund seems to be referring should not be confused with the consensus rule that was established for the ATT, which in this case was insisted on by the US, but which gives any government the right to jettison the process without explanation. Clearly, there are sufficient ways for governments to ‘protect’ their interests in this process should they choose to exercise them.

Nevertheless, in taking such a strong stance, we believe, if the process should be severely undermined or even fail altogether, both of which are certainly possible, then Mr. Bromund is correct:  If we (NGOs) are full partners in this process, NGOs should be subject to the same scrutiny as states in any assessment of why the process did not succeed in producing a viable Treaty.  “Looking into the mirror” is something that none of us does enough.

We, along with many of our NGO colleagues, believe that the ideal outcome of an ATT is a robust instrument of international standards to regulate the global business of the transfer of arms that is fully implementable to include a comprehensive scope, primary attention on diversion, provisions and structure to facilitate international cooperation and assistance that will ultimately stop transfers of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty, and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, we are not unmindful of the possibility that the first iteration of the Treaty will most likely be lacking in many of the characteristics that NGOs rightfully push for—strong humanitarian language, victims’ assistance when rights are violated via illicit transfers, a requirement of denial notifications. However, institutionalizing a strong review process with the possibility for improving on the first iteration of the ATT would be a generally positive outcome. Similar to the evolutionary process of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the argument would be that the ATT will most likely require sequential refinement under the auspices of a regular cycle of review conferences in order to achieve even close to its full potential, and that such refinements in this case are possible and preferable to abandoning the process entirely.

On a side note, Mr. Bromund’s characterization of review conferences as “running battles between countries that are easily swayed by left-wing NGOs” is hardly our experience. We don’t know how many review conferences he has attended (we would be pleased to make his acquaintance as we attend them all), but there are a few points to be made in response to his characterization, one of which is that specific expectations for the ATT are by no means shared by all NGOs, which are generally not considered to be ‘left leaning’ by any groups claiming to be so. Second, the NRA and other gun lobbies – not a lot of “left leaners” in that crowd – have participation in Preparatory Committee meetings, though their interventions have been mostly focused on US policy and the concern that the “UN” is somehow a major threat to gun ownership in this country.  Third, the “battles” referred to, such as they exist, are an inherent and sometimes useful aspect of diplomatic processes. It is better to air grievances in initial stages than to have them ‘sprung’ on states at later stages.

Mr. Bromund’s point concerning implementation is correct insofar as the ATT must make a practical difference in preventing and combating the diversion of weapons to abusive regimes if it is to be counted as a success. However, Mr. Bromund categorically and carelessly dismisses the utility of an ATT saying that it will not make any practical difference where the world’s dictatorial regimes are concerned because the Treaty will state clearly and explicitly the right of all governments to buy, sell, and transfer weapons. However, this claim of the sovereign right of states to import and export weapons does not preclude an ATT that can help stem the flow of weapons to abusive governments and eliminate a diverted market dominated by criminals, terrorists and other rogue interests. States retain the sovereign right to sell weapons under an ATT, and arguments by the NRA and others that the UN is seeking (or even has the capacity) to undermine the US second amendment are careless and ideologically driven. But the point here is that no state is required to make sales of weapons and, certainly, states cannot reasonably argue that there is no national interest in keeping weapons out of the hands of criminals, human rights abusers, terrorists and corrupt government officials. In instances where a state willingly permits a weapons transfer to a government that is known to divert weapons to non-state actors, a strong ATT would authorize the means to apply political and diplomatic pressure on both producing and recipient governments to reconsider the sale.

Human rights abuses will not be curbed solely by the adoption of an ATT (even if it were to miraculously receive full and enthusiastic endorsement by all 193 member states of the UN). But we have an opportunity in July to negotiate a strong Treaty to stem the flow of weapons and ammunition to corrupt or rights-abusing governments. We understand full well that the UN system is not always the most functional playing field, but the issue of diverted weapons is one where norms and practice can find a common and positive framework. This is a path that our own national interest requires us to follow.

 

–Katherine Prizeman & Robert Zuber

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The Arms Trade Treaty: No Treaty, Weak Treaty, ‘Plan B’?

25 May

As the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) preparations are drawing to a close and diplomats and civil society alike anxiously await the July Diplomatic Conference, much of the attention has turned to the possible configurations of a (hopefully) forthcoming consensus treaty. Some would argue that it is best to focus on making the negotiations a success rather than prematurely anticipating their failure. As such, the levels of pessimism and optimism vary according to whom one is talking, whether a member state delegation or civil society advocate.

One could continue to debate the ‘nuts and bolts’ of treaty language from scope and final provisions to the strength of the humanitarian references included. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is absolutely necessary at this point to, at the very least, objectively evaluate and consider the possible scenarios of the 4-week Diplomatic Conference and the corresponding consequences of each circumstance irrespective of one’s position on the desired outcome. Such an evaluation would be useful insofar as it would essentially reveal the net effect of each outcome, whether positive or negative, on what I see as the most desirable outcome of the ATT process—a robust instrument of international standards to regulate the global business of the transfer of arms that is fully implementable to include a comprehensive scope, primary attention on diversion, provisions and structure to facilitate international cooperation and assistance that will ultimately stop transfers of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty, and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Questions on the minds of many who have dedicated themselves to this process for over a decade are clear— is a weak treaty better than no treaty at all? Would a weak treaty do more harm than the harm caused by opting out of the process altogether? Where are the ‘redlines’ that would warrant such an abandonment come July? Are there alternatives for negotiating an ATT within the UN system, or perhaps outside it? In order to address these inquiries it is important to contextualize the ATT debate. To my mind, the ATT process will encompass much more than the month of July. It is essential to assume a long-term perspective, in particular a process through which states commit to a review process that establishes regular meetings of states parties to assess and adjust the ATT to better reflect evolving security circumstances. Moreover, as with all multilateral negotiations, the ATT has not and will not be formulated in a vacuum. In 2012, member states are faced with parallel disarmament and arms control challenges—high stakes for a Conference on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, a continued stalemate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament now stretching over 15 years, and a 13th straight year without consensus recommendations in the Disarmament Commission. Furthermore, a failed negotiation on an ATT would, in turn, also cast a long shadow over the Review Conference of the UNPoA, which is scheduled to take place in August after the ATT negotiations have concluded.

