Tag Archives: UN

‘Small-5’ Propose GA Resolution on Improving Working Methods of the Security Council

17 May

Known as the ‘Small-5,’ Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland presented a draft resolution that seeks to improve the working methods of the Security Council without proposed amendments to the UN Charter. As such, these states advocate that this resolution will have no bearing on the ongoing and separate negotiations for reform and expansion of the Security Council. Member states such as India and Brazil have opposed the resolution given their interest in and support for an amendment to the Charter that would expand the Security Council’s membership and give their delegations a permanent seat. The P5 members have also made clear their opposition noting that they do not see a role for the General Assembly in offering recommendations to the Security Council.

Led by the mission of Switzerland and its Permanent Representative Ambassador Paul Seger, this group has worked for improvement in the working methods of the Security Council since 2006. In March 2012, the S-5 tabled a resolution and have since undertaken several rounds of consultations with member states, in particular the P5, to identify a way forward with regards to these recommendations. This effort has been pursued both in the General Assembly and through cooperation with the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. The S-5 had decided it is time to bring the resolution to a vote in the GA and allow member states, although the adoption of such a resolution would not be binding, to communicate a political and moral message on improving the accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of the Council. However, as of Friday 18 May, Ambassador Seger of Switzerland decided to withdraw the resolution after increasing pressure from opponents of the resolution. Faced with the prospect of procedural wrangling that would “engulf the entire Membership and leave everyone confused”, he said the S-5 had decided to withdraw the text.

Ambassador Seger addressed the GA this week under the agenda item “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit” offering remarks on the content of the resolution. He gave a similar presentation in April 2012 describing the S-5’s proposals.

The principle recommendations include:

  • A greater role for the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and those that make large financial contributions in the preparation and modification of mandates for peacekeeping missions
  • Standing invitations to the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in relevant debates and, when appropriate, informal discussions
  • Better access for interested and directly concerned States to subsidiary organs
  • Establishing a working group on lessons learned in order to analyze reasons for non-implementation or lack of effectiveness to suggest mechanisms aimed at enhancing implementation of decisions
All the proposals are based on long-standing dissatisfaction with the way in which the Council does its work. In particular, GAPW would welcome strong and institutionalized methods of ‘assessment’,  particularly on questions of implementation, of resolutions and decisions of the Council.  The lack of assessment was no more apparent than in the case of Libya in which the Council lost control of the ‘narrative’ after adoption of the original resolution. This was indicative in part by the fact that the resolution barely surfaced in the discourse around NATO’s implementation of it. It wasn’t until the operation itself ended that the resolution was cited. In its aftermath, both Russia and China expressed serious concerns over the implementation of Resolution 1973, which has undoubtedly contributed to the decision by these P5 members to veto an subsequent Western-sponsored resolution threatening sanctions against Syria for the killings of civilians.
It seems the most ‘controversial’ proposals deal directly with the use of the veto. The S-5 proposes what they consider to be “nothing radical or revolutionary” noting that they fully respect the Charter-based right to the veto. P5 states are called to:
  • Explain the reasons for resorting to a veto or declaring its intention to do so by circulating a copy of the explanation as a separate Security Council document to all member states
  • Refrain from using the veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (as legally defined in the Rome Statute for the ICC)
  • Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring  that when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution it does not constitute a veto thus allowing the P5 member to cast a negative vote while not blocking the action altogether

Many members of civil society have advocated for such a provision to be added to the veto power– requesting that P5 members consider refraining from using their vetoes on action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, warm crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. Civil society and member states alike cite paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, stating that “the international community, through the UN, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; and that when a state is manifestly failing, the international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive response, including measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.” Nonetheless, it goes without saying that garnering support for recommendations to change the highly politicized issue of the veto are fraught with challenges. In order to combat this spirit of contention, the S-5 has tried to make clear that their intention is not to abolish the veto, but to provide recommendations only on how and when it should be used.

It seems that the primary concern of the S-5 is the lack of access for non-members of the Security Council to the Council’s work due to weak transparency and accountability measures, rather than a concern over the composition of the Council. The S-5 has tried to make clear that what they propose is a way forward through which Council members can seek the view of member states outside the Council without prejudice to the need for often timely action on sensitive  matters. Striking this balance is a difficult, but important goal for moving forward successfully with these recommendations.

—Katherine Prizeman

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First Prep Com of New NPT Review Cycle Concludes in Vienna

15 May

From 30 April to 11 May, the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) for the 2015 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met in Vienna, Austria. The Prep Com adopted a final report and a factual Chair’s summary as a working paper of the Committee (not a consensus document), under the authorship of Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. Two welcome developments from this session of the Prep Com were the 16-country statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as well as the increase in attention paid to addressing modernization of existing arsenals as a threat to the credibility of the NPT regime. Both of these initiatives were referenced in the Chair’s summary. Furthermore, the government of Norway announced that it would be host to a conference in 2013 on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.

