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Text Message: The BMS Draws to a Close

23 Jun

Editor’s Note:   This essay was one of GAPW’s contributions to the Small Arms Monitor organized by Reaching Critical Will. Access to all essays and all monitors is available at:  
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/salw/2014/sam

Thanks to determined leadership by Ambassador Tanin (Afghanistan) and the Bureau of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), as well as the willingness of states to ‘walk away’ from some Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA)-related policies dear to their hearts, consensus on a BMS outcome document was reached at around 5PM last Friday.

While we tend not to regard textual consensus as major feature inspiring implementation of PoA objectives, it was nevertheless heartening to see this fine group of diplomats come away with an outcome worthy of applause.  As GAPW has noted from the beginning, as much as diplomats seem to enjoy wrestling with and negotiating text, the purposes of the PoA are likely to be better served through an examination of successfully multi-lateral efforts already undertaken within the key activity frameworks endorsed by the PoA.  As Qatar seemed to imply on behalf of the Arab Group, the consensus sought at this BMS is as much about the value of the PoA itself as about the specifics in the outcome document. Such a document has uses as a window on state priorities, but it is unlikely in itself to force serious reassessment of or increase levels of commitment to PoA implementation.  That motivation will come from elsewhere.

Sometimes what is not said in these documents is more important that what is said.  Australia, CARICOM and others noted issues that were neglected, or omitted altogether – Security Council resolutions, security sector reform, the role of UNSCAR, border-related issues, and of perhaps greatest concern, ammunition.  In addition, there were also closing statements by Israel, Canada, the US and the EU distancing each from language linking self-determination and actions to eliminate small arms.

Nevertheless, the ‘good mood’ largely persisted in the room during the course of the week, in some cases through long meetings that challenged diplomats and civil society to forsake World Cup matches. This was both satisfying and a credit to BMS leadership, including the widely-praised Anthony Simpson.  As Venezuela noted with pleasure, ‘there is still a disarmament process which can still achieve consensus.’  Indeed, this might be the single most powerful message that this BMS sends out to a weapons-weary world.

Clearly, with or without this text, the PoA seemed destined to move forward.   States and civil society will continue to identify small arms-related security problems.   Capacity support will be solicited and offered.   We will continue to seek technology for marking, tracing and physical security of stockpiles that can stay one step ahead of those who seek to undermine its benefits.  We will continue to highlight PoA norms and face squarely the challenges (noted by Egypt, Indonesia and others) of implementation based on national and regional priorities.

And we will continue to count victims of needless gun violence; victims of small arms trafficking, of unrestricted flows of mostly second hand weapons, of arms manufacturers pushing weapons like dealers push heroin, of rabid gun lobby groups who refuse to acknowledge, as my late, gun-using father once said to his then gun-possessing sons, that gun rights are at best a relatively minor part of the myriad rights and responsibilities that make up a great country.

What this BMS made clear is that, as welcome as consensus on text is, there is only so much momentum that text alone can build.   The real momentum, the real hope for the victimized and the fearful, is in the many stories of success that the PoA has leveraged; the borders that are more secure, the streets that are safer, the gang members and insurgents who have been disarmed, the illicit ordinance that has been sent up in flames.

China warned on Friday that there is so much further we need to travel to remove the scourge of weapons-related violence.   It is through stories of progress as much as through textual norms from which the impetus to continue on this challenging and life-saving journey will come.

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

Extremism and Terrorism Response – Tools that Need Sharpening

22 Jun

Over this past week there have been a number of UN events aimed at reviewing global policy towards eliminating terrorism.  Obviously traditional approaches such the role of the intelligence community and state based military responses are key component of this discussion. Also of interest however were suggestions for a range of tools that can be used as complimentary measures for dealing with terrorism. These approaches seem to have the advantage of supporting good governance without losing focus on terrorism. In addition, these tools can help successfully address terror threats without strengthening military and intelligence capacities in countries where these institutions are not accountable or are actually a threat to democratic development.

Two themes that came to the fore were how the criminal justice system can be used in combating terrorism and how development and engagement strategies can help mitigate extremist rhetoric.

The latter topic was examined by the missions of Burkina Faso and Denmark as well as the Global Centre for Co-Operation, with a special focus on West African countries and the Sahel.  The meeting focused on the need for multilateral, multi-scale approaches that would help take more conventional development aid programs and orient them toward combating extremism. A key part of this effort, it was argued, was directing more resources towards women and youth. These groups were deemed particularly vulnerable to radical ideology and are target groups for recruitment. Suggested examples for these sectors include skills training, cultural activities and sports programs.

Beyond normal development aid it is also possible to create new programs that help to counter extremist rhetoric. Examples noted include implementation of inter-faith events, cultural exchanges, more creative use of local radio, and de-radicalisation programs in prisons. These initiatives all serve very specific policy ends and can be funded from within current aid packages although further negotiation is needed to increase the range and effectiveness of these programs.

Development itself is not a magic bullet for dealing with extremism, but must be complemented elsewhere. Civil society groups attending the session pointed to how early warning systems are being used effectively to monitor and assess the ‘temperature’ of political rhetoric.  One particular areas of concern:  Calls for the suspension of “terms limits” for government leaders in West Africa and the Sahel, they warned, are creating significant political instability and swelling the potential for increased extremism.

