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Disarmament Deadline: Powering Down a Three Year Cycle

20 Apr

In reviewing the most recent versions of the Disarmament Commission Working Papers submitted by the Chairs of both Working Group I (nuclear weapons) and II (conventional weapons), it would seem that we are getting close to some kind of agreement whereby recommendations will be forthcoming that can both bind the two Working Groups within a successful process and provide real guidance to a disarmament community badly in need of deliberative assistance.

Without disclosing the specific contents of these Working Papers (negotiations on text language are well under way), we would like to offer the following comments:

After three weeks and, in essence, three years of the current policy cycle, it is imperative that the Disarmament Commission renders a set of recommendations on its two policy objectives – nuclear disarmament and confidence building in the field of conventional weapons.   As we have noted in other contexts, the value of these recommendations lies as much in building confidence in the Disarmament Commission itself as in providing working ‘capital’ to inspire movement on some of the difficult disarmament challenges that we all face.

Confidence, of course, is largely in the eyes of the beholder, but Working Group II especially seems to have found the language to facilitate some movement in that direction, in part by keeping in mind the nature of the deliberative process – recommending next steps in areas such as stockpile management or ending the diverted arms trade rather than engaging in preemptive policy precedents that are the proper domain of other parts of the disarmament machinery.

The ‘bar’ regarding Working Group I is set higher of course, since the objective is the elimination of a potentially devastating weapons system rather than spreading confidence to address a range of weapons tasks, from marking and tracing to regulation of the global arms trade.   Still, as weapons of all kinds increase in destructive potential and find new pathways (i.e. unmanned aerial vehicles, outer space) for threat or use, an approach that is disarmament-focused (more than about mere regulation) and at the same time committed to greater trust building among states should be able to result in shared policy advice.

That task is hardly a modest one.  As noted by Working Group II, confidence building measures cover a broad range of mutually reinforcing activities of a political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural nature.  This is important point, tying the work of disarmament to other core functions of the international community and reminding diplomats and others that all work on weapons includes confidence building dimensions.

Some delegations have taken their Working Group responsibilities quite seriously. Mexico for instance has offered its own recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament, joining other proposals offered by the Non-Aligned Movement and the League of Arab States, as well as the significant input on Working Group I drafts offered by Iran, Egypt, China, Brazil, the UK, Morocco, South Africa and other states.

The essence of Mexico’s position takes account of the fact that, “in the past, weapons have been eliminated after they have been outlawed.  We believe that this is the path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”

While delegates seem united in affirming the need for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Mexico’s strong commitment to a legally binding instrument towards that end is unlikely to be echoed in the final Working Group I document.  Indeed there are several other items of importance to us that are also unlikely to be included:  modernization comes to mind as does a stronger insistence on convening a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone conference with full engagement by regional states.   In addition, it would also be useful from our standpoint to reaffirm that nuclear disarmament and its conventional counterpart are best promoted through multiple lenses – humanitarian to be sure, but also legal, political and even ethical.   A combination of lenses that can reinforce commitments and inspire greater will to abide by them seems to us to be the most propitious path.

But the most important thing now is to produce a document that satisfies the basic commitment of the Disarmament Commission to the productive policy engagement by the remainder of the UN’s disarmament machinery.   While disarmament is a matter of utmost urgency, this particular deliberative body must show it can first walk before being expected to move at a more urgent pace.

Some good, sound, actionable suggestions from each Working Group that provide guidance without threatening work in other disarmament settings would be a welcome outcome of this final week of a long and winding cycle, welcome for the Commission’s future as well as for the wider world.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Why Disarmament Matters — and the Need for Constant Reminders

15 Apr

Editor’s Note:  This piece was originally published in Huffington Post. 

Recently a group of disarmament scholars and policy experts met in New York City to honor Peter Weiss, President Emeritus of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP), for his lifelong commitment to a subject of permanent gravity that often remains in a political, legal and generational stalemate. Equally importantly, the function served as a reminder to the public that in particular, an emotionally compelling topic such as nuclear disarmament needs be at the forefront of not only continuous scholarship but policy discussion and, more importantly, civic action.

Five speakers representing legal approaches to nuclear disarmament analyzed the global status quo and portrayed a very realistic picture of urgency. They also evaluated the role of the United Nations and, in particular, the role of the UN Security Council.

Virginia Gamba, Director of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, reiterated the importance of the five multilateral norms that the international community identified as a standard for a feasible disarmament agreement, which can be found in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Those principles are verification, transparency, irreversibility, bindingness, and universality, standards that are mutually reinforcing and essential for trust building among states, particularly keeping in mind the ongoing issue of verification in relation to nuclear haves and have-nots alike. “Disarmament commitments must be bound to the law,” Gamba summarized.

Professor Roger Clark from Rutgers School of Law in Camden referred in his remarks to the significance of the 1997 draft model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), resulting from the unanimous ICJ declaration from July 1996. “There exists a legal obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its respects,” he said. The draft convention underwent a review and update in 2007 and would, in its current state, supplement existing treaties such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies describes the model NWC as follows:

Under the 2007 model NWC, all States would be prohibited from pursuing or participating in the “development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.” Those States that possess nuclear weapons would be obligated to destroy their nuclear arsenals in a series of phases. These five phases would progress as follows: taking nuclear weapons off alert, removing weapons from deployment, removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles, disabling the warheads, removing and disfiguring the “pits” and placing the fissile material under international control. Under the model convention, delivery vehicles would also have to be destroyed or converted to a non-nuclear capability. In addition, the NWC would prohibit the production of weapons-usable fissile material. The States Parties would also establish an Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that would be tasked with verification, ensuring compliance, decision-making, and providing a forum for consultation and cooperation among all State Parties. The Agency would be comprised of a Conference of State Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. Declarations would be required from all States Parties regarding all nuclear weapons, material, facilities, and delivery vehicles in their possession or control along with their locations.

Applying the model NWC to a current political situation, Clark wondered, “Imagine what a powerful, international inspection regime would have brought about for the situation in Syria?”