The Prep Com did not accomplish much in the way of advancing the disarmament agenda insofar as there was neither a thorough review of the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan nor adoption of strategies for moving forward commitments to nuclear disarmament. As has been the case in previous NPT review cycles, many member states, particularly the nuclear weapon states (NWS), chose to focus on non-proliferation rather than disarmament (article VI) obligations. Following general debate, the discussion was divided into three clusters– implementation of provisions relating to non-proliferation, disarmament, and international peace and security with discussion on specific issues of nuclear disarmament and security assurances (Cluster 1); implementation of provisions relating to non-proliferation, safeguards, and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) with specific issue debate on regional issues including the 1995 resolution on the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East (Cluster 2); implementation of the provisions relating to the “inalienable right” of states parties to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Cluster 3).

There are still many concerns about the  earnestness of commitments to nuclear disarmament through the full implementation of article VI of the NPT, particularly given the continued call by some member states,  including Russia and China, for first “creating the conditions” for nuclear disarmament by maintaining “strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all.” These calls for continued reliance on nuclear weapons stand in striking contrast to the increasingly unified call for nuclear abolition by the majority of states parties to the NPT. At parallel and civil society meetings, there were also calls for addressing NATO’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons as part of its security framework, especially in light of the Chicago Summit to take place 20-21 May and the release of the Defense and Deterrence Posture Review (D&DPR). In March 2011, NATO began a year-long round of consultations on a new D&DPR.  Many members of civil society noted the innate contradiction that exists between NPT obligations and the current NATO deterrence policies. Professor Erika Simpson of the University of Western Ontario suggested that it is not altogether surprising that horizontal proliferators are trying to acquire nuclear weapons when NATO members themselves rely on nuclear deterrence for their protection.

A frustrating and diversionary debate lives on as member states remain divided between those who wished to emphasize combating non-proliferation risks (i.e. Iran and DPRK) and those underscoring the lack of substantial movement on disarmament and the hypocrisy that surrounds these debates. Brazil’s representative underscored a “groundless addiction” to nuclear weapons noting that the international community has already banned two other categories of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological). A joint P5 statement was “pleased to recall” that the group met in July 2011 “with a view to considering progress on  the commitments made” at the 2010 Review Conference, clearing indicating no urgency in reporting on, let alone adopting, concrete disarmament measures. The Australian delegation called for greater transparency from the NWS with regards to such joint meetings. Although this Prep Com did not see concrete reporting, the 2010 Action Plan “calls upon” the NWS to report to the 2014 Prep Com and the 2015 Review Conference on their undertakings related to Action 5, thereby placing a timeline (however weak) on progress towards nuclear disarmament. There were also many statements of concern regarding the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK, including a call by the UK that Iran implement “practical steps to build confidence around the world that Iran will implement its international obligations and does not intend to build a nuclear weapon.” The Iranian delegation, of course, defended its program as entirely peaceful and called the accusations “baseless allegations of non-compliance,” while also noting that Iran has been previously denied access to IAEA safety workshops. Other member states called for the DPRK to cease all tests and rejoin the NPT.

Also under discussion during the Prep Com was the status of implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The facilitator of the 2012 Conference, Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, addressed the Prep Com, but could not offer many details as no date or agenda has been set, although it is expected that it will be held in Helsinki in December. Ambassador Laajava pledged to continue consultations in the region that will focus on the agenda, modalities, outcome of the conference, and follow-up mechanisms. Ambassador Laajava also noted that not all states in the region have confirmed their participation, even though universal participation by all states in the region is considered by many states to be a non-negotiable element for success of the conference. Moreover, several member states called for greater efforts on the part of the co-sponsors (US, UK, and Russia) to facilitate the conference. The US reiterated its familiar position that regional peace is a prerequisite for the establishment of a WMDFZ and stated that the agenda must be larger than singling out any “particular state.”

The third cluster, that which deals with peaceful uses, consisted of multiple assertions of the ‘right’ to produce ‘peaceful’ nuclear energy. An astonishingly small number of delegations acknowledged the Fukushima disaster or offered an honest assessment of its effect on the future of nuclear energy. The US delegation acknowledged that Fukushima “affected public perceptions of the safety of nuclear power,” but argued that “the basic factors that led to an increased interest in nuclear power before that incident have not changed.” The Japanese delegation asserted its commitment to improving safety standards of its nuclear power facilities. The Norwegian and New Zealand delegations stated that they have chosen not to pursue nuclear energy programs, although these states do not dispute the right to pursue such energy and emphasize that they have exercised their right by not pursuing nuclear power. The Austrian delegation was the stand-out among the group, rightly noting that nuclear power can never be 100 percent safe and is not a panacea for climate change or sustainable development given its safety, security, and proliferation risks.