Another UN session organized by the Pakistani Mission explored judicial-legal contributions to countering terrorism. Institutions associated with law and courts are not always seen as useful in preventing terrorism, but rather as a reactive tool to investigate and prosecute once terrorist acts have been committed. This session showed ways that legal systems can be used within a broader policy framework to prevent terror incidents in the first place. One innovation highlighted methods to help encourage more effective communication between intelligence agencies and civil authorities, for instance in building frameworks to ensure inter-agency information privacy and processes to ensure that integrity of evidence. Unregulated, these systems tend to hinder effective joint action among diverse government agencies. Better co-operation can more effectively address some of the unsavory activities that enable terrorism, such as money laundering.

Also stressed was the need for trustworthy, transparent, accountable police services. One positive example cited was in Afghanistan where police engagement with communities regarding less serious security threats (such as traffic safety) has helped build the trusting relationships needed to counter larger threats, including terrorism.

Training was also cited as being very important for the criminal justice system as a whole. Potential avenues for innovation include the need for judges to understand the international law implications of their decisions; the police to have a more robust engagement with regard to the human rights aspects of their work; education focused on how to conduct safe, lawful surveillance; and the importance of assisting women to find their rightful places within the still male-dominated security sector.

None of this precludes the importance of traditional military-intelligence requirements for the combating of terrorism. The approaches outlined above however help prevent the overuse of more traditional solutions — the proverbial “hammer” that creates a “nail” out of every aspect of terrorism prevention.  Given more political will, innovative thinking, clever legal craft and some spin on traditional development activities, counter-terrorism and extremism measures can be improved without undermining measures to ensure more effective governance.

Benji Shulman, GAPW

The UN and the Rights of the Palestinians – A need for more balanced, cohesive communication

14 Jun

Editor’s Note:  This is the 2nd Blog Post from Benji Shulman from South Africa.  Benji is spending the summer with GAPW working on the implications for conflict of climate change and environmental degradation.  As someone also involved in Jewish-Islamic relations in his country, Benji will also reflect from time to time (as he does here) on how the UN navigates the complexities of Middle East politics, culture and human rights. 

This blog reports on the 361st meeting of UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The meeting was attended mostly by Arab states and key members of the Non-Aligned Movement and included a feedback session by committee members and a report back by the office of the Special Rapporteur.

The session focused on reports from various meetings, processes and outcomes of the committee. Updates on the diplomatic front were also given, with a special, positive emphasis placed on the recent Palestinian Unity deal between Hamas and Fatah (See related GA statement — http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2014/gapal1300.doc.htm).  Key issues raised over the course of the meeting were the status of the West Bank barrier, prisoners and prisons, conditions in Palestinian areas, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian participation in other UN committees, and upcoming events commemorating the 2014 UN year of solidarity with the Palestinian People.

The mandate and configuration of the committee was generally favorable to the Palestinian perspective with an absence of Israel-supportive voices in the room. Given this, the outcomes of this committee would likely be considered partisan by onlookers, with more focus and encouragement for current unilateral diplomatic and related efforts being undertaken by the Palestinians than on the encouragement of bilateral negotiations and engagements between the opposing parties.

From a peace and security perspective there are several items worth noting. The first is the progressively milder and more measured language being used by Palestinian diplomatic representatives in this committee. This restraint should be more widely encouraged by the committee. In particular the policy community in Palestine and international Palestinian support groups might not share or even know about the official political stances being taken in their name at the UN, something that would also apply to Israel and its support groups.

The diplomatic corps also need to make sure that their affiliated missions worldwide are conscious and more supportive of the more moderate policy positions being articulated in these UN committees. For example the Palestinian embassy in South Africa, under the late Ambassador Ali Haliemah, was careful to avoid endorsing extremist groups that would undermine the Palestinian state position even if those groups claimed to  be acting on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Since his unfortunate death the Palestinian embassy in South Africa has endorsed events and groups which would be considered at odds with the stated policy positions of the Palestinian representatives at the UN committee and even with those positions the embassy has shared with the South African government.

Going forward clear and consistent communication on policy will be required so that potentially positive diplomatic outcomes do not needlessly confront obstacles from local actors or implicate embassy staff in acts of extremism. This will be especially important in light of the recently announced unity government of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, which as noted was much lauded at the UN meeting. The Palestinian representative dealt only briefly with the issue of conflicting viewpoints between these two parties. The consistent emphasis at the meeting on the goal of a peaceful two- state solution seems considerably at odds with Hamas’s continued aggressive non-recognition of Israel. It remains to be seen which of the two perspectives — or which combination of the two — will become mainstream Palestinian policy.

The other issue that piqued significant interest is the status of Jerusalem on which the committee reported extensively including aspects such as construction, evictions, legal perspectives and religious issues. One point of contention during discussion was the characterization by some of Jerusalem as an “international security issue.” Whilst the area continues to be a hot spot for tensions, it has generally been calmer than other locales including much of the West Bank or indeed many other parts of the Middle East. It is important for discussion to reflect this relative calm given the generally high potential for unrest in the city because of it elevated levels of religious fervor. It has however been demonstrated that these risks have the potential to be mitigated as the recent visit of Pope Francis to the city and the region suggests.