Ambassador Hans Corell, former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations from 1994 to 2004, focused in his address on nuclear disarmament and Security Council reform and did not shy away from pointing out clear obstacles and how they can be transferred to the ongoing crisis with Russia.

Corell sees the need for a “cooperative, rules-based international order” enforced through multilateral institutions, headed by the UN Security Council as the “ultimate global authority,” in order to pursue disarmament and nonproliferation effectively.

Corell refers to the problems the UN Security Council would have executing this position adequately by stating the fact that the UNSC is in need of “radical reform,” a topic that is widely discussed among international scholars. Based on former Mexican President’s Ernesto Zedillo’s comments, Corell agrees with the skepticism toward the addition of more members to the UNSC, a viewpoint shared by many involved with various Council reform proposals.

Describing Russia as a current aggressor by violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and annexing Crimea, Corell points out that the veto option of the permanent five members to the UNSC can significantly slow down if not hinder political decision making in times of crises. “Personally, I am seriously concerned at the negative effects that the Russian annexation of the Crimea peninsula will have on the political climate in the future. And we certainly do not know what President Putin may be up to next.”

Honoree Peter Weiss shared some good news before releasing the audience, saying, “During the follow-up conference to Oslo held in Nayarit, Mexico, Feb. 13 and 14, Sebastian Kurz, the foreign minister of Austria, announced that he would convene a conference in Vienna later this year because the international nuclear disarmament efforts require an urgent paradigm shift.'”

In May 2008 Dr. Hans Blix gave me an interview in which he explained:

Al Gore woke up the world with the reality of one inconvenient truth, but I think that the second inconvenient truth exists, namely the remaining nuclear weapons of mass destruction. There is something like 37,000 of them still around. And with the increasing tension in the world it is time to discover that we need to move swiftly back to the disarmament table.

Because of the subjects’ ongoing relevance, communicating this urgency to the next generation of not only policy makers but youth with political aspirations or interests should be a big part of disarmament/nonproliferation events going forward.

Lia Petridis Maiello, Journalist 

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Highlight Reel: The DC’s Work in Progress

11 Apr

As the Disarmament Commission settles into its two Working Groups for the next couple of weeks, the rest of the world hopes that a spirit of deliberation will prevail over some of the policy impediments that have hindered progress in years’ past.

We have written previously about some of these impediments, but they are worth repeating in summary fashion:

  • Confusion about the nature of the deliberative process
  • Concerns of states about setting policy precedents
  • The recent history of inertia from disarmament machinery
  • A lack of confidence regarding compliance with existing commitments
  • The expectation of resolving issues rather than contributing to their resolution
  • Unaddressed power imbalances in the UN’s security system

These impediments were exacerbated by conflicts in Ukraine, Central African Republic, Syria and elsewhere, and might well lead to assumptions about the quality and creativity of Disarmament Commission statements made by member states.

But, in fact, there were some very good reflections from delegations, reflections that were sometimes modest in their implications but were also hopeful from the standpoint of reassuring the world that the UN is, in fact, up to the challenges of reducing threats from new and existing weapons systems.

Here is some of what we heard over the first two days that piqued our interest and raised our levels of anticipation for the Working Groups:

  • Ambassador Drobnjak’s admonition to the group that we need to “prove otherwise” that the DC has lost its way.
  • DSG Eliasson’s caution that we must not allow the option of returning  to a “dark age” of mistrust.
  • Switzerland’s call for more efforts focused on DC working methods, including more access by civil society (echoed by Japan, Kazakhstan and others).
  • The African Group’s calls for complete, non-discriminatory security assurances from nuclear weapons states.
  • CELAC’s generous mention of the contributions of both OPANAL and UNLiREC to regional disarmament.
  • The NAM’s proposal for an international day for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
  • The mention by Australia, Ecuador and others of the urgent need for universal adherence to efforts to eliminate cluster weapons and land mines.
  • South Africa’s assertion that nuclear weapons should be subject to prohibition as chemical and biological weapons now are.
  • Venezuela’s call for both “horizontal and vertical” disarmament processes.
  • China’s concrete commitments to both a ‘five point plan’ to move forward negotiations with Iran and the production of a national PoA report.
  • Algeria’s suggestion that lessons from existing nuclear-free zones be readily available to assist the Middle East zone process.
  • The European Union’s positing of dangerous linkage between illicit/diverted weapons and prospects for the commission of mass atrocities.
  • Egypt’s concern that the issue of ‘overproduction’ of small arms and conventional weapons is not sufficiently addressed by the ATT or other international instruments.

This is just a small sample of hopeful statements offered amidst the finger pointing over the failure (so far) of the ME WMD-free Zone, the DPRK’s deteriorating relationship with the US, and other tensions.  These tensions are real, they beg for resolution, but it is unclear that a Commission dedicated to deliberation is the proper forum to work out full details towards progress and reconciliation.

In the end, as with the C34 Peacekeeping Committee that recently produced a report after having failed to do so a year earlier, it is critical that the DC Working Groups produce real recommendations this year.   As Australia and others noted, the recommendations don’t have to be ‘game changing’ in order to have impact.   At this point, any recommendations – however modest – would be helpful both in advancing disarmament discussions and in sparing the reputation of the Disarmament Commission itself.

It is not necessary to fix things entirely in order to improve them substantially.   As we have done in the past, and as Reaching Critical Will and others have done over many years, we urge the DC to use every bit of its considerable technical and diplomatic expertise to point the way to the next levels of disarmament progress.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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Shock and Awe: The C34 Finishes Its Report

9 Apr

After 30 days of negotiation, re-negotiation, and a little bit more negotiation, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — also known by its shorter title of ‘the C34’ — produced a report for 2014. The report, which examines the ‘whole question’ of peacekeeping – from DDR to policies on procurement – is meant to offer guidance on UN peacekeeping policy. (We will have more to say about the report shortly.) Thus we trust that some of the key recommendations will now be ‘operationalised’ primarily through the UN’s Department of Field Support, and Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As far as intergovernmental processes go, completing a report does not register much surprise. However, it is quite an achievement for the assorted members of the committee to produce this report after they failed to do so during the previous year’s session.