Although it was just the first session of three prior to the 2015 Rev Con, each meeting of states parties to the NPT is critical to the health, sustainability, and, most importantly, full implementation of dual non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. As is often noted by member states and civil society alike, the NPT is the only binding, multilateral framework available for addressing the blight of nuclear weapons. It must not be allowed to become merely a forum for conversation, but rather a legal document to be rigorously implemented in its totality.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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Debating Political Will and Working Methods in the Disarmament Commission

5 Apr

The General Debate in the 2012 session of the Disarmament Commission has been quite scattered as some delegations have used the plenary to lay out detailed positions on all issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation, some to lament the widespread stalemate across the multilateral disarmament fora, and others to propose recommendations for improving the functioning of the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) itself. While there can be some merit to discussing national positions on disarmament-related issues in a broad context such that national priorities can be understood as part of a conglomerate of concerns, there is little value added in reiterating general support for existing treaties, frameworks, and broad principles of disarmament and non-proliferation. This is most especially true in a forum, the UNDC, which is mandated to deliberate on particular issues, formulate recommendations, and submit them to the General Assembly for further action. A reiteration of existing national positions does little to advance this agenda and while the problem of paralysis is not exclusive to the UNDC, but rather characterizes the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as well, member states must use the next three weeks of substantive discussion to address the issue at hand—the UNDC’s failure to deliver recommendations for the last twelve years. The UNDC must take seriously its mandate to deliberate on specific agenda items to formulate recommendations to be submitted to the GA and, indirectly, to the CD for the purposes of negotiation. In order to do so, all obstacles to achieving consensus must be honestly reviewed.

Delegations have been split over the nature of these obstacles, ultimately whether they are of a political or institutional nature. The Swedish delegation reiterated support for time dedicated to a discussion on how the UNDC goes about its work as well as how its work relates to the role envisaged for the UNDC within the multilateral disarmament machinery. The Kazakh delegation suggested the Chair prepare a short note outlining the previous resolutions from the GA and other fora that “spell out how the working methods of the UNDC can be strengthened” identifying recommendations that have been previously set forth on this topic. Other delegations have disagreed with the assertion that working methods have been the cause of the UNDC’s failure. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has made clear on many occasions that the stalemate is due to the lack of political will. The NAM states have called for the work of the UNDC to “be intensified through reinvigorated political will.” The Egyptian delegation stated categorically that the problems of the UNDC are not related to its working methods. Similarly, the Pakistani delegation has stated that the lack of progress is rooted in the lack of political will and “double standards.” Even the Chair has weighed in on this argument in his letter to delegations prior to the start of the session stating that the ‘lack of political will’ case is not valid in a deliberative body.

The issues contributing to the UNDC paralysis are not so simple as to categorically blame either political will or working methods exclusively. As the Norwegian delegate stated during the open debate, perhaps the deadlock is due in part to political will, but delegations must make more imperative use of the UNDC to identify ways to overcome the stalemate in any case. Likewise, the Swiss delegate noted that there are several issues that have contributed to the deadlock. Mr. Bavaud stated, while political will has been significantly lacking and in places where it has existed has not been acted upon, much of the lack of progress has been of an institutional nature. Moreover, the Swiss delegation rightly noted that restrictive approaches to working methods, such as not allowing the input of outside experts into the Commission, are no longer acceptable when national security concerns cannot be delinked from global peace and security challenges.

Member states have put forth specific recommendations for improving the functioning of the UNDC. Poland’s delegation has issued a working paper on the topic calling for a Chairman’s summary or joint statement to be issued on all agenda items on which member states cannot reach consensus, and no recommendation can be formulated, as to reflect the views and positions of delegations and to prevent the loss of exchange of views altogether. The stalemate of recent years has prevented the transmission of information to the General Assembly rendering the UNDC’s work utterly useless. Furthermore, the delegations of Poland, Japan, and Switzerland have also suggested opening up UNDC proceedings to exchanges with representatives from academia and civil society.  Poland, in its working paper, also noted the issue of organizational matters encouraging the early election of not only the Chairperson, but also the Chairpersons of the subsidiary working groups and Vice-Chairpersons.

As noted by a handful of delegations, it would be wise to also examine the formulation of agenda items. Inclusion of broad, generic items related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has not proven effective.  The Brazilian delegation called the debate during the last cycle of the UNDC “excessively general and ambitious, making it more difficult to have concrete results.” The Swiss delegation agreed that it would be helpful to focus on more specific, circumscribed items, such as negative security assurances, nuclear weapon free zones, or verification mechanisms for conventional arms.

The international community has a joint responsibility to find more constructive ways to work and to explore all the possible impediments to success. The argument over the two obstacles to the UNDC’s success is not an either/or debate. Movement forward in the UNDC will require both the political will necessary to accept compromise for the sake of multilateral agreement and a re-examination of working methods that have not yielded concrete results in more than ten years.