Treating the current status of Jerusalem as a ‘peace and security threat’ seems excessive. One of the risks associated with the unilateral (and sometime inflammatory) actions currently being undertaken by both the Palestinians and Israelis is the continuing threats of violence resulting in part from a lack of negotiations. Currently however violence is not the norm in Jerusalem and it is important to be careful not to create the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The potential for dangerous religious tension in the city can in fact be diminished by the international community, by Israel and by the Palestinians, through encouraging inter-faith engagement, clamping down on religious incitement, guaranteeing unimpeded access to all holy sites, and through related confidence-building measures.

Benji Shulman, GAPW

Winning At Russian Roulette – A Student’s Thoughts on Nuclear Containment and the Future of Global Conflict

7 Jun

Editor’s Note:  The following is by Carly Millenson, who spent a year in the GAPW office working for Women in International Security.  Carly has written previously on what she sees as major security and other threats to her generation.  She is soon off to school at Princeton.  

Most games have many players, but only one winner. Russian roulette has several winners and only one very unlucky loser. When it comes to nuclear diplomacy, if someone pulls the trigger when the chamber is loaded, we all lose. So far we’ve been lucky, but like any smart gambler we’re best off quitting while we’re ahead. Already, the number of states armed with nuclear weapons has risen to eight or nine, depending who you ask. Other nations are working to develop nuclear capabilities, and still other are “the turn of a screw” away from acquiring nuclear weapons, should the need arise. As the number of states with nuclear capabilities grows, so too does the risk of a deadly accident occurring.

Tensions reaching a breaking point, a bluff gone wrong, a tragic misunderstanding – any of these scenarios could lead to the breakout of nuclear conflict on a regional or global scale. As the number of players increases, so too does the risk of a conflict or misunderstanding leading to the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, no one believes that nuclear conflict is beneficial for global security or stability. However, unfortunately conflicts between states frequently occur and when nations fight people die. Weapons intended as a warning can easily end up being deployed in such a tense situation. As the number of nuclear armed states grows, the possibility of nuclear weapons being used during a conflict becomes close to a near certainly according to The Dangers of A Nuclear Iran, an article in Foreign Affairs by field expert Eric S. Edelman. As an international community we have already accepted the use of guns and conventional bombs in warfare. Furthermore, despite strenuous condemnation of the use of such brutal tactics, chemical weapons were deployed in Syria and may exist elsewhere. Is nuclear warfare something that is almost destined to occur?

This question seems almost ridiculous. The answer – an emphatic no – has been instilled into international political culture since Cold War days. However, it merits analysis. Some believe that nuclear containment is a losing battle and that it is pointless fight against the rising tide. According to proponents of this viewpoint, we would do better to accept the fact that like machine guns and fighter planes, nuclear devices will not remain elite, little used weapons forever. Some even feel that by evening the playing field nuclear proliferation may prevent conflict. However, unlike conventional and perhaps even biological, or chemical arms, the effects of nuclear devices are incredibly long term, lasting long after the conflict that sparked their use has ended. Thus, once a weapon is deployed future generations will have to deal with the result of that fateful decision long after the rationale behind it is no longer applicable to the global situation. A large-scale nuclear conflict could wreak havoc on an unimaginable scale and even smaller nuclear conflicts or nuclear terrorism would take horrific toll and would forever destroy what remains of the accepted rules of combat. Perhaps it is inevitable that a nuclear conflict will occur, but if there is even a slim chance to prevent even some of this carnage, isn’t it our duty to seize that option?

Assuming that the use of nuclear weapons is not in any way acceptable, and urging that the international community do everything in its power to stand against such use; this in itself accomplishes nothing. The glaring unspoken question that seems to permeate current events today seems to be how much we care about containment? The problem with secret military bases is that they are secret, and thus intrinsically hard to effectively regulate. Sanctions, while certainly effective do not guarantee that promises to halt nuclear weapons construction are true. Thus, we return to the central question – are we willing to live with nuclear warfare and if not, how far will we go to protect future generations from the catastrophic effects of such a conflict? It’s a complicated matter, and one that the global community needs to resolve together. We can keep passing around the gun and hope for the best, or we can empty our own chamber while doing more to keep the gun from others.

Carly Millenson, Former Program Manager, Women in International Security, New York

 

 

 

 

Amplifying Women’s Voices in Ukraine

5 Jun

Editor’s Note:  This is the first post from Danielle Peck, who comes to GAPW from the University of Wyoming.   Danielle will take leadership for some of GAPW’s program work in the areas of youth development and human rights, and she will be writing in this space from time to time. 

At the recent (pre-election) panel discussion “Invest in Women for Peace: Conflict Prevention and Women’s Participation in Ukraine,” part of the speaker series for Women, Peace and Security, panelists Natalia Karbowska and Gregore Pop-Eleches highlighted the unsettling situation facing women being excluded from the political processes taking place in the Ukraine.