With the success of the process this year (delegates even managed to wrap things up by 17.30 on the final day), one could easily be deceived into believing that all is fine in the land of peacekeeping governance.  However, the development of peacekeeping over the last 6-12 months has demonstrated the degree to which the C34 process is in need of stringent examination, a process which continually reminds the actors involved in peacekeeping policy of the precarious situation that such policy now often finds itself in.

The state of peacekeeping policymaking at the UN can be visualized as three concentric rings, or cogs:

1)    First, Longer term policy developments – this is the slowest of the cogs in the UN system, as it involves the widest array of actors and policy issues. This is where the C34 comes in, supplementing the development of structural changes in the DPKO/DFS and doctrinal developments (‘principles and guidelines’) such as in the new Horizons Process. The fruits of this process often have to find agreement of a wider range of member states, as well as operationalization by the Secretariat.

2)    Second are Operational demands –These refer to responses to threats taking the form of mandates for peacekeeping operations through the Security Council and Secretariat, from the surge in operations at the beginning and end of the 1990s to current developments in Mali, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some of those operations have considerable ramifications for what we have traditionally come to know as ‘peacekeeping.’

3)    The final cog is comprised of ‘Shocks’ – these come in the form of often-avoidable events which shake up peacekeeping practice. For instance: The killing of US servicemen in Somalia in 1992, the Rwandan Genocide, the massacre in Srebrenica, the sexual exploitation and abuse scandals in the early 2000s, and the possible political and legal ramifications from the Cholera outbreak in Haiti. At times these shocks happen due to significant failures at a tactical level. However, sometimes they come about as a result of urgent operational demands working on a different timeline than longer term policy developments.

It can be observed that peacekeeping in the UN is currently stretched in such a policy dynamic: in particular the shorter-term operational and the longer-term policy seem to be working at dramatically different speeds. This is to be expected to a certain extent as, from time to time, urgent operational demands must overtake careful policy development. Moreover, longer-term policy cannot always spin on a dime, with the most coherent and effective policy sometimes taking a considerable time and patience to develop.

However, the past six months have seen operational demands which have significantly challenged the core principles of peacekeeping – the impartiality of a deployed peacekeeping force, the need for strategic consent from the host state, and changes regarding the minimum use of force (apart from self defence and the defence of the mandate). There is a clear and even stark contrast between operational developments – most clearly seen in the Security Council – and deliberations related to longer-term planning — seen through statements from the C34 in which member states consistently refer back to the prominence of core principles.

For instance, in his briefing to the Security Council about the UNMISS operation in South Sudan, USG for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, failed to acknowledge the role of consent as a pillar of the UNMISS operation, while outlining his plan to withdraw capacity building for the government and opposition and focus purely on the impartial protection of civilians. As laudable as the protection of civilians is in South Sudan, the deafening silence concerning host nation consent sets the operation on a precarious path, particularly when the UN’s own reports cite the host government as a primary coordinator of attacks against UNMISS. In the larger picture of peacekeeping policy development, this is even more problematic – if a peacekeeping mission can continue to be deployed without host nation support, what does this mean for peacekeeping’s claim of impartial response?

Additionally, the assessment of UNMISS, and planning for deployment in the Central African Republic are both taking place at the same time as the UN is undertaking tricky negotiations over reimbursement rates for peacekeepers. Levels of financial reimbursement are being closely linked by some states to levels of preparedness of peacekeepers and the equipment that accompanies them in the field. Moreover, Troop Contributors wish to see an even higher rate of reimbursement in situations where they send soldiers into particularly hazardous environments. Linking this to debates in the Security Council where peacekeepers are being mandated to deploy in areas with high levels of insecurity, with little formalized peace processes in place, and (as in the case of MONUSCO) with part of the mission recalibrated to launch offensive combat operations against belligerents, gaps in the timing of policy formulation – including policy on reimbursement — are more pronounced.

In addition to these gaps, a trend exists which considers the Security Council as the primary anchor point in peacekeeping policy, particularly visible among advocacy groups. For instance, advocacy around the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has seen a considerable level of activity at the UN Security Council (most pertinently around operations), but nothing comparable at the C34. No statement from the joint office on R2P/genocide prevention has been made at the C34; the concept is not referred to at all in this year’s C34 report, nor does it appear in other iterations of the UN’s peacekeeping policy machinery (for instance the Principles and Guidelines). The level of ‘impact’ from advocacy at Security Council level may potentially be greater, but there is a danger in neglecting other capacities established to develop peacekeeping policy, thereby reinforcing the belief by Security Council membership (in particular Permanent Members), that they are the only drivers of such policy.

From our perspective, strengthening the role and functionality of the C34 is essential – that this year’s report was approved is no small feat. However, work towards the strengthening of the report, the level to which the report’s policy recommendations can be operationalized, is a task for the coming year. Secondly, there needs to be a bit more humility from those member states in the Security Council who too often feel that their idea of peacekeeping is the only viable way forward. Statements made regarding the CAR as being a ‘new type of operation’ seemed to ride roughshod over years of (admittedly imperfect) peacekeeping development which began at the end of the 1990s. Thirdly, contributors to the C34 need to develop and utilize their own strengths to facilitate peacekeeping research. The growth of peacekeeping training centers within a growing number of states brings with it opportunities of spreading “lessons learned” and cultivating more nuanced levels of understanding. Finally, those advocacy groups seeking policy relevance solely through tracking Security Council resolutions and debates may have to revisit their strategies, or at least examine the extent to which they can also support the longer term policy approaches represented by the C34.

The fear is that if longer term policy and shorter-term operational demands continue to move at such radically different speeds, then the UN could find itself in a similar position as the beginning of the 1990’s. As those who follow the history of peacekeeping knows, the 1990’s contained plenty of shocks.  Another generation of preventable ‘shocks’ is in the best interests of no one.