 

–Katherine Prizeman

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2012 Substantive Session of the Disarmament Commission: Eager for Consensus

30 Mar

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is hailed as the ‘sole, multilateral deliberative body’ mandated to make recommendations on two or three specific issues related to disarmament, one of which must pertain to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. At the 2011 session the US delegation referred to the UNDC as a “deliberative think tank on arms control.” The UNDC, universal in its representation, a significant characteristic to note in contrast to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that does not include the participation of all member states, is tasked to formulate consensus-based recommendations to be delivered to the General Assembly prior to the start of the First Committee such that those recommendations will be considered and integrated as part of the Committee’s agenda of work.

Unfortunately, the UNDC has been unable to agree upon and subsequently adopt any recommendations in more than a decade’s time. The conclusion of the 2011 session, without adoption of any substantive recommendations, marked the twelfth year of no agreement on any of the agenda items– nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a declaration of the 2010s as the next disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures around conventional weapons. After three weeks of plenary meetings and working groups, many delegations were outspoken about their discontent, disappointment, and frustration. The Mexican delegation noted that this continued failure is unacceptable when the world is “threatened by nuclear weapons and excessive accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons” stating that the only tangible result of the UNDC has been the expenditure of resources by taxpayers.

Frustration around the multilateral disarmament fora is not unique to the UNDC. The other obvious point of contention and frustration is, of course, the CD that has fought since 1998 to agree on a programme of work. The seemingly intractable stalemate in the Geneva-based body has become an alarming concern for member states, civil society, and the Secretary-General himself who has publicly stated that the CD is “no longer living up to expectations.”  Proposals for working outside of the CD have come to bear among delegations, particularly in terms of negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Nonetheless, arms control and disarmament are not without their elements of optimism. The forthcoming Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations, although wrought with its own set of complexities and challenges, represent a majority opinion that arms transfers should be regulated by a set of common international standards. There is little doubt that such a treaty should exist, although the strengthen and scope of the future treaty remain unclear. Similarly, the Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA) is a consensus-based framework, adopted by all member states in 2000, for national, regional, and international provisions for preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Implementation of the PoA has had a mixed record overall, but the review process has nonetheless had marked success and continues to seek ways of strengthening implementation, most recently with last week’s Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference. The Prep Com was able to achieve its goals of setting an agenda of work, adopting rules of procedure, and endorsing a Chair for the Review Conference (Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria).

The 2012 session of the UNDC will begin a new three-year cycle and will meet for three weeks in both plenary and working group sessions chaired by Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru. Consensus on its provisional agenda remains elusive. Some delegations have expressed interest in including an agenda item that includes an “introspective look” at the Commission’s role in the broader disarmament machinery and examines its working methods. However, there is no consensus on this point as some member states contend that the obstacle to adopting recommendations is not in the working methods, but rather the political will of states. There have also been calls for more specific subjects to be vetted rather than the generic and repetitive discussions often held in the UNDC rendering it irrelevant to the wider international security discourse.

The UNDC has the unique opportunity to deliberate disarmament and arms control issues in a universal forum prior to the start of the First Committee in the fall. Recommendations offered from the UNDC could help streamline and focus the vast spread of issues that need to be covered in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) as well as underscore issues that are most important to member states. Moreover, as the CD has garnered much of the attention of the international community, albeit exclusively negative attention because of its current state of stalemate, the UNDC has the flexibility to arguably work with less politicization, and “fly under the radar” of sorts, while enjoying universal participation.

The UNDC must use this new cycle as a point of departure from the methods and habits of the last decade (such as generic statements of support for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) to tackle the obstacles to consensus that have prevented the formulation of any principles, guidelines, or recommendations. In order to do so, it is important that member states address both the political will and the working methods issues. The stalemate is surely due in part to the lack of will of governments to commit to recommendations (even non-binding ones as they are). Likewise, the work of the UNDC has also been impeded by its methods insofar as member states continue to discuss the same issues in the same manner, ultimately leading to the same results year after y ear. It would be logical to explore alternative methods of work. It would be worthwhile to explore other ways of deliberating, such as inclusion of expert panels, NGO statements, or other specialized presentations that could contribute to the conversation.

Many member states identify disarmament and arms control, related to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, as among the most pressing priorities on the international agenda. As such, the UNDC’s path towards irrelevance must be altered if these priorities are to be genuinely addressed in all forums available to the international community.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Discussion over Chair’s Summary at the Final Day of the PoA Prep Com

23 Mar

The final day of the Prep Com was devoted to a review of the Chair’s Summary, which incorporated much of the previous days’ discussions and seemed to find considerable informal and formal support by states. There were objections of course. In some cases, delegations both lamented the lack of time needed to digest the Draft and then provided very specific criticisms of its contents. This seems incongruous on the surface but perhaps not as much as initially assumed.