Karbowska began the panel with an example detailing how talk of war in other states often includes the gender perspective, which looks at the impact of gender on people’s opportunities, interactions and social roles during war. Ukrainians as well as the international community have yet to apply the gender perspective on the current situation in Ukraine. Karbowska explained that when Ukrainian women fight to be heard, they are told that their opinions are important but that they can be heard later. Women, not only from the Ukraine should be asking, “When is this later that you speak of?” Women all around the world have been silenced for many generations, too many generations. I say, enough is enough. While it is 2014, women are in need to be heard now especially in countries like the Ukraine that are attempting to implement serious reform.

While NGOs and Parliament are implementing reforms to help overcome crisis and fight corruption, they often still do not sufficiently incorporate a gender perspective or promote women’s participation in political processes. Karbowska explained further, “During this moment in time, many important developments within social policy are being made. Ukrainian women are at risk of losing their own rights; they are at risk of losing their only rights and permanently.” Women need to be involved not only to secure but also to protect their liberty. She also stated that organizations and programs that include women are often the first shut down due to budget cuts. The National Action Plan on gender equality is one of those programs at risk. The narrow window of opportunity for Ukrainian women to finally and fully be heard is closing.

The National Action Plan on gender equality to improve the situation and status of women was first approved in 1997, and then later modified in 2001 to not only improve the situation of women, but to implement gender equality in society. Many positions were implemented all over the state to ensure its success. One major goal of the plan was to significantly raise the female representation within the highest positions by 2015. The National Action Plan not only incorporates a list of goals and tasks to accomplish gender equality, but it supports other programs that support the interests of women. Karbowska referred to the National Action Plan as an essential tool to guarantee women’s involvement in the political decision-making process.

Pop-Eleches focused his presentation more on the divide between East and West Ukraine, which helped explain where and possibly why Ukrainian women’s voices are having the least impact. Due to the lack of mass media in the country, the East and West gather different perspectives from the surrounding countries’ media sources, which can lead, as a result, to a different perception of political reality.  Women from eastern Ukraine are the least represented within the state. As shown in the recent election, there was a high voting turn out everywhere except for regions in eastern Ukraine where polling stations were shut down by pro-Russian separatists. Even though statistics of women’s participation in the election have not yet been revealed, Karbowska explained that in past elections male voters outnumbered women two to one.

Taking all of the above into consideration, what can be done to assure Ukrainian women’s political participation? The international community ought to support Ukraine’s National Action Plan on gender equality. Funding and budget advising should be given to increase the program’s success. The international community should also support other grassroots woman’s civil society organizations in the country. Pressure and education about the importance of including women through media attention, and UN and other state capacity assistance to the Ukrainian parliament and government are both needed. The Ukraine is going through an unsettling period of political reform at this moment in time and cannot afford to ignore the voices and talents of its women. A nation whose policies represent only the interests and positions of men is a nation that, in reality, is only half a true society.

Danielle Peck, GAPW Intern

Land-Locked Developing Countries – Minimizing Vulnerability, Maximizing Integration

2 Jun

Editor’s note:  The following is from Benjamin Shulman who is serving this summer in a joint position with GAPW and our partner Green Map System.   Benji is from South Africa, is a geographer by training, and has deep interests in the Middle East and in security-climate relationships.  Here, Benji looks at the unique economic and related challenges faced by Land-Locked Developing Countries, an important dimension of our security and media work. 

The Kingdom of Lesotho has two unusual geographic traits among the family of nations. Firstly it has the world’s highest ‘low point,’ which is to say that its lowest point (which in most nations is the sea) is quite high up in the Maloti mountain range which makes up the bulk of its territory. The second is that Lesotho is the world’s only country that is surrounded entirely by one other country (South Africa) with no access to the sea.

These two rather unusual characteristics are outliers but they illustrate the geographic realities faced not just by Lesotho but by a whole range of other states known Land Locked Developing Countries (LLDC’s).  This category of states was the focus of a session recently at the United Nations with key players in attendance including diplomats from interested and affected countries, as well as presenters from the UN-OHRLLS, UNCTAD, the World Bank and UN-DESA. The discussion was held with one eye on the upcoming second UN conference on LLDC’s which is scheduled for November 2014 in in Vienna, Austria.

As the session made clear, LLDCs have all the markers characteristic of a developing country but have the defining feature of also not having access to the sea. This factor poses additional constraints to their development. Issues such as isolation, regional integration challenges and production and marketing limitations are particularly pertinent to this group of countries.   These factors can easily lead to more fragile economies that are especially vulnerable to external shock factors such as price fluctuation and global financial instability.

Although LLDC’s form a band of often economically small and vulnerable states this does not mean that they have no impact on global stability.  Take for example in 1998 when the South African Development Community (SADC) intervened to quell unrest in Lesotho resulting in loss of life and considerable damage. Economic vulnerability along with other social and historic factors indicates that these states have sometimes significant potential to cause instability well beyond their land-locked borders.