Dr. David Curran, GAPW Peacekeeping Fellow

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Making Persons ‘Reappear’ in El Salvador

27 Mar

As many readers of this blog know, the vicious civil war that raged for years in El Salvador left many victims, including the mostly unhealed scars of families seeking knowledge of the whereabouts of children (now adults) who were ‘disappeared’ during military operations in the 1980s.  The combination of the sudden loss of a loved one followed by years of silence regarding their whereabouts is a pain that only few of us can imagine.   The pain only deepens when the ‘disappeared’ are children.

GAPW just spent an important afternoon with the staff of the Pro- Búsqueda Association (www.probusqueda.org.sv/), a group of mostly younger professionals dedicated to lifting the veil of disinformation and deceit imposed by those seeking to cover up the truth of many hundreds of childhood disappearances.  Using sophisticated tracking software, Pro- Búsqueda has successfully reunited hundreds of disappeared children (now adults) and their loved ones. The organization also provides counseling services for families.  Many of these extraordinary stories can be founded on their website.

Staff at Pro- Búsqueda have noted with appreciation the cooperation they have received from many international experts as well as from the Inter-American Court for Human Rights.   Pro- Búsqueda is assisting now on what will be only the fourth case to come to the Court from El Salvador.  However, the organization believes that over 900 cases of disappearances are entitled to their day in court, with the strong potential for reparations as well.

A major violation occurred in November 2013 when three armed men entered the Pro- Búsqueda offices, stole computers and set fire to some documents and files.  The attack, which was condemned at the time by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, has thankfully not proven to be a fatal setback.  The offices we visited were filled with deep resolve, but also with the sounds of laughter.

One recommendation from Pro- Búsqueda and other groups working in this area is for El Salvador to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/ConventionCED.aspx) and fully abide by its provisions, including ensuring “that any individual who alleges that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance has the right to report the facts to the competent authorities, which shall examine the allegation promptly and impartially and, where necessary, undertake without delay a thorough and impartial investigation.”

That states have not done due diligence on matters of fact finding, investigation and ending impunity is why the work of Pro- Búsqueda and others working on enforced disappearances is so important.  Disappearing children is a grave crime.   From the standpoint of promoting peaceful societies, giving the disappeared from El Salvador the opportunity to return to their families and communities is among the most hopeful work we have witnessed anywhere.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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An Open Letter to UN Permanent Representatives — Give the Disarmament Commission Another Chance

20 Mar

Editor’s note:  For many years, GAPW has lamented the decline in productivity of the UN Disarmament Commission.  Given some recent hopeful signs in disarmament and the fact that the DC is in the third year of a 3 year policy cycle, we believe that the upcoming UNDC is an opportunity for meaningful deliberations warranting the attention of diplomatic missions that might well choose to put their energies elsewhere. 

Excellencies:

As most of you are aware, April 7 marks the beginning of the 2014 UN Disarmament Commission, the third year of its current policy cycle.   Ambassador Drobnjak has met with delegates to brief them on his own hopes and expectations for the three-week session and will convene another preparatory meeting on March 24. As he does so, we recall Ambassador Grima’s assertion from last April that the 2013 session did much to rebuild trust among delegations as a precondition for meaningful deliberations on nuclear disarmament and confidence building in the field of conventional weapons. This assertion may be as much an aspiration as a fact, but Ambassador Grima’s words at the very least underscore the need for more trustbuilding in disarmament matters as well as to increase the resolve of the UNDC to ‘test’ strategies that can build even more trusting and policy-effective relations among delegations tasked with disarmament matters.

Excellencies, this letter is a request to all of you to consider supporting another push for effectiveness in the UNDC in April, prioritizing time and energy from your missions to help support the possibility of deliberative movement that can provide real guidance to First Committee delegates. The UNDC now stands at risk of being overtaken by events as governments and civil society increasingly look outside the UN for the means to carry forward focused and technical deliberations on critical and emerging disarmament issues. A successful UNDC, resulting in clear if modest recommendations, can help erase the frustration of many inside and outside the UN that our disarmament structures are now simply and stubbornly inflexible.  

We recognize the challenge in asking for this commitment.  Our sense while speaking with many representatives of missions is that the UNDC feels too much like a long and tedious obligation that, as we all acknowledge, has failed to produce tangible results in many years.  GAPW has noted with concern many changes in the makeup of delegations to the UNDC over the years, the smaller numbers of diplomats who make the trip from Geneva or national capitals, the reduced ranks of diplomats assigned to cover the DC and its working groups, especially after the formal statements have been concluded.

With all that delegations need to accomplish on issues ranging from disabilities and the status of women to atrocity crime prevention and post-2015 development goals — not to mention other disarmament obligations — it is understandable that many of you would choose to minimize mission involvement in such a protracted and, especially in recent years, largely unfulfilling process.  But we also recognize that disarmament structures have undergone change in the past, they can be changed again, and it is worth our while to seize current opportunities to change them further.

As you all know, the UNDC is a deliberative body not a negotiating body.  It makes political judgments regarding the best paths forward on disarmament but neither creates nor endorses binding agreements. As such, there is little pressure regarding the establishments of precedents in disarmament negotiations, important given that the UNDC will be followed this year by the precedent-laden NPT review and the 5th Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms.   In addition, there is little pressure for the UNDC to issue comprehensive guidelines on disarmament matters.  Concrete, if modest, suggestions for how to move disarmament processes forward would be both sufficient and welcome.   As much as the global public craves solutions on disarmament matters, they can be provisionally satisfied with tangible policy movement of the sort that should by now be the UNDC’s specialized domain.

Failure to use this final year of the UNDC’s cycle to productive ends will further erode delegate interest.  It will increase the likelihood that states will no longer see the value in funding these sessions.  And, perhaps most important, failure of the UNDC might well encourage the Security Council to take up disarmament more frequently as a thematic consideration in a manner that marginalizes GA initiatives. The apparent inability of yet another GA process to live up to expectations will only embolden those who see the Council and the Council alone as the only effective body to take up these concerns.