While the Chair acknowledged the problem associated with diplomats having to respond to a Draft without sufficient guidance from capitals, it is assumed (by us at least) that most of the controversial matters would already have been vetted with diplomatic colleagues back home. The Draft, after all, is intended to provide guidance not (as some delegations seemed to imply) to create a controversial or preemptive blueprint for summer negotiations. Our view is that, as a rule, objections not raised are more toxic to a consensus disarmament process than those put on the table. In the case of the Arab Group and others, objections should be seen both as an effort to keep consensus options fully in play and as a statement of willingness to be fully active at the summer Review Conference.

As Mexico noted, the Draft is not a consensus document. It is useful as a guide to the Review Conference but does not seek to bind the hands of delegations. For us, this seems to be a document with contents largely consistent with the PoA process itself – implementation that is hopeful but incomplete, effective but not fully binding. When Pakistan spoke of the need to consolidate implementation in local and regional contexts, this is of course the core value of this endeavor. And nothing happened this week to jeopardize future progress. No funding was pulled off the table. No objections were raised that were deal breakers for delegations. No existing commitments were dismantled. No irreparable rifts between stakeholders took place.

It wasn’t perfect. It didn’t solve all problems. But it did no harm. And it reinforced for many delegations the degree to which illicit small arms are, indeed, the true weapons of mass destruction. This Prep Com represented another opportunity for delegations to learn how to work together to enhance what is for now an effective process with no legal standing, but with much creativity and generosity with which to conduct its work.

Moving forward, delegations have at their disposal a Draft that can both organize and promote a successful meeting in August. This is not a Draft to dodge, but a draft to use as guidance to build a new generation of PoA related commitments.

–Robert Zuber

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Prioritizing the UNPoA on small arms

14 Mar

As member states gather next week for the Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference to assess progress made on the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), there is much work to be done on evaluating the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of implementation of the PoA and the separately adopted International Tracing Instrument (ITI). As more than a decade has passed since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, member states must be serious about using 2012’s forums—the Prep Com as well as the Review Conference—to thoughtfully and thoroughly identify where weaknesses remain in the implementation of the PoA and promote strong and transparent measures to address these weaknesses through information exchange, international assistance, and solid reporting measures. The PoA offers the unique opportunity to tackle an issue that affects all member states—whether as manufacturer or importer of arms, in post-conflict or conflict-laden societies, or as supplier or consumer.

Following a very successful Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in May 2011 under the leadership of Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, member states must now fight the ‘negotiating fatigue’ that is sure to be a factor this year with the PoA Review Conference held just a few weeks after the month-long ATT Negotiating Conference in July. It is significant to highlight that the MGE was both a success for the PoA and a breakthrough achievement for arms-related processes on the whole as it was the first of its kind. The hope is that this type of meeting will be institutionalized and made to repeat in the PoA process and perhaps other arms control processes as well. The technical discussions held among national implementers who directly apply these methods in their capitals was a true value added as member states could share best practices and lessons learned in marking, tracing, and record keeping with regards to the PoA and the ITI. It is hoped that this positive momentum will be carried through into next week’s Prep Com, now under the able leadership of Nigeria’s Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu.

The importance of the PoA ‘blueprint’ for international, regional, and national action on preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) cannot be understated. It important to note, as has been pointed out by many in the diplomatic and civil society communities, that the PoA lays the groundwork for drying up existing stockpiles of weapons as well as those weapons already in circulation, something that the hoped-for, future ATT will not have the ability to do. Therefore, it is crucial that the PoA be robustly supported in concert with the current work on the ATT. It is critical that this Prep Com—in addition to the Review Conference—be prioritized as an important opportunity for progress on the PoA’s implementation. Moreover, as the PoA is a non-legally binding document that lacks clear benchmarks for success, it is vital that member states use the Prep Com as a means of evaluation to push forward implementation mechanisms in the most vigorous way possible. Furthermore, it is imperative that member states discuss a wide expanse of SALW-related issues in evaluating the illicit trade, including border controls, ammunition, intermediary brokers, and civil society cooperation in addition to the technical aspects of marking, tracing, and record keeping in order to improve implementation. These issues provide a valuable context for devising a comprehensive strategy for the control, prevention, and eradication of trade in SALWs, but also a strategy that is realistic in its implementation related expectations.

A key element of the success of the PoA, and thus also of tracking the progress on implementation, is honest and reliable reporting—something that is still starkly lacking among many member states. More than thirty member states have never submitted a report and others have only done so once or twice over the 11-year period since the PoA’s adoption. Although many states are, in fact, implementing the lion’s share of PoA undertakings, the lack of official and comprehensive reporting makes for a difficult process of analysis of progress made, which is the very goal of this Prep Com and subsequent Review Conference. National reports allow for better matching of needs and resources so that adequate international assistance can be provided to those states that need support in adopting measures in line with the PoA commitments. As such, it is important that this Prep Com encourage those states that have been remiss in their reporting duties to recommit to doing so. Moreover, the lack of benchmarks and of a formal monitoring system is often perceived as a major weakness of the PoA. Improvements in national reporting would certainly help curb the negative implications of the limited oversight mechanisms that exist within the PoA framework as well as help generate greater public awareness around the small arms process.