The UN discussion on LLDC’s was heavily tilted towards two subjects, namely the threat of external “shocks” that may affect these countries and the potential for developing reliable information systems that could be useful in increasing resilience to such shocks. On the other hand, there was very little attempt to integrate cultural assessments, human resource development or any direct security concerns. On the issue of trade, one of the more problematic issues was how to integrate LLDCs into the regional and global economy. By their nature LDCC’s are reliant on their neighbours to transport incoming goods and services. On the one hand this means having to maintain carefully cultivated diplomatic ties with nearby states while simultaneously having to grapple with possible exposure to any instability in the internal political dynamics of their neighbors. This is compounded by the number of states bordering LLDC’s which is on average nearly double those of other countries. This complex regional geo-political situation has meant that these states have often found it challenging to find politically and logistically smooth pathways into the international economy. Even if they are able to achieve integration there is the additional risk that negative external shocks coming from the international system may significantly dampen the benefits of increased trade and economic growth.  This is especially true when you consider that many LLDC’s are single commodity exporters for which fluctuating prices are a considerable worry.

There was also much talk at the UN meeting of creating a “vulnerability index” for LLDCs which could be used both as early warning system and as a policy analysis tool.  The idea however is still in its infancy and there are a number of problems that an academic project of this kind might confront. Trying to figure out what metrics and measurements should be used, deciding how they could be made consistent across all country contexts, and proper sourcing of potential data sets are just some of the key stumbling blocks that still need to be resolved.

During the interactive portion of the session, there were some pertinent remarks made by diplomats representing LLDCs. They pointed out that many of the problems associated with this group of states are also mirrored in the Small Island Developing states and should thus be addressed in concert. In addition there were some complaints that there is no real incentive for states to move from their present “developing” designation as this comes with aid benefits and other assistance which is lost once a state “graduates” to another status. It was suggested during the discussions that these ‘graduating’ states might continue to receive specific technical assistance suited to their context similar to what is already provided to developing countries more broadly. This would provide inexpensive and effective interventions that could contribute to lowering the risks that these countries face as they seek economic integration and transition to more developed stages.

 Benjamin Shulman, GAPW

 

The Emotional and Psychological Trauma to Our People Can’t Be Measured In Real Terms

31 May

Editor’s Note:  Lia Petridis Maiello is a frequent contributor to this blog.   John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy is both an office mate and is also deeply involved with the Marshall Islands suits. 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands in the northern Pacific Ocean is not only a breathtakingly beautiful island state, but has recently moved into the public eye by starting a bold initiative that is widely interpreted as a “David against Goliath” undertaking.

The Marshall islands were subjected to dozens of nuclear tests, carried out by the U.S. after 1945.

According to the Associated Press, the island group filed suit in late April against each of the nine nuclear-armed powers in the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands. It also filed a federal lawsuit against the United States in San Francisco.

The Marshall Islands claims that instead of negotiating disarmament, the nine countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals, spending $1 trillion on those arsenals over the next ten years.

“I personally see it as kind of David and Goliath, except that there are no slingshots involved,” David Krieger, president of the California-based Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, told AP. The Foundation is acting as a consultant in the case and is hoping that other countries will join the legal effort, Krieger points out.

Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea are included in the indictment. The last four are not parties to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but appear to be, according to the lawsuits, bound by its provisions under “customary international law.” The NPT, considered the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament efforts, requires negotiations among countries in “good faith” on disarmament, AP reports.

None of the countries had been informed in advance of the lawsuits. The case found broad recognition within the international press.

The Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands, Tony de Brum, explains in an interview the impact the nuclear tests had and still have for his citizens and what he hopes this lawsuit can achieve for the island state and the world community.

You grew up on the island of Likiep during the 12-year period when the United States tested 67 atomic and thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere and under water in the Marshall Islands (1946-1958). What are your memories on the impact these tests had for the island of Likiep and its inhabitants? Environmentally, politically and psychologically?

My memories of the tests are a mixture of awe, of fear, and of youthful wonder. We were young, and military representatives were like gods to our communities and so our reactions to the tests as they took place were confused and terrifying. We had no clue as to what was happening to us and to our homelands. Our elders, including my grandfather, tried to stop the tests in petitions and communications to the UN but were not successful. I personally witnessed the injuries to some of our countrymen from Rongelap and to this day cannot recall in words my sense of helplessness and anxiety without severe emotional stress. But for as long as I can remember, the explosions and the bizarre effects that lit up our skies are still a source of pain and anger. How could human beings do this to other humans?

While in later life many attempts have been made, both in good and bad faith, to reconstruct the impact of the testing on our people, only the physical and environmental effects can be discussed with some confidence. The emotional and psychological trauma to our people, both young and old, cannot be measured in real terms. The pain is real and the uncertainty is overwhelming. As a young lady said to me when showing me pictures of her dead deformed infant child, “God did not create my baby. He cannot be so cruel.”

The Republic of the Marshall Islands recently filed an extraordinary lawsuit at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, suing all nine nuclear weapons possessors for failing to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. But only three of the nine nuclear states named by the lawsuit generally accept the rulings of the International Court of Justice. What do you hope for the outcome of this case?