GAPW’s clear position is that we need to keep disarmament firmly as a GA function.  But we also need to demonstrate that GA disarmament structures, especially the UNDC, can be less prone to gridlock or held hostage to an inflexible view of ‘consensus’ that belies the UNDC’s purely deliberative functions.  With all that is taking place inside and outside the UN, it is no longer clear that the UNDC will continue to have a key role in disarmament affairs if we cannot take measures now to make modest, limited recommendations to other parts of the GA which are more directly responsible for establishing and promoting disarmament obligations.

Excellencies, with all due respect for the multiple, important agendas taking up the time of you and your mission colleagues, we urge you to give ample attention to this session of the DC. We have noted with deep appreciation recent “openings” on regulating the global arms trade, fact-based discussion on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, hopeful collaborations among states as part of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, Iran’s still-tentative recalibration of its own nuclear ambitions, efforts to address the impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, building transparency and confidence in outer space activities, and more.  With all that is now attempting to bloom, this could also be the season when we can replace structural immovability with a more flexible and collaborative tone.  This could be the year for deliberation that yields suggestions for moving forward on disarmament obligations that people worldwide are yearning to see.

Excellencies, you have assurances of our highest consideration as well as our support as the UNDC navigates its current challenges and opportunities.

Dr. Robert Zuber

zuber@globalactionpw.org

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Goodbye Sierra Leone, Hello CAR: On ‘new’ peacekeeping not being so ‘new’

12 Mar

With Ban Ki Moon overseeing the wrapping up of the UNIPSIL peacebuilding operation, fifteen years of UN involvement in Sierra Leone through peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations has come to an end. This note will not go into much depth about that process, as there are some competent histories of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone[1]. Nevertheless, it’s aim is to highlight certain of its peacekeeping components (UNAMSIL), while demonstrating the value in reflecting on Sierra Leone operations as opposed to simply forgetting about them. Such reflection is pertinent in light of current proposals on a peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR), and wider debates on peacekeeping.

More or less at the same time as the UN is wrapping up its Sierra Leone’s commitments, the organization is preparing itself to deploy into the CAR. The descent of the CAR into the grave violence seen today has been well documented[2], as has analysis of the joint French (Operation SANGARIS) and African Union (MISCA) peacekeeping intervention.  The Security Council’s meeting on 6th March looked to directly address the worsening situation in the country through the establishment of a UN peacekeeping presence in the country. Contributions to the meeting came from heads of humanitarian agencies (OCHA and the UNHCR, both of whom appeared to be doing a great deal of work on very little money), the Foreign Minister of the CAR (who gave a considerably emotional and powerful speech), the African Union (who sought to outline MISCA’s achievements, and not have their efforts pushed side by an international presence), as well as a number of member states.

Regarding the probable establishment of a UN operation, the view is very much that the deployment would have to be ‘phased’ – i.e. – robust at first, followed by a larger, more multifunctional force when security was more established. This model of peacekeeping is logical if international peacekeepers are to be deployed. However, the approach was described as being a ‘new approach to peacekeeping’[3]. This description is problematic: the experience of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone demonstrates that phasing operations in this way is anything but ‘new’. The description could become even more problematic if lessons from previous phased operations are not incorporated into new resolutions.

On an organizational front, the Sierra Leone missions incorporated a range of phased actors.  Through the second half of the 1990’s ECOWAS’s military wing, ECOMOG led a robust intervention, largely via the regional hegemon (Nigeria). A considerable number of these forces were ‘re-hatted’ – i.e. forces acting under a regional banner and transitioning over to working under a UN flag[4]. Moreover, the deployment of the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation was supported by a robust, combat capable deployment from a P5 member – the UK. This allowed for a ‘phased approach’, wherein the UN/UK would push outwards to unsecured zones of operation to create secure conditions for a multifunctional peacekeeping force to undertake core peacebuilding functions.

Conceptually, this demonstrated the first signs of ‘post-Brahimi’ peacekeeping. UNSCR 1270 mandated the operation under Chapter VII to take ‘necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. At the time, Protecting Civilians in peacekeeping mandates was a new phenomenon – UNSCRs 1265 and 1296 being passed in 1999 and 2000 respectively[5].

The use of Chapter VII to authorize ‘necessary action’ allowed peacekeepers to undertake more robust approaches to their duties when faced with belligerent groups.  This linked to the significant doctrinal efforts of the time, in particular the evolution of the ‘Peace Support Operations’ concept[6], which espoused a robust, combat capable military presence to start a mission, which would be phased out by a multifunctional peacebuilding presence.  Indeed, the principle author of PSO doctrine, Phillip Wilkinson, saw Sierra Leone as a conceptual test of that idea[7].

Finally, efforts were put into the transition from peacekeeping – the provision of negative peace – into peacebuilding – the provision of more positive forms of peace. The transition from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL (later to become UNIPSIL) and the subsequent involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission demonstrated a commitment to longer-term peacebuilding

Sierra Leone demonstrates that ‘new models’ of peacekeeping have been undertaken in the past – but so what? The importance here is that the mission endured a significant range of challenges – some almost bringing the mission down. It is through acknowledging such failures that peacekeeping doctrine and practice develop, particularly useful in the context of establishing new operations.

Levels of enthusiasm towards ‘Robust peacekeeping’ varied considerably as the mission went on. Reports of contingents not willing to undertake offensive operations against rebels beset the operation throughout the first year of its deployment. This was compounded by issues of considerable in-fighting between contingents[8] linked to issues of re-hatting of ECOMOG Peacekeepers into UN ones[9]. The operation was also the ‘poster image’ for the oft-used concept of peacekeepers arriving in theatre with inadequate levels of training and equipment, a dilemma often faced when peackeepers are required to deploy rapidly. Even Secretary General Annan was quoted to have said ‘Anyone who believes, or says they believe, in multilateral affairs must be disappointed.’[10] These dilemmas were to contribute to the low point of the operation in the summer of 2000, when rebel groups took 300 peacekeepers hostage[11].