Illicit trafficking in SALWs is at the forefront of minds this year as many in the diplomatic community are set to tackle this issue through both the PoA and ATT processes. It would be wise to bear in mind the distinctive importance of the PoA in addressing the current challenges of communities awash in weapons and suffering severely from armed violence and other abuses committed at gun point. Illicit SALWs are a true blight on the security of communities by limiting and often preventing the ability to create and sustain a robust security sector with implications for the participation of women, the education of children, and much more. Building on the positive energy of the MGE, the Prep Com must continue its work of evaluating where weaknesses in implementation exist and, in turn, providing the support and pressure necessary to fill those gaps.

–Katherine Prizeman

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A Review of the New SG Report on the Support Mission in Libya: Urgent Security Challenges

8 Mar

On 1 March 2012, the Secretary-General issued a new report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) detailing the major developments in the country since the release of the previous report from 22 November 2011 as well as the activities undertaken by the mission under its mandate from Security Council resolutions 2009, 2017, and 2022. The report outlines the major challenges facing Libya in its political transition as well as recommendations for the future for both UNSMIL and Libyan authorities.

The report offers a recount of the political developments in the country from the announcement of a new interim government by the National Transitional Council (TNC) on 22 November 2011 to the intermittent struggles with the revolutionary ‘brigades’ in Tripoli and beyond. It is clear that the security situation remains highly precarious. The issue of the call for semi-autonomy by local tribal leaders in the oil-rich eastern region has also recently come to the forefront for the TNC among other security sector challenges such as proliferation of weapons, trans-border challenges posed from porous movement across neighboring borders with Chad, Niger, and Mali among others, skirmishes between rival brigades, and attacks against internally-displaced persons (IDPs). Welcome references in the SG’s description of the increasingly active political discourses are youth and women who, according to the report, represent groups that “seek to transform their role from freedom fighters to nation-builders through engagement in making decisions on Libya’s political, economic and social future.”

Among a variety of mandated-activities, UNSMIL is focused primarily on providing support for the upcoming electoral process; protecting human rights, transitional justice and rule of law, in particular addressing the detention of conflict-related detainees and interrogations; securing public security including border security, landmines and explosive remnants of war, and small arms proliferation; and supporting socio-economic recovery in coordination with other international assistance. The Secretary-General has asked for the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNSMIL for another 12 months as an integrated political  mission to help ensure the best possible transition in the post-Qadaffi era. The SG has highlighted the importance of maintaining the Libya mission as a “relatively small special political mission, joining forces with the work of agencies, funds and programmes,” as such a model thereby limits the budgetary requirements.

Most especially in light of the upcoming Preparatory Committee for the Programme of Action on small arms in just two weeks, it is important to underscore the specific references to arms proliferation in the SG’s report. As has been referenced on this blog before, the issue of uncontrolled weapons across the whole of Libya has been a significant challenge in the post-revolution period as Libyans seek to secure their nation and embrace democracy in an extremely tenuous security environment. The report explains that visits to 123 weapons storage sites have been conducted jointly by Libyan officials and international counterparts such as the UN Mine Action Service and have revealed a total of 5,000 registered man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and their components, although the fear of missing MANPADS is still a viable concern. Most alarming is the lack of detailed records of weapons in pre-conflict stocks and weapons used and transferred during the conflict. As such, currently there is exploration of a registration system of weapons– including MANPADS– as well as ammunition and its storage and management. For this type of system to be successfully implemented, it is clear that all those that manage and possess weapons participate, including those tribal brigades that are still engaged in their own internal power struggles. The issue of landmines and other explosive remnants of war has also been addressed by the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team, although the operation has struggled due to a lack of funding. A total of 126,155 mines and explosive weapons have been cleared as of the end of January 2012. The Ministry of Defence has also established the Libyan Centre for Mine Action with this mandate.

The primary challenge of the arms situation in Libya is the lack of transparency and access to the stockpiles controlled by the rival brigades that are still very much a factor in the difficult political situation. Therefore, it seems the most urgent need related to the brigade fighters and their large number of unaccounted for weapons is the integration and unification of these revolutionary fighters into national security institutions. The first step must be adequate demobilization in solid coordination with halting small arms proliferation through a transparent registration system of weapons in circulation. Obviously this will be no easy task. One of the most difficult challenges of small arms is just that– they are small, mobile, and easily collected, traded, and hidden. The same cannot be said for other types of conventional weapons such as tanks, helicopters, or missile systems. Many of these revolutionary fighters are unwilling to forego their weapons due to the weak security sector, which, in turn, remains weak in part due to the wide circulation and hoarding of weapons. It is a dangerous and vicious cycle that must be broken. The Libyan authorities themselves have recognized that their foremost challenge is to address the wide circulation of weapons and the armed brigades fighting for control of territory across the country. Furthermore, these weapons are undoubtedly finding their way across borders fueling conflict and violence in neighboring states such as Sudan wrought with its own set of very difficult internal conflicts.