My country has exhausted all means within our limited power to bring attention and closure to our outstanding nuclear issues with our former Administrative Authority, the United States. Mechanisms jointly established for dealing with outstanding claims for physical injury and property damage have fallen way short of satisfying even the basic findings of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal formed under treaty agreements. This is due mostly to the withholding of critical information necessary for us to make informed decisions regarding our nuclear past and our uncertain future. To this day the United States still refuses to release information we have identified and requested under established processes. All the while we have to cope with displaced communities, skyrocketing medical costs, dangerously radioactive environments, and deprivation of use of traditional lands.

The United States tells us they have satisfied their obligation under the Free Association Compact, a Treaty, and that they will not entertain any claims or requests for meaningful assistance in this issue. In fact, the US Supreme Court refused to hear the cases of the People of Bikini and the People of Enewetak seeking damages for their destroyed homelands. After seeing what mere testing of these terrible weapons of mass destruction can do to human beings it makes sense for the Marshallese People to implore the nuclear weapons state to begin the hard task of disarmament. All we ask is that this terrible threat be removed from our world. It is the best we can do as collateral damage in the race for nuclear superiority. Our sacrifice will be for naught if the nuclear countries do not stand up and take notice of the evil that nuclear weapons present to our earth.

Do you think that this case can help to create enough international momentum for the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT) to be treated — due to its near universal adherence — as part of customary international law by which all states must abide, regardless of whether or not they actually signed the treaty?

We believe that it is sensible and logical for the world community to consider this matter as one of customary international law. To do otherwise is to gamble with the future of the world.

What effects would that have on the discourse of nuclear disarmament worldwide?

It should stimulate intelligent discourse and wise solutions. For what would it gain the world for instance, to be protected from climate change, only to suffer massive destruction from nuclear weapons? All our efforts to be sane about the future must be connected to survival and peace. The right hand cannot be out seeking climate peace while the left is busy waging nuclear war.

Looking at the status quo of this discourse, how do you evaluate the outcome of the recent NPT PrepCom at United Nations’ headquarters in New York City which closed without adopting the Chair’s draft recommendations to the Review Conference?

The outcome of the recent NPT PrepCom appeared to be more “business as usual,” with the nuclear-armed parties to the treaty essentially evading their Article VI obligations or claiming they were fulfilling them in a step by step manner, while at the same time continuing to modernize their nuclear arsenals and relying upon them in their military strategies. It is clear that the nuclear-armed states are not pursing negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, as they are obligated to do under Article VI of the treaty.

You have also been advocating on the issue of climate change, a grave concern that affects not only the Pacific Islands, but has obvious global consequences. Are there linkages between nuclear disarmament and climate change? Considering that both issues climate change, as well as nuclear disarmament are political matters of tremendous significance, which one, in your opinion, has the capacity of being addressed faster by the international community?

I hit upon this somewhat in question four but clearly one cannot isolate climate change from the other most pressing issue of world security today. They go hand in hand, and must be dealt with in a coordinated and universally accepted pathway. As a country that has seen the ravages of war, suffers the lingering effects of nuclear tests, and facing the onset of a rising sea, we see all these to be threats of equal force against world peace and human life. But finger pointing and challenges of who goes first must now stop and sane and intelligent human beings must confront this insanity with firm confidence and clear peaceful intentions.

Lia Petridis Maiello, Journalist

Raising the Stakes on Conflict Prevention Stakeholders

25 May

On Thursday, an unusually large crowd of diplomats, invited guests and NGOs gathered in the Security Council to observe the veto of a resolution on Syria (S/2014/348) that had been drafted by France and endorsed by an array of other states inside and outside the Council.

The gist of the resolution was a referral to the International Criminal Court as one measure of ending impunity or at least, in the words of the Australians, to remind abusers that there is no ‘statute of limitation’ on crimes being committed in Syria.

Such reminders are important, to be sure, though it is unclear that the ICC is well suited to conduct investigations and render judgments in the midst of a protracted civil war.   The Chief Prosecutor of the ICC speaking at a briefing on Libya earlier in the month pointed out to the Council that conducting investigations with little funding while confronting massive security threats is difficult at best.  That Syria (like Libya) features massive abuses by multiple parties only complicates jurisprudence, perhaps placing the attainment of justice in this instance well beyond the reasonable capacity of the court.

The failed resolution on Syria seemed somehow consistent with a recent pattern in the Council of trying to ‘do something’ by punting the political football to DPKO (in the form of more complex and coercive mandates) or the ICC (in the form of hastily conceived, unfunded, imprecise referrals) rather than examining the limitations of its own power and process.   The Council remains among the most politicized spaces in the UN.  It is also among the most uneven spaces from the standpoint of power and influence.   The non-permanent members (with the exception of their time as president) largely populate sub-committees and make public statements.  The Russians and Chinese would have little say on many resolutions if they could not force Council members to pay attention to them through threat of the veto.   And the rest of the UN system too often sits on its proverbial hands waiting to see if the Council will take on yet more ‘thematic concerns’ for which it then presumes to act as global legislator.