On a wider scale, issues with the Lomé Peace Agreement offered considerable lessons in the crafting of peace agreements[12], in particular, the awarding of Senior Ministerial Posts to those in the highest echelons of the principal rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front. Critiques over the minimal role of women in crafting peace agreements for Sierra Leone were also made. Moreover, assessments of the PBC engagement noted substantial difficulties with the coordination of peacebuilding, in particular the use of the Peacebuilding Fund without effective political agreement with the government on how the money would be used[13]. UNAMSIL was also one of the active missions to be highlighted in reports of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, at a time when the SEA went from being an issue swept under the carpet to one of the most damaging scandals to beset UN peacekeeping operations.

If history is constantly being reinvented by those who authorize and deploy operations, then there is a legitimate concern that the lessons of that history will not have been learned. This is not to say that the mission in the CAR is a ‘Sierra Leone’ engagement – no two conflicts are the same, neither should the response be. However, if the CAR operation runs into difficulties, suggesting that the difficulties are due to the fact that this is a ‘new’ type of operation will be neither honest nor sufficient. This is a critical matter when it comes to properly addressing and assessing significant security threats to human lives.

This leads one to ask what ‘new’ actually means. States in the C34, and fourth committee have often sought to highlight how peacekeeping today is substantially different from what it used to be. The C34 committee contained statements – both tinged with skepticism and optimism – that peacekeeping just wasn’t like it used to be. Given that peacekeeping in Sierra Leone was being undertaken 15 years ago, this judgment about the relation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ peacekeeping should be interrogated more deeply. Again, peacekeeping operations are deployed into highly violent societies. Consistently claiming to invent the wheel when the wheel has long been present will not help us meet current peacekeeping challenges.

It is not up to this article to proclaim Sierra Leone as a ‘success’ – that is up to the people of Sierra Leone to decide. Nevertheless, its importance in developing peacekeeping doctrine and practice is not to be sniffed at. What the mission did, how it did it, and the challenges it faced should all be kept in mind, particularly as the UN seeks to establish a peacekeeping mission to the CAR.

By all means consign peacekeeping in Sierra Leone to the history book, but do not consign its lessons to the trashcan.

Dr. David Curran, Peacekeeping Fellow

[1] David Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, New York, Palgrave, 2005

[2] Gobal Centre for R2P, ‘Central African Republic’, http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/central_african_republic

[3] French Mission to the United Nations – 6 mars 2014 – République centrafricaine – Remarques à la presse de M. Gérard Araud, représentant permanent de la France auprès des Nations unies – found at http://www.franceonu.org/la-france-a-l-onu/espace-presse/declarations-presse/points-de-presse/article/6-mars-2014-republique

[4] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit – “Re-Hatting” Ecowas Forces As UN Peacekeepers: Lessons Learned http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/coe/referencedocuments/ECOWAS%20Rehatting.pdf

[5] Curran, D. M.; Woodhouse, T., Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: What can Africa contribute?, International Affairs. Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007 pp. 1055-1070.

[6] Joint Doctrine Development Centre, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: Peace Support Operations. London: Permanent Joint Headquarters, 1998, (JDDC is now the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre – DCDC)

[7] Wilkinson, P, ‘Peace support under fire: lessons from Sierra Leone’, International Security Information Service briefing paper, June 2000

[8] Bullion, A, India in Sierra Leone: A case of Muscular Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.77–91

[9] The Guardian, Sierra Leone peace force accused of sabotage, 8 September 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone.unitednations

[10] See note 8.

[11] United Nations, Lessons learned from United Nations peacekeeping experiences in Sierra Leone, UN Best Practices Unit ‘Lessons learned’ report, New York,  United Nations, Sept. 2003

[12] Bright, D., ‘Crafting the Lomé Peace Agreement, Conciliation Resources Report, 2000, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2009_7Implementing%20the%20Lome%20Peace%20Agreement_2000_ENG.pdf

[13] Actionaid, CAFOD and CARE International, ‘Consolidating the peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’, London, CARE International, 2007

 

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Women Cadets Talk “Homeland Security”

11 Mar

This past weekend, Global Action teamed up with the New York Chapter of Women in International Security for a presentation at West Point to women cadets as part of International Women’s Day.

The cadets represented two service academies – at West Point and Annapolis – and were attending the Corbin Women’s Leadership Summit on the theme, “Beyond the Brass Ceiling: Educating, Inspiring and Empowering for the Future.“

The situation of many women cadets in the US service academies is challenging at best.   There have been a host of very ‘public’ incidents of discrimination and abuse that have undermined trust in the academies and raised concern from women, peace and security advocates.   There have also been some high profile military activities that portend a shift from conventional military operations to more ‘high tech’ engagements that substitute robots for soldiers and drones for ‘manned’ aircraft.

None of this was news to these cadets.  Indeed, we generally find that conversations on peace and security with military personnel (or personnel in training) are among the most stimulating discussions that we are fortunate to be part of.   For this session, we decided it best to focus more on their social environment and a bit less on their military obligations:

·       We highlighted the changing constellation of threats that need to be assessed as potential sources of conflict.   Not only does most of the conflict on the UN Security Council agenda take place within states rather than across borders, but there is a general recognition that future conflicts are at least as likely to arise from competition over resources, especially water, as well as lands and oceans whose ecological potential has already been seriously compromised by pollution and climate change.  In addition, cadets must prepare to participate in a new generation of multi-lateral peacekeeping operations as well as assess security factors such as the trend to more asymmetrical warfare with an array of non-state actors and their increasingly clever killing devices.

·        We highlighted the need to identify and enfranchise stakeholders across a wide spectrum of conflict prevention and response.  This is not about ‘hearts and minds’ so much as about willing hands.    We simply leave too many assets on the table when creating strategies for addressing conflict, and we desperately need to raise that involvement.   We drove the point home that the most powerful military that has ever graced this planet had more than its share of difficulty subduing one of the poorest countries in the world.   Our militaries, it seems, are simultaneously intimidating and insufficient to the tasks of preserving and rebuilding the peace.  We need more, and we need it from a wider range of stakeholders and their distinctive capacities.