Libya has a difficult road ahead as it transitions to a new government and seeks to integrate a country fraught with regional and tribal divisions. To do so will require a stable security situation without which the transition will be impossible and such stability in the security sector requires control of arms proliferation.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Opening of CSW 56 with Special Focus on Empowering Rural Women through Technology

28 Feb

Yesterday marked the opening of the 56th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), organized for the first time in conjunction with UN-Women. Madame Michelle Bachelet, Executive Director of UN-Women, offered remarks to the Commission chaired this year by Ambassador Marjon Kamara of Liberia. In addition to the theme of this year’s CSW on the situation of rural women, Madame Bachelet drew particular attention to the assistance needed for Palestinian women as well as women and children kidnapped and subsequently imprisoned in armed conflict. Madame Bachelet called for adoption of concrete actions for empowering rural women, women who represent one out of every four people in the world, over the next two weeks of the CSW. As aptly noted by many of the speakers in the opening session, empowering women is not only good for women, but it is good for peace and, therefore, for humanity.

Ms. Bachelet succinctly outlined the social, cultural, economic and political barriers impeding rural women’s participation and, in turn, the development of the entire community. Ms. Bachelet provided  examples of improved communities around the globe, such as Egyptian women being able to sign up for ID cards for access to health care, suffrage and education, as well as the more than 1 million women who have been asked to sit on rural village boards throughout India.

Ms. Bachelet also described another phenomenal form of development and its connection to women- Information Communication Technology for Development (ICTD). ICTD was referenced as it relates to a global survey conducted by the GSMA Development Fund. She reported that 93 percent of women surveyed felt safer with a mobile phone, 85 percent of women felt more independent with a mobile phone, and 41 percent had increased their economic opportunities by being mobile and connected. Other speakers such as Elizabeth Atangania of the Pan-African Farmer’s Forum also outlined the benefits of connecting women with resources and access explaining that mobile technology can be a helpful tool in aiding this process.

The exponential effects of a mobile phone were specifically underscored for their powerful influence on women’s empowerment, whether economic, political, social or otherwise. Ms. Bachelet noted, “And here I want to talk about mobile phones because they are changing lives and strengthening economic enterprises. Whether it’s information about credit, markets, weather updates, transportation or health services, mobile phones are changing the way rural women and men obtain services and conduct business.” One need not look much farther than the events associated with the Arab Spring over the last year and the tremendous impact of mobile technologies, social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook, and other real-time updates from the ground by women and men alike.

These new technologies are key components to bridging the divide between men and women, rural and urban, as well as granting access and mobilization opportunities, most especially for rural women who are so often removed from the center of political discourse. In the context of social networking, these tools have a multiplier effect that ultimately give a voice to any woman that has a mobile phone and internet connection. Therefore, we sincerely hope that this year’s CSW will form concrete and actionable recommendations for improving the situation of rural women such that their voices can be heard buttressed by greater access to information and resources through these new technologies.

–Shea Molloy and Katherine Prizeman

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Sexual Violence in Conflict, Small Arms, and Key Linkages

27 Feb

The Security Council, under the presidency of Togo, hosted an open debate on sexual violence in armed conflict featuring briefings from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Margot Wallstrom, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Herve Ladsous, and a statement from Libyan activist Ms. Amina Megheirbi representing the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. Although unable to adopt a Presidential Statement condemning such violence or a public statement on follow-up to Resolution 1960 (2010), the Council did express relatively unanimous support for Ms. Wallstrom’s mandate to alert the members to instances of sexual violence in conflict as well as increasing the effectiveness of the 1960 mandate through better coordination and information sharing. Member states were also supportive of the inclusion of a new mandate for Women Protection Advisers in peacekeeping operations. The debate was held just a few weeks after the Secretary-General released a  new report on ‘Conflict-related Sexual Violence’ on 13 January 2012.

Ms. Wallstrom noted in her statement that no one could remain unmoved by the striking country examples found in the most recent SG report, which she identified as already a ‘bit out of date’ and but one tool to combat the scourge of sexual violence in conflict. She referred to instances in Guinea, Syria, and Libya and poignantly stated that in contemporary wars it is more dangerous to be a women collecting firewood than a solider on the front line. More broadly, Special Representative Wallstrom also emphasized country level information moving effectively to the Council as well as robust support for government initiatives to combat impunity. Expanding the ‘naming and shaming’ listing was also identified as one way in which perpetrators could more effectively be held accountable.