The present preoccupation with veto restraint within some parts of our policy community is a diversion that belies full recognition of the limitations of the Security Council and the under-tapped resources of the broader UN system (including the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect) which the Council seems largely to ignore.    As we have written previously, effective veto restraint implies the existence of depoliticized findings of impending mass atrocity violence, a sincere and robust commitment to solve violence primarily through diplomatic means, and Council members whose motives are transparent and attached to the kinds of assessments and accountabilities that have eluded that body for most of its history.  In a system where findings are politicized, where preventive measures are under financed and too often disregarded, and where there is no way to hold the Council accountable for its own mistakes, veto restraint would simply be a gift to the P-3, one which they have not necessarily merited.  Whether or not such restraint would also be a ‘gift’ to victims has to do in part with organizational assessments of the relative efficacy of diplomatic vs. militarized solutions to complex patterns of violence.

Capacity support is the lifeblood of the UN system, and this is true for atrocity crime prevention as in other areas.   But the success of such support is only enhanced when the full complement of stakeholders is acknowledged and engaged.  Regarding RtoP, for instance, it has never been clear who the relevant stakeholders are.  Is it permanent Council members?  Other member states?   The small group of NGOs that gather around the issue here in NY?  Regional or national governmental/military alliances?   What is the role for a small office like GAPW aside from routine (and often ineffective) ‘squawking’ about systemic limitations?   What is the role of media?  Business?   Education?  Development agencies?   Local civil society organizations? Is atrocity crime prevention a responsibility of the entire, extended UN ‘family’ or is it a responsibility of a few powerful states and some random national focal points?   It has often seemed as though the RtoP/atrocity crime prevention community has been more effective in shutting off hard questions than in welcoming them, of closing the gates on offers of energy and commitment rather than finding ways to put such to work.   But our own limitations notwithstanding, the stakes remain critical for the prevention of mass atrocities. We need to get this right, by which we mean to establish reliable and fair structures that are largely prevention oriented and that encourage the broadest possible stakeholder involvement.   We remain far from that goal.

The UN Charter does, indeed, confer upon the Council the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security.    However, this does not indicate ‘sole’ responsibility nor does it imply that ‘maintenance’ is primarily a reactive matter rather than a preventive one.  Whatever the results of the parallel reform movements afoot within the UN regarding the membership and working methods of the Council, it is imperative that the current Council takes stock of itself and does more to address violence than fling accusations across the desks of political adversaries. Perhaps it could start with an examination of its own ‘franchise.’ After all, the more the Council is understood (or understands itself) as the only relevant player on atrocity violence the more unlikely it is to endorse and encourage other stakeholders.  However, such endorsements and encouragements are the key to an effective system of protection from mass violence that can both energize diverse conflict prevention capacities and help spare the international community the spectacle on Syria that we recently witnessed and which frankly was hard to watch.

Dr. Robert Zuber

 

Five Lost Weeks

9 May

Editors Note:   Our hope is to use this space for multiple pieces of commentary motivated by the largely unsuccessful end to both the 2014 Disarmament Commission and the NPT Preparatory Committee. Additional information on both the DC and NPT can be found on the Reaching Critical Will site. 

With applause emanating from most delegates to the NPT Preparatory Committee, five weeks of disarmament commitments from diplomatic missions, Secretariat officials and others was drawn to a close.  The Disarmament Commission. The NPT Review Committee.   Hundreds of government statements.  Many more hours of deliberations.   Millions of dollars in airfare, accommodations, interpreters and more.  The opportunity costs have been staggering, the opportunities themselves largely wasted.

Welcome to spring 2014, a time when some of us anticipated a slight breath of new momentum on disarmament, at least with fingers crossed, but even those modest expectations were effectively suppressed. The Marshall Islands lawsuit in the ICJ was the one glimmer of hope among the many dim flickers of disarmament possibility.

The mood inside the NPT room mirrored some familiar dynamics. On the one hand, diplomatic reverence for the NPT persists, a bit like holding on sentimentally to an automobile that once held promise but is not beginning to show signs of rust.  As Ambassador Roman-Morey wisely noted, we are dealing now with 2014 issues.  The vehicles we employed in 2010 might need a bit of upgrading now.

On the other hand, modifying agreed treaty text within a highly imbalanced and politicized security system allows powerful states to open up pathways to consolidate their own national interests at the expense of others.   And we know that once opened, those pathways are invariably exploited.

The NPT process appears to be caught in a trap of its own making.   A highly political treaty in its own right without independent mechanisms to ensure compliance, the NPT is known by its three pillars as well as its key “essentialist” notions. Foremost among these notions is the NPT’s insistence that the designation of “nuclear weapons states” is not directly tied to the actual possession of such weapons.   This creates needless wastes of energy trying to convince some current nuclear powers to adopt a treaty which, in essence, denies the existence of weapons that everyone knows they have. According to NPT logic, if France were tomorrow to rid themselves of their weapons they would remain a “nuclear weapons state,” while Pakistan, the DPRK, etc. will forever be non-nuclear weapons states regardless of how large their arsenals become. Israel would as well, of course, which makes some modicum of sense, albeit cynical, since they do not acknowledge the existence of weapons that are widely known to exist.  Apparently, there are neither clear points of entry, nor clearly marked exit signs, within the NPT.

The Middle East WMD-Free Zone, a pillar of the 2005 Review Conference, remains a large unfulfilled promise, taking on the character of ‘suggested behavior’ rather than a fundamental, treaty-related commitment.   This is not what was intended in 2005 and is not what is needed now.  After all, we have collectively solved tougher technical and political challenges over the past nine years than getting this conference up and running.

From the outside, the NPT (and its non-outcomes) looks like nothing more than standard UN disarmament politics, disconnected from the public security longings that help inspire state connectivity to the UN in the first place.

In our experience, the good will on the floor of disarmament negotiations is surprisingly sincere, but it also masks deep levels of distrust that play out in multiple policy venues beyond the reach of weapons.  It also hides a diplomatic rotating door that leaves large gaps in institutional memory that new diplomats can only attempt to fill.

Diplomats do their best but then, with few exceptions, they quickly rotate home or to new posts overseas.   For their part, many NGOs parachute in to share their preferences and then go home as well, learning little about how UN headquarters functions including the ways in which their presence is manipulated by states to articulate plausible (but not necessarily successful) outcomes.

Still five weeks of policy attention in a dangerous world should yield more than commitments to revisit commitments.    It is getting harder and harder for those of us who have pretentions to being answerable to global constituents to explain how governments seemingly hold local security needs and aspirations in such little regard.

These constituents can’t experience for themselves the uneven power dynamics and hidden deals that characterize so much of the UN’s disarmament machinery.  They can’t fathom what it takes to create consensus from 194 state positions, all mediated by often extraordinary diplomats who can’t make many more binding policy commitments than the NGOs can.   They can’t grasp why the politics of states, over and over, take blanket precedence over the security needs of communities.

Diplomats will never get this time back again.   The global community, for its part, might never fully regain the confidence that states are truly promoting the community’s best security interests. We’ll have to wait until 2015, it seems, for a full cost accounting of the trust deficits that have only widened during these five long weeks.

Dr. Robert Zuber

A Call for Stable and Peaceful Policies

4 May

On April 25, Global Action joined with other civil society organizations (WFUNA, FES, WILPF) in launching an initiative to support the work of the Office of the President of the UN General Assembly in promoting the cross-cutting theme, “Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies.”  These organizations affirm the important value of this theme as the UN seeks adoption of a new (and hopefully expanded) set of sustainable development goals.

Our event immediately followed a day and a half long Thematic Debate in the General Assembly on ‘Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies’ that sought to field comment outlining both state aspirations and responsibilities within this dynamic normative framework.

As one might anticipate, the range of lenses that diplomats sought to include in their analysis of ‘stable and peaceful societies,’ was quite broad.   This is as it should be.  The normative framework suggested by this Thematic Debate touches on all facets of the UN’s work as diplomats were quick to acknowledge.   Some, like Qatar and Israel, noted the need for more ‘honest and responsible governance.’ Cuba underscored the deep divides that must be overcome between rich and poor.  Switzerland called for dramatic improvements in accessible public space.  Japan called for more attention to the management of ‘disaster risk.’ Australia, Nicaragua and others highlighted the need for more efforts to empower women.  Ecuador called for restraints on over-consumption and the end of what it called ‘speculative economies.’  Argentina affirmed the need for more attention to ‘rule of law’ obligations.  Egypt called for more efforts to address ‘massive refugee flows.’  Kenya noted challenges to peace represented by both illicit weapons and shortages of precious water.  The US and others clarified and solidified the linkages between violence and impediments to the fulfillment of development priorities.  Indonesia called for internal UN reforms to better serve the interests of a ‘rebalanced’ economic system.

On and on it went for over a day: states sometimes being provocative but mostly pointing out diverse elements of the massive, multi-dimensional undertaking that is ‘stable and peaceful societies.’   The Thematic Debate in the GA underscored the degree to which challenges associate with all three pillars that delineate the UN’s primary responsibilities – peace and security, human rights and development –   must be addressed in tandem.  Indeed, our growing populations and shrinking access to available resources; our increasingly sophisticated, digitally-driven military tools; and a new set of often-gruesome human rights responsibilities from Damascus to Bangui are more than sufficient to keep the policy community engaged at multiple levels.    The bar is set high here. The expectations for action coming from beyond UN headquarters are considerable.   This is not a ball we can afford to drop.

We know from the NGO side that we need to do more to support states and UN secretariat officials in keeping linkages relevant to the promotion of ‘stable and peaceful societies’ fresh among diverse stakeholders.  This involves a deeper level of partnership commitment, more than simply telling diplomats what’s missing and what ‘they’ need to do about it.    Through our own related initiatives, we seek to take more responsibility for goal setting and implementation, to do more to redress imbalances and end violence than merely pointing out the limitations of others.

As the presidency of the General Assembly shifts from year to year, we can do our part to be both facilitator and ‘institutional memory’ when it comes to ‘stable and peaceful societies.’     This involves a commitment to work closely and effectively with the new GA president’s staff on another round of diplomatic engagements with this thematic issue.  But it also involves a commitment to take account of broader fields of inquiry and their stakeholders, to perceive wider relevance and open doors to different kinds of constituent participation. ‘Stable and peaceful societies’ represents both a compelling aspiration and a profound test of our policy commitment and maturity.   This is one test we need to study hard for.

Dr. Robert Zuber