·         We highlighted the need to rescue ‘service’ from its overly militarized contexts.   These cadets were quite prepared to acknowledge that their ‘service’ is only one of many forms and that, indeed, more service from more places would be most welcome.    My many relatives in the military would have made a similar acknowledgment, that service is more a lifestyle than a professional obligation.   For all our flaws as people, we took seriously the need to lend a hand where we could, to look out for our neighbors, to offer support in a crisis, to share skills that would otherwise be in short supply.  As our societies become more complex and anxious, the need for service – if not the interest in service – must grow as well.  As our militaries are not sufficient to the challenges of modern security, our notions of service are inadequate to societies drowning in distraction and self-preoccupation.

·         And this led to the final major point, the degree to which modern culture has tuned out the institutions, strategies and practices of the military (and others) on whom we depend to protect our ‘way of life.’ We don’t always like what the military does, but it is indispensable to keep connected with its people, like these cadets, who will carry out missions ostensibly on our behalf.   More and more, people in the US (and elsewhere) know little or nothing about what military personnel do on a daily basis, how they motivate themselves to perform, how they feel about the things they are being asked to do on behalf of a largely disinterested population.   I related stories of my church life in the 80s and 90s when service personnel would return to the US, often badly damaged in body and spirit, sometimes drug addicted, with few employment prospects, let alone access to sufficient physical and psychological care.   Most of them could handle the dangerous streets.  What was harder to deal with was the sense that they were being shunned by the very people they imagined it had been their job to protect.

This seemed to strike a deep chord with many of the cadets.  How do you defend people who don’t have any interest in their erstwhile defenders nor in any of the other activities that must take place in the world in order for us to have all the material comforts and distractions that we take for granted, the advantages to which we feel entitled, the career pursuits that have little benefit beyond the limits of our own tight social orbits?  How do you ‘defend’ people who see others largely as ‘markets,’ who are more bitter than grateful, who allow themselves to be absorbed by gadgets such that we don’t ever have to pay attention to the world beyond our phones?

The cadets came away with a clearer sense, perhaps, that our security is about much more than defending our perimeter through military bases sited in other countries.   It is also about the security of the homeland, ensuring that the cores of our cultures are active and disciplined and hospitable and fair, including and especially fair to women.  As citizens, these women gave every indication of being willing to see and acknowledge connections to global processes to which we are usually blind, as well as the needs in our neighbors towards which we are more and more content to remain willfully ignorant.

Dr. Robert Zuber

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UN Panel Discussion Highlights Rule of Law Obligations

6 Mar

The Rule of Law thematic has been on the UN’s agenda frequently this winter with open debates and panel discussions taking place across complementary processes. From the post-2015 development agenda to the work of peacekeeping missions in conflict and post-conflict settings, it seems that there is ample space and opportunity for this issue to be integrated in many important security, human rights and development discussions.

Following up to the Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, a panel discussion was held on 27 February 2014 focusing on rule of law, peace and security, human rights and development. The Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson provided the introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. In his remarks, he highlighted that “[t]he rule of law, based on human rights, underpins peace and security.” Reflecting on the rule of law at the international level, he highlighted the role of the UN Charter and peaceful settlement of disputes while at the national level, justice and law are important in preventing conflict and mitigating grievances accordingly. Rule of law also makes significant contributions in fostering and promoting economic growth and building strong institutions which are integral to sustainable development and to the well-functioning of societies.

Specifically focusing on rule of law and human rights, Ms. Louise Arbour, President of the International Crisis Group, made the case for how rule of law and human rights are not interlinked because they are the same. Mr. Muna Ndulo, Professor of Law at Cornell University raised important questions about the conditions necessary for the rule of law to become a reality (in a peace and security context) and how its implementation can be monitored, including efficiency of services and accountability systems.

Speaking in her capacity as Director-General of the IDLO, Ms. Irene Khan iterated that the links between rule of law and development are mutually reinforcing. It is not enough for laws to be adopted, but they have to be properly enforced because there is risk that both laws and legal institutions can be mismanaged. Thus, it is hard to separate rule of law from development because it provides the basis for empowerment, eradicating poverty, and equitable access to services and resources.

During the discussion, many member states raised thought-provoking questions, including complying with the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as well as the need for judicial review of the Security Council decisions. Moreover, further to the role of the Security Council, questions were raised as to what further steps can be taken to promote equal and effective implementation of all Security Council resolutions, including the peaceful settlement of disputes. Finally, questions arose about what to do to ensure that there is no duplication of efforts, between the UN and member states on addressing some of these issues. Emphasis was placed on national ownership, national sovereignty and ensuring that the concepts that are promoted by the UN, including in peacekeeping missions, are agreed on by member states and are based on practical situations.

The aforementioned discussions are welcomed both in increasing visibility around this issue but also in promoting rule of law as an integral part of good governance and functioning societies. At the same time, more attention could be given to identify how to increase awareness over this issue at the national and international level; and how to promote strong rule of law at the international level while fully respecting national sovereignty. These are some, among a plethora of similar questions that deserve more careful analysis, in hopes of fully integrating this concept among complementary agendas and promoting fair, safe and just societies.

Preparations are currently underway to shape the high level meeting this summer discussing Contributions of Human Rights and the Rule of Law  in the post‐2015 Development Agenda. Given the significance that was highlighted in this meeting regarding the role of rule of law in the development processes, perhaps there will be scope in the upcoming high level to build on current discussions to contemplate how the UN and member states can join efforts in strengthening rule of law at the national and international levels so as to promote the post-2015 development goals, from a human-rights centric approach.

Global Action is committed to following the development of this thematic in complementary and cross-cutting agendas very closely, especially as it pertains to peace and security which is integral to our mandate. Further inquiries and discussions about this matter are welcomed.