Nonetheless, perhaps most importantly, Ms. Wallstrom classified the issue of conflict-related sexual violence as not a women’s issue, but a security issue with much wider peace and security implications than particular instances of rape. This point is particularly important for Global Action as we strive to link such issues to other components of the broader human security agenda. Not only can rape serve as a precursor to conflict, a diagnostic of pre-conflict conditions, and a symptom of impunity, it is also evidence of a weak and insufficient security sector. As is often said by proponents of the women, peace and security agenda, there is no security without women’s security and the aim is not only to protect women from violence, but to also encourage their active participation in political and economic life. A robust sector sector will indubitably support such participation as well as enhance protection mechanisms needed to eliminate such sexual violence in and out of conflict.

Indicative of these linkages, the delegate of Germany also referred to the proliferation of small arms and its dire effects on violence against women and children. It is a fact that women are disproportionately affected by gun violence in communities. Furthermore, the ready availability of small arms undoubtedly facilitates grave crimes such as sexual and gender-based violence, which is almost always committed at the point of a gun. Better gun control mechanisms, including a robust Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that is to be negotiated this July as well as better implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms, are essential to a more dependable security sector and, in turn, protections for women against sexual violence and, just as critical, participation opportunities.

As Special Representative Wallstrom noted, the response to conflict-related sexual violence must be gender-focused and community-based. Communities must deal with this issue as part of a bundle of security issues that pose a threat to the well-being of its citizens– including small arms proliferation, gender-based violence, and lack of women’s access to political and economic life. We fully support the mandate of Ms. Wallstrom and her staff and hope that continued emphasis on the broad security implications of sexual violence will bear more robust and effective response mechanisms for communities suffering from such blights.

–Katherine Prizeman

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Worry on Many Fronts for the #Armstreaty

22 Feb

The ATT preparatory committee completed its work last week during the fourth and final session of its series of meetings. Diplomats were able to adopt rules of procedure and a report on its work during all four preparatory meeting.

With each passing day, there seemed to be more urgency and anxiety around completing the preparatory process of the ATT—making state positions clearly known on substance, gathering and approving the necessary background documents, and adopting some semblance of rules of procedure. Also prevalent in the undertones of many statements and interventions was an air of worry over tackling too much or too little in the months remaining until the negotiating conference.

Some delegations focused this angst on completion of a comprehensive compendium of views from all four of the previous preparatory committee sessions. Cuba’s delegate made the case that national experts—military, trade, and legal—would benefit from this sort of document in their deliberations back in capital prior to the negotiations in July.  The European Union and Swiss delegations expressed doubt over the usefulness of this burdensome task for the Secretariat claiming that statements and positions are already available on the UNODA website. Algeria’s representative, whose delegation first brought up the idea of a compendium during the last Prep Com, disagreed stating that such statements on the UNODA website were incomplete and member states should have access to alternatives not reflected in the Chair’s Paper from 14 July 2011. Likewise, the Nicaraguan representative reiterated support for a compendium document reflecting updated states’ views. Belize’s delegation stated that any document, including such a compilation, would have to be reviewed and approved by member states before its inclusion in background documentation for the negotiating conference. The Iranian delegation reiterated the need to have all documents related to the conference—the SG’s report on states’ views, the Report from the GGE, and the Draft Report on the Prep Com among others—to be available to all member states in the interim.

Other delegations focused intently on completing and adopting rules of procedure before close of discussions for fear that negotiations will seriously be hindered without clear and agreed upon provisions. The Costa Rican delegation noted that the rules of procedure must facilitate negotiations rather than hinder them. The Indonesia delegate referred to a certain level of awkwardness that may come about if during the July negotiations the rules of procedure would need to be amended. As such, the delegate called for including a stipulation in the rules of procedure that they could be changed by consensus. More generally, Morocco implored all member states to stay focused on the rules of procedure and the Chairman’s report.

Some delegations focused their worry on particular substantive aspects of the treaty. Sweden’s delegation cautioned against an outright ban against arms transfers to non-state actors as industry would fall under this category and such cross-border industry cooperation is important and likely to increase among states. The delegation of Malaysia focused on the overall goal of the ATT and stated that reference to corruption, legal and victims’ assistance would serve to detract from the main objective of an ATT– completion of a legal and trade agreement. Contrastingly, the Chilean and Sierra Leonean delegation claimed that there is an undeniable humanitarian element to the ATT in addition to the legal regulations negotiated. Nigeria’s delegate took the opportunity to reiterate the necessity of including ammunition in the treaty’s scope.

It comes as no surprise that there is much anxiety still remaining on many fronts. As this final Prep Com concluded, delegations continued to make those anxieties known in the waning days of official preparations. The task at hand is complex and wrought with substantive and procedural challenges. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that the lack of international standards for the transfer of conventional arms is a severe blight on the world community and needs remedying. Furthermore, the distinct air of anxiety among diplomats illustrates just how important filling this crack in international law truly is.

For more reporting, analysis and documents from the Prep Com, please see Reaching Critical Will.

–Katherine Prizeman

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