What, then, are the possible scenarios for the ATT Conference? It seems that two of the principle scenarios—adoption of a weak treaty or adoption of no treaty at all—will have significant negative consequences. The only outcome that would not have negative effects would be adoption, by consensus, of an ideal treaty characterized by high levels of state accountability (especially on weapons diversion), oversight capacity for an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), and strong, binding humanitarian language. However, as this process is subject to a consensus rule, a provision that was introduced by the US as a precondition for taking part in the negotiations, this scenario is highly unlikely. Some member states, including the US, have already made clear that a high level of oversight, or any oversight, will not be acceptable and that it is entirely a national prerogative to determine how to manage national export controls in response to any international standards adopted in the ATT. Other member states have continuously asserted that the ATT is a trade treaty seeking merely to regulate the legal business of arms transfers and will not seek to limit the right of member states to sell or purchase arms by overburdening them with treaty-specific reporting obligations.

Therefore, I highlight two principle scenarios and what effect each would have on the long-term process. There are strong arguments that an ATT deemed ‘weak’ is better than no treaty at all. Some would argue that a strong review process with the possibility for improving on the first iteration of the ATT would be a generally positive outcome. Similar to the evolutionary process of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the argument would be that the ATT will most likely require sequential refinement under the auspices of a regular cycle of review conferences in order to achieve even close to its full potential, but that such refinements are possible and preferable to abandoning to the process altogether.

It could also likewise be argued that prospects for success of an ATT next July, as opposed to this July, is not any higher (especially given the consensus provision); thus any postponement would be futile, especially given the weight of the consensus provision. In light of other related UN processes such as the UNPoA, a completely failed ATT Conference would be severely detrimental to the other, in many cases already broken, parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery dealing a major legitimacy blow to the system. Even if the ATT is not universally considered a disarmament treaty per se it is certainly being treated as such by civil society and some member states. A failed process would indubitably be a serious blow to a system desperately in need of tangible victories.

In contrast, there are those that argue, and rightfully so, that a weak treaty would have far greater negative effects in the aggregate. A weak treaty— a simple list of principles which member states should bear mind in when transferring weapons without any accountability or implementation mechanism—could be used as cover for future transfers of questionable character. Signatories could argue that they are acting in accordance with their international law obligations as parties to the ATT, have evaluated a given transfer according to this list of principles (‘bearing them in mind’), and have nonetheless decided to continue the dubious transfer. Moreover, a weak ATT could potentially be used as the basis for states seeking to curtail UN efforts to advocate for better controls of illicit small arms or for stronger application of international humanitarian and human rights law related to the production or use of armaments. Either of these outcomes would fuel considerable skepticism regarding the viability of the UN in regulating the global arms trade, not to mention anger at the UN for creating ‘cover’ for bad behavior rather than eliminating said behavior.

Universality of the ATT process will have a direct effect on its strength—the more member states that subscribe to it, the weaker it will inevitably become. This debate begs the question, then, when is it better to walk away from the process than to proceed with a weak treaty? What are the points that are ‘non-negotiable’? For each member state, the answer to this question will vary. The CARICOM states have placed tremendous emphasis on the inclusion of SALWs in the scope, while the UK has recently underscored the arms trade as the ‘greatest threat to development, beyond disease and disaster’. Brazil, on the other hand, has continuously asserted its marked opposition to references to corruption, development, and stability in the criteria. Needless to say, the ‘redlines’ are not uniform and vary according to national interests, but it is absolutely essential that delegations know what those lines are before formal negotiations begin in July. Delegations must evaluate when the best course of action would be to ‘walk away’ from the process and seek alternatives elsewhere.

If delegations choose to ‘walk away’ from the process in July, alternative forums for negotiating an ATT are available, but also with their own set of limitations. There is the option to take the issue to the General Assembly in the fall and seek a new resolution and form of recourse to get negotiations back on track. Some like-minded states have discussed, unofficially, the possibility of opting out of the universal process in order to pursue a more comprehensive ATT, but one that will inevitably have fewer signatories. Foregoing a universal forum for ATT negotiation could call into question the future relevance of universal negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms control, which is already in serious jeopardy given the CD paralysis. Furthermore, such an approach would meet the same difficulties as have been encountered with regards to international efforts to ban cluster munitions and landmines. While such courses of action of like-minded states contribute to norm-setting, they likely fail to provide a universal framework for addressing the issue at hand. The value added of an ATT that is not universal, most especially one that does not legally bind the primary arms manufacturers and exporters, is not altogether lost, but certainly substantially diminished. The states subject to such treaties negotiated outside the universal process are usually those already committed to the regulations.

What, then, is the best scenario? The best scenario is, as previously mentioned, a robust and comprehensive instrument with full implementation capacity. However, this is not the only question that should be asked. The focus now should not be just on what is the best scenario, but also on the best path towards the ideal scenario, even after July negotiations conclude, by objectively evaluating the consequences of each of the most likely negotiating outcomes.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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