–          Melina Lito, Legal Adviser on UN Affairs, Global Action, melina.gapw@gmail.com

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Our Responsibilities to Protect and to Promote

4 Mar

Editor’s Note:  The following was written by Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette, a student at the University of Southern Maine and a contributor to several RtoP-related projects in New York and elsewhere.  Dylan wrote this to coincide with the opening of the Commission on the Status of Women on March 10. GAPW, mostly through the efforts of Melina Lito, has done extensive work exploring WPS-RtoP relationships.

The project of promoting and facilitating gender equality has been and continues to be a daunting undertaking. With millennia upon millennia of learned and institutionalized gender inequity, it is little wonder that this challenge persists.

There is good news however. Since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000, the United Nations has worked actively and ardently on the “Women, Peace and Security” (WPS) agenda and there has been substantial progress. Despite this progress, there is still much work to be done in advancing the cause of gender equality and in addressing the unique and disproportionate burdens shouldered by women and girls in conflict situations.

Resolution 1325, the canonical WPS report published by the UN Secretary General in 2002, and subsequent Council resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106 and 2122 – text available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/security_council_monitor/) all enumerate the various and diverse array of obstacles and hurdles faced by women in matters of peace and security. These obstacles span the gamut from second-class social statuses in some societies to assumptions about the appropriate “place” of women to employment discrimination to enforced domestic or sexual slavery. There are two broad categories that emerge as central to the WPS discussion: the imbalance of female representation in positions of leadership and decision-making and the continued persistence of gender-based and sexual violence. Both are crucial in tackling the malaise of gender inequity and yet each contain within them potential pitfalls and drawbacks.

The horrors of gender-based and sexual violence are undeniable and such ravages demand redress. Women and girls are often primary targets in the midst of conflict as a means of waging psychological, emotional and physical warfare against a perceived enemy. The visible and invisible scars of such violence are unimaginable, except to those who bear them. It is vital to acknowledge the disparity in the way in which men and women experience war and conflict but it is equally important to resist the temptation to essentialize women and girls as occupying the exclusive role of helpless victim. Such unintentional characterizations, most often resulting from genuine compassion and concern, can nevertheless be destructive to the aim of affirming the agency and dignity of women and girls more broadly. After all, if you are only fit to become a victim then how can you possibly be anything else, for instance, an effective peace activist or negotiator?

It is far more important to achieve gender balance and inclusivity at all levels of institutional, organizational and societal structures. Such structures can vary in nature widely, from legislative bodies to dispute resolution entities to peacekeeping missions to UN organs. The critical point is to internalize gender sensitivities and responsiveness within all contexts, be they post-conflict transitions or peace negotiations or economic development efforts. It is widely understood that the exclusion of women from positions of leadership and decision-making prior to conflict in a given community will likely be mirrored in post-conflict settings. The UN is often a presence in all phases of conflict and can serve a vital function in leading by example. The obvious concern to deal with in these efforts is tokenism and patronization, which must be avoided.

Gender does not refer primarily to biology or physiology. It is a social construction, informed by the particular values, customs, traditions and assumptions attendant to a given community or society. The important thing to note, and something that the Secretary General noted in his report in 2002, is that these social constructions are learned and changeable. As is true with any other idea or conception, the law of dynamism is at work. Ideas are not static but rather are subject to constant reinterpretation and re-imagination. It is the provision of new ways of thinking about gender and the revision of old ones that will ultimately yield the lasting and sustainable changes to gender norms that currently form the core of discriminatory and repressive conditions across the world.

As already mentioned the UN is in a position to lead the way in the WPS movement and is doing so in some positive ways. The goal of 50/50 representation among men and women at medium to upper-level official positions within all organs and entities is a work in progress but laudable in that it is a codified and stated objective. Annual reports from the Secretary General on the continued advancement of WPS and its constituent line-items helps track progress and highlight gaps. The appointment of women to prominent high-level positions – including Mary Robinson, former High Commissioner for Human Rights and now Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, and Jennifer Welsh as the Special Advisor to the Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect — function as good-faith efforts to ensure that women have seats at the various tables that form the basis for global governance. The creation of UN Women, an entity dedicated to the promotion of issues that affect women uniquely and to presenting policy prescriptions and analyses aimed at mitigating those issues, is yet another substantive and promising endeavor toward achieving the broad mandate set forth by the WPS framework.

It is also important to recognize the indispensable role that civil society plays in actualizing the WPS agenda. As an emblematic example, consider the efficacy of a coalition of women’s groups in Kosovo in 2013 that lobbied successfully to identify women and girls who were the victims of gender-based and sexual violence as war victims, thus rendering those affected eligible for compensation and reparations previously only available to mostly male combatants. Such activism and civil engagement highlights the power that women possess in catalyzing change and asserting their agency and relevance in post-conflict and transitional justice environments.

The UN and other official governance bodies do not possess sole proprietorship over WPS as a norm or its policy extensions. The goal of promoting gender justice belongs to us all, at every level of society and in every nation in the world. The lack of said justice is one of the most durable and pervasive disequilibria to afflict humankind and its ultimate resolution requires collaborative and innovative solutions. The first step is to recognize that women play diverse roles in all peace and security contexts, ranging from Sierra Leone women organizing peace marches to Guatemalan women facilitating community-based dispute resolution processes. Women are potent agents of positive change but of course they can also be both victims and perpetrators in the midst of armed conflicts. Regardless, women must be included in all processes designed to resolve such conflicts and must be consulted in crafting gender sensitive and responsive policies in all policymaking efforts. Normalizing the presence of women in positions of leadership can help undermine traditional assumptions that relegate women to secondary roles and lay the groundwork for new societal understandings about gender, which are essential to achieving gender equality in the long run. Peace and security and the maintenance thereof wil only be feasible when women are equal participants in all phases of relevant endeavors. Until then, advancing the WPS normative agenda and leading by example are the most vital and viable means of reaching the goal of gender justice